Manalo II vs. People of the Philippines

An amended Information that has been admitted supersedes the original Information, rendering the latter legally nonexistent and incapable of supporting a valid plea; consequently, an inadvertent arraignment under the superseded original Information does not trigger first jeopardy, and the re-reading of the Amended Information does not violate the right against double jeopardy.

Petitioner Felix Nathaniel "Angel" Villanueva Manalo II was the subject of a search and seizure operation conducted on March 2, 2017 at his residence inside the Iglesia ni Cristo compound in Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, pursuant to Search Warrant No. 5326(7). Several unlicensed firearms and ammunition were allegedly discovered and confiscated, leading to the filing of multiple Informations before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, including a charge for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under Section 28(b) of Republic Act No. 10591. The prosecution subsequently sought to amend the Information to include a qualifying circumstance under Section 28(e) of the same statute, alleging that one of the confiscated firearms was loaded with ammunition.

On March 2, 2017, police officers conducted a search and seizure operation at the residence of Felix Nathaniel "Angel" Villanueva Manalo II inside the Iglesia ni Cristo compound in Tandang Sora Avenue, Quezon City, pursuant to Search Warrant No. 5326(7). During the search, several unlicensed firearms and ammunition were allegedly discovered and confiscated. Manalo, along with Victor Erano Manalo Hemedez, Jonathan S. Ledesma, and several other individuals, were placed in detention. Multiple Informations were thereafter filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, including a charge for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under Section 28(b) of Republic Act No. 10591, docketed as Criminal Case No. R-QZN-17-03231-CR. The original Information charged Manalo with possession of one M-16 Colt AR 15 rifle, one M1 carbine, and one 12-gauge Action shotgun, without the necessary license or permit.

Manalo filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, which the RTC Branch 84 of Quezon City granted, directing the OCP-QC to conduct a preliminary investigation. The city prosecutor issued a Resolution affirming the finding of probable cause against Manalo, Hemedez, and Ledesma. In the interim, Manalo filed a Motion to Fix Bail. Thereafter, Police Chief Inspector Jun G. Fortunato filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, praying that the charge against Manalo be upgraded because one of the firearms — specifically the 12-gauge Action shotgun bearing Serial No. 116534 — was allegedly loaded with ammunition, qualifying the offense under Section 28(e) of Republic Act No. 10591.

During the hearing of Manalo's Motion to Fix Bail, the prosecution filed a Motion to Admit Attached Amended Information, explaining that due to inadvertence it had failed to allege in the original Information that the shotgun was loaded with seven live ammunitions, as stated in the Police Letter Referral Report. The Amended Information accordingly added the phrase "Loaded with seven (7) live ammunitions" to the description of the shotgun. The RTC Branch 84 issued a Joint Resolution denying the Motion to Fix Bail, granting the prosecution's Motion to Admit Attached Amended Information, and setting the arraignment and pre-trial. Manalo filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion to Inhibit seeking the disqualification of the presiding judge of RTC Branch 84. The RTC Branch 84 granted the Motion to Inhibit, and the case was ordered re-raffled — first to RTC Branch 85, where the presiding judge voluntarily inhibited due to a related case, and then to RTC Branch 216. RTC Branch 216 issued an Omnibus Order denying Manalo's Motion for Reconsideration.

On January 18, 2019, Manalo was arraigned in Criminal Case No. R-QZN-17-03231. Due to inadvertence, the contents of the original Information — not the Amended Information — were read to Manalo. With the assistance of his counsel, Manalo entered a plea of not guilty to the original Information. After the plea was entered, the public prosecutor inquired as to which Information had been read, and it was discovered that the original Information was read by mistake. The RTC Branch 216 directed the reading of the Amended Information. When the Amended Information was read, Manalo refused to enter a plea, arguing that he had already pleaded not guilty based on the original Information and that rearraignment would violate his right against double jeopardy. The RTC entered a plea of "not guilty" on Manalo's behalf. Manalo then filed a Motion to Quash the Amended Information, contending that his right against double jeopardy had been violated because he had already been arraigned under the original Information. The RTC Branch 216 denied the Motion to Quash and the subsequent Motion for Reconsideration, holding that the Amended Information was the only valid Information, that Manalo could not have made a valid plea to the original Information as it was insufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction for the qualified offense, and that the re-reading was a mere correction of inadvertence that neither resulted in conviction or acquittal nor operated to dismiss or terminate the case without Manalo's consent.

• Binding Effect of Initial Plea: Petitioner contended that the prosecution is already bound by his initial plea of not guilty based on the original Information, having been validly arraigned thereunder.
• Presence of Double Jeopardy Elements: Petitioner maintained that all the requisites for double jeopardy are present, arguing that his prior arraignment and plea under the original Information constituted first jeopardy.
• Improper Rearraignment: Petitioner argued that the retraction of a plea or rearraignment is allowed only in certain instances, none of which is present in this case.

• Supersession of Original Information: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the Amended Information supersedes the original Information and renders the latter without legal effect, such that no valid plea could be derived from the original Information.
• Absence of First Jeopardy: Respondent insisted that there was no violation of the right against double jeopardy because first jeopardy attached only upon a plea to the Amended Information, and the case has yet to be terminated.

• Double Jeopardy: Whether the Amended Information filed against petitioner should be quashed on the ground of double jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy: No. The Amended Information should not be quashed on double jeopardy grounds, because the original Information had already been superseded by the Amended Information, rendering any plea entered under the original Information invalid and incapable of attaching first jeopardy.

• Double Jeopardy: Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites concur: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. First jeopardy attaches when there has been a valid indictment before a competent court, after arraignment, when a valid plea has been entered, and when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent. In this case, the fourth and fifth elements were not established. Petitioner did not make a valid plea to the original Information because the original Information had already been superseded by the Amended Information, which was admitted by the trial court. An amended Information that has been admitted renders the original Information legally nonexistent. While the original Information was inadvertently read first, the prosecution immediately inquired whether the Amended Information had been read and promptly moved for its re-reading upon discovering the error — a clear expression of the State's intention to proceed under the Amended Information. Because the trial court, not the prosecution, committed the error in reading the superseded original Information, it would be unfair to make the prosecution suffer the consequences of a mistake it did not commit. Furthermore, the re-reading of the Amended Information neither resulted in petitioner's conviction or acquittal nor operated to dismiss or terminate the case without his consent; it was a mere correction of inadvertence in the reading of an Information involving one continuous trial over one offense. The Court relied on Cabangangan vs. Concepcion, where the original Information had been superseded by the Amended Information, and on Binabay vs. People of the Phil., where a rearraignment under a superseded original Information was declared null and void because the original Information was legally nonexistent.

• Doctrine of Supersession of Amended Information — When an Amended Information is admitted, it supersedes the original Information and renders the latter without legal effect. Any arraignment or plea made under the superseded original Information is null and void, and no valid judgment could have been rendered thereon. In this case, because the Amended Information had already been admitted before the arraignment, the original Information was legally nonexistent, and petitioner's plea to the original Information could not constitute a valid plea for purposes of attaching first jeopardy.
• Requisites of Double Jeopardy — Double jeopardy exists when: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. First jeopardy attaches: (1) after a valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without express consent. All five elements must concur; the absence of any one prevents first jeopardy from attaching.

• "petitioner did not make a valid plea to the original Information as the same had already been superseded by the Amended Information." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: because the original Information was superseded, no valid plea could have been entered thereunder, and consequently first jeopardy did not attach.
• "a re-reading of the Amended Information neither results in petitioner's conviction or acquittal nor operates to dismiss or terminate the case without his consent. Instead, it was a mere correction of an inadvertence in the reading of an Information involving one continuous trial over one offense." — This passage defines why the correction of inadvertence in reading the proper Information does not trigger double jeopardy, distinguishing it from a termination or dismissal of the case.
• "As a consequence, the rearraignment under such original [I]nformation and petitioner's plea to the charge therein set forth were properly declared null and void, and no valid judgment could have been rendered in the case[.]" — This quotation from Binabay vs. People of the Phil. articulates the canonical formulation of the supersession doctrine, relied upon by the Court to support its conclusion that the plea to the original Information was void.

• Cabangangan vs. Concepcion, 95 Phil. 87 (1954) — Followed. In that case, the trial court erroneously read the original Information instead of the Amended Information during arraignment, and the counsel of the accused pointed out the error. The Court ruled that the original Information had been superseded by the Amended Information and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court applied the same principle of supersession to the present case.
• Binabay vs. People of the Phil., 147 Phil. 402 — Followed. The Court ruled that when an accused is inadvertently rearraigned under the original Information even though it had been superseded by the Amended Information, the original Information is legally nonexistent, and the rearraignment and plea thereunder are null and void. The Court relied on this ruling to conclude that petitioner's plea to the original Information was invalid.
• SSgt. Pacoy vs. Hon. Cajigil, 560 Phil. 598 (2007) — Cited for the proposition that double jeopardy exists when three requisites concur: first jeopardy attached prior to the second, valid termination of the first jeopardy, and a second jeopardy for the same offense.
• People vs. Cawaling, 355 Phil. 1 (1998) — Cited for the enumeration of the five elements necessary for first jeopardy to attach.

• Rule 117, Section 3(i), Rules of Court — Provides that the accused may move to quash the complaint or information on the ground that the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. Petitioner anchored his Motion to Quash on this provision.
• Rule 117, Section 7, Rules of Court — Defines former conviction or acquittal and double jeopardy, stating that when an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case dismissed without express consent, upon a valid complaint or information sufficient in form and substance and after the accused has pleaded to the charge, the conviction, acquittal, or dismissal shall be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense. The Court applied this provision to determine whether the requisites of double jeopardy were present.
• Section 28(e), Republic Act No. 10591 — Provides that the penalty of one degree higher than that provided in paragraphs (a) to (c) shall be imposed upon any person who unlawfully possesses any firearm loaded with ammunition or inserted with a loaded magazine, among other qualifying conditions. This provision was the basis for the amendment of the Information to allege that the shotgun was loaded with seven live ammunitions.

Lazaro-Javier, M. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred.

• Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson) — Filed a separate dissenting opinion. The text of the dissenting opinion was not included in the provided case material; the specific points of disagreement could not be ascertained from the available text.