Mañalac vs. Bidan

A sheriff who enforces a writ of execution for delivery or restitution of real property without first serving notice on the adverse party and demanding that it peaceably vacate within three working days commits simple neglect of duty, punishable under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service.

Carlos Gaudencio M. Mañalac filed the administrative complaint on behalf of Philippine One Investment (SPY-AMC), Inc. (PI One), a special purpose vehicle created under Republic Act No. 9182 (Special Purpose Vehicle Law of 2002), against Hernan E. Bidan, Sheriff IV of RTC Branch 53, Bacolod City. PI One had acquired a lot (TCT No. 166-2015000786) through a foreclosure proceeding due to MADCI's failure to pay its mortgage, and had obtained lawful possession via a Writ of Possession issued by RTC Kabankalan City, Branch 61. Simultaneously, MADCI was undergoing corporate rehabilitation before RTC Makati, Branch 149, which had issued a Stay Order covering the subject lot. The dispute arose from the intersection of these proceedings when RTC Bacolod, Branch 53, acting in MADCI's rehabilitation case, declared the foreclosure null and void and ordered PI One to restore possession of the subject lot to MADCI.

PI One, a special purpose vehicle created under Republic Act No. 9182, acquired a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 166-2015000786 through a foreclosure proceeding arising from MADCI's failure to pay its mortgage on the property. PI One obtained lawful possession of the subject lot by virtue of a Writ of Possession issued by RTC Kabankalan City, Branch 61, as reflected in that court's Order of October 20, 2015. Meanwhile, MADCI was undergoing corporate rehabilitation before RTC Makati, Branch 149, in SP Case No. M-6682, which had issued a Stay Order dated September 23, 2008, covering, among others, the subject lot. Thus, the subject lot was under custodia legis of RTC Makati at the time of the events in question.

On May 5, 2016, RTC Bacolod, Branch 53, acting in the corporate rehabilitation case of MADCI (Commercial Court Case No. 05-057), issued an Order declaring the foreclosure of MADCI's property, including the hospital, and all subsequent proceedings null and void. The Order directed PI One to immediately restore possession of the subject lot and the hospital to MADCI. A writ of execution was issued pursuant to this Order. On the afternoon of May 13, 2016, PI One's security guards stationed at the subject lot reported that Dr. Enigardo Legislador, Jr., the former owner of the property, accompanied by respondent sheriff Bidan, certain civilians, and security guards, "stormed" the subject lot in an apparent illegal take-over. PI One's in-house counsel remonstrated with respondent sheriff, pointing out that PI One had not received any court order, notice, writ, or other process regarding the subject lot, and that the property was under custodia legis of RTC Makati, making the take-over illegal.

Respondent sheriff countered that his actions fell within his official duties, that the May 5, 2016 Order had declared the foreclosure null and void, and that he proceeded with implementation of the writ of execution in good faith. He maintained that it was his ministerial duty to execute a valid writ and that complainant had presented no substantial evidence that he acted beyond his legal authority. The OCA found, however, that the Order to restore possession was directed at PI One and not at respondent sheriff; that respondent sheriff should have served a copy of the writ of execution on PI One and accorded it reasonable time and opportunity to comply; and that respondent sheriff should not have immediately taken possession of the subject lot and placed MADCI in possession on the very day the writ was issued, without prior notice to PI One's counsel.

• Gross Misconduct and Grave Abuse of Authority: Complainant alleged that respondent sheriff, in the company of the former owner and security guards, "stormed" the subject lot in an illegal take-over, without first serving any court order, notice, writ, or process on PI One, which was then in lawful possession and whose property was under custodia legis of RTC Makati.
• Violation of Due Process: Complainant argued that respondent sheriff's blatant disregard of established law and procedure — particularly the requirement to serve the adverse party with the court order or writ before implementation — deprived PI One of its right to due process and unlawfully dispossessed it of the subject lot.
• Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service: Complainant maintained that respondent sheriff's overzealous implementation of the court's processes, vitiated by lack of proper notice to the adverse party, constituted grave abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

• Performance of Official Duties: Respondent sheriff argued that his impugned actions came within the ambit of his official duties as a court sheriff, and that he proceeded in good faith.
• Validity of the Underlying Order: Respondent sheriff pointed out that eight days before the alleged illegal take-over, RTC Branch 53 had issued an Order categorically declaring the foreclosure and all subsequent proceedings null and void, thereby providing the legal basis for the writ of execution he implemented.
• Ministerial Duty: Respondent sheriff maintained that it was his ministerial duty to execute a valid writ, and that complainant had not presented substantial evidence showing he acted beyond or outside his legal authority; accordingly, he is presumed to have performed his official duties in due course.

• Procedural Compliance in Writ Execution: Whether respondent sheriff committed an administrative offense by implementing the writ of execution without first serving notice on PI One and demanding that it peaceably vacate the subject lot within three working days.
• Proper Classification and Penalty: Whether respondent sheriff's acts constitute simple neglect of duty or the graver offenses of abuse of authority and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and what the appropriate penalty should be.

• Procedural Compliance in Writ Execution: Yes. Respondent sheriff ran afoul of Section 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court by enforcing the writ without the required notice and before the expiration of the three-working-day period.
• Proper Classification and Penalty: Simple neglect of duty. The violation was not tainted with malice or bad faith; the minimum penalty was imposed in light of the mitigating circumstance, converted to a fine equivalent to one month and one day of respondent's salary.

• Procedural Compliance in Writ Execution: It is hornbook law that a sheriff who enforces a writ without the required notice or before the expiration of the three-day period violates Section 10(c), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. That provision requires the officer to demand that the person against whom the judgment for delivery or restitution of real property is rendered, and all persons claiming rights under him, peaceably vacate the property within three working days and restore possession to the judgment obligee; only after such period may the officer oust them with assistance if necessary. While respondent sheriff's duty to implement the writ was ministerial, it was equally his mandated duty to first demand that PI One peaceably vacate the subject lot within three working days after service of the writ. The OCA correctly found that the Order to restore possession was directed at PI One, not at respondent sheriff; that respondent sheriff should have served a copy of the writ on PI One and accorded it reasonable time to comply; and that he should not have immediately taken possession and placed MADCI in possession on the very day of the writ's issuance without prior notice to PI One's counsel. Notice to the client and not to counsel of record is not notice at all. The requirement of notice is based on the rudimentary tenets of justice and fair play.
• Proper Classification and Penalty: Failure to observe the requirements of Section 10(c), Rule 39 constitutes simple neglect of duty, a less grave offense punishable by one month and one day to six months suspension under Section 52(6)(1) of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS). Under Section 49(a), Rule 10 of the RRACCS, the minimum penalty is imposed where only mitigating and no aggravating circumstances are present. The OCA appreciated the mitigating circumstance that respondent's violation was not so grave and was unattended by malice or bad faith. Accordingly, suspension for one month and one day was the appropriate penalty. However, because suspension would not be practical as respondent's work would be left unattended, and because sheriffs discharge frontline functions, a fine may be imposed in lieu of suspension pursuant to Section 47(1)(b) and Sections 47(2) and (6), Rule 10 of the RRACCS. The fine was set at the equivalent of one month and one day of respondent's salary, computed on the basis of his salary at the time the decision becomes final and executory.

• Sheriff's Ministerial Duty to Execute Writs with Procedural Compliance — A sheriff's duty to implement a writ is purely ministerial, but this ministerial character does not exempt the sheriff from the obligation to scrupulously observe and comply with the Rules of Court in implementing court orders, writs, and processes. Specifically, under Section 10(c), Rule 39, the sheriff must demand that the person against whom the judgment for delivery or restitution of real property is rendered peaceably vacate within three working days, and only thereafter may the sheriff oust such persons. Failure to observe these requirements constitutes simple neglect of duty.
• Notice to Counsel as Notice to Client — Notice to the client and not to the counsel of record is not notice at all within the meaning of the law. The requirement of notice is based on the rudimentary tenets of justice and fair play. A sheriff must serve the writ on the adverse party's counsel of record and accord reasonable time and opportunity to comply before proceeding with execution.
• Fine in Lieu of Suspension for Frontline Personnel — Under Section 47(1)(b), Rule 10 of the RRACCS, when the respondent is actually discharging frontline functions or those directly dealing with the public and the personnel complement of the office is insufficient, the disciplining authority may allow payment of a fine in place of suspension. The fine is computed on the basis of respondent's salary at the time the decision becomes final and executory, at the ratio of one day of suspension to one day of fine.

• "A sheriff who enforces the writ without the required notice or before the expiration of the three-day period runs afoul with Section 10(c) of Rule 39." — This passage states the controlling rule on a sheriff's duty to observe the notice and three-day demand period before executing a writ for delivery or restitution of real property.
• "while it is settled that respondent sheriff's duty to implement the writ was ministerial, it is equally settled that it was respondent sheriff's mandated duty to first demand that PI One peaceably vacate the subject lot within three working days after service of the writ." — This passage clarifies that the ministerial nature of a sheriff's duty does not dispense with procedural prerequisites of notice and demand.
• "respondent sheriff should not have immediately taken possession of the subject lot and should not have placed MADCI in possession thereof on the very day of the issuance of the writ of execution, without prior notice to PI One's counsel" — This passage, drawn from the OCA's findings as adopted by the Court, identifies the specific act constituting the neglect of duty: same-day execution without notice to counsel.

• Calaunan vs. Madolaria, 657 Phil. 9 (2011) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the proposition that failure to observe the requirements of Section 10(c), Rule 39 constitutes simple neglect of duty, a less grave offense punishable by one month and one day to six months suspension.
• Sabijon vs. De Juan, 752 Phil. 110 (2015) — Cited for the principle that a sheriff's duty to execute a writ is ministerial.
• Mariñas vs. Florendo, 598 Phil. 322 (2009) — Cited for the proposition that suspension may be impractical as the respondent's work would be left unattended, for which reason a fine may be imposed instead.
• Cabigao vs. Nery, 719 Phil. 475 (2013) — Cited for the rule that because sheriffs discharge frontline functions, a fine may be imposed in lieu of suspension under Section 47(1)(b), Rule 10 of the RRACCS.

• Section 10(c), Rule 39, Rules of Court — Governs execution of judgments for delivery or restitution of real property. Requires the officer to demand that the person against whom the judgment is rendered peaceably vacate within three working days before ouster. The Court found respondent sheriff violated this provision by executing the writ without notice and without waiting for the three-day period to lapse.
• Section 2, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Relates to notice requirements; cited in connection with the obligation to serve notice on the adverse party's counsel of record.
• Section 52(6)(1), Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) — Classifies simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense punishable by one month and one day to six months suspension.
• Section 46(D)(1), Rule 10, RRACCS — Classifies simple neglect of duty as a less grave offense, punishable by suspension for one month and one day to six months for the first offense, and dismissal for the second offense.
• Section 49(a), Rule 10, RRACCS — Provides that the minimum penalty shall be imposed where only mitigating and no aggravating circumstances are present.
• Section 47(1)(b), Rule 10, RRACCS — Allows payment of fine in lieu of suspension when the respondent is discharging frontline functions and the office personnel complement is insufficient.
• Section 47(2) and (6), Rule 10, RRACCS — Provides the guidelines for the penalty of fine, including the ratio of one day suspension to one day fine, and computation based on respondent's salary at the time the decision becomes final and executory.

Leonardo-De Castro, C.J., Jardeleza, J., and Tijam, J., concurred. Bersamin, J., was on official leave.