Managuelod vs. People

A conviction under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused bore, carried, or transported a firearm or other deadly weapon during the election period and in a public place; bladed instruments are included in "other deadly weapons," but an uncorroborated and unreliable showing of possession, including failure to present the marked corpus delicti, cannot sustain conviction. Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 is no longer applicable because its rationale ceased, but a charge under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 may still stand.

The petitioner, Arsenio Managuelod y Tandayu, and the respondent, the People of the Philippines, are the parties to this criminal case. Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 amended Presidential Decree No. 9, a martial-law measure enacted to curtail subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder under Proclamation No. 1081. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 amended Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code and prohibits bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places during the election period unless authorized in writing by the Commission on Elections. COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 implemented that prohibition for the 2019 National and Local Elections and specified that "deadly weapon" includes bladed instruments, except when possession is necessary to the possessor's occupation or used as a tool for legitimate activity.

On March 18, 2019, around 11:30 p.m., Giero D. Tumabao, manager of Hometel Inn in Mercedes Village, Barangay Leonarda, Tuguegarao City, saw petitioner Arsenio Managuelod y Tandayu with a sling bag climbing up the hotel's concrete fence and onto the railings of the upper portion of the building. Tumabao called the police. When SPO2 Edmar Allam and PO1 Patrocinio Lappay of the Tuguegarao City Police Station arrived, Managuelod was still standing on the railings. They arrested him and apprised him of his constitutional rights.

According to the prosecution, after the arrest, SPO2 Allam saw a knife handle protruding from Managuelod's blue sling bag with the brand "Jansport." PO1 Lappay searched the bag and confiscated a knife with a camouflage holster. He marked the fabric handle of the knife with his initials "PBL." The police officers brought Managuelod, Tumabao, and the seized items to the Tuguegarao City Police Station. PSSg Edwin Pagulayan interviewed Tumabao for his report while photos of Managuelod and the seized items were taken. These items were later presented and identified in court by PO1 Lappay.

Managuelod gave a different account. He testified that on March 18, 2019, he was driving his motorcycle along the road beside Hometel Inn. When he stopped to urinate, two men on board a motorcycle approached and asked him what he was doing there. He replied that he was merely urinating, but one of the men suddenly drew a firearm and ordered him to raise his hands. The man called for back-up through the radio and said "may taong suspicious dito, kailangan maimbestigahan. Baka [isa] ito sa grupo na nagnakaw kay Judge." The men handcuffed him and brought him to the police station.

At trial, PO1 Lappay testified that the knife presented in court was the same knife he confiscated from Managuelod. When confronted with the absence of markings on the knife's handle, the prosecution explained that the ink from the pen used to write the marking may have already been absorbed by the fabric of the handle, given that it was presented in court more than a year after its seizure. The photograph of the knife in the records, however, did not appear to bear any marking on its handle, although the prosecution alleged that the photograph was taken right after the knife had already been marked.

The other prosecution witness, PSSg Pagulayan, was not present during Managuelod's arrest and the seizure of the alleged knife. As investigating officer, he did not go to Hometel Inn to investigate or to interview the apprehending and seizing officers, SPO2 Allam and PO1 Lappay. He conducted his investigation based solely on his interview with Tumabao. Tumabao was not presented as a witness; the prosecution's witnesses were PO1 Lappay and PSSg Pagulayan, while Managuelod was the lone defense witness.

The trial court found that Managuelod carried a deadly weapon in a public place during the 2019 election period without the necessary authority, and that the seizing officers showed no improper or ill motive to falsify evidence against him. The Court of Appeals sustained these findings.

• Failure to Prove Possession: Petitioner argued that he must be acquitted because the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he possessed a knife during the election period in a public place; PO1 Lappay's testimony on how he allegedly saw a knife protruding from petitioner's bag was highly incredible.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioner maintained that the credibility of the prosecution witnesses is questionable and that the prosecution's version of how he was allegedly seen with a knife and subsequently arrested is highly incredible.
• Failure to Present Tumabao: Petitioner argued that the prosecution should have presented Tumabao, the manager of Hometel Inn, to corroborate the testimonies of the police officers.
• Necessity for Profession: Petitioner argued that the prosecution failed to prove that a knife is unnecessary for his profession as a driver.
• Public Place: Petitioner argued that Hometel Inn is a private place.
• Inadmissibility of Seized Knife: Petitioner argued that the seized knife is inadmissible because it did not contain any markings as alleged by the prosecution when it was presented in court.

• Burden on Accused: The Office of the Solicitor General countered that under the law, Managuelod has the burden to show that his possession of a deadly weapon during the election period was necessary for his profession.
• Explanation for Lack of Marking: As for the lack of marking on the knife, the Office of the Solicitor General argued that the prosecution sufficiently explained that the ink of the marking may have already been absorbed by the fabric of the handle since more than a year had elapsed from the time of marking to its presentation as evidence in court.
• Presumption of Regularity: The Office of the Solicitor General argued that PO1 Lappay enjoys the presumption of regularity in the performance of his official duty.

• Applicable Law and Validity of Charge: Whether Managuelod was properly charged under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, the Omnibus Election Code, and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 despite the prosecution's erroneous invocation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6.
• Definition of "Other Deadly Weapons": Whether a bladed instrument, such as the knife allegedly possessed by Managuelod, is included in the term "other deadly weapons" under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that Managuelod carried a deadly weapon in a public place during the election period.

• Applicable Law and Validity of Charge: Yes. Despite the prosecution's erroneous invocation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6, which is no longer applicable, Managuelod was properly charged under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, the Omnibus Election Code, and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446.
• Definition of "Other Deadly Weapons": Yes. Bladed instruments are included in "other deadly weapons" under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 because they are capable of producing death or serious bodily injury.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: No. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Managuelod carried a deadly weapon in a public place during the election period; the evidence on the alleged knife's seizure was uncorroborated and unreliable.

• Applicable Law and Validity of Charge: Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 amended Presidential Decree No. 9, which was enacted to curtail subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder under Proclamation No. 1081. Because the rationale for Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 had ceased, the law itself ceased under the maxim cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex; People vs. Purisima held that Presidential Decree No. 9 was limited to acts of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to Proclamation No. 1081. The prosecution therefore erroneously charged Managuelod with a "dead law." Nevertheless, the Information also charged violation of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, in relation to the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446. Section 32 prohibits bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places during the election period unless authorized in writing by the Commission on Elections, and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 implemented that provision for the 2019 elections. Thus, Managuelod was properly charged under Republic Act No. 7166, the Omnibus Election Code, and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446.
• Definition of "Other Deadly Weapons": Republic Act No. 7166 does not define "other deadly weapons," so the Court applied statutory construction. The common denominator between firearms and other deadly weapons in Section 32 is their ability to cause fatal consequences. A deadly weapon is defined as any firearm, or other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Bladed instruments have that common denominator and are included in "other deadly weapons" because they are deadly weapons other than firearms. The Legislature has long considered bladed instruments as deadly weapons, as shown by Act No. 1780, Section 26, which made it unlawful to carry concealed any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon. Resort to statutes in pari materia was warranted, as explained in Yaphockun vs. Professional Regulation Commission. COMELEC Resolution No. 10446, Section 1(l), Rule 1, also expressly includes bladed instruments in the term "deadly weapon," except when possession is necessary to the occupation of the possessor or when used as a tool for legitimate activity. The knife allegedly found in Managuelod's possession is therefore within the purview of Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: To secure conviction under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; (b) such possession occurs during the election period; and (c) the weapon is carried in a public place. Possession of the deadly weapon in a public place must be established beyond reasonable doubt. Although the Court is not a trier of facts and only questions of law may generally be raised under Rule 45, an exception applies when the lower court ignored, overlooked, or misconstrued relevant facts that would change the outcome. Here, reasonable doubt existed as to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies alleging that Managuelod was seen carrying a knife on top of Hometel Inn. The prosecution alleged that when SPO2 Allam and PO1 Lappay arrested Managuelod, they saw a knife's handle protruding from his sling bag; PO1 Lappay confiscated the knife and marked its handle with his initials "PBL." At trial, PO1 Lappay testified that the knife presented in court was the same knife he confiscated, but when confronted with the absence of markings on the handle, he admitted there was no marking and the prosecution explained that the ink may have been absorbed by the fabric. The photograph of the knife in the records did not appear to bear any marking on its handle, although the prosecution alleged that the photograph was taken right after the knife had already been marked. In Cardona vs. People, the prosecution's failure to present the physical evidence of the corpus delicti in a case for violation of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to the Omnibus Election Code resulted in acquittal; similarly, the failure to present the marked knife cast serious doubt on Managuelod's guilt. This also degraded PO1 Lappay's credibility. There was no other corroborating testimony as to the alleged seizure of a knife from Managuelod. The only other prosecution witness, PSSg Pagulayan, was not present during the arrest and seizure; he did not go to Hometel Inn to investigate or to interview SPO2 Allam and PO1 Lappay, and he conducted his investigation based solely on his interview with Tumabao. In Gonzales vs. People, the accused was acquitted for the prosecution's failure to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he was holding a knife in a public place, because there was no corroboration and the evidence was inconsistent. PO1 Lappay's inconsistent testimony, the lack of marking on the physical evidence, and the lack of corroborating evidence as to the knife's seizure all cast serious doubt on Managuelod's guilt, since it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty whether he truly possessed a knife when he was caught climbing the concrete fence and railings of Hometel Inn. The prosecution failed to overcome the burden of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt and to overcome the presumption of innocence, so acquittal was warranted.

• Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex — When the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases. The Court applied this maxim to Batas Pambansa Blg. 6, which amended Presidential Decree No. 9, a martial-law measure enacted to curtail subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder under Proclamation No. 1081. Because that rationale had ceased, Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was no longer applicable.
• In pari materia — Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, the same class of persons or things, or the same object or subject matter. They must be interpreted not only consistently with themselves but also harmonized with other laws on the same subject to form a complete, coherent, and intelligible system. The Court applied this principle to interpret "other deadly weapons" under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166 by harmonizing it with Act No. 1780 and COMELEC Resolution No. 10446.
• "Other deadly weapons" under Section 32, Republic Act No. 7166 — The term includes firearms and other deadly weapons, the common denominator being their ability to cause fatal consequences. A deadly weapon is any firearm, or other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Bladed instruments are included. COMELEC Resolution No. 10446 expressly includes bladed instruments, except when possession is necessary to the occupation of the possessor or when used as a tool for legitimate activity.
• Elements of violation of Section 32, Republic Act No. 7166 — The prosecution must prove: (a) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; (b) such possession occurs during the election period; and (c) the weapon is carried in a public place. Possession of the deadly weapon in a public place must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
• Corpus delicti and physical evidence — The prosecution's failure to present the physical evidence of the corpus delicti, such as the allegedly marked knife, casts serious doubt on the guilt of the accused. The Court relied on Cardona vs. People, where failure to present the physical evidence of the corpus delicti in a case for violation of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to the Omnibus Election Code resulted in acquittal.
• Presumption of innocence and burden of proof — The burden is on the prosecution to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused. Failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt merits acquittal. The Court cited Daayata vs. People in applying this principle.
• Credibility and corroboration — Uncorroborated testimony and inconsistencies between a witness's testimony and the physical evidence degrade the witness's credibility and may create reasonable doubt. The Court cited Gonzales vs. People, where the accused was acquitted because the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he was holding a knife in a public place, there was no corroboration, and the evidence was inconsistent.

• "Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex. When the reason for the law ceases, the law itself ceases." — The Court used this maxim to hold that Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was no longer applicable because the rationale for its enactment, the curtailment of public disorder during martial law, had already ceased.
• "A deadly weapon is defined as "any firearm, or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury." — The Court used this definition to conclude that bladed instruments are included in the phrase "other deadly weapons" under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166.
• "In order to secure a conviction of an accused under Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166, the prosecution must prove that: (a) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; (b) such possession occurs during the election period; and (c) the weapon is carried in a public place. It is essential that possession of the deadly weapon in a public place be established beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage states the elements of the offense and the quantum of proof required for conviction.
• "PO1 Lappay's inconsistent testimony, the lack of marking on the physical evidence presented before the trial court, and the lack of any corroborating evidence as to the knife's seizure all cast serious doubt on the guilt of Managuelod since it cannot be determined with reasonable certainty whether he truly possessed a knife when he was caught climbing the concrete fence and railings of the Hometel Inn." — This passage encapsulates the Court's ratio for acquitting Managuelod on reasonable doubt.

• People vs. Purisima, 176 Phil. 186 (1978) — The Court held that Presidential Decree No. 9, taking into consideration its intent and spirit, is limited to acts of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to Proclamation No. 1081. This supported the conclusion that Batas Pambansa Blg. 6, which amended Presidential Decree No. 9, was no longer applicable.
• Gonzales vs. People, 826 Phil. 190 (2018) — The accused was acquitted for the prosecution's failure to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he was holding a knife in a public place; there was no corroboration of the police officer's testimony, and the information and physical evidence contradicted the testimony. The Court followed this precedent in finding reasonable doubt.
• Cardona vs. People, 876 Phil. 265 (2020) — The prosecution's failure to present the physical evidence of the corpus delicti in a case for violation of Republic Act No. 7166 in relation to the Omnibus Election Code resulted in the accused's acquittal. The Court applied this ruling to the missing marking on the knife.
• Yaphockun vs. Professional Regulation Commission, 899 Phil. 554 (2021) — The Court explained the rule on statutes in pari materia, which was cited to justify interpreting "other deadly weapons" in Republic Act No. 7166 in harmony with other laws on the same subject.
• Daayata vs. People, 807 Phil. 102 (2017) — Cited for the principle that the burden is on the prosecution to overcome the presumption of innocence of the accused.
• Light Rail Transit Authority vs. City of Pasay, G.R. No. 211299, June 28, 2022 — Cited for the maxim cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.
• Victoria vs. COMELEC, 299 Phil. 262 (1994) — Cited for the rule that when a statute is clear, there is no room for interpretation.
• Garma vs. People, G.R. No. 248317, March 16, 2022 — Cited for the exception to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, namely, when the lower court ignored, overlooked, or misconstrued relevant facts.

• Batas Pambansa Blg. 6, Section 1 — It is unlawful to carry outside one's residence any bladed, pointed, or blunt weapon such as "knife," "spear," "pana," "dagger," "bolo," "barong," "kris," or "chako," except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood or in pursuit of a lawful activity. The Court held that this law is no longer applicable because the rationale for its enactment had ceased.
• Presidential Decree No. 9 — Enacted to curtail subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder under Proclamation No. 1081. The Court held that Presidential Decree No. 9 is limited to acts of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation connected with or related to Proclamation No. 1081.
• Republic Act No. 7166, Section 32 — During the election period, no person shall bear, carry, or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle, or public conveyance, even if licensed to possess or carry the same, unless authorized in writing by the Commission. Only regular members or officers of the Philippine National Police, the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other enforcement agencies of the Government who are duly deputized in writing by the Commission for election duty may be authorized to carry and possess firearms during the election period. The Court applied this provision and enumerated its elements.
• Omnibus Election Code, Section 261 — Amended by Section 32 of Republic Act No. 7166; it is the source of the prohibition on bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons during the election period. The Court referenced this provision in holding that Managuelod was properly charged under Republic Act No. 7166.
• COMELEC Resolution No. 10446, Section 1(l), Rule 1 — Defines "deadly weapon" to include bladed instruments, hand grenades, or other explosives, except pyrotechnics; provided that a bladed instrument is not covered by the prohibition when possession of the bladed instrument is necessary to the occupation of the possessor or when it is used as a tool for legitimate activity. The Court applied this definition to include the knife allegedly possessed by Managuelod.
• Act No. 1780, Section 26 — It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon; provided that the prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have secured a license therefor or who are entitled to carry the same under the provisions of the Act. The Court cited this law to show that the Legislature has long considered bladed instruments as deadly weapons.
• Rules of Court, Rule 45 — A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may generally raise only questions of law. One exception is when the lower court had ignored, overlooked, or misconstrued relevant facts, which if taken into consideration will change the outcome of the case. The Court applied this exception.

Leonen, SAJ (Chairperson), M. Lopez, J. Lopez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concur.