Manahan vs. Bernardo

The filing with the COMELEC of a petition to annul or suspend a proclamation suspends the running of the period within which to file an election protest, and a trial court’s order to recount ballots upon a protest’s allegations of irregularities is a ministerial duty under Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code; no independent proof of irregularities is required before opening the ballot boxes.

Ireneo A. Manahan and Abundia L. Garcia were rival candidates for the mayoralty of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 11, 1995, Garcia filed a petition with the COMELEC (SPA No. 95-180) to suspend the canvass of election returns because of alleged irregularities, but Manahan was proclaimed the winning candidate later that day after the canvass was completed. Garcia subsequently filed two more petitions with the COMELEC: one to declare Manahan’s proclamation null and void (SPC No. 95-058, filed May 12, 1995), and an appeal seeking the exclusion of election returns and the annulment of the proclamation (SPC No. 95-089, filed May 16, 1995). All three petitions were eventually dismissed on the ground that the alleged irregularities were proper subjects of an election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy.

• The Elections and Proclamation: Ireneo A. Manahan and Abundia L. Garcia were candidates for mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija, in the May 8, 1995 elections. On May 11, 1995, Garcia filed a petition with the COMELEC (SPA No. 95-180) to suspend the canvass of election returns, alleging that Manahan had committed irregularities such as the snatching and burning of ballot boxes and preventing Garcia’s watchers from closely observing the proceedings. The canvass was nevertheless completed that same day, and Manahan was proclaimed the winning candidate for mayor.

• Garcia’s Pre-Proclamation Petitions: On May 12, 1995, Garcia filed a second petition with the COMELEC (SPC No. 95-058) seeking to declare Manahan’s proclamation null and void. On May 16, 1995, she filed an appeal with the COMELEC (SPC No. 95-089) praying for the exclusion of election returns from eighteen precincts and for the annulment of the proclamation. The COMELEC dismissed SPC No. 95-089 on May 24, 1995, ruling that the allegations of snatching of ballot boxes, exclusion of watchers, and delay in delivery of ballot boxes were proper grounds for an election protest, not a pre-proclamation controversy. It found that the alleged threats and intimidation in the preparation of election returns were unsubstantiated, and that formal defects did not affect the returns’ genuineness. The dismissal was without prejudice to the seasonable filing of an election protest. SPC No. 95-058 was dismissed on May 26, 1995, and SPA No. 95-180 on June 29, 1995, on substantially the same grounds. Garcia received a copy of the resolution in SPC No. 95-089 on May 30, 1995.

• The Election Protest before the RTC: On June 5, 1995, Garcia filed a Petition Ad Cautelum before the Regional Trial Court of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 34, docketed as Election Protest No. 95-04. The protest sought: (a) recount or revision of ballots in numerous specified precincts; (b) nullification of the Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of Manahan; (c) declaration of Garcia as the duly elected mayor after recount; (d) moral damages of ₱1,000,000.00; and (e) attorney’s fees of ₱1,000,000.00 plus costs. As grounds, she alleged rampant switching and stuffing of ballot boxes with fake ballots, misappreciation, misreading, and non-reading of ballots cast in her favor, multiple and inaccurate counting of votes for Manahan, erroneous computation of votes, and widespread irregularities in the conduct of the election.

• Manahan’s Objections and the Trial Court’s Orders: Manahan filed a Motion to Dismiss, Supplemental Motion to Dismiss, and a Motion to Declare Petition Ad Cautelum Automatically Dismissed. He argued that the protest was filed beyond the ten-day reglementary period under Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code (the proclamation having been made on May 11, 1995, and the protest filed only on June 5, 1995), that it stated no cause of action, and that Garcia was not entitled to a judicial recount. In an Order dated April 23, 1996, respondent Judge Arturo M. Bernardo denied all three motions. The trial court ruled that the filing of Garcia’s pre-proclamation petitions with the COMELEC suspended the running of the prescriptive period under Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code; consequently, the protest was timely filed. The court further ordered the recount of ballots in the contested precincts and directed Garcia to make a cash deposit of ₱300.00 for every ballot box. The subsequent motion for reconsideration and a second motion for reconsideration were denied.

• Prior Certiorari Proceedings: Earlier, Manahan had sought the inhibition of Judge Bernardo; upon denial, he elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 39492), which was dismissed on March 29, 1996. His further petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 124423) was dismissed on May 28, 1996, on the ground that certiorari was not the proper remedy and that no reversible error was committed.

• Prescription of the Election Protest: Petitioner maintained that Garcia’s election protest was filed on June 5, 1995, twenty-five days after his proclamation on May 11, 1995, thus clearly beyond the ten-day reglementary period prescribed by Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code for contests involving municipal offices.

• Entitlement to Judicial Recount: Petitioner argued that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion by ordering the opening of ballot boxes and the recounting of votes without first requiring Garcia to adduce proof of the alleged irregularities, insisting that the bare allegations of the protest were insufficient.

• Tolling of Prescriptive Period: Respondent countered that the ten-day period was suspended by the filing of her three petitions with the COMELEC—all aimed at annulling or suspending the proclamation—pursuant to Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code. Because the last of those petitions was resolved on May 24, 1995 and she received the resolution on May 30, 1995, her protest filed on June 5, 1995 fell well within the remaining period.

• Sufficiency of Allegations for Recount: Respondent maintained that Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code allows the court to order an examination and recount of ballots whenever the allegations of a protest so warrant; the specific irregularities pleaded—switching and stuffing of ballot boxes, misappreciation of ballots, and erroneous counting—directly required a perusal of the ballots, making an immediate recount proper without further evidentiary showing.

• Prescription: Whether the election protest was filed within the ten-day reglementary period under Section 251 of the Omnibus Election Code, considering that Garcia had previously filed pre-proclamation petitions with the COMELEC seeking to annul or suspend Manahan’s proclamation.

• Propriety of Recount Order: Whether the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in ordering the revision and recounting of ballots based solely on the allegations of the protest, without requiring the protestant to first present independent proof of the alleged irregularities.

• Prescription: The protest was timely filed. Section 248 of the Omnibus Election Code expressly suspends the running of the period for filing an election protest upon the filing with the COMELEC of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of a candidate. Garcia’s three petitions—to suspend canvass (filed before proclamation), to annul proclamation, and to exclude returns—all sought to halt or undo the proclamation. The last of these petitions (SPC No. 95-089) was dismissed on May 24, 1995, and Garcia received the resolution on May 30, 1995. The ten-day period had not yet elapsed when she filed her election protest on June 5, 1995. The suspension under Section 248 applies regardless of the merits of the pre-proclamation petitions.

• Propriety of Recount Order: No grave abuse of discretion attended the order for recount. Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that where allegations in a protest so warrant, or whenever the interests of justice require, the court shall immediately order the ballot boxes brought before it and the ballots examined and recounted. The provision does not demand that the protestant first present evidence beyond the allegations; to hold otherwise would give the protestee an opportunity to delay and defeat the protest through lengthy cross-examination and presentation of contrary evidence. The allegations of switching and stuffing of ballot boxes, misappreciation and non-reading of ballots, multiple counting, and erroneous computation plainly required a perusal and counting of the ballots. Consequently, the trial court’s order was a mere performance of its ministerial duty under Section 255, consistent with settled doctrine in Crispino v. Panganiban and Astorga v. Fernandez.

• Suspension of Prescriptive Period under Section 248, Omnibus Election Code — The filing with the COMELEC of a petition to annul or to suspend the proclamation of any candidate suspends the running of the period within which to file an election protest or quo warranto proceeding. The suspension takes effect upon filing and the prescriptive period resumes only upon final resolution of the pre-proclamation petition. In this case, the doctrine was applied to hold that Garcia’s three COMELEC petitions tolled the ten-day period, making her election protest filed on June 5, 1995 timely.

• Ministerial Duty to Order Recount under Section 255, Omnibus Election Code — Where an election protest contains allegations that would require the perusal, examination, or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the recounting of votes. No independent proof of the alleged irregularities is required before the court acts, as requiring such proof would afford the protestee an instrument to delay the resolution of the election contest. The doctrine finds its basis in the rationale that the simplest, most expeditious, and best means to determine the truth or falsity of such allegations is to open the ballot box and examine its contents.

• “Obviously the simplest, the most expeditious and the best means to determine the truth or falsity of this allegation is to open the ballot box and examine its contents. To require parol or other evidence on said alleged irregularity before opening said box, would have merely given the protestee ample opportunity to delay the settlement of the controversy, through lengthy cross-examination of the witnesses for the protestant and the presentation of testimonial evidence for the protestee to the contrary.” (quoting Astorga v. Fernandez)

• “Time and again, this Supreme Court has declared in numerous cases that, when there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal, examination, or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein.” (quoting Crispino v. Panganiban)

• Astorga v. Fernandez, 19 SCRA 331 (1967) — Followed; established that allegations of irregularities requiring opening of ballot boxes are sufficient for a recount, and requiring further evidence would unduly delay the protest.
• Crispino v. Panganiban, 219 SCRA 621 (1993) — Followed; reiterated the ministerial duty of trial courts to order a recount upon allegations in an election protest that necessitate examination of ballots.
• Pareja v. Narvasa, 81 Phil. 22 (1948) — Cited in Crispino; supports the same ministerial-duty rule.
• Cecilio v. Belmonte — Cited in Astorga; stands for the proposition that requiring parol evidence before opening ballot boxes would sanction an easy way to defeat a protest.

• Section 251, Omnibus Election Code — Prescribes a ten-day period after proclamation for filing an election contest involving municipal offices. The period was suspended, not violated.
• Section 248, Omnibus Election Code — Provides that the filing of a petition to annul or to suspend a proclamation with the COMELEC suspends the running of the period to file an election protest. Applied to toll the prescriptive period while Garcia’s pre-proclamation petitions were pending.
• Section 255, Omnibus Election Code — Judicial counting of votes in election contests; authorizes the court to immediately order the examination and recount of ballots where allegations in a protest so warrant or in the interest of justice. Served as the statutory basis for upholding the trial court’s recount order without independent proof.

Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Francisco, and Martinez, JJ., concur. Panganiban, J., took no part.