Primary Holding
A trial court cannot dismiss an action on its own initiative without a motion to dismiss, except in the cases expressly allowed by the Rules of Court; a third-party claimant may vindicate a claim to attached property by an independent action, not only by intervention, and the court in that action may issue interlocutory orders to preserve the property pending adjudication.
History
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Original Filing
CFI Manila Civil Case No. 11531 — Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit against Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, and secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon a P50,000 bond.
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Related Filing
CFI Manila Civil Case No. 12263 — Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. filed a joint suit against the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc., seeking to enjoin the attachment and P45,000 damages.
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Interlocutory Rulings
Judge Pecson issued a preliminary injunction restraining the sheriff; Judge Ramos later granted Quirino's ex parte petition to dissolve it on a P21,000 bond, then set aside that order on reconsideration and set the matter for hearing.
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Lower Court Decision
Judge Ramos, after hearing and memoranda, declared Civil Case No. 12263 "unnecessary, superfluous and illegal" and dismissed it, holding that Manila Herald and Printers should intervene in Civil Case No. 11531.
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Jan 18, 1951
SC Action
Manila Herald and Printers filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction; the SC granted the petition on January 18, 1951, with costs against respondents except the respondent Judge.
Facts
Antonio Quirino filed a libel suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 11531 in the CFI of Manila, against Aproniano G. Borres, Pedro Padilla and Loreto Pastor, editor, managing editor and reporter, respectively, of the Daily Record, a daily newspaper published in Manila, asking damages aggregating P90,000. With the filing of the suit, Quirino secured a writ of preliminary attachment upon putting up a P50,000 bond, and the Sheriff of the City of Manila levied an attachment upon certain office and printing equipment found in the premises of the Daily Record. Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. then filed with the sheriff separate third-party claims, alleging that they were the owners of the property attached. The sheriff required Quirino to put up a counterbond of P41,500 to meet the claim of Manila Herald and another bond of P59,500 to meet the claim of Printers, Inc.; upon Quirino's motion under Section 13, Rule 59, the CFI reduced these amounts to P11,000 and P10,000, respectively.
Unsuccessful in their attempt to quash the attachment, Manila Herald and Printers, on October 7, 1950, commenced a joint suit against the sheriff, Quirino and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. in which they sought (1) to enjoin the defendants from proceeding with the attachment of the properties and (2) P45,000 damages. This suit was docketed as Civil Case No. 12263. Civil Case No. 11531 was being handled by Judge Sanchez, while Civil Case No. 12263 fell in the branch presided by Judge Pecson. On the same date, on an ex parte motion in Civil Case No. 12263 by Manila Herald and Printers, Judge Pecson issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing the sheriff to desist from proceeding with the attachment of the properties.
After the issuance of that preliminary injunction, Quirino filed an ex parte petition for its dissolution, and Judge Simeon Ramos, to whom Civil Case No. 12263 had in the meantime been transferred, granted the petition on a bond of P21,000. Judge Ramos soon set aside that order on a motion for reconsideration by Manila Herald and Printers and set the matter for hearing on October 14, then continued to October 16. Upon the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Ramos required the parties to submit memoranda on whether the subject matter of Civil Case No. 12263 should be ventilated in an independent action or by means of a complaint in intervention in Civil Case No. 11531.
Memoranda having been filed, Judge Ramos dismissed Civil Case No. 12263. At the time of the dismissal, neither a motion to dismiss nor an answer had been made in that case, and the matter then before the CFI was a motion seeking a provisional or collateral remedy connected with and incidental to the principal action. Manila Herald and Printers then filed the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Issues
- Authority to Dismiss: Whether Judge Ramos had authority to dismiss Civil Case No. 12263 at the stage when it was thrown out of court, without a motion to dismiss.
- Independent Action vs. Intervention: Whether Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. and Printers, Inc. should come as intervenors in the libel case instead of bringing an independent action.
- Jurisdiction over Attachment: Whether Judge Pecson or Judge Ramos had jurisdiction in Civil Case No. 12263 to quash the attachment levied in Civil Case No. 11531.
Ruling
- Authority to Dismiss: No. The CFI had no power to dismiss the case without the requisite motion under Section 1, Rule 8; dismissal on its own initiative was grave abuse of discretion if not in excess of jurisdiction.
- Independent Action vs. Intervention: Yes. Section 14, Rule 59 allows a third person to vindicate a claim to attached property by any proper action; an independent action is proper, and intervention is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory.
- Jurisdiction over Attachment: Yes. The CFI in the independent action had jurisdiction over interlocutory matters incidental to the cause, including releasing the attached property pending final adjudication, because the sheriff's seizure of a stranger's property was beyond the attachment order.
Ruling Rationale
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Authority to Dismiss: In Civil Case No. 12263, neither a motion to dismiss nor an answer had been made when the decision was handed down; the matter before the CFI was a motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction. Section 1, Rule 8 enumerates the grounds for dismissal and specifically requires a motion to that end. The memoranda filed by the parties did not supply the deficiency. Rule 30 provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed, and the inclusion of those cases excludes any other under the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. The only instance in which the CFI may dismiss on its own motion is when the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial, fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time, or fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the CFI. The Rules of Court are intended to be observed with diligence by the courts and parties, and compliance with them generally gives the CFI jurisdiction to act. Judge Ramos therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion, if not in excess of jurisdiction, in dismissing the case without any formal motion to dismiss.
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Independent Action vs. Intervention: Section 14, Rule 59 provides that nothing in it shall prevent a third person from vindicating his claim to attached property by any proper action. Section 1, Rule 2 defines an action as an ordinary suit in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong, while Section 2, Rule 2 states that a civil action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the court. The word "action" has a well-defined technical meaning, and "commencement" indicates an action that originates an entire proceeding and puts in motion the instruments of the court calling for summons, answer, etc., not an intermediary step in the proceeding. If the intention had been intervention, the Rules could have said so. Intervention is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring a new, independent suit. Under the old procedure, separate action was said to be the correct and only procedure contemplated by Act No. 190; the new Rules adopted Section 121 of Act No. 190 and added Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Procedure, now found in Section 1, Rule 13. The right to intervene is not absolute but left to the sound discretion of the CFI, making intervention less preferable to an independent action from the claimants' standpoint. There is no multiplicity of suits when the parties and issues in the independent action are different from those in the case where the attachment was levied. Thus, Manila Herald and Printers could bring an independent action.
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Jurisdiction over Attachment: The objection that one judge would interfere with another judge's actuations is superficial. If a separate action by a third party claiming ownership of attached property is appropriate, the judge trying that action may render judgment ordering the sheriff or whoever has possession of the attached property to deliver it to the plaintiff-claimant or desist from seizing it. The CFI may also make an interlocutory order, upon the filing of such bond as may be necessary, to release the property pending final adjudication of title. Jurisdiction over an action includes jurisdiction over an interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties' interests. The sheriff was holding the property by order of the CFI handling the libel case only to a limited extent: that CFI did not direct the sheriff to attach the particular property in dispute; the order was to attach the property of Borres, Padilla and Pastor, and the sheriff was not supposed to touch any other property. If he did, he acted beyond the limits of his authority and upon his personal responsibility. Property in custodia legis cannot be interfered with without permission of the proper CFI, but the rule is confined to property belonging to the defendant or in which the defendant has a proprietary interest. When the sheriff acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not apply and interference with his custody is not interference with another CFI's order of attachment. The third-party claim may be unfounded or meritorious, but title is the very issue in the action for recovery or dissolution of the attachment, and pending final decision the CFI may enter any interlocutory order calculated to preserve the property in litigation and protect the parties' rights and interests. The SC did not imply that the setting aside of the attachment should be granted; it held only that the CFI had jurisdiction to act. The granting or denial of the prayer for dissolution would be a proper subject of a new proceeding if the party adversely affected should be dissatisfied.
Doctrines
- Dismissal on the CFI's Own Initiative — Under Section 1, Rule 8 and Rule 30, an action may be dismissed only upon motion, except when the plaintiff fails to appear at the time of trial, fails to prosecute the action for an unreasonable length of time, or fails to comply with the Rules or any order of the CFI. The SC applied this rule to hold that Judge Ramos gravely abused his discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 12263 without a motion to dismiss.
- Third-Party Claimant's "Proper Action" — Section 14, Rule 59 allows a third person claiming attached property to vindicate his claim by any proper action; "action" means an ordinary suit commenced by filing a complaint, not an intervention or other intermediary step. The SC applied this to hold that Manila Herald and Printers could bring an independent action.
- Intervention as Cumulative and Suppletory — The right to intervene under Section 1, Rule 13 is not exclusive; it is cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring a new, independent suit, and it is left to the sound discretion of the CFI. The SC applied this to hold that the claimants were not required to intervene in the libel case.
- Jurisdiction over Incidental Interlocutory Matters — A CFI with jurisdiction over an action has jurisdiction over an interlocutory matter incidental to the cause and deemed necessary to preserve the subject matter of the suit or protect the parties' interests. The SC applied this to hold that the CFI in Civil Case No. 12263 had jurisdiction to act on the motion to dissolve the attachment.
- Custodia Legis Limited to the Defendant's Property — Property legally attached is in custodia legis, but the rule against interference applies only where the property belongs to the defendant or one in whom the defendant has a proprietary interest. When the sheriff seizes a stranger's property beyond the bounds of his office, interference with his custody is not interference with another CFI's order of attachment. The SC applied this to hold that the CFI in the independent action could act on the attachment.
Key Excerpts
- "The Rules of Court are devised as a matter of necessity, intended to be observed with diligence by the courts as well as by the parties for the orderly conduct of litigation and judicial business. In general, it is compliance with these rules which gives the court jurisdiction to act." — The SC used this to stress that the Rules require a motion to dismiss and that compliance with the Rules is essential to the CFI's authority to act.
- "We are the opinion that the court acted with grave abuse of discretion if not in excess of its jurisdiction in dismissing the case without any formal motion to dismiss." — This is the SC's conclusion on Judge Ramos's dismissal of Civil Case No. 12263.
- "The most liberal view that can be taken in favor of the respondents' position is that intervention as a means of protecting the third-party claimants' right is not exclusive but cumulative and suppletory to the right to bring a new, independent suit." — The SC used this to hold that the claimants could bring an independent action instead of intervening in the libel case.
- "When the sheriff acting beyond the bounds of his office seizes a stranger's property, the rule does not apply and interference with his custody is not interference with another court's order of attachment." — The SC used this to hold that the CFI in the independent action could act on the attachment without interfering with the libel court's order.
Provisions
- Section 1, Rule 8, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for dismissal and requires a motion to that end; the SC applied it to hold that Judge Ramos could not dismiss Civil Case No. 12263 on his own initiative.
- Rule 30, Rules of Court — Provides for the cases in which an action may be dismissed; the SC applied the rule with the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to hold that dismissal on other grounds without a motion was not allowed.
- Section 14, Rule 59, Rules of Court — Contains the proviso that nothing in it shall prevent a third person from vindicating his claim to attached property by any proper action; the SC applied it to hold that an independent action was proper.
- Section 1, Rule 2, Rules of Court — Defines an action as an ordinary suit in a court of justice for the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong; the SC used it to interpret "proper action" in Section 14, Rule 59.
- Section 2, Rule 2, Rules of Court — States that a civil action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the court; the SC used it to hold that "action" means a proceeding commenced by complaint, not an intervention.
- Section 1, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Allows intervention at any period of a trial, in the CFI's discretion, if the person has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; the SC applied it to hold that intervention is discretionary and not exclusive.
- Section 121, Act No. 190 — The old procedure under which separate action was said to be the correct and only procedure contemplated; the SC noted that the new Rules adopted this section and added Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
- Rule 24(a), Federal Rules of Procedure — The added provision on intervention; the SC noted that it was combined with Section 121 of Act No. 190 in Section 1, Rule 13.