Manalo vs. Mariano

A final judgment in a land registration case, rendered after the parties voluntarily submitted the issue of a partition agreement’s validity and were given full opportunity to be heard, constitutes res judicata and bars a subsequent action to annul that agreement even if the later action is cast in a different form or brought by the compulsory heirs of the losing party, where the real party in interest remains the same and the subject matter and cause of action are identical; one branch of the Court of First Instance cannot nullify or relitigate the final judgment of another branch without exceeding its jurisdiction.

Pedro Manalo owned a parcel of land in Pateros, Rizal. The land passed by inheritance through Teodora Manalo to Francisco Ymzon, who donated it to his first cousins Demetrio and Mamerto Manalo. Demetrio and Mamerto partitioned the property in 1952. After Mamerto’s death, Demetrio and Mamerto’s son Severino executed a second partition agreement in 1960 covering additional parcels of land. Demetrio later applied for registration of the lands he acquired under both partitions, triggering opposition from Severino on the ground of fraud and prompting a series of proceedings across two branches of the same trial court.

• The Property and the Partition Agreements: Pedro Manalo owned a parcel of land in Barrio Ususan, Pateros, Rizal. After his death in 1901, the land devolved to his daughter Teodora and later to her son Francisco Ymzon. Ymzon donated it to his first cousins Demetrio Manalo and Mamerto Manalo. On April 30, 1952, Demetrio and Mamerto executed an extrajudicial partition equally dividing the land, which then had an area of 1,474 square meters. Mamerto died in 1956, and his one-half share passed to his son Severino Manalo. On August 4, 1960, Demetrio and Severino executed a “Kasulatan ng Hatian ng Lupa” partitioning three parcels of land covered by Tax Declarations Nos. 1249, 856 and 1368 in Mamerto’s name, with respective areas of 768, 4,706, and 1,286 square meters. The document recited that Demetrio and Severino were the true owners of these parcels. Demetrio received a parcel of 1,286 square meters plus 2,094 square meters out of the 4,706-square-meter parcel; Severino received the 768-square-meter parcel and the remaining 2,612 square meters. The instrument was recorded in the Registry of Deeds of Rizal on August 25, 1960.

• The Land Registration Case: On March 6, 1968, Demetrio filed an application for registration of the lands he acquired under the 1952 and 1960 partitions, identified as Lots 1 to 5 of Plan Psu-191273 with a total area of 4,045 square meters (LRC Case No. N-6347, Branch VIII). Severino opposed, alleging that his signature on the 1960 partition had been fraudulently secured by Demetrio, who misrepresented himself as an heir of Mamerto. Severino prayed that the document be declared null and void, that Demetrio’s application be denied, and that the lands be registered in his own name. He later withdrew his opposition to Lots 4 and 5, confining his opposition to Lots 1, 2, and 3. Severino did not testify at the hearing; his son Inocencio testified about the alleged fraud. Branch VIII found Inocencio’s testimony “nebulous and uncertain” and unworthy of credence. By decision dated October 9, 1970, the court upheld the validity of the partition, noting the presumption of validity of a public document, the failure of Severino himself to testify, and his inaction for many years in challenging the partition. The court decreed registration of all five lots in Demetrio’s name. Severino did not perfect an appeal, and the decision became final and executory. On October 2, 1971, the court ordered issuance of the corresponding decree.

• The Civil Case for Annulment: On July 31, 1970—before the land registration case was terminated—Severino’s children Inocencio, Priscilla, Teodora, Elena, and Lope filed a petition in the same Court of First Instance of Rizal, assigned to Branch X (Civil Case No. 13708), to annul the 1960 “Kasulatan ng Hatian ng Lupa” on the ground of fraud. They alleged that Severino, who lacked education, signed the document because of Demetrio’s false and fraudulent representation that he was an heir of Mamerto. Demetrio moved to dismiss on grounds that the action was between family members without prior efforts at compromise, that the plaintiffs lacked legal capacity to sue, that the action was barred by the prior judgment in the land registration case (res judicata), and that the action was barred by prescription. Branch X denied the motion in its orders of March 10 and July 17, 1971. It ruled that the land registration decision did not constitute res judicata as to the partition’s validity because Severino had not testified in that proceeding and because a land registration court, possessing only limited jurisdiction, could not resolve that issue.

• Res Judicata: Petitioner Demetrio Manalo maintained that the final judgment in LRC Case No. N-6347, which upheld the validity of the 1960 partition agreement, barred the subsequent action for annulment in Civil Case No. 13708 under the principle of res judicata. He argued that there was identity of parties (Severino, the real party in interest, having been the oppositor), subject matter (Lots 1, 2, and 3), and cause of action (the alleged nullity of the partition).

• Grave Abuse of Discretion and Collateral Attack: Petitioner contended that Branch X acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss the complaint, effectively permitting a collateral attack on a final judgment of a coordinate and coequal branch of the same court. He argued that the remedy of certiorari was proper because appeal would not be an adequate remedy under the circumstances.

• Lack of Capacity and Family Compromise: In the motion to dismiss, petitioner additionally argued that the plaintiffs, as Severino’s children, lacked legal capacity to sue since Severino was still alive and the cause of action belonged to him, and that the suit between family members failed to plead earnest efforts toward a compromise.

• Limited Jurisdiction of Land Registration Court: Respondents Severino Manalo et al. contended that the land registration court, sitting with limited jurisdiction, could not properly adjudicate the validity of the partition agreement. They argued that because Severino did not testify in the land registration case, the issue was not fully litigated, and the decision could not be given res judicata effect on the question of fraud.

• Difference in Parties: Respondents argued that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 13708 were Severino’s children, who were not parties to the land registration case, and that the civil action was not a land registration case, thus precluding the application of res judicata.

• Res Judicata: Whether the final judgment in LRC Case No. N-6347, which upheld the validity of the 1960 partition agreement, bars the subsequent action in Civil Case No. 13708 to annul that same agreement on the ground of fraud.

• Jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court: Whether the Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the partition agreement such that its judgment can operate as res judicata on that issue.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether certiorari and prohibition lie to set aside the denial of a motion to dismiss when the ground of res judicata is clearly established and the maintenance of the second action constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

• Res Judicata: The action was barred by the prior judgment. All elements of res judicata were present: a final judgment on the merits, a court with jurisdiction over the res and the parties, and identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. The decision in a land registration proceeding is a judgment in rem, conclusive upon title and binding on the whole world under Section 49(a), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, and it was also a judgment in personam against Severino as the oppositor who presented evidence. That Severino’s children brought the second action as compulsory heirs did not avoid res judicata because Severino was still alive and remained the real party in interest; the cause of action pertained to him, not to his children. A party cannot escape the effects of res judicata by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting the case.

• Jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court: The Court of First Instance possessed general original jurisdiction, and the question of whether an issue should be resolved in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited jurisdiction as a special court was procedural, not jurisdictional, and could be waived. Although an issue properly litigable in an ordinary civil action should generally not be resolved in a land registration proceeding, where the parties acquiesced in submitting the issue to the land registration court and were given full opportunity to present evidence, that court had jurisdiction to pass upon it. Severino himself invoked the court’s jurisdiction by praying that the partition be declared null and void and that the lands be registered in his name. Having sought affirmative relief, he could not later repudiate or question that same jurisdiction after an adverse ruling, under the doctrine of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Generally, certiorari does not lie to review an order denying a motion to dismiss, the proper remedy being appeal. However, where a patent grave abuse of discretion was committed in not dismissing a complaint on the ground of res judicata, and where broader interests of justice or public policy require an exception, certiorari may be granted. The denial of the motion to dismiss in this case constituted such grave abuse of discretion because it permitted a collateral attack on a final judgment of a coequal branch and required relitigation of an already settled issue. One branch of the Court of First Instance cannot annul the judgment of another branch; an attempt to do so exceeds its jurisdiction.

• Res Judicata in Land Registration Proceedings — A final judgment in a land registration case, being a proceeding in rem, is conclusive upon the title to the land and binding on the whole world. When an oppositor appears and litigates an issue such as the validity of a partition agreement, the judgment also operates as a judgment in personam against that party. The elements of res judicata are: (a) a final judgment, (b) a court with jurisdiction over the res and the parties, (c) a judgment on the merits, and (d) identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action. A party cannot escape res judicata by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting the case.

• Estoppel to Challenge Jurisdiction — A party who invokes the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against an opponent cannot, after failing to obtain that relief, repudiate or question the same jurisdiction. This principle, recognized in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, applies even when the court exercises a special limited jurisdiction, where the parties voluntarily submit an issue and are given full opportunity to be heard.

• Jurisdiction of a Land Registration Court over Ancillary Issues — While an issue properly litigable in an ordinary civil action should ordinarily not be resolved in a land registration proceeding, the Court of First Instance, possessing general original jurisdiction, may decide such an issue if the parties acquiesce in submitting it for determination and third-party interests are not impaired. The distinction between the court’s general and limited jurisdiction is in essence procedural and may be waived.

• Doctrine of Non Quieta Movere and Coordinate Branches — One branch of a Court of First Instance cannot annul or nullify the prior judgment rendered by a coequal and coordinate branch. An action that seeks to relitigate an issue already determined by another branch constitutes an unwarranted collateral attack and is barred. Certiorari and prohibition lie to prevent one branch from exceeding its jurisdiction in this manner.

• Certiorari Against Denial of a Motion to Dismiss — As a general rule, certiorari is not available to annul an order denying a motion to dismiss; appeal in due time is the proper remedy. However, where there is a patent grave abuse of discretion, as when a complaint should have been dismissed on the ground of res judicata, and the broader interests of justice require it, certiorari may be granted to set aside the interlocutory order.

• “The decision in a land registration proceeding, which is a proceeding in rem, ‘is conclusive upon the title’ to the land and is binding on the whole world.”

• “Whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited jurisdiction as a special court (probate, land registration, etc.) is in reality not a jurisdictional question. It is in essence a procedural question involving a mode of practice ‘which may be waived’.”

• “[A] party cannot invoke the court’s jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.”

• “A party cannot, by varying his form of action or adopting a different method of representing his case, escape the effects of res judicata.”

• “The jurisdiction to annul a judgment of a branch of the Court of First Instance belongs solely to that branch. Another branch, even if it belongs to the same judicial district, that attempts to annul the judgment of another branch, exceeds its jurisdiction or acts with grave abuse of discretion.”

• Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29 — Applied for the rule that a party who invokes a court’s jurisdiction and seeks affirmative relief is estopped from later questioning that jurisdiction after an adverse decision.

• Franco v. Monte de Piedad and Savings Bank, G.R. No. L-17610, April 22, 1963, 7 SCRA 660 — Cited to support the principle that a land registration court may decide an issue that would normally be litigated in an ordinary civil action if the parties acquiesce and are given full opportunity to present evidence.

• Rasay-Lahoz v. Leonor, G.R. No. L-27388, March 23, 1971, 38 SCRA 47 — Relied on for the proposition that a party cannot avoid the effects of res judicata by varying the form of action or adopting a different method of presenting the case.

• J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. L-24717, December 4, 1967, 21 SCRA 1169 — Applied for the rule that one branch of a Court of First Instance cannot nullify the prior judgment of a coequal and coordinate branch, and that certiorari and prohibition lie to prevent such excess of jurisdiction.

• Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 56 — Cited as authority that a probate court may decide a question of title if the parties submit it and third-party interests are not impaired, supporting the analogous rule for land registration courts.

• Section 49(a), Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that a judgment in a proceeding in rem is conclusive upon the title to the land and binding on the whole world. Applied to establish the binding effect of the land registration decision on Severino and his successors.

• Section 39, Judiciary Law — Defines the Court of First Instance as a court of general original jurisdiction invested with power to take cognizance of all kinds of cases. Invoked to explain that the land registration court is the same court exercising a limited jurisdiction, and the distinction is procedural rather than jurisdictional.

• Act No. 3344, amending Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code — Governs the recording of instruments affecting unregistered lands. Cited because the 1960 partition agreement was recorded in the Registry of Deeds pursuant to this law, reinforcing its validity as a public document.

• Article 221(4), Civil Code — Permits compulsory heirs to bring an action to impugn a simulated alienation of property intended to deprive them of their legitime. Discussed and distinguished; the Court held that this provision did not authorize Severino’s children to sue because Severino was still alive and the action was not one for deprivation of legitime.

Justices Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Concepcion, Jr., concurred.

N/A — The decision was unanimous.