Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals

A person released on bail does not enjoy an unrestricted right to travel; the condition to appear before the court whenever required is a valid restriction on the constitutional right to travel, which may be impaired upon lawful order of the court. Before an accused on bail may be permitted to leave the country, he must show (1) an urgent necessity for the travel, (2) the duration of the trip, and (3) the consent of the surety; otherwise, a court’s denial of permission is not an abuse of discretion.

After a flight by a stock broker triggered a “run” on brokerages, petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr.—then in the United States—returned and, with his co-stockholders, petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission for a management committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc. and Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The SEC granted the petition for Manotoc Securities, Inc. and requested the Commissioner of Immigration to issue a hold-departure order against petitioner; a memorandum to that effect was issued on February 4, 1980. Subsequently, a Torrens title submitted to the firm was suspected to be spurious, leading six clients to file estafa complaints. Informations were lodged before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, and petitioner was admitted to bail.

• Nature of the Case: Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr. was a principal stockholder of Trans-Insular Management, Inc. and Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. He held no officer position in the latter but acted as president of the former.
• SEC Management Committee and Hold Order: Following a “run” on brokerages, petitioner and his co-stockholders sought and obtained from the SEC the appointment of a management committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc. In connection with this, the SEC requested the Commissioner of Immigration to prevent petitioner’s departure; a hold memorandum was issued on February 4, 1980.
• Criminal Charges: A Torrens title accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be fake. Six clients filed estafa complaints against petitioner and Raul Leveriza, Jr. (the firm’s president). Six corresponding informations were filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Petitioner was admitted to bail with FGU Insurance Corporation as surety in the total amount of ₱105,000.00.
• Motions for Permission to Leave: On March 1, 1982, petitioner moved in both trial courts for permission to leave the country, stating he wished to go to the United States “relative to his business transactions and opportunities.” No specific transaction, urgency, duration, or evidence of surety consent was provided.
• Denial by Trial Courts: Judge Camilon denied the motion on March 9, 1982, finding no urgency and no matter of magnitude warranting judicial imprimatur; he barred departure until termination of the cases. Judge Pronove denied it on March 26, 1982, partly observing that allowing departure might free the surety from liability should the accused fail to return.
• Immigration Denial: Petitioner’s parallel request to the Immigration Commissioner to lift the hold order was likewise denied.
• Subsequent Developments: During the pendency of the Supreme Court petition, the criminal cases before Judge Pronove were dismissed as to petitioner on the prosecution’s motion after verification that he was not connected with the firm at the time of the offenses. The two cases before Judge Camilon remained; the informations were amended to describe petitioner as “controlling/majority stockholder” rather than president. Petitioner’s renewed motion for leave to travel pendente lite, supported by a letter from a U.S. company inviting him for investment discussions, was denied by the Court En Banc.

• Right to Travel as an Incident of Bail: Petitioner contended that because he had been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the trial courts nor the Securities and Exchange Commission could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
• Reliance on People v. Shepherd: Petitioner invoked the Court of Appeals’ ruling in People v. Shepherd, which stated that liberty under bail operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the granting state, and that there is no law expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend territorial boundaries.
• Surety’s Consent: Petitioner asserted that his surety had agreed to his travel plans, having posted cash indemnities, and therefore the surety’s liability was not a bar.

• Lack of Urgency and Necessity: The Solicitor General argued that petitioner’s motion showed no urgent or compelling reason to travel; no specific transaction was identified, no showing that the business could not be handled by another person, and no irreparable damage from non-departure was demonstrated.
• Protection of the Surety’s Undertaking: The trial courts underscored that allowing the accused to leave might discharge the surety from liability, as the surety’s obligation presupposes the principal’s continued amenability to the court’s process within Philippine territory.
• Validity of the Hold Order and Bail Condition: The trial courts’ orders were valid exercises of judicial discretion to ensure the accused’s continued appearance and the effectiveness of the bail bond.

• Right to Travel of an Accused on Bail: Whether a person facing criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail possesses an unrestricted constitutional right to travel abroad.
• Requisites for Judicial Permission to Travel: Whether an accused on bail must demonstrate urgent necessity, specify the duration of travel, and obtain the surety’s consent before a court may allow departure.

• Right to Travel of an Accused on Bail: No such unrestricted right exists. The condition in a bail bond that the accused shall appear before any court whenever required operates as a valid restriction on the constitutional right to travel. Under Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, bail is security given for the release of a person in custody, conditioned on his appearance when required. The effect of a bail bond is to transfer custody from public officials to the sureties, a custody regarded as a continuation of the original imprisonment. Because the court’s jurisdiction over the person of the accused remains unaffected, the court may prohibit the accused from leaving the Philippines; otherwise, its orders and processes would be rendered nugatory outside the jurisdiction. The constitutional guarantee that the liberty of abode and travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court (1973 Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 5) is directly engaged: an order granting bail is itself such a lawful order, as it carries the implicit condition restricting travel.
• Requisites for Judicial Permission to Travel: Permission to leave may be denied absent a showing of these prerequisites. The trial courts did not abuse their discretion because petitioner failed to (a) establish any urgent or compelling necessity for the trip, (b) indicate the duration of the proposed travel, and (c) present the consent or conforme of his surety. Without the surety’s assent, allowing the principal to leave would increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies, potentially discharging the surety. The ruling in People v. Shepherd was distinguished precisely because there the accused satisfied the court as to all three requirements. Petitioner’s mere allegation that his surety had agreed because he posted cash indemnities was insufficient; explicit conformity was required.

• Bail as a Continuing Restraint on Liberty — The execution of a bail bond transfers custody of the accused from public officials to the sureties of his own selection, and such custody is a continuation of the original imprisonment. The principal remains amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court. Consequently, the condition to appear whenever required implicitly prohibits the accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because court orders would have no binding force abroad.
• Constitutional Right to Travel Is Not Absolute — Under Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the liberty of abode and travel may be impaired upon lawful order of the court. A bail order, by conditioning the accused’s release on his availability for court appearances, constitutes such a lawful order and thus operates as a permissible restriction on the right to travel.
• Requisites for Allowing an Accused on Bail to Travel Abroad — Before a court may grant an accused on bail permission to leave the country, the accused must demonstrate: (1) the existence of an urgent and compelling necessity for the travel; (2) the specific duration of the trip; and (3) the express consent or conforme of the surety to the proposed travel. Failure to satisfy any of these requisites justifies denial of the motion.

• “The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state.”
• “… the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.” (quoting People v. Uy Tuising)
• “The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. … To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.”

• People v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935) — Followed as controlling authority for the principle that the surety’s obligation to keep the accused amenable to court orders effectively prohibits the accused from leaving the Philippine jurisdiction, because court processes have no extraterritorial force.
• People v. Shepherd, C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980 — Distinguished. The broad statement that liberty under bail operates fully both within and without the country was rejected as a fallacy. The case was not on all fours because Shepherd demonstrated urgent necessity, specified the period of travel, and secured the surety’s conforme, thereby satisfying the court that the conditions of the bail bond would still be met.

• Article IV, Section 5, 1973 Constitution — “The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or public health.” Applied to hold that a bail order is a “lawful order of the court” that can validly restrict the right to travel.
• Rule 114, Section 1, Rules of Court — Defines bail as the security required and given for the release of a person in custody of the law, conditioned on his appearance before any court when required. Served as the statutory basis for the condition that petitioners out on bail must remain available to the court, which necessarily limits their freedom of movement abroad.

Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, and Paras, JJ. (Justice Feria took no part.)