Mandagan vs. Jose M. Valero Corporation

A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and cannot be reviewed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 unless the prosecution was denied due process or the trial was a sham; an error in the appreciation of evidence, even if potentially erroneous, is an error of judgment correctible by appeal — not by certiorari — and does not overcome the bar of double jeopardy.

Jose M. Valero Corporation (JMV) accommodated petitioner Mandagan by permitting her to use its corporate name and account for a car loan intended for her personal use. JMV entered a lease‑to‑own agreement with BPI Leasing Corporation for a 2001 Kia Rio sedan and gave possession and use of the vehicle to Mandagan. In return, Mandagan issued 34 postdated checks payable to JMV covering monthly amortizations. Ownership of the vehicle would transfer to Mandagan only upon full payment.

• The Accommodation and Check Issuance: JMV allowed Mandagan to use its corporate name and account for a car loan. On July 28, 2001, JMV, through its executive officer, entered a lease-to-own arrangement with BPI Leasing Corporation over a 2001 Kia Rio sedan. JMV paid the downpayment, guarantee deposit, initial rental, and notarial fee. The vehicle was turned over to Mandagan, who issued 34 postdated Equitable‑PCI Bank checks for ₱12,796.00 each, payable to JMV. The parties agreed that ownership would transfer to Mandagan only after full payment.
• Dishonor and Demands: Fourteen checks were honored. Eleven checks were subsequently dishonored for “drawn against insufficient funds” or “account closed.” JMV’s Treasury Head informed Mandagan of each dishonor and demanded payment. JMV’s General Account Supervisor likewise communicated with Mandagan, who requested photocopies of the dishonored checks and promised to settle. On June 20, 2003, JMV’s counsel sent a demand letter requiring Mandagan to pay the value of the dishonored checks or return the vehicle plus depreciation costs, within five days. The demand went unheeded, despite Mandagan’s counsel later sending a reply letter dated June 27, 2003 acknowledging the demand. (The reply letter was never formally offered in evidence.)
• Criminal Charges: After preliminary investigation, eight Informations for violation of B.P. 22 were filed before the MeTC, covering eight of the dishonored checks.

• No Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner Mandagan argued that the RTC judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion; the acquittal was based on a legitimate assessment that the prosecution failed to prove receipt of a written notice of dishonor, an essential element of the offense. An error of judgment in the appreciation of evidence is not a proper ground for certiorari.
• Finality of Acquittal and Double Jeopardy: Petitioner maintained that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and unappealable. The rule against double jeopardy prohibits a review of the acquittal via certiorari absent any allegation or proof that the prosecution was denied due process or that the trial was a sham, neither of which was present.

• Grave Abuse in Disregarding Admissions: Respondent JMV Corporation contended that the RTC capriciously disregarded the defense’s admissions made during the preliminary conference and in the counter‑affidavit, as well as the acknowledgment of receipt of the demand letter shown by the reply letter of Mandagan’s counsel. Such arbitrary disregard of evidence amounted to grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
• Receipt of Notice Established: Respondent argued that the prosecution sufficiently proved Mandagan’s receipt of the notice of dishonor: the pre‑trial order recorded the defense’s admission of the genuineness and due execution of the demand letter, the counter‑affidavit acknowledged communication about the dishonor and the demand letter, and Mandagan’s counsel sent a reply letter dated June 27, 2003 responding to the demand letter, all of which constituted actual receipt.

• Certiorari Review of Acquittal: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in granting the petition for certiorari and annulling the RTC’s judgment of acquittal based solely on an alleged misappreciation of evidence, in the absence of any showing that the prosecution was denied due process or the trial was a sham.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the RTC’s refusal to treat the admissions in the preliminary conference, the counter‑affidavit, and the purported reply letter of counsel as proof of receipt of a notice of dishonor constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

• Certiorari Review of Acquittal: The CA committed reversible error. A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and may be reviewed only through certiorari under Rule 65 upon a clear demonstration that the prosecution was denied due process or that the trial was a sham. JMV’s petition contained no allegation or proof of such violations. The RTC’s conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove receipt of the notice of dishonor, even if erroneous, constituted at most an error of judgment — not an error of jurisdiction. Re‑examination of evidence through certiorari without a finding of mistrial violates the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No grave abuse of discretion was committed by the RTC. The admissions made during the preliminary conference were not binding because they were not reduced to writing signed by the accused and her counsel, nor was there any admission in the pre‑trial order that Mandagan actually received the demand letter. The counter‑affidavit’s mention of a demand letter was ambiguous as to whether receipt occurred before the filing of the complaint. Crucially, the CA relied on a Reply‑Letter dated June 27, 2003 that was never formally offered in evidence; a court cannot consider evidence not formally offered, and such a document has no evidentiary value. The alleged phone admissions were uncorroborated and insufficient. The RTC thus did not act capriciously — its acquittal rested on a permissible evaluation of the evidence, and the CA had no basis to annul it for grave abuse of discretion.

• Finality of Acquittal and Double Jeopardy — A judgment of acquittal in a criminal case is immediately final and unappealable. The rule flows from the constitutional right against double jeopardy. Once rendered, it may no longer be recalled or corrected regardless of any claim of error, except through the extraordinary remedy of certiorari when the prosecution was denied due process or the trial was a sham. (See People v. Tria‑Tirona; People v. Alejandro.)
• Limited Scope of Certiorari in Reviewing Acquittals — For an acquittal to be vitiated by grave abuse of discretion, the prosecution must show that its right to due process was violated or that the trial was a sham. The burden lies on the petitioner to establish that the court blatantly abused its authority to the point of depriving itself of the power to dispense justice. Mere errors of judgment — including misapplication of law or misappreciation of evidence — do not constitute grave abuse of discretion and cannot be corrected via certiorari. A review of the records and re‑evaluation of evidence would circumvent the rule against double jeopardy. (People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 198119, September 27, 2017.)
• Proof of Second Element of B.P. 22 — Written Notice of Dishonor — The prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds under Section 2 of B.P. 22 arises only upon proof that the issuer received a written notice of dishonor. Without proof of receipt, the five‑day grace period for payment or arrangement cannot be computed, and the essential element of knowledge remains unproven. The notice must be in writing; oral notice is insufficient, and the absence of a written notice is fatal to the prosecution. (Resterio v. People.)
• Doctrine of Formal Offer of Evidence — Courts may consider only evidence that has been formally offered. A document merely marked for identification is not evidence; it must be formally offered to afford the opposing party an opportunity to object. A document not formally offered has no evidentiary value. (Candido v. Court of Appeals; Concepcion v. Court of Appeals.)

• “In criminal cases, no rule is more settled than that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and unappealable. Such rule proceeds from the accused’s constitutionally‑enshrined right against prosecution if the same would place him under double jeopardy.”
• “x x x [F]or an acquittal to be considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion, there must be a showing that the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. … The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.”
• “Even if the court a quo committed an error in its review of the evidence or application of the law, these are merely errors of judgment. We reiterate that the extraordinary writ of certiorari may only correct errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”
• “A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensue. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.”
• “It is settled that courts will only consider as evidence that which has been formally offered. … A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for identification; it must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross‑examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it.”

• People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 198119, September 27, 2017 — Distinguished the scope of certiorari review of acquittals; reiterated that an error of judgment is not correctible via certiorari, and that re‑examination of evidence would violate double jeopardy.
• People v. Court of Appeals, 691 Phil. 783 (2012) — Affirmed that an acquittal may be reviewed by certiorari only when the prosecution’s due process right was violated or the trial was a sham, with the burden on the petitioner to show blatant abuse.
• Candido v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 95 (1996) — Applied the rule that evidence not formally offered cannot be considered by the court; the reply‑letter in this case, never formally offered, was stripped of evidentiary value.
• Resterio v. People, 695 Phil. 693 (2012) — Enumerated the elements of B.P. 22 and emphasized that written notice of dishonor is indispensable to trigger the presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds.

• Section 2, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Provides that the making, drawing, and issuance of a check that is dishonored for insufficient funds within 90 days from the date of the check constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge of such insufficiency, but such presumption arises only upon proof that the drawer received notice of dishonor and failed to pay or make arrangements within five banking days. The Court held that without proof of Mandagan’s receipt of the written notice, the presumption never attached.
• Section 3, Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 — Implicitly required that the notice of dishonor be in writing. The Court underscored that oral notice is insufficient; the prosecution’s failure to present a written notice received by Mandagan before the filing of the complaint was fatal.
• Rule 65, Rules of Court — The special civil action for certiorari is limited to correcting errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Court refused to allow its use to re‑examine the RTC’s appreciation of evidence.
• Article III, Section 21, 1987 Constitution (Right against Double Jeopardy) — Served as the constitutional foundation for the rule that an acquittal is immediately final and unassailable, except when the prosecution’s due process rights are violated or the trial is a sham.

Carpio (Chairperson), Perlas‑Bernabe, J. Reyes, Jr., and Lazaro‑Javier, JJ., concurred.