Manalo vs. Robles Transportation Company, Inc.

An employer subsidiarily liable under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code is bound by the judgment of conviction rendered against its employee in a criminal case, provided there is no collusion between the accused and the offended party, and the employee's insolvency may be proved by the sheriff's return on unsatisfied writs of execution without requiring the sheriff to testify in court.

Robles Transportation Company, Inc. owned and operated a taxicab driven by Edgardo Hernandez in the business of public transportation. On August 9, 1947, that taxicab collided with a passenger truck in Parañaque, Rizal, and in the course of the accident ran over eleven-year-old Armando Manalo, inflicting injuries that proved fatal several days later. Armando's parents, Emilio Manalo and Clara Salvador, stood as the deceased's heirs. The subsidiary civil liability of an employer for offenses committed by its employees in the discharge of their duties was then governed by Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provisions whose continued force after the promulgation of the New Civil Code in 1950 became a contested issue in this litigation.

On August 9, 1947, a taxicab owned and operated by Robles Transportation Company, Inc. and driven by its employee Edgardo Hernandez collided with a passenger truck at Parañaque, Rizal. In the course of and as a result of the collision, the taxicab ran over Armando Manalo, an eleven-year-old boy, causing him physical injuries that led to his death several days later. Hernandez was thereafter prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of prision correccional, ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of ₱3,000, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment, plus costs.

Hernandez served out his sentence but failed to pay the indemnity. Two writs of execution were issued against him to satisfy the amount, but both were returned unsatisfied by the sheriff, who certified that no property, real or personal, in Hernandez's name could be found. On February 17, 1953, Armando's parents, Emilio Manalo and Clara Salvador, filed the present civil action against the Company to enforce its subsidiary liability pursuant to Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

The Company filed its appearance and answer, later an amended answer with special defenses and counterclaim, and a motion to dismiss unless Hernandez was included as a party defendant, which the Company considered an indispensable party. The trial court denied the motion, and the Company's certiorari petition to the Court of Appeals was likewise rebuffed, that court holding that Hernandez was not an indispensable party. To prove their case, the plaintiffs introduced a copy of the decision in the criminal case convicting Hernandez, the writs of execution, and the sheriff's returns showing insolvency. Over the Company's objections, the trial court admitted this evidence and based its decision thereon, sentencing the Company to pay ₱3,000 with interest at twelve percent per annum from November 14, 1952, plus ₱600 for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, with costs. The Company appealed.

• Inadmissibility of Judgment of Conviction: The Company contended that the copy of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against Hernandez was inadmissible against it as the subsidiarily liable party, citing City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Company (52 Phil., 586) and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric as decided in Martinez vs. Barredo (81 Phil., 1).
• Inadmissibility of Sheriff's Return Without Cross-Examination: The Company claimed that the sheriff's returns on the writs of execution were improperly admitted to prove Hernandez's insolvency without giving the Company an opportunity to cross-examine the sheriff who made the returns.
• Repeal of Articles 102 and 103 by the New Civil Code: The Company argued that Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code were repealed by the New Civil Code, promulgated in 1950, particularly by the repealing clause under which comes Article 2270 of the said code.
• Prescription: The Company invoked prescription, claiming the present action was barred by the Statute of Limitations as an action upon a quasi-delict, which under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code must be instituted within four years.
• Indispensable Party: The Company maintained that the convicted driver Hernandez was an indispensable party defendant and that the complaint should be dismissed unless he was included.

• Action Based on Judgment: The appellees argued that the present action was based upon a judgment — namely, the conviction in the criminal case sentencing Hernandez to indemnify the heirs — and consequently could be instituted within ten years.

• Admissibility of Conviction: Whether the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against the employee is admissible and binding against the employer sought to be held subsidiarily liable.
• Admissibility of Sheriff's Return: Whether the sheriff's return on unsatisfied writs of execution is admissible to prove the employee's insolvency without requiring the sheriff to testify and be cross-examined.
• Repeal of RPC Provisions: Whether Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code were repealed by the New Civil Code.
• Prescription: Whether the action to enforce subsidiary liability is barred by prescription as an action upon a quasi-delict subject to a four-year prescriptive period.

• Admissibility of Conviction: Yes. The judgment of conviction is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable, absent any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, as held in Martinez vs. Barredo.
• Admissibility of Sheriff's Return: Yes. A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty enjoined by law, constituting prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, and the sheriff need not testify in court.
• Repeal of RPC Provisions: No. Article 2177 of the New Civil Code expressly recognizes civil liabilities arising from negligence under the Penal Code, providing only that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission.
• Prescription: No. The action is based upon a judgment — the conviction in the criminal case — and consequently may be instituted within ten years, not the four-year period for quasi-delicts under Article 1146.

• Admissibility of Conviction: The Company relied on City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Company and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric to argue that the judgment of conviction was inadmissible against it. After considering those same cases, the Court held that the judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable. The rationale is that the subsidiary liable party's obligation flows from and is dependent upon the principal debtor's adjudged liability; the conviction establishes both the offense and the civil indemnity, and the employer, whose liability is merely subsidiary, cannot relitigate what has already been judicially determined against the employee.

• Admissibility of Sheriff's Return: The Company objected to the admission of the sheriff's returns without being given the opportunity to cross-examine the sheriff. The Court rejected this contention, holding that a sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 11 and Rule 123, Section 35 of the Rules of Court. The sheriff need not testify in court as to the facts stated in his entry. Citing Antillon vs. Barcelon (37 Phil., 151), which in turn cited Wigmore on Evidence, the Court explained the practical necessity of this rule: if public officers were routinely summoned to testify about their official acts, the work of government administration and the interest of the public would suffer. The law reposes particular confidence in public officers, presuming they will discharge their duties with accuracy and fidelity, and whatever acts they do in discharge of public duty may be given in evidence and taken to be true, subject to such caution as the nature of each case requires.

• Repeal of RPC Provisions: The Company contended that Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code were repealed by the New Civil Code, particularly through the repealing clause associated with Article 2270. The Court found this untenable, pointing to Article 2177 of the New Civil Code, which expressly recognizes civil liabilities arising from negligence under the Penal Code. Article 2177 provides that responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article (Article 2176 on quasi-delicts) is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code, with the sole limitation that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. The express recognition of Penal Code-based civil liability in Article 2177 negated any implied repeal of Articles 102 and 103.

• Prescription: The Company argued that the action was one upon a quasi-delict and therefore barred after four years under Article 1146 of the New Civil Code. The Court agreed with the appellees that the present action was based upon a judgment — the criminal case conviction sentencing Hernandez to indemnify the heirs ₱3,000 — and consequently could be instituted within ten years. The action was not an original quasi-delict claim but an enforcement of subsidiary liability that flowed from an existing judgment, thus falling under the longer prescriptive period for actions upon a judgment.

• Subsidiary Liability of Employer under Articles 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code — An employer is subsidiarily liable for the civil indemnity adjudged against its employee convicted of a felony committed in the discharge of the employee's duties, provided the employee's insolvency has been established. The judgment of conviction in the criminal case is binding upon the employer as the subsidiarily liable party, absent collusion between the accused and the offended party. The employer cannot relitigate the employee's liability; its obligation is merely subsidiary and arises only when the principal debtor cannot satisfy the judgment.

• Sheriff's Return as Prima Facie Evidence — A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law and forming part of official records. It constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, and the sheriff who made the return need not testify in court. This rule rests on the practical necessity of avoiding the disruption of government functions that would result if every public officer were routinely summoned to testify about official acts, and on the presumption that public officers discharge their duties with accuracy and fidelity.

• Coexistence of Penal Code and Civil Code Civil Liabilities — Article 2177 of the New Civil Code establishes that civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code is entirely separate and distinct from quasi-delict liability under the Civil Code, with the sole restriction that the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission. This express recognition precludes any argument that the New Civil Code repealed the subsidiary liability provisions of Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code.

• "The judgment of conviction, in the absence of any collusion between the defendant and offended party, is binding upon the party subsidiarily liable." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the binding effect of a criminal conviction on the subsidiarily liable employer, resolving the admissibility issue and establishing the doctrinal rule frequently cited in subsequent subsidiary liability jurisprudence.

• "A sheriff's return is an official statement made by a public official in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by the law and forming part of official records, and is prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein." — This defines the evidentiary status of a sheriff's return and the rationale for admitting it without requiring the sheriff's testimony, grounding the rule in the Rules of Court and the presumption of regularity in official duties.

• "Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act of omission of the defendant." — This is the text of Article 2177 of the New Civil Code as quoted in the decision, establishing the coexistence of Penal Code and Civil Code civil liabilities and foreclosing the argument that Articles 102 and 103 were repealed.

• City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Company, 52 Phil., 586 — Cited by the appellant in support of its contention that the judgment of conviction was inadmissible against the subsidiarily liable party. The Court considered this case and reached the opposite conclusion, holding the conviction binding.
• Martinez vs. Barredo, 81 Phil., 1 — The case in which Arambulo vs. Manila Electric was decided. Cited by appellant but relied upon by the Court to support the holding that the judgment of conviction is binding on the subsidiarily liable party absent collusion.
• Antillon vs. Barcelon, 37 Phil., 151 — Cited by the Court for the proposition that public documents and official statements made by public officers in the discharge of their duties may be given in evidence without requiring the officer to testify, supporting the admissibility of the sheriff's return. The case in turn cited Wigmore on Evidence.

• Articles 102 and 103, Revised Penal Code — Govern the subsidiary liability of employers for the civil liabilities of their employees convicted of felonies committed in the discharge of their duties. The Court held these provisions were not repealed by the New Civil Code and remained the basis for the heirs' action against the Company.
• Article 2177, New Civil Code — Expressly recognizes that civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code is separate and distinct from quasi-delict liability under the Civil Code, with the sole limitation that double recovery is prohibited. The Court relied on this provision to reject the argument that Articles 102 and 103 were repealed.
• Article 1146, New Civil Code — Provides a four-year prescriptive period for actions upon quasi-delicts. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the present action was based on a judgment, not a quasi-delict, and thus governed by a ten-year prescriptive period.
• Rule 39, Section 11 and Rule 123, Section 35, Rules of Court — Cited as the procedural basis for the rule that a sheriff's return constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein, supporting the admission of the returns to prove Hernandez's insolvency.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concurred.