Mamadsual vs. Moson

A complaint alleging ownership and actual possession since time immemorial states an action to quiet title that is imprescriptible while the plaintiffs remain in possession; the plaintiff need not be the registered owner because title may connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner. The Shari'a courts apply the Rules of Court suppletorily, so a ground for dismissal pleaded as an affirmative defense may be heard even though a motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading.

The Mamadsual spouses and the Macarapan spouses are the opposing parties in a dispute over land in Cotabato City, with the Register of Deeds of Cotabato impleaded as a nominal party. Civil cases before the Shari'a District Courts are governed by the Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a, under which the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in civil cases. The governing procedural framework is the Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a, under which the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in civil cases.

The Mamadsual spouses sued the Macarapan spouses and the Register of Deeds of Cotabato over two parcels covered by Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-138. On November 14, 1988, the Mamadsuals filed with the Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District at Cotabato City a complaint for "Quieting of Title To Property, Annulment of Original Certificates of Title Nos. P-122 and P-138, and Damages, With Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction," impleading the Register of Deeds as a nominal party. They alleged actual, continuous, and adverse possession of the land since time immemorial in the concept of owners, and that the Macarapans had recently disturbed that possession by surreptitiously constructing dikes.

Private respondents filed their answer dated December 1, 1988. After issues were joined, a pre-trial conference was held on March 14, 1989, where Presiding Judge Hon. Corocoy D. Moson issued a pre-trial order defining the issues and directing the parties to submit statements (shudhud) of at least two competent witnesses on the issues defined at the pre-trial conference and other evidence (bayyina) setting forth the facts and the law relied upon within ten days from notice. Petitioners filed the required sworn statements on April 17, 1989, but private respondents did not.

The case was set for trial on the merits on May 22, 1989, but it was postponed at the instance of private respondents; other settings were postponed for one reason or another. On July 4, 1989, private respondents filed a pleading designated as "Amplification of Affirmative or Special Defenses with Prayer for Dismissal of Complaint On the Ground of Lack of Jurisdiction."

On November 7, 1989, the trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint; the order noted that title over the land is registered in the names of the defendants. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on January 29, 1990, and they filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

• Special Rules of Procedure: Petitioners argued that the lower court should not have considered private respondents' pleading, which was in effect a motion to dismiss, as it is a pleading disallowed under Section 13 of the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a.
• Jurisdiction and Proper Parties: Petitioners maintained that the trial court had jurisdiction and erred in ruling that they were not proper parties; they claimed they were real parties in interest because they would be benefited by the judgment or entitled to the avails of the suit in their own right.
• Prescription: Petitioners contended that since they were in possession of the land, an action to quiet title does not prescribe.
• Cause of Action / Title: Petitioners argued that the complaint stated a cause of action because the title they referred to meant legal title or ownership or dominion over the land acquired from their ancestors by operation of the law on succession, not registered ownership.

• Lack of Title: Private respondents sought dismissal on the ground that petitioners have no title to the property, hence their action to quiet title is not proper.
• Improper Parties: Private respondents sought dismissal on the ground that petitioners are not the proper parties to ask for the annulment or cancellation of the certificates of title.
• Prescription: Private respondents sought dismissal on the ground that the action, being based on an implied trust, has already prescribed.
• Procedural Objection: Private respondents cited Heirs of Olivas vs. Judge Flor to argue that a motion to dismiss filed after an answer had already been submitted within the reglementary period is not the pleading prohibited by the Rules on Summary Procedure, and observed that Section 13 of the Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a is lifted from the Rules on Summary Procedure.

• Procedural Rules in Shari'a Courts: Whether the Shari'a District Court erred in acting on private respondents' pleading, which was in effect a motion to dismiss, despite Section 13 of the Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a.
• Proper Parties / Jurisdiction: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction because petitioners were not the proper parties to bring the action.
• Prescription: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the action had prescribed.
• Cause of Action / Legal or Equitable Title: Whether the trial court erred in ruling that the complaint had no cause of action because petitioners had no legal or equitable title to the land.

• Procedural Rules in Shari'a Courts: No. Section 16 of the Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a makes the Rules of Court suppletory in civil cases, and Section 5, Rule 16 allows dismissal grounds to be pleaded as affirmative defenses; the prohibition is against a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer that causes delay.
• Proper Parties / Jurisdiction: Yes. The complaint was one for quieting title, not reversion; petitioners claimed title by prescription, which effectively withdrew the property from the public domain and made it private property, so the Solicitor General was not the only proper party.
• Prescription: Yes. An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession; petitioners alleged actual, continuous, and adverse possession since time immemorial in the concept of owners.
• Cause of Action / Legal or Equitable Title: Yes. The plaintiff in a quieting-title action need not be the registered owner; legal or equitable title or interest suffices, and title may connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner.

• Procedural Rules in Shari'a Courts: Section 16 of the Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a expressly provides that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner in civil cases. Section 5, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allows any ground for dismissal, except improper venue, to be pleaded as an affirmative defense, with a preliminary hearing as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. The trial court therefore properly set the case for hearing on the affirmative defenses in private respondents' answer. The Ijra proscribes only a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer that would stop the period to answer and cause undue delay; since private respondents had already filed their answer on December 1, 1988, their July 4, 1989 pleading was not the prohibited motion. Heirs of Ricardo Olivas vs. Flor applied the same distinction under the Rules on Summary Procedure.
• Proper Parties / Jurisdiction: The trial court dismissed on the ground that the action had prescribed and observed that, as one for reversion to the state, it should be brought by the Solicitor General. A reading of the complaint shows it is an action for quieting title: petitioners alleged actual, continuous, and adverse possession since time immemorial in the concept of owners. Since petitioners claim to have acquired title by prescription, the property was effectively withdrawn from the public domain and became property of private ownership. The ruling that only the Solicitor General could institute the action as one for reversion has no cogent basis.
• Prescription: An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property. In Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana, the SC applied the rule, made applicable by Article 480 of the New Civil Code, that the right to quiet title is not barred while the plaintiff or grantors remain in actual possession claiming to be owners; the owner may wait until possession is disturbed or title is attacked. Petitioners alleged actual, continuous, and adverse possession since time immemorial and recent disturbance by private respondents' surreptitious construction of dikes. The statute of limitations was therefore not available as a defense.
• Cause of Action / Legal or Equitable Title: Article 477 of the Civil Code requires the plaintiff in a quieting-title action to have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property, but it does not require registered ownership. In Chacon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, the SC treated as an action for quieting title a complaint alleging ownership and actual possession since time immemorial by the plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest, while the defendants secured a certificate of title through fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit. Title does not necessarily mean the original transfer certificate of title; it can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner. One with an equitable right or interest may also file the action.

• Action to Quiet Title — Imprescriptibility in Possession — An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiff is in actual possession claiming ownership; the owner may wait until possession is disturbed or title is attacked. The SC applied this because petitioners alleged possession since time immemorial and disturbance by dikes.
• Title for Quieting Title Need Not Be Registered Ownership — The plaintiff need not be the registered owner; legal or equitable title or interest suffices, and title may connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner. The SC applied this to hold the complaint stated a cause of action.
• Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court in Shari'a Courts — Under Section 16 of the Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a, the Rules of Court apply suppletorily in civil cases; under Section 5, Rule 16, dismissal grounds may be pleaded as affirmative defenses and heard preliminarily. The SC applied this to private respondents' pleading filed after answer.
• Prohibition on Motion to Dismiss in Shari'a Courts — The Ijra proscribes a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer that would stop the period to answer and cause undue delay. The SC applied this to hold that private respondents' amplification, filed after their answer, was not the prohibited motion.
• Reversion vs. Quieting Title — If the action is one to quiet title and the plaintiffs claim title by prescription, the property is effectively withdrawn from the public domain and becomes private property; the action is not one for reversion that only the Solicitor General may institute. The SC applied this to reject the trial court's proper-party ruling.

• "An action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession of the property." — The SC's core ruling on prescription, reversing the trial court's dismissal of the quieting-title complaint.
• "It is not necessary that the person seeking to quiet his title is the registered owner of the property in question." — The SC rejects the trial court's requirement of registered ownership for a quieting-title action.
• "The statute of limitation is not available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title over property in possession of the petitioners." — The SC applies the rule that possession by the plaintiff keeps the quieting-title action alive.
• "What the Ijra-At Al Mahakim Al Shari'a proscribes is the filing of a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer which would stop the running of the period to file an answer and cause undue delay." — The SC defines the procedural prohibition and holds that private respondents' pleading after answer was not covered.

• Heirs of Ricardo Olivas vs. Flor, 161 SCRA 393 (1988) — Relied on for the rule that a motion to dismiss filed after an answer had already been submitted within the reglementary period is not the pleading prohibited by the Rules on Summary Procedure; what is proscribed is a motion to dismiss that would stop the period to answer and cause undue delay.
• Sapto, et al. vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683 (1958) — Controlling precedent for the rule that an action to quiet title is imprescriptible while the plaintiff is in possession.
• Chacon Enterprises vs. Court of Appeals, 124 SCRA 784 (1983) — Relied on for treating as an action for quieting title a complaint alleging ownership and actual possession since time immemorial, while the defendants secured a certificate of title through fraud, misrepresentation, and deceit.
• Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441 (1977) — Cited for the rule that an action to quiet title is imprescriptible if the plaintiffs are in possession.
• Heirs of Segundo Uberas vs. CFI of Negros Occidental, 86 SCRA 144 (1978) — Cited for the same rule on imprescriptibility of an action to quiet title while the plaintiffs are in possession.

• Section 16, Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a — Provides that the Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory manner in civil cases; the SC used it to apply Rule 16 to the Shari'a District Court proceeding.
• Section 5, Rule 16, Rules of Court — Allows any ground for dismissal except improper venue to be pleaded as an affirmative defense, with a preliminary hearing as if a motion to dismiss had been filed; the SC applied it to private respondents' amplification.
• Section 13, Ijra-at Al Mahakim Al Shari'a — Proscribes a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer that would stop the period to file an answer and cause undue delay; the SC held it did not bar private respondents' pleading filed after their answer.
• Article 477, Civil Code of the Philippines — Requires the plaintiff in a quieting-title action to have legal or equitable title to, or interest in, the real property, but need not be in possession; the SC held this does not require registered ownership.
• Article 480, New Civil Code — Made applicable in this jurisdiction the American rule that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible; the SC relied on it in the prescription ruling.
• Articles 540, 541, 1117 and 1130, Civil Code — Cited in the decision's footnote for the proposition that title can connote acquisitive prescription by possession in the concept of an owner.