Manikad vs. Tanodbayan

Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A does not vest the EPZA with exclusive power to receive and investigate complaints for penal violations inside export processing zones; the Tanodbayan and his deputies may conduct a preliminary investigation over offenses within Sandiganbayan jurisdiction. The pendency of an administrative proceeding does not bar a criminal prosecution for the same offense.

Petitioners Gavino Manikad, Roberto Bañez, and Benito Arellano were the director and members, respectively, of the EPZA Police Force in Bataan; private respondents Guillermo M. Santos, Jr. and Bernardo S. Yambao were also members of that force. Respondent Benjamin T. Vianzon was a deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor. Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A grants the Export Processing Zone Authority police authority over zones it owns or administers and the power to receive and investigate complaints for penal violations committed there, while P.D. No. 1606 defines the offenses within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.

Sometime in November 1982, Guillermo M. Santos, Jr. and Bernardo S. Yambao, both members of the EPZA Police Force in Bataan, filed a complaint with Benjamin T. Vianzon, a deputized Tanodbayan prosecutor, charging Gavino Manikad, Roberto Bañez, and Benito Arellano—the director and members, respectively, of the same police force—with smuggling, qualified theft, violations of the Anti-Graft Law, and violations of the Anti-Fencing Law. The complaint concerned offenses committed within the export processing zone.

On the date scheduled for the preliminary investigation, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss. They asserted that Vianzon had no authority to conduct the preliminary investigation, that the complaint was improperly and prematurely filed, and that there was no prima facie case against them. Private respondents seasonably opposed the motion.

On March 8, 1983, Vianzon issued an order denying the motion to dismiss. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration and/or petition for review with the Tanodbayan, but the Tanodbayan denied it in an order dated May 27, 1983. Petitioners then came to the SC on certiorari and prohibition.

• Exclusive EPZA Authority: Petitioners argued that under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A, the power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violations of penal laws committed inside zones owned and administered by the EPZA is exclusive to the EPZA, precluding the Tanodbayan or his deputies from conducting a preliminary investigation; respondent Fiscal Vianzon therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
• Prematurity: Petitioners argued that the complaint filed by private respondents was improperly and prematurely filed.
• Absence of Prima Facie Case: Petitioners argued that there was no prima facie case against them.

• Exclusivity of EPZA Investigative Power: Whether Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A vests the EPZA with exclusive power to receive and investigate complaints for violations of penal laws committed inside zones owned and administered by the Authority, thereby precluding the Tanodbayan or his deputies from conducting a preliminary investigation.
• Prematurity of Criminal Complaint: Whether the pendency of an administrative proceeding bars the filing or prosecution of a criminal complaint for the same offense, making the complaint prematurely filed.

• Exclusivity of EPZA Investigative Power: No. Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A grants the EPZA police authority and investigative/prosecutorial functions but does not make them exclusive; the Tanodbayan and his deputies may investigate offenses within Sandiganbayan jurisdiction.
• Prematurity of Criminal Complaint: No. The pendency of an administrative proceeding does not bar a criminal prosecution for the same offense; administrative and criminal proceedings are separate and distinct and may proceed independently.

• Exclusivity of EPZA Investigative Power: Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A provides that the EPZA, in the exercise of its "sole police authority" over export processing zones, shall have power to receive and investigate complaints relative to violations of penal laws committed inside zones and, when evidence warrants, to file and be deputized to prosecute criminal cases. The SC read the word "sole" as modifying only "police authority"; no similar term or synonym described the investigative and prosecutorial powers. Under the basic rule of statutory construction that a meaning not appearing nor intended in the statute's language cannot be placed therein, the SC refused to read exclusivity into those other functions. The interpretation of Sections 182 and 184 of the Election Code in Rogelio de Jesus vs. People of the Philippines could not be applied to Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A. Section 7 is also not an exception to or limitation on the Tanodbayan's authority under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 to investigate offenses within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, namely violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379, crimes by public officers under Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, and other crimes by public officers in relation to their office. The Tanodbayan prosecutor could therefore conduct the preliminary investigation.
• Prematurity of Criminal Complaint: The SC held that the pendency of an administrative proceeding does not constitute a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same offense. An administrative case is an entirely separate and distinct proceeding from a criminal action, and each may proceed independently of the other. Petitioners' claim that the complaint was premature because of the administrative proceeding therefore failed.

• Non-exclusivity of EPZA's investigative and prosecutorial powers — Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A grants the EPZA police authority and the power to receive and investigate complaints for penal violations inside zones and to be deputized to prosecute, but only its "police authority" is described as "sole"; the investigative and prosecutorial functions are not exclusive. Applied: the Tanodbayan prosecutor could conduct the preliminary investigation despite the EPZA's authority.
• Statutory construction — no meaning outside the text — A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the statute's language cannot be placed therein. Applied: the SC refused to read exclusivity into Section 7 because the text did not say so.
• Independence of administrative and criminal proceedings — An administrative case is separate and distinct from a criminal action, and each may proceed independently. Applied: the pendency of an administrative proceeding did not make the criminal complaint premature or bar prosecution.
• Tanodbayan authority over Sandiganbayan offenses — Under Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606, the Tanodbayan and his deputies may investigate violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379, crimes by public officers under Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, and other crimes by public officers in relation to their office. Applied: Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A did not limit that authority.

• "While the adjective "sole" was used in conjunction with "police authority", no similar term or synonym was employed to describe the other powers vested by Section 7 on the EPZA." — The SC uses the text of Section 7 to reject the claim that EPZA's investigative and prosecutorial powers are exclusive.
• "It is a basic rule of statutory construction that a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein." — The SC invokes this rule to refuse reading exclusivity into Section 7.
• "The pendency of an administrative proceeding does not constitute a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same offense." — The SC rejects petitioners' prematurity argument.
• "An administrative case is an entirely separate and distinct proceeding from a criminal action. Each may proceed independently of the other." — The SC explains why the administrative proceeding did not bar the criminal complaint.

• Rogelio de Jesus vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 61998, February 22, 1983 — Distinguished; its interpretation of Sections 182 and 184 of the Election Code of 1978 was not applied to Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A.
• Chang Yung Fa, Et. Al. vs. Gianzon, 97 Phil. 913 — Cited in support of the rule that a meaning not appearing in the statute's language cannot be placed therein.

• Section 7, Presidential Decree No. 1716-A — Grants the EPZA police authority over export processing zones and the power to receive and investigate complaints for penal violations committed inside zones and, when evidence warrants, to file and be deputized to prosecute criminal cases; the SC held that only the police authority is "sole" and the investigative/prosecutorial powers are not exclusive.
• Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 1606 — Defines the offenses within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction: violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379; crimes by public officers under Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and other crimes by public officers in relation to their office. The SC held Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A is not an exception to or limitation on the Tanodbayan's authority to investigate these offenses.

• Justice Abad Santos (Concurring) — Opined that Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A gives the EPZA no more than the power to organize a police department with functions similar to a municipal police department; the EPZA police can file criminal complaints and prosecute criminal cases in municipal trial courts, but cannot conduct preliminary investigations pertaining to fiscals, the Tanodbayan, and judges.
• Justice Makasiar (Concurring) — Joined Justice Abad Santos's concurrence and added that Section 6, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution prevails over Section 7 of P.D. No. 1716-A.