Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. Manila Trading Labor Association

An employer cannot be required to pay wages to officers of a labor union for days they voluntarily absent themselves from work to attend hearings of cases between the employer and the union, because the rule is a fair day's wage for a fair day's labor; no work, no pay, unless the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed, or suspended.

Manila Trading & Supply Co. was the employer of the workers who composed the Manila Trading Labor Association. The Court of Industrial Relations exercised broad powers in the settlement of disputes between capital and labor, and the Department of Labor could certify disputes to that court. The controversy concerned whether those powers allowed the industrial court to order an employer to pay union officers' wages for time spent attending hearings in cases between the employer and the union.

Manila Trading & Supply Co. was the employer of the workers who composed the Manila Trading Labor Association. On October 10, 1950, the association made a demand upon the company for increase of personnel, Christmas bonus, and other gratuities and privileges. The company refused the demand, and the Department of Labor, whose intervention the association had sought, failed to effect an amicable settlement. On October 25, 1950, the Head of the Department certified the dispute to the Court of Industrial Relations, where it was docketed as Case No. 521-V. On the same day, the company applied to the Court of Industrial Relations for authority to lay off 50 laborers due to "poor business," and the application was docketed as Case No. 415-V (4).

To resolve the disputes in the two cases, the Court of Industrial Relations conducted various hearings between October 26, 1950, and January 18, 1951. Of their own volition, the president and vice-president of the association attended the hearings and were absent from work; they later claimed entitlement to their wages for the days they were absent while in attendance. The Court of Industrial Relations found merit in the claim and, at their instance, ordered the company to pay them their wages corresponding to the days they were absent from work while in attendance at the hearings.

Contending that the industrial court had no authority to issue the order, the company asked the Supreme Court to annul it. The association opposed the petition and contended that the order came within the broad powers of the industrial court in the settlement of disputes between capital and labor.

• Authority of the Court of Industrial Relations: Petitioner contended that the Court of Industrial Relations had no authority to issue the order requiring the company to pay the wages of the association's president and vice-president for the days they attended the hearings, and it asked the Supreme Court to annul the order.

• Broad Powers of the Court of Industrial Relations: Respondent contended that the order came within the broad powers of the industrial court in the settlement of disputes between capital and labor.
• Initiation of the Cases and Opportunity to Defend: Respondent claimed that it was not the one that brought the cases to the Court of Industrial Relations, and argued that if a laborer dragged to court is deprived of his wages while attending court hearings, he would in effect be denied the opportunity to defend himself and protect his interests and those of his fellow workers.

• Wages During Attendance at CIR Hearings: Whether the Court of Industrial Relations may require an employer to pay the wages of officers of its employees' labor union while attending the hearing of cases between the employer and the union.

• Wages During Attendance at CIR Hearings: No. The Court of Industrial Relations may not require an employer to pay the wages of officers of its employees' labor union while attending hearings of cases between the employer and the union. The controlling rule is a fair day's wage for a fair day's labor; no work, no pay, unless the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed, or suspended. The order was set aside.

• Wages During Attendance at CIR Hearings: The question was no different from J.P. Heilbronn Co. vs. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-5121, where the Court set aside a Court of Industrial Relations order requiring a company to pay the president and secretary of a labor union their salaries for days they attended conferences and hearings before that court. In that precedent, the Court reasoned that even in a legal strike, strikers may not collect wages during days they did not work; for the same reasons, if not more, laborers who voluntarily absent themselves from work to attend the hearing of a case in which they seek to prove demands against the company, whose legality and propriety are not yet known, should lose their pay during such absence. The age-old rule governing labor and capital or management and employee is a fair day's wage for a fair day's labor; if no work is performed, there can be no wage or pay, unless the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed, or suspended. It is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employer's time. The Court noted that the laborer might seek reimbursement from the union that declared the strike or filed the case, or have his absence charged against his vacation leave. Three Justices in the cited case believed the deductions might possibly be charged as damages if the case prosecuted for the union is finally decided in its favor and against the company, but the majority made no commitment on that point. Respondent's claim that it did not bring the cases to the Court of Industrial Relations did not change the result: although the Secretary of Labor certified the dispute in Case No. 521-V, the dispute was initiated by a demand from the labor association, and while one case was filed by the employer, the other was initiated by the employees. The employer may generally be in a better position to bear the burdens of litigation, but it remains hardly fair for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employer's time. The most that could be conceded was to charge the absences against vacation leave if any, or, as suggested by three Justices in the cited case, to charge the wages failed to earn as damages if the cases were decided in favor of the association, but the majority made no commitment on the latter point. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari was granted and the order set aside.

• Fair day's wage for a fair day's labor — This rule governs the relation between labor and capital or management and employee: if no work is performed, there can be no wage or pay, unless the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed, or suspended. The Court applied it to deny wages to union officers who voluntarily absented themselves from work to attend Court of Industrial Relations hearings.
• No right to wages for attending hearings against employer — An employee who voluntarily absents himself from work to attend a conference or hearing in a case or incident between him and his employer may not collect wages from the employer for the time absent. The employee may seek reimbursement from the union that declared the strike or filed the case, or charge the absence against vacation leave; any claim for damages based on the outcome of the case was not committed to by the majority.
• CIR authority over wages for hearing attendance — The Court of Industrial Relations has no authority to order an employer to pay the wages of union officers for days they attended hearings of cases between the employer and the union, because such attendance is not work performed for the employer and the fair day's wage rule applies.

• "The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital or management and employee is that of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor."" — States the controlling rule applied to deny wages for non-work attendance at hearings.
• "If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out, dismissed or suspended." — Defines the no-work-no-pay rule and its exception.
• "it is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against his employer on the employer's time." — Expresses the rationale for denying wages during attendance at hearings.
• "The most that can be conceded in favor of the claimants herein is to have the absences occasioned by their attendance at the hearings charged against their vacation leave if they have any, or as suggested by three of the Justices who signed the decision in the case just cited, to have the wages they failed to earn charged as damages in the event the cases whose hearings they attended are decided in favor of the association. But the majority of the Justices make no commitment on this latter point." — Identifies the only concessions considered and the majority's refusal to commit on damages.

• J.P. Heilbronn Co. vs. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-5121 — The Court treated the question as no different from this earlier case and followed its ruling setting aside a Court of Industrial Relations order that required a company to pay the president and secretary of a labor union their salaries for days they attended conferences and hearings before the industrial court. The Court quoted its reasoning on the fair day's wage rule and the impropriety of litigating against the employer on the employer's time.

Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Montemayor, Jugo, and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.