Mallion vs. Alcantara

A prior final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on one ground bars a subsequent petition for nullity of the same marriage on a different ground, because the validity of the marriage celebration — including the existence of an essential requisite such as a marriage license — could and should have been raised in the first action; a party cannot split the grounds for recovery by filing successive petitions predicated on separate defects of the same marriage.

Oscar P. Mallion and Editha Alcantara were married to each other. Mallion sought to have their marriage declared null and void, first by invoking Article 36 of the Family Code on psychological incapacity, and then by alleging the absence of a valid marriage license. The dispositive question was whether the dismissal of the first nullity petition on the merits precluded the second under the doctrines of res judicata, splitting a cause of action, and forum shopping.

On October 24, 1995, Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of the Family Code, citing respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in a decision dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief sought. The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a resolution dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and other lawful fees within the reglementary period, and the RTC decision attained finality.

After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 became final, petitioner filed on July 12, 1999 another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void because it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss dated August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping. In an order dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent's motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping and multiplicity of suits. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an order dated January 21, 2000.

Petitioner then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, arguing that the trial court had confused, distorted, and misapplied the fundamental rules and concepts on res judicata, splitting of a cause of action, and forum shopping. The factual antecedents were not disputed; the controversy centered on a question of law: whether a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bars a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license.

• Distinct Causes of Action: Petitioner argued that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same — the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent — the cause of action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claimed that res judicata does not lie to bar the second petition.
• No Forum Shopping or Splitting of Cause of Action: Petitioner maintained that there was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the splitting of a cause of action, since the two petitions were anchored on separate grounds requiring different evidence.

• Same Issue and Remedy: Respondent countered that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 — the validity of petitioner and respondent's marriage — and prays for the same remedy, the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contended that petitioner violated the rule on forum shopping.
• Multiplicity of Suits: Respondent asserted that petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits, as the ground he cites in the present petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.

• Res Judicata: Whether a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code bars a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity of the same marriage on the ground of lack of a marriage license.
• Splitting a Cause of Action: Whether the two petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, predicated on different grounds, constitute separate causes of action such that the rule against splitting a single cause of action is not violated.

• Res Judicata: Yes. The second petition is barred by res judicata in its concept as "bar by prior judgment," because both petitions involve the same cause of action — the declaration of nullity of the same marriage — and the absence of a marriage license could have been raised in the first case.
• Splitting a Cause of Action: No. The two petitions do not constitute separate causes of action; petitioner merely invoked different grounds for the same cause of action, which is the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. A party cannot divide the grounds for recovery.

• Res Judicata: Res judicata in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" requires the concurrence of four requisites: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action between the first and second actions. Petitioner did not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. The test for identity of causes of action is whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. While petitioner contended that the evidence for psychological incapacity differs from the evidence for absence of a marriage license, he overlooked that a cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner had the same cause — the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differed was merely the ground upon which the cause of action was predicated. Moreover, in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, petitioner impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with law. He is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license could have been presented and heard in the earlier case. Parties are bound not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their claims, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged in that case. A party cannot evade the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case.

• Splitting a Cause of Action: A party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same wrong or injury. A party seeking to enforce a claim must present to the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, all the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to split up his demands and prosecute them by piecemeal or present only a portion of the grounds upon which special relief is sought and leave the rest to a second suit if the first fails. There would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation were allowed. Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of the marriage celebration in the first case, petitioner is deemed to have waived any defects therein.

• Res Judicata — Bar by Prior Judgment — Under Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. The requisites are: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it was rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or order on the merits; and (4) there is identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action. The Court applied this doctrine to bar the second nullity petition because both petitions sought the same relief — declaration of nullity of the same marriage — and the ground of lack of marriage license could have been raised in the first action.

• Identity of Causes of Action — Same Evidence Test — The test to determine whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in the first case is a bar to the subsequent action. The Court found that petitioner was invoking different grounds for the same cause of action, not separate causes of action.

• Prohibition Against Splitting a Cause of Action — A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading all issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he claims to exist and cannot be permitted to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive actions to recover for the same wrong or injury. A party cannot divide the grounds for recovery.

• Conclusiveness of Admissions in Prior Litigation — Having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of the marriage celebration in the first nullity petition, a party is bound by that admission and is deemed to have waived any defects in the marriage celebration, including the alleged absence of a marriage license.

• "Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has the same cause — the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: that different grounds for nullity of the same marriage do not constitute separate causes of action, and thus res judicata bars the second petition.

• "A party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal." — This formulation of the rule against splitting a cause of action is the doctrinal core frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on res judicata and multiplicity of suits.

• "It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method of presenting his case." — This principle, quoting Perez vs. Court of Appeals, establishes that varying the form of an action or the theory of recovery does not evade res judicata when the underlying claim is the same.

• Gutierrez vs. CA, G.R. No. 82475, January 28, 1991, 193 SCRA 437 — Cited for the definition of res judicata as a matter adjudged and a rule that a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties in all later suits on points and matters determined in the former suit.
• Cruz vs. CA, G.R. No. 164797, February 13, 2006, 482 SCRA 379 — Cited for the precepts underlying res judicata: public policy requiring an end to litigation and the hardship on the individual of being vexed twice for the same cause.
• NHA vs. Baello, G.R. No. 143230, August 30, 2004, 437 SCRA 86 — Cited for the dual aspect of res judicata under Section 47(b) and (c) of Rule 39.
• Spouses Rasdas vs. Estenor, G.R. No. 157605, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 538 — Cited to distinguish res judicata as "bar by prior judgment" from "conclusiveness of judgment."
• Luzon Development Bank vs. Conquilla, G.R. No. 163338, September 21, 2005, 470 SCRA 533 — Cited for the four requisites of res judicata as bar by prior judgment.
• Sangalang vs. Caparas, G.R. No. L-49749, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 53 — Cited for the "same evidence" test to determine identity of causes of action.
• Perez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157616, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 89 — Cited for the principle that a different form of liability is not a different cause of action if it grows out of the same transaction, and that a party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action by limiting theories in the first.
• Carlet vs. CA, G.R. No. 114275, July 7, 1997, 275 SCRA 97 — Cited for the rule that parties are bound not only as to matters offered and received but also as to any admissible matter which might have been offered, and of all matters that could have been adjudged in the case.

• Section 47(b) and (c), Rule 39, Rules of Court — Embodies the dual concept of res judicata: Section 47(b) as "bar by prior judgment" (same claim, demand, or cause of action) and Section 47(c) as "conclusiveness of judgment" (issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action). The Court applied Section 47(b) to bar the second nullity petition.
• Section 2, Rule 2, Rules of Court — Defines a cause of action as the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. The Court used this definition to establish that both petitions involved the same cause of action — the declaration of nullity of the marriage — despite different grounds.
• Article 36, Executive Order No. 209 (Family Code), as amended — Governs declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. This was the basis of petitioner's first nullity petition.
• Article 4, Family Code — Prescribes the essential requisites of marriage. The Court framed the issue as whether the invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite under Article 4 should be raised in the same proceeding where the marriage is impugned under Article 36.

Puno, J. (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Corona, J., and Garcia, J., concurred.