Manalang vs. Bacani

An RTC hearing an appeal from an MTC ejectment judgment must decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings in the court of origin and may not conduct a trial de novo or receive additional evidence; and a complaint alleging encroachment discovered by relocation survey, without averring the manner and time of entry or that possession was by tolerance, states a boundary dispute cognizable in accion reivindicatoria, not an unlawful detainer within the MTC's jurisdiction.

Petitioners Ruben, Amado, Carlos, Ladislao, and Luis Manalang, and Concepcion Gonzales were co-owners of Lot No. 4236 (914 square meters) of the Guagua Cadastre, declared for taxation in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia and covered by approved survey plan Ap-03-004154. Respondents Bienvenido and Mercedes Bacani owned adjacent Lot No. 4235 covered by OCT No. N-216701, title over which was confirmed in respondents' favor in Cadastral Case No. N-229 before the RTC of Guagua, Branch 53, by decision dated August 28, 1996, which had become final and executory. The dispute arose when a 1997 relocation survey revealed that respondents' structures extended beyond their titled 481-square-meter lot into petitioners' property.

Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Ladislao Manalang, Luis Manalang, and Concepcion M. Gonzales were co-owners of Lot No. 4236, a 914-square-meter parcel in the Guagua Cadastre declared for taxation in the name of Tomasa B. Garcia and covered by approved survey plan Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to their property was Lot No. 4235, covered by OCT No. N-216701 and owned by respondents Bienvenido and Mercedes Bacani. Respondents' title over Lot No. 4235 had been confirmed in Cadastral Case No. N-229 before the RTC of Guagua, Branch 53, by decision dated August 28, 1996, which had become final and executory. Their OCT covered only 481 square meters.

In February 1997, petitioners caused a relocation and verification survey of Lot No. 4236 and adjoining lots. The survey, conducted by Geodetic Engineer Rufo R. Rivera, revealed that respondents had encroached upon 405 square meters of petitioners' property, with portions of respondents' houses erected on the encroached area. A preliminary relocation survey by the Lands Management Sector of the DENR confirmed this finding. In June 1997, petitioners lodged a complaint before the Barangay Council of San Juan, Guagua, Pampanga. When respondents refused to vacate despite a formal demand letter dated March 10, 1997, the Barangay Captain issued a certification to file action on March 4, 1997.

Petitioners thereafter filed a complaint for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua, Branch 2 (Civil Case No. 3309). The complaint alleged respondents' "illegal use and occupation" of the encroached portion and sought reasonable compensation of ₱3,000, attorney's fees of ₱30,000 plus ₱1,000 per appearance, and litigation expenses of ₱10,000. The complaint did not aver when or how respondents had entered the land or constructed their houses, nor did it allege that respondents' occupation was by petitioners' tolerance.

The MTC, Branch 2, dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction on September 17, 1998, finding the case to be essentially a boundary dispute. On appeal, the RTC reversed and remanded. Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1, again dismissed the complaint on August 31, 2000, finding that petitioners failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence of encroachment and that preponderance of evidence favored respondents' right of possession. Petitioners appealed anew to the RTC, which ordered a relocation and verification survey and heard the testimony of DENR surveyor Engr. Emmanuel Limpin. On September 19, 2001, the RTC reversed the MTC's dismissal, relying on the court-ordered survey and the surveyor's testimony to find encroachment, and awarded ₱1,000 per month as reasonable compensation plus ₱20,000 in attorney's fees. The CA, however, reversed the RTC on October 18, 2002, holding that the RTC had improperly conducted a trial de novo and that the complaint did not vest jurisdiction in the MTC.

• RTC's Appellate Authority: Petitioners contended that the RTC had authority to receive additional evidence on appeal in an ejectment case because it was not absolutely confined to the records of the trial in resolving the appeal.
• Estoppel: Petitioners argued that respondents were estopped from assailing the relocation and verification survey ordered by the RTC because they had actively participated in the survey and had even cross-examined Engr. Limpin.
• Presumption of Regularity: Petitioners maintained that Engr. Limpin's testimony must be given credence, invoking the principle of regularity in the performance of official functions.
• No Trial De Novo: Petitioners asserted that the RTC did not conduct a trial de novo by ordering the survey and hearing the surveyor's testimony, and that the desirability of the survey had always been part of the proceedings even before the appeal.
• Jurisdiction — Ejectment: Petitioners argued that the case, because it involved encroachment into another's property, qualified as an ejectment case within the MTC's jurisdiction.
• Laches: Petitioners contended that respondents were barred by laches for never questioning the RTC's February 11, 1999 ruling on the issue of jurisdiction.

• Immaterial Survey: Respondents assailed the relocation and verification survey ordered by the RTC as immaterial because it could not vest a right of possession or ownership.
• Petitioners' Status: Respondents argued that petitioners were mere claimants, not the owners of the property, and that petitioners had never been in possession of the area in question.
• Unreliability of Cadastral Surveys: Respondents maintained that cadastral surveys were not reliable.
• No Effect on Outcome: Respondents asserted that whether or not the relocation and verification survey was considered would not alter the outcome of the case.

• Scope of RTC Appellate Review in Ejectment: Whether the RTC, in deciding an appeal from an MTC ejectment judgment, may order a relocation and verification survey and receive the surveyor's testimony in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
• Jurisdiction — Nature of the Action: Whether the petitioners' complaint stated a cause of action for unlawful detainer within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, or a boundary dispute cognizable in accion reivindicatoria before the RTC.

• Scope of RTC Appellate Review in Ejectment: No. The RTC must decide the appeal on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted; ordering a survey and hearing testimony constitutes an impermissible trial de novo under Section 18, Rule 70.
• Jurisdiction — Nature of the Action: No. The complaint's allegations disclosed a boundary dispute, not unlawful detainer, because they failed to aver how or when respondents entered the land or that their possession was by tolerance; the proper remedy is accion reivindicatoria before the RTC.

• Scope of RTC Appellate Review in Ejectment: Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that the RTC shall decide the appeal "on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court." The RTC violated this rule by ordering the conduct of a relocation and verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the surveyor, acts tantamount to holding a trial de novo. The violation was compounded by the RTC's ultimate reliance on the survey and surveyor's testimony—evidence not part of the MTC record—instead of the record of the proceedings in the court of origin. The CA's reversal was therefore warranted.

• Jurisdiction — Nature of the Action: The nature of an action and the court's jurisdiction are determined by the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. For unlawful detainer to lie, the complaint must allege that the defendant unlawfully withholds possession after expiration or termination of a right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied, and must show that the defendant's initial possession was lawful—typically by tolerance of the plaintiff. The petitioners' complaint alleged only respondents' "illegal use and occupation" of the property, without averring when or how respondents had entered the land, how and when dispossession started, or that petitioners had permitted or tolerated the occupation. The dispute was in reality a boundary dispute—whether the property claimed by respondents formed part of petitioners' property—which cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 and must instead be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria before the RTC. The MTC's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was correct, and the CA properly reinstated it.

• Nature of action determined by allegations of the complaint — The allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over it. Applied here: the complaint's failure to aver the manner and time of entry or tolerance of occupation meant the case was not unlawful detainer but a boundary dispute.

• Elements of unlawful detainer — Unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom possession of land or building is unlawfully withheld after expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract, express or implied. The defendant's possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of the right of possession. To vest MTC jurisdiction, the complaint must embody a statement of facts clearly showing the attributes of unlawful detainer, including how and when entry was effected and that possession was initially by tolerance.

• Boundary dispute vs. ejectment — A boundary dispute is not about possession but about encroachment—whether the property claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff's property. It cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70, which is limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry, and must be resolved in accion reivindicatoria.

• No trial de novo on appeal in ejectment — Under Section 18, Rule 70, the RTC on appeal from an MTC ejectment judgment shall decide on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be required. Receiving additional evidence or conducting surveys constitutes an impermissible trial de novo.

• "The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court." — The Court quoted Section 18, Rule 70 to establish that the RTC's appellate function in ejectment cases is confined to the MTC record, precluding the reception of additional evidence.

• "A boundary dispute cannot be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible entry." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on jurisdiction: that encroachment disputes are boundary disputes requiring a plenary action, not summary ejectment.

• "In unlawful detainer, the defendant unlawfully withholds the possession of the premises upon the expiration or termination of his right to hold such possession under any contract, express or implied. The defendant's possession was lawful at the beginning, becoming unlawful only because of the expiration or termination of his right of possession." — This defines the essential nature of unlawful detainer, distinguishing it from the boundary dispute alleged in the complaint.

• Sarmiento vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116192, November 16, 1995, 250 SCRA 108 — Controlling precedent. The Court held that a complaint markedly similar to the one at bar did not vest MTC jurisdiction over unlawful detainer because it failed to aver the manner and time of entry or tolerance of possession. The CA correctly relied on this case over Benitez and Calubayan.

• Abellera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127480, February 28, 2000, 326 SCRA 485 — Cited for the proposition that the RTC, in an appeal of an ejectment judgment, shall not conduct a rehearing or trial de novo.

• Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. vs. Cruz, G.R. No. 151212, September 10, 2003, 410 SCRA 484 — Cited for the rule that the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of the action and the court's jurisdiction.

• Estate of Soledad Manantan vs. Somera, G.R. No. 145867, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 81 — Cited for the definition of unlawful detainer as an action against unlawful withholding of possession after expiration or termination of the right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied.

• Benitez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104828, January 16, 1997, 266 SCRA 242 — Distinguished/rejected. The RTC's reliance on this case was misplaced; Sarmiento was the controlling ruling.

• Calubayan vs. Ferrer, No. L-22645, September 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 146 — Distinguished/rejected. The RTC's reliance on this case was likewise misplaced.

• Section 18, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Provides that the judgment in an ejectment case is appealable to the RTC, which shall decide "on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court." Applied to hold that the RTC's ordering of a relocation survey and reception of the surveyor's testimony violated this provision.

• Section 13(3), Rule 70, Rules of Court — Cited by the CA for the proposition that reopening of trial is not allowed on appeal in ejectment cases.

Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Jose Portugal Perez, and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe concurred.