Manarpaac vs. Cabanatan

An action for reconveyance, not a petition to set aside a decree, is the proper remedy of a landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name after the one-year period from the date of the decree has lapsed. The decree is respected as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, but the landowner may bring an ordinary action in the ordinary courts for conveyance, or for damages if the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value.

The plaintiffs, 24 individuals surnamed Manarpaac, claimed ownership of two parcels of land in Barrio 15, Batac, Ilocos Norte, which they allegedly possessed since time immemorial. Defendant Rosalino Cabanatan filed an application for a free patent over a parcel of agricultural public land in the same municipality. The dispute implicates the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496), particularly the one-year period for review of decrees of registration under Section 38 of Act 496.

The plaintiffs, 24 individuals surnamed Manarpaac, filed an action on December 7, 1960, as amended on December 22, 1960, against Rosalino Cabanatan, the Director of Lands, and the Register of Deeds of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. The complaint alleged that the plaintiffs had been, since time immemorial, in actual possession as owners of two parcels of land — the first with an area of 8,742 square meters assessed at P160.00 under tax declaration No. 034206 in the name of Rogaciano Manarpaac, and the second with an area of 12,211 square meters assessed at P390.00 under tax declaration No. 030876 — both situated at Barrio 15, Batac, Ilocos Norte. The plaintiffs alleged that their possession had been public, uninterrupted, and in the concept of owner, and that they had their houses built on the land.

In 1956, defendant Cabanatan filed an application for a free patent over a parcel of agricultural public land situated at Barrio Suyo, Batac, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 27,788 square meters. According to the plaintiffs, Cabanatan, "taking advantage of the ignorance and lack of education of the plaintiffs, wilfully, fraudulently, maliciously, and surreptitiously without previous notice to the plaintiffs whatsoever," included the plaintiffs' parcels in his application for free patent. On November 7, 1959, a free patent was issued in the name of Cabanatan by the Director of Lands, and on December 3, 1959, certificate of title No. V-105031 was issued in his name by the register of deeds. The plaintiffs prayed that the free patent and certificate of title be declared null and void and cancelled, or alternatively, that Cabanatan be ordered to reconvey the lands unlawfully and fraudulently included in the title, plus attorney's fees of P1,000.00.

Cabanatan denied the material allegations and raised as special defenses: (a) that the issuance of the free patent and certificate of title was regular and after compliance with the requirements of law; (b) that the plaintiffs never protested with the Director of Lands, did not appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands, and failed to exhaust administrative remedies, making the decision final; and (c) that the amended complaint changed the cause of action from nullity of title to reconveyance, which was legally impermissible. The Director of Lands admitted that one year from the issuance of the patent had not yet elapsed when the complaint was filed, and alleged that the plaintiffs never filed any protest with the Bureau of Lands. The Register of Deeds alleged that he merely acted in compliance with the law in issuing the certificate of title.

On September 22, 1962, Cabanatan filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action had prescribed and the court lacked jurisdiction, citing rulings that the one-year period under Section 38 of Act 496 should be counted from the issuance of the patent. The plaintiffs opposed the motion. On September 23, 1963, the court dismissed the complaint, holding that since the free patent was issued on November 3, 1959, and the first complaint was filed on December 7, 1960, the action for review of the decree was filed more than one year after the issuance of the patent. The plaintiffs appealed directly to the Supreme Court.

• Sufficiency of Allegations: Plaintiffs argued that their complaint sufficiently alleged ownership, as possession since time immemorial carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
• Proper Remedy: Plaintiffs maintained that the amended complaint was an action for reconveyance, which is the proper remedy after the one-year period for setting aside a decree has lapsed, and that the trial court erred in dismissing the action on prescription grounds.

• Prescription: Defendant Cabanatan argued that the action had prescribed because the one-year period under Section 38 of Act 496 should be counted from the issuance of the patent, and the complaint was filed more than one year after the patent was issued on November 3, 1959.
• Change of Cause of Action: Cabanatan argued that the amended complaint changed the cause of action from nullity of title to reconveyance, which was legally impermissible, and that the amended complaint should have been dismissed.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Cabanatan argued that the plaintiffs never protested with the Director of Lands, did not appeal from the decision of the Director of Lands, and failed to exhaust administrative remedies, making the decision final.
• Regularity of Issuance: The Director of Lands argued that the issuance of the free patent was regular and after compliance with the requirements of law, and that the plaintiffs never filed any protest with the Bureau of Lands.

• Prescription of Action: Whether the action for reconveyance was barred by prescription, having been filed more than one year after the issuance of the free patent.
• Sufficiency of Cause of Action: Whether the complaint stated a sufficient cause of action for recovery of possession of the land based on the allegations of possession since time immemorial.

• Prescription of Action: No. The action was not barred by prescription because the amended complaint was an action for reconveyance, not a petition to set aside the decree. After one year from the date of the decree, the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action for conveyance, respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review.
• Sufficiency of Cause of Action: Yes. The complaint stated a sufficient cause of action for recovery of possession of the land. The allegations of possession since time immemorial, tax declarations in the names of two of the plaintiffs, and houses built on the land were sufficient averments of ownership.

• Prescription of Action: The Court reasoned that the one-year period under Section 38 of Act 496 applies to actions to set aside a decree of registration. However, the amended complaint was for reconveyance, which is a different remedy. The Court cited the settled rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary courts for conveyance, or for damages if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value. The Court noted that defendant Cabanatan himself admitted in his answer that the amended complaint was an action for reconveyance, which admission is deemed admitted on a motion to dismiss.

• Sufficiency of Cause of Action: The Court held that the allegations in the complaint — that the plaintiffs have been since time immemorial in possession as owners of the disputed land, have declared the land for tax purposes in the names of two of them, and have built their houses on the land — were sufficient averments of ownership. The Court cited the principle that possession since time immemorial carries the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain, or that it had been private property even before the Spanish conquest. Whether this presumption should hold as a fact is a question appropriately determinable only after the parties have adduced, or at least are given the opportunity to adduce, their respective evidence. The Court also cited the ruling in Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands that a person in actual and physical possession of agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively, and publicly since July 26, 1894, has a right to a certificate of title, and that the land had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, beyond the control of the Director of Lands.

• Presumption of private ownership from immemorial possession — All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule is any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the plaintiffs' allegations of possession since time immemorial were sufficient to state a cause of action, and that whether the presumption should hold as a fact is a question determinable only after the parties are given the opportunity to adduce their evidence.

• Reconveyance as remedy after one-year period — The remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary courts for conveyance, or if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the amended complaint for reconveyance was the proper remedy and was not barred by prescription.

• Presumption juris et de jure under Section 45(b) of Act No. 2874 — All the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are presumed complied with when a person has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively, and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title. The Court cited this doctrine from Susi vs. Razon in support of the plaintiffs' theory that their possession since time immemorial gave them a right to the land beyond the control of the Director of Lands.

• "All lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in interest since time immemorial. FOR SUCH POSSESSION WOULD JUSTIFY THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LAND HAVE NEVER BEEN PART OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN OR THAT IT HAD BEEN A PRIVATE PROPERTY EVEN BEFORE THE SPANISH CONQUEST." — This passage articulates the presumption of private ownership from immemorial possession, which the Court applied in holding that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to state a cause of action.

• "settled is the rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, not to set aside the decree, but respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of justice for conveyance or, if the property has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages." — This passage states the controlling rule on reconveyance as the proper remedy after the one-year period for setting aside a decree has lapsed, which is the ratio decidendi of the case.

• "If, as above stated, that land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property, there is lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the possession thereof and hold it." — This passage, quoted from Susi vs. Razon, supports the principle that a person who has acquired a grant by operation of law through immemorial possession may bring an action to recover possession.

• Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890 — Cited for the presumption that possession since time immemorial justifies the conclusion that the land had never been part of the public domain or had been private property even before the Spanish conquest.
• Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 — Cited in Oh Cho for the same presumption of private ownership from immemorial possession.
• Susi vs. Razon and Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 414 — Re-affirmed in Mesin vs. Pineda, L-14722, May 25, 1960; cited as controlling precedent sustaining the validity of the plaintiffs' theory that possession since time immemorial gives a right to a grant by operation of law, making the land private property beyond the control of the Director of Lands.
• Casilan vs. Espartero, 95 Phil. 799 — Cited for the settled rule that the remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is, after one year from the date of the decree, an ordinary action for conveyance or for damages.

• Section 38, Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act) — The provision governing the one-year period for review of decrees of registration. The Court held that this period applies to actions to set aside the decree, but not to actions for reconveyance, which may be brought after the one-year period has lapsed.
• Section 45(b), Act No. 2874 (Public Land Act) — The provision establishing the presumption juris et de jure that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with when a person has been in actual and physical possession of agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively, and publicly since July 26, 1894. The Court cited this provision from Susi vs. Razon in support of the plaintiffs' theory.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concurred.