Mangila vs. Lantin

The Court of First Instance and the Municipal Court have concurrent, not exclusive, jurisdiction over criminal cases where the penalty provided by law is imprisonment exceeding six months but not exceeding three years, or a fine exceeding P200 but not exceeding P3,000, or both. The enlargement of municipal court jurisdiction under Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 did not repeal or withdraw the original jurisdiction conferred on Courts of First Instance under Section 44(f) of the same Act.

Petitioner Consolacion P. Mangila was charged with serious slander before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The case involved the application of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts 2613 and 3828, which governed the jurisdiction of courts at the time. The dispute required harmonizing two provisions of the same statute — Section 44(f), conferring original jurisdiction on Courts of First Instance over offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding six months or a fine exceeding P200, and Section 87(c), granting municipal courts jurisdiction over offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding three years or a fine not exceeding P3,000.

Petitioner Consolacion P. Mangila was charged with serious slander in Criminal Case 2923 before the Court of First Instance of Tarlac. The case originated from a verified criminal complaint filed on October 8, 1963 with the Fiscal's Office by spouses Naciensena Santos de Dazo and Mariano T. Dazo. Two days later, on October 10, 1963, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Fernando M. Bartolome, before whom the complaint was subscribed and sworn to, lodged an information for serious slander against Mangila. The fiscal later registered an amended information on February 15, 1965, attaching the complaint of the offended spouses.

The defamatory words claimed to have been uttered by Mangila in Concepcion, Tarlac, on or about September 30, 1963, were: "BAYU CO MIYASAWA MAGLANDI CA PANG CANG DAZO, PUTANG MALANDING PACARAT," which translates to English as: "BEFORE YOU WERE MARRIED YOU HAD ILLICIT RELATIONS WITH DAZO. PROSTITUTE." These words were allegedly directed against the spouses Dazo.

On February 12, 1965, petitioner moved to quash the information on two grounds: (1) that the crime of serious slander falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Concepcion, Tarlac; and (2) that the defamation charged consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio, yet the criminal action was not brought at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended parties. Respondent judge initially dismissed the information on February 24, 1965 for lack of jurisdiction, but on motion for reconsideration by the prosecuting attorney, reconsidered the dismissal on May 10, 1965, denied the motion to quash, and set a date for arraignment. Petitioner's subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on June 17, 1965, prompting her to come to the Supreme Court on certiorari and prohibition.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction of Municipal Court: Petitioner argued that the case of grave oral defamation falls within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Court of Concepcion, Tarlac, citing Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts 2613 and 3828.

• Improper Initiation of Prosecution: Petitioner argued that the defamation charged consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio, and yet the criminal action was not brought at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended parties, as required by the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Concurrent Jurisdiction: The prosecuting attorney moved for reconsideration of the dismissal, successfully arguing that the Court of First Instance retained jurisdiction over the case notwithstanding the enlarged jurisdiction of municipal courts under Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

• Jurisdiction over Serious Slander: Whether the Court of First Instance of Tarlac had jurisdiction to hear and determine the criminal case for serious slander, or whether jurisdiction belonged exclusively to the Municipal Court of Concepcion, Tarlac.

• Requirement of Complaint by Offended Party: Whether the criminal prosecution for serious slander was properly initiated without a complaint expressly filed by the offended parties, given that the defamation consisted in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio.

• Jurisdiction over Serious Slander: Yes. The Court of First Instance of Tarlac had jurisdiction over the case. Sections 44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 confer concurrent jurisdiction over criminal cases where the penalty is imprisonment exceeding six months but not exceeding three years, or a fine exceeding P200 but not exceeding P3,000, or both.

• Requirement of Complaint by Offended Party: Yes, the prosecution was properly initiated. The imputation of prostitution and premarital illicit relations does not fall within the crimes enumerated in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code that cannot be prosecuted de officio, and therefore does not require a complaint expressly filed by the offended party.

• Jurisdiction over Serious Slander: The Court reasoned that the penalty for serious oral defamation ranges from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period — from four months and one day to two years and four months — which falls within the jurisdictional range prescribed in both Section 44(f) and Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948. Citing Esperat vs. Avila, the Court noted that the enlargement of municipal court jurisdiction under Section 87(c) cannot be taken as a repeal or withdrawal of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of First Instance under Section 44(f), since implied repeal is disfavored and statutes must be construed to harmonize all apparent conflicts. The two provisions can stand together and be given a conjoint, not discordant, effect. There is, therefore, parity of jurisdiction between the municipal court and the Court of First Instance over criminal cases where the penalty is more than six months' imprisonment or a fine of more than P200, but not exceeding three years' imprisonment or a fine of P3,000, or both.

• Requirement of Complaint by Offended Party: The Court examined the last paragraph of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 1289, which provides that no criminal action for defamation consisting in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party. The crimes which cannot be prosecuted de officio are specifically enumerated in Title XI, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code: adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness. The slanderous imputation in this case — that the Dazos had illicit relations before marriage and that the wife was a prostitute — does not fall within these enumerated crimes. While prostitution is a crime, it is a crime against public morals and can be prosecuted de officio. The alleged premarital relations could be a vice or defect, but Article 360 does not apply because the law only requires a complaint expressly signed by the offended party where the crime imputed cannot be prosecuted de officio.

• Concurrent Jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance and Municipal Courts — Under Sections 44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, there is parity of jurisdiction between the Court of First Instance and municipal courts over criminal cases — except violations of election laws — where the penalty imposable is more than six months' imprisonment or a fine of more than P200, but not exceeding three years' imprisonment or a fine of P3,000, or both. The enlargement of municipal court jurisdiction does not repeal or withdraw the jurisdiction conferred on the Court of First Instance, as implied repeal is disfavored and statutes must be construed to harmonize all apparent conflicts.

• Statutory Construction — Harmonization of Conflicting Provisions — A statute must be construed as a whole, with constituent parts considered together, to ascertain legislative intent from the whole act, and to make every part effective, harmonious, and sensible. The Court applied this principle to reconcile Sections 44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, finding no inconsistency between them.

• Article 360, Revised Penal Code — Crimes Requiring Complaint of Offended Party — The requirement that a criminal action for defamation be brought at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party applies only where the defamation consists in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio. The crimes which cannot be prosecuted de officio are specifically enumerated in Title XI, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code: adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness. Imputations of prostitution or premarital illicit relations do not fall within this enumeration.

• "The fact that the jurisdiction of the municipal or city courts was enlarged in virtue of the amendment of section 87(c), cannot be taken as a repeal or withdrawal of the jurisdiction conferred on the court of first instance. Not only is implied repeal disfavored by the law, but also, it is a cardinal principle that a statute must be so construed as to harmonize all apparent conflicts, and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible." — This passage, quoted from Esperat vs. Avila, states the controlling principle for reconciling Sections 44(f) and 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and establishes the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction.

• "There is, indeed, parity of jurisdiction in the municipal court and in the Court of First Instance over criminal cases — except violations of election laws — in which the penalty imposable is more than six months' imprisonment or a fine of more than P200, but not exceeding three years' imprisonment, or a fine of P3,000, or both such fine and imprisonment." — This is the Court's formulation of the concurrent jurisdiction rule applied to the facts of the case.

• "The crimes which cannot be prosecuted de officio are with specificity enumerated in Title XI, Book Two, of the Revised Penal Code, thus — adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness. The slanderous imputation here certainly is not one of those just recited." — This passage defines the scope of Article 360's requirement of a complaint by the offended party and explains why the imputation of prostitution does not trigger that requirement.

• Esperat vs. Avila, 20 SCRA 597 (1967) — Controlling precedent cited for the proposition that the enlargement of municipal court jurisdiction under Section 87(c) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 does not repeal or withdraw the jurisdiction conferred on Courts of First Instance under Section 44(f), and that the two provisions should be harmonized.

• Le Hua vs. Reyes, 23 SCRA 53 (1968) — Cited as among the cases reaffirming the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction between Courts of First Instance and municipal courts.

• Andico vs. Roan, 23 SCRA 93 (1968) — Cited as among the cases reaffirming the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction.

• People vs. Doriquez, 24 SCRA 163 (1968) — Cited as among the cases reaffirming the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction.

• Republic vs. Reyes, 17 SCRA 170 (1966) — Cited for the principle of statutory construction that a statute must be construed as a whole, with every part made effective, harmonious, and sensible.

• Section 44(f), Judiciary Act of 1948 — Confers original jurisdiction on Courts of First Instance over all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos. The Court applied this provision to hold that the Court of First Instance retained jurisdiction over the serious slander case.

• Section 87(c), Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended by Republic Acts 2613 and 3828 — Confers original jurisdiction on municipal judges and judges of city courts over all offenses, except violations of election laws, in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than three years, or a fine of not more than three thousand pesos, or both. The Court harmonized this provision with Section 44(f) to establish concurrent jurisdiction.

• Article 358, Revised Penal Code — Defines the penalty for serious oral defamation, ranging from arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period (four months and one day to two years and four months), which the Court used to determine the applicable jurisdictional range.

• Article 360, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 1289 — Provides that no criminal action for defamation consisting in the imputation of a crime which cannot be prosecuted de officio shall be brought except at the instance of and upon complaint expressly filed by the offended party. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the imputed crimes (prostitution and premarital illicit relations) are not among those that cannot be prosecuted de officio.

• Article 344, Revised Penal Code — Enumerates the crimes which cannot be prosecuted de officio: adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness. The Court used this enumeration to determine that the slanderous imputation in this case did not require a complaint by the offended party.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concurred. Dizon, J., took no part.