Mangubat vs. Sandiganbayan

The discharge of a co-accused to serve as a state witness under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, and an error in discharging an accused who lacks some of the enumerated qualifications does not constitute reversible error, as such error does not impair the competency or evidentiary quality of the discharged witness’s testimony. Even a prior conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude will not automatically disqualify a proposed state witness if the conviction is not yet final and executory, for the constitutional presumption of innocence remains until final judgment.

Multiple informations for estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents were filed before the Sandiganbayan against several accused, including herein petitioners and private respondent Delia Preagido. Preagido was an accused in six of the eight jointly tried cases. After the prosecution had presented eleven witnesses and other intended witnesses became unavailable, the prosecution moved to discharge Preagido, Alice Gadiane, and Hilmer Suson as state witnesses. Petitioners opposed Preagido’s discharge, citing a December 1979 Sandiganbayan decision convicting her of 126 counts of estafa thru falsification—a crime involving moral turpitude—and arguing that the conviction, although appealed, had become final. The Sandiganbayan nevertheless granted the motion, reasoning that the appeal remained pending and the constitutional presumption of innocence precluded disqualification. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via certiorari and prohibition, securing a temporary restraining order against Preagido’s testimony.

• Nature of the Charges: Petitioners and private respondent Delia Preagido were among the accused in eight criminal cases for estafa thru falsification of public/official/commercial documents jointly tried before the Sandiganbayan. Preagido was an accused in six of those cases.

• Motion to Discharge: During the joint trial, after the prosecution had presented eleven witnesses and other intended witnesses were no longer available, the prosecution filed a motion to discharge Preagido, Alice Gadiane, and Hilmer Suson as state witnesses, alleging that all three satisfied the requisites under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court.

• Preagido’s Prior Conviction: On December 6, 1979, the Sandiganbayan had convicted Preagido, together with others, of 126 counts of estafa thru falsification of public/commercial documents, sentencing her to an indeterminate penalty ranging from 8 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count.

• Status of the Prior Appeal: Preagido and four co-accused appealed the 1979 conviction to the Supreme Court via petition for review (G.R. Nos. 52528-52654). On August 27, 1980, the Supreme Court denied the petition for raising factual questions and for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration was denied with finality on October 6, 1980. Thus, Preagido’s prior conviction had become final and executory before the motion to discharge was filed. The Sandiganbayan, however, granted the discharge on the erroneous premise that the appeal was still pending and that the presumption of innocence remained.

• Petitioners’ Opposition: Petitioners argued that the final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude—estafa thru falsification—disqualified Preagido from being a state witness under the seventh requisite of Rule 119, Section 9.

• Sandiganbayan’s Resolutions: The Sandiganbayan’s March 5, 1982 resolution granted the discharge, stating: “with respect to the fact that Delia Preagido has been previously convicted … suffice it to state that these cases are still on appeal with the Supreme Court. Preagido has still in her favor the constitutional presumption of innocence. Until a promulgation of final conviction is made, this constitutional mandate prevails.” It deferred to the prosecution’s judgment of the necessity of Preagido’s testimony. The motion for reconsideration was denied.

• Supreme Court Restraint: Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, and on June 8, 1982, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the Sandiganbayan from receiving Preagido’s testimony.

• Disqualification by Final Conviction: Petitioners maintained that Delia Preagido was disqualified under the seventh requisite of Section 9, Rule 119 because she had been previously convicted of estafa thru falsification—an offense involving moral turpitude. They stressed that the conviction had become final after the Supreme Court denied her appeal in G.R. Nos. 52528-52654.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners argued that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering Preagido’s discharge despite the clear and final conviction, and that the trial court’s reliance on a supposedly pending appeal was a clear factual error that vitiated the discharge.

• Presumption of Innocence: Respondent People countered that the prior conviction was still on appeal at the time the motion to discharge was filed, and therefore Preagido retained the constitutional presumption of innocence. No final judgment of conviction existed to trigger the disqualification.

• Sound Discretion of the Trial Court: Respondents contended that the discharge of a co-defendant is a matter entrusted to the trial court’s sound discretion. After hearing eleven witnesses, the Sandiganbayan was fully able to determine the absolute necessity of Preagido’s testimony. Even if some qualifications were arguably absent, the settled rule is that an error in discharging an accused is not reversible and does not destroy the competency of the witness.

• Sufficiency of Corroboration: Respondents pointed out that the records already contained ample evidence—testimonies and documents—supporting the trial court’s findings and the prosecution’s representation that Preagido’s testimony could be substantially corroborated.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in discharging Delia Preagido as a state witness notwithstanding her prior final conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No grave abuse of discretion attended the discharge. The resolution was sustained on the ground that the discharge of an accused under Section 9, Rule 119 is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. The Supreme Court invoked the long-settled principle that even if the discharged witness lacks some of the qualifications enumerated in the rule, the testimony will not for that reason alone be discarded or disregarded. An error in discharging a co-defendant is held not to be a reversible one, because the error does not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged defendant (citing People v. Jamero, 24 SCRA 206, 247, and People v. Bautista, 106 Phil. 39). In this case, the Sandiganbayan had already heard eleven prosecution witnesses and was thus in a position to determine absolute necessity. The Court deferred to that assessment, holding that sufficient proof in the records supported the discharge. The Temporary restraining order was accordingly lifted and the petition dismissed.

• Discharge of an Accused as a State Witness is within the Trial Court’s Sound Discretion — Under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, the decision to discharge a co-defendant to be used as a state witness rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The court’s determination, reached after hearing evidence, will not be overturned on appeal unless a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion is made.

• Error in Discharge is Not a Reversible Error; Testimony Remains Competent — Even where the discharged accused lacks some of the qualifications required by the rule, the defect does not constitute reversible error. The principle rests on the policy that the mistake of the trial court in discharging an accused does not affect the competency and the evidentiary quality of the testimony given by the discharged defendant. The testimony may still be received and weighed, and the error alone will not nullify the proceedings or the resulting judgment.

• Presumption of Innocence and Finality of Conviction — For purposes of the disqualification that the proposed state witness “has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude,” the conviction must be final and executory. While an appeal is pending, the constitutional presumption of innocence remains operative, and the proposed witness cannot be deemed to have been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude within the meaning of the rule.

• “[T]his Court has time and again declared that even if the discharged witness should lack some of the qualifications enumerated by Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, his testimony will not, for that reason alone, be discarded or disregarded. In the discharge of a co-defendant, the court may reasonably be expected to err, but such error in discharging an accused has been held not to be a reversible one. This is upon the principle that such error of the court does not affect the competency and the quality of the testimony of the discharged defendant.” — This encapsulates the ratio decidendi that a flaw in the discharge does not destroy the admissibility or weight of the state witness’s evidence.

• “At any rate, the discharge of a co-defendant under Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is a matter that lies within the sound discretion of the trial court.” — Affirms the standard of review that severely constrains appellate interference with the trial court’s decision to discharge an accused.

• People v. Jamero, 24 SCRA 206 (1968) — Followed as controlling doctrine that an error in discharging an accused to be a state witness is not a reversible error because the mistake does not affect the competency or the quality of the testimony.

• People v. Bautista, 106 Phil. 39 (1959) — Cited as foundational authority for the rule that the discharge of a co-defendant under Rule 119, Section 9 is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.

• Section 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court — Sets forth the seven requisites for the discharge of an accused to be a state witness: (1) two or more persons are charged with the offense; (2) the motion is filed before the defense has offered its evidence; (3) absolute necessity for the testimony of the defendant whose discharge is requested; (4) no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense, except the testimony of said defendant; (5) the testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (6) said defendant does not appear to be the most guilty; and (7) said defendant has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. The Court construed this provision as directory rather than jurisdictional in character, permitting the discharge to stand despite a possible defect in the seventh requisite, so long as the trial court exercised its discretion reasonably.

Fernando, C.J., Abad Santos, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concurred. Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Alampay, JJ., concurred in the result. Teehankee, Aquino, Escolin, and Cuevas, JJ., took no part. Concepcion, Jr., J., was on leave.

• Justice Makasiar — Dissented on the ground that Preagido’s final conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude—the very same crime of estafa thru falsification with which she was charged—militated decisively against her discharge. The dissent emphasized that the seventh requisite of Rule 119, Section 9 barred the discharge of an accused who had been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and that the finality of Preagido’s conviction left no room for the application of the presumption of innocence.