Mallari vs. People

A conviction based on circumstantial evidence requires that the totality of the circumstances exclude every hypothesis consistent with innocence; where the circumstances yield at least two inferences, one consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other with guilt, the accused must be acquitted. Corollarily, the extrajudicial confessions of co-accused who do not take the witness stand are inadmissible against the accused, violating his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him.

Melanio Mallari y Liberato was the principal of Bustamante High School (also referred to as Bustamante Barangay High School) in Davao City, where Erlinda Boyose served as a classroom teacher and guidance counselor from 1977 to 1989. The two initially enjoyed a good working relationship, which deteriorated after Boyose began questioning Mallari about school funds that had remained unaccounted for. This administrative friction forms the backdrop against which the subsequent criminal charge of frustrated murder — later reduced to attempted murder — arose.

Melanio Mallari y Liberato was the principal of Bustamante High School in Davao City, where Erlinda Boyose served as a classroom teacher and guidance counselor from 1977 to 1989. The two initially enjoyed a good working relationship, which turned sour when Boyose began questioning Mallari about school funds that had remained unaccounted for. On March 22, 1989, Boyose personally handed Mallari a letter reminding him of unmet school needs and his failure to account for fees collected from students; after reading it, Mallari told her sarcastically that he had been to so many schools but that it was only she who had written to him in such a manner, and warned her that she "made a mistake in writing this [letter]."

On June 29, 1989, at about 9:00 a.m., while Boyose was at the Guidance Office, a man approached her and asked if he could still enroll his nephew. Because enrollment was already closed, she advised him to see Mallari. About twenty minutes later, the man approached her again at her classroom; when she asked if he had been able to talk to Mallari, the man answered that the principal was not in his office, so she advised him to return the following day. In the afternoon, Boyose rode a jeepney bound for Sasa, Davao, and observed that the same man was also in the jeepney. When she inquired whether he had been able to talk to the principal about his nephew's enrollment, the man ignored her. While they were near Km. 13, Panacan, Davao City, the man drew and pointed a gun at Boyose's temple. She heard two successive clicking sounds but the gun did not fire, and the man uttered in Cebuano, "Unsa man ni, dili man ni moboto" ("What's this, this will not fire"). She grabbed the gun and grappled for its possession but failed. She eventually got out of the jeepney and ran, but the man followed her and shot her repeatedly, hitting her in the lower mouth and at her back. She shouted for help, and a man helped her and brought her to San Pedro Hospital, where she was treated and confined.

Policeman Remo Pagal of the Sasa Police Station went to the crime scene on June 29, 1989 to investigate, but nothing came out of it; he was able to get the description of the gunman only the following day when he interviewed the victim at the hospital. The police obtained a lead when a certain Andy Magdadaro went to the Sasa Police Station and told Pagal that he knew something about the shooting. Magdadaro said that he had been asked by one Edwin Amparado to kill Boyose but that the plan was not carried out, and he pointed to Zaldy Bontia as the man who hired Amparado to look for a triggerman. Amparado was then picked up by the police and, while at the police station, told investigators that on one occasion he went to Mallari's house and Mallari asked him to kill Boyose, who used to be his neighbor at Doña Pilar Village, but that the plan did not push through; he later offered the job to Magdadaro, his neighbor in Agdao, and Magdadaro was only waiting for his go-signal. Amparado executed an affidavit regarding Mallari's offer.

On August 1, 1989, at around 3:00 p.m., Pagal and other policemen from the Sasa Police Station arrested Zaldy Bontia near Mallari's house. Zaldy allegedly admitted participation in the incident and implicated his brother Leonardo Bontia as the gunman. The police went to Asuncion, Davao del Norte to arrest Leonardo, who was brought to the Sasa Police Station at about 2:00 p.m. of August 2, 1989. Later that day, a police line-up was conducted, and Boyose identified Leonardo as the gunman and Zaldy as the constant companion and protégé of Mallari. When the custodial investigation was about to start, the Bontia brothers were apprised by police investigator Anastacio Naive of their constitutional rights. When asked if they had a lawyer, they said they had none, so Naive stopped the investigation and called the PAO office. At around 5:00 p.m. that day, Atty. Jonathan Jocum, a PAO lawyer, arrived, and the Bontia brothers agreed to be represented by him. During the custodial investigation, Leonardo admitted to being the gunman and pointed to Mallari as the one who hired him to kill Boyose, while Zaldy admitted having been hired by Mallari to look for a gunman and having recommended his brother Leonardo for the job for a fee.

Mallari, Leonardo Bontia, and Zaldy Bontia were charged by Assistant City Prosecutor Jose Emmanuel M. Castillo with frustrated murder. During arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Mallari moved for a separate trial, which the trial court granted in its Order dated September 18, 1990. In his separate trial, Mallari did not present evidence to establish his innocence or refute the prosecution's evidence; instead, he moved for dismissal by way of demurrer to evidence, which the trial court denied in its Order dated July 2, 1992. Although given ample time and granted numerous postponements over about a year, he failed to present any witness in his favor.

The RTC concluded that there was conspiracy among the three accused, although Leonardo Bontia was alone when he shot Boyose. It held Mallari liable as principal by inducement, Leonardo as principal by direct participation, and Zaldy as principal by indispensable cooperation, based on eight circumstances supposedly establishing their complicity, among them Mallari's alleged motive arising from Boyose's persistent inquiries into school funds, Zaldy's alleged indebtedness to Mallari, Leonardo's financial need, the ₱900 allegedly given by Zaldy to Leonardo, the Bontias' extrajudicial statements, and a letter of apology purportedly written by Leonardo to Boyose. The CA essentially upheld these findings and conclusions of the trial court, except as to the stage of the crime committed, convicting the accused of attempted murder on the reasoning that circumstantial evidence sufficed to establish Mallari's inducement of the Bontia brothers despite the absence of direct evidence.

• Circumstantial Evidence Rule: Petitioner argued that the CA Decision and its denial of reconsideration were not in accord with the circumstantial evidence rule and the controlling jurisprudence thereon.
• Improper Evidence: Petitioner maintained that the CA erred in upholding the trial court's admission of irrelevant, immaterial, and improper evidence — specifically the testimony of Edwin Amparado — which was among the bases for conviction.
• Evidence from Separate Trial: Petitioner argued that the CA incorrectly sustained the trial court's consideration of evidence given in a separately conducted trial, not as against him, which was among the bases for conviction.
• Due Process: Petitioner claimed that the CA Decision, which failed to tackle all the issues raised on appeal, was inconsistent with due process.

• Single Case Number: The Office of the Solicitor General contended that in the trial against petitioner, there was no need to offer anew the evidence separately proffered against the Bontias because the case filed against them involved only one case number.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Respondent substantially repeated the circumstances relied upon by the CA and the RTC in support of petitioner's conviction, including his alleged motive, the Bontias' extrajudicial statements, the letter of apology, and Amparado's testimony, as sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

• Evidence from Separate Trial: Whether the trial and the appellate courts erred in taking cognizance of evidence given in the separate trial of petitioner's co-accused.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: Whether there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Due Process: Whether the Court of Appeals failed to accord due process to petitioner.

• Evidence from Separate Trial: No. The trial and appellate courts did not convict petitioner on the basis of evidence adduced at his co-accused's separate trial; most prosecution witnesses were presented in his own trial, and the testimonies not presented were either merely corroborative or, on their face, favorable to him.
• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: No. The circumstantial evidence did not establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; the co-accused's extrajudicial confessions were hearsay and inadmissible against petitioner, and the remaining circumstances did not exclude every hypothesis consistent with innocence.
• Due Process: No. Petitioner failed to substantiate the allegation that the CA failed to resolve all issues; in any event, a wrong disposition by the court is not tantamount to a denial of due process.

• Evidence from Separate Trial: As a rule, a court should not take judicial notice of evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been brought before it or are actually pending before it, especially in criminal cases where the accused has the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses presented against him. When a separate trial is granted, the testimony of an accused imputing the crime to a co-accused is not admissible against the latter, who has had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses; otherwise, the object of conducting a separate trial would be rendered naught. Records showed, however, that most of the prosecution witnesses presented during the trial of the Bontias were likewise presented during petitioner's separate trial — Pfc. Danilo Carvajal, Atty. Jonathan Jocom, Pfc. Anastacio Naive, and Erlinda Boyose all testified against petitioner. The testimonies of Policemen Antonio Ysulat and Victoriano Padilla were admitted by petitioner per stipulation. Only Pfc. Remo Pagal and Dr. Roberto Alabado were not presented against petitioner, and their testimonies were merely corroborative of the other witnesses. The declarations of Zaldy and Leonardo Bontia in open court were, on their face, favorable to petitioner, since they denied committing the crime. Thus, no basis existed for the allegation that the lower courts convicted petitioner on the ground of evidence adduced at his co-accused's separate trial.

• Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence: In the absence of direct proof, conviction may rest on circumstantial evidence, but the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence. Examining the circumstances relied upon by the CA: the first circumstance — that Mallari had an axe to grind against the victim because of her persistent inquiries into school funds — appeared to be a conclusion based merely on the victim's own impression, supported only by her self-serving statement and the single letter she wrote; to the extent it tended to establish motive, it could be taken into consideration. The second to fourth circumstances — Zaldy's alleged indebtedness to Mallari, Leonardo's financial need, and the ₱900 allegedly given by Zaldy to Leonardo — were not directly established by the evidence against petitioner; none of the prosecution witnesses testified thereon, and these circumstances were derived from the "Written Statements" of petitioner's co-accused presented when Prosecution Witnesses Carvajal and Naive testified. Under Section 36 of Rule 130, witnesses can testify only with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge; otherwise, their testimonies are inadmissible as hearsay. Neither witness had personal knowledge of those circumstances; they merely attested to the voluntariness and due execution of the Bontias' extrajudicial confessions. Thus, insofar as the substance of those confessions is concerned, the testimonies of the police witnesses were mere hearsay. The fifth and sixth circumstances referred to the Written Statements of petitioner's co-accused who did not testify against him; well-settled is the rule that extrajudicial declarations are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant's co-accused, and the admission of such declarations violates the incriminated person's right to due process, especially where the declarants fail to take the witness stand and thereby deny the accused the fundamental right to confront and cross-examine them face-to-face. While exceptions exist — such as when the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the co-accused's participation, or when the confession is corroborated by other pieces of evidence — the merits of these circumstances depend on the strength of the other circumstantial evidence against petitioner, which was lacking. The last circumstance — the supposed letter of Leonardo Bontia addressed to the victim containing explicit details of the crime and asking for forgiveness — was presented as part of the testimony of Boyose, but Leonardo was not presented in court to identify it, and no other witness testified as to its genuineness or voluntary execution; Boyose received it through the mail, and no one attested that it had been written and sent by Leonardo. An unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed; being mere hearsay, its contents are suspect and of no probative value. As to the additional circumstance advanced by the OSG — Amparado's testimony that he had been contacted by petitioner to kill Boyose — the testimony concerned petitioner's alleged proposal to him, not to the Bontias, an act that by his own admission did not materialize; even if petitioner made such a proposal, it did not necessarily mean that it was also made to the Bontias, absent any strong supporting evidence, and the witness did not appear privy to any conspiracy between petitioner and the Bontias. Insofar as the actual attempt on Boyose's life was concerned, Amparado's testimony was irrelevant and of no probative weight. In the final analysis, other than the victim's letter tending to establish ill motive, there was hardly any evidence to corroborate the co-accused's extrajudicial confessions (later recanted) or to establish the probability of petitioner's actual participation by inducement in the commission of the crime. The strength of the prosecution evidence fell short of the required quantum of proof beyond reasonable doubt, and petitioner's constitutional right to be presumed innocent had to prevail. When the circumstances shown to exist yield at least two inferences — one consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other with the finding of guilt — the Court must acquit the accused, because the evidence does not then fulfill the test of moral certainty or suffice to support a judgment of conviction.

• Due Process: While it was no longer necessary to resolve this issue in view of the disposition of the second, petitioner neglected to substantiate the allegation in his Petition; he did not point out, much less discuss, what issues the appellate court had failed to resolve. In any event, a wrong disposition by the court is not tantamount to denial of due process.

• Requisites of Circumstantial Evidence — A conviction may be based on circumstantial evidence provided the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The Court applied this test and found the prosecution's circumstantial evidence insufficient because the co-accused's extrajudicial confessions were hearsay and the remaining circumstances did not exclude every hypothesis consistent with innocence.

• Exclusion of Hypotheses Consistent with Innocence — Corollary to the constitutional presumption of innocence, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence. Where the circumstances yield at least two inferences — one consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other with the finding of guilt — the Court must acquit the accused, because the evidence does not then fulfill the test of moral certainty. This rule was the decisive ground for petitioner's acquittal.

• Hearsay Rule (Section 36, Rule 130) — Witnesses can testify only with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge; otherwise, their testimonies are inadmissible as hearsay. Testimonial or documentary evidence is hearsay if based not on the personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent shows that it falls within any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule. The Court applied this rule to the testimonies of the police investigators who merely attested to the voluntariness and due execution of the Bontias' confessions but had no personal knowledge of the confessions' substance.

• Inadmissibility of Extrajudicial Confessions of Co-Accused — Extrajudicial declarations are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant's co-accused, and the admission of such declarations violates the incriminated person's right to due process, especially where the declarants fail to take the witness stand and thereby deny the accused the fundamental right to confront and cross-examine them face-to-face. Exceptions exist when the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the co-accused's participation in the crime, or when the confession is corroborated by other pieces of evidence; in such instances, the significance of the confession comes to the fore only in relation to the other circumstantial evidence establishing the guilt of the person incriminated.

• Unverified Private Documents — An unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value because the party against whom it is presented is deprived of the right and opportunity to cross-examine the person to whom the statements or writings are attributed. Its executor or author should be presented as a witness to provide the other party the opportunity to question its contents; failure to present the author renders its contents suspect and of no probative value.

• Separate Trials and Cross-Examination — When a separate trial is granted, the testimony of an accused imputing the crime to a co-accused is not admissible against the latter, who has had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. The object of conducting a separate trial would be rendered naught if evidence proffered at the trial of one accused were considered likewise adduced in the distinct trial of the other accused. The grant of separate trials for persons jointly accused is discretionary upon the court, and motions therefor are usually found meritorious when antagonism is apparent in the respective defenses of the accused.

• Judicial Notice of Evidence in Other Proceedings — As a rule, a court should not take judicial notice of evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been brought before it or have been heard by and are actually pending before it. This rule is especially true in criminal cases, in which the accused have the constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses presented against them.

• Due Process and Erroneous Disposition — A wrong disposition by the court is not tantamount to a denial of due process; the claim must be substantiated by identifying the specific issues allegedly left unresolved.

• "To warrant conviction based on circumstantial evidence, the totality of the circumstances must eliminate beyond reasonable doubt the possibility of innocence; otherwise, the accused must be acquitted." — This opening statement of the ponencia articulates the controlling rule that governed the disposition and is the most frequently cited formulation of the circumstantial-evidence standard in this case.

• "Corollary to the constitutional precept that the accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent with innocence." — This passage states the corollary rule that the Court applied in evaluating each of the circumstances relied upon by the CA, and it supplies the standard against which the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence was measured.

• "Well-settled is the rule that extrajudicial declarations are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant's co-accused." — This is the canonical statement of the rule on co-accused confessions, which the Court applied to reject the fifth and sixth circumstances relied upon by the CA, since the Bontia brothers never testified against petitioner.

• "The Court has repeatedly held that when the circumstances shown to exist yield at least two inferences -- one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other with the finding of guilt -- the Court must acquit the accused, because the evidence does not then fulfill the test of moral certainty or suffice to support a judgment of conviction." — This passage is the ratio decidendi for the acquittal, articulating the two-inferences rule that compelled the reversal of the CA Decision.

• People vs. Bato, 348 Phil. 246 (1998) — Cited for the requisites of circumstantial evidence and for the corollary rule that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude every hypothesis consistent with innocence.
• People vs. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124 (1998) — Cited, together with Bato, for the requisites of circumstantial evidence and the exclusion of hypotheses consistent with innocence.
• People vs. Kulais, 354 Phil. 565 (1998) — Cited for the rule that a court should not take judicial notice of evidence presented in other proceedings, especially in criminal cases where the accused has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses.
• People vs. Tanso, 105 Phil. 1289 (1959) — Cited for the rule that when a separate trial is granted, the testimony of an accused imputing the crime to a co-accused is not admissible against the latter who had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.
• Talino vs. Sandiganbayan, 148 SCRA 598 (1987) — Cited, together with Tanso, for the same rule on separate trials and the inadmissibility of a co-accused's testimony against another accused.
• Joseph vs. Villaluz, 89 SCRA 324 (1979) — Cited for the discretionary nature of the grant of separate trials and the meritoriousness of such motions when antagonism is apparent in the defenses of the accused.
• People vs. Manhuyod Jr., 352 Phil. 866 (1998) — Cited for Section 36 of Rule 130, which limits witnesses to facts of personal knowledge.
• People vs. Franco, 336 Phil. 206 (1997) — Cited for the rule that the testimonies of police witnesses who merely attested to the voluntariness and due execution of extrajudicial confessions are hearsay as to the substance of those confessions.
• Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 647 (1998) — Cited for the rule that extrajudicial declarations are inadmissible in evidence against the declarant's co-accused.
• People vs. Sabalones, 356 Phil. 255 (1998) — Cited for the exceptions to the rule on inadmissibility of co-accused confessions, namely, when the confession is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of the co-accused's participation, or when the confession is corroborated by other pieces of evidence.
• People vs. Sacapaño, 372 Phil. 543 (1999) — Cited for the rule that hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless it falls within an exception, and for the rule that an unverified and unidentified private document cannot be accorded probative value.
• People vs. Crispin, 383 Phil. 919 (2000) — Cited, together with Sacapaño, for the hearsay rule.
• PNOC Shipping & Transport Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 38 (1998) — Cited for the rule that the author of a private document must be presented as a witness to allow the adverse party to question its contents.
• People vs. Fider, 223 SCRA 117 (1993) — Cited for the two-inferences rule requiring acquittal where the circumstances yield an inference consistent with the presumption of innocence.
• People vs. Santos, 388 Phil. 993 (2000) — Cited, together with Fider, for the two-inferences rule.
• People vs. Sayana, 405 SCRA 243 (2003) — Cited, together with Fider and Santos, for the two-inferences rule requiring acquittal where the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty.

• Section 36, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that witnesses can testify only with regard to facts of which they have personal knowledge; otherwise, their testimonies are inadmissible for being hearsay. The Court applied this provision to reject the testimonies of the police investigators who merely attested to the voluntariness and due execution of the Bontias' extrajudicial confessions but had no personal knowledge of their substance.
• Section 4, Rule 128, Rules of Court — Defines relevant evidence as that which tends to establish, to any reasonable degree, the probability of a fact in issue. The Court applied this provision to hold that Amparado's testimony, which concerned an alleged proposal to him that did not materialize, was irrelevant and of no probative weight in establishing petitioner's guilt.
• Article 248 in relation to Article 6, Revised Penal Code — Article 248 defines and penalizes murder, while Article 6 defines the stages of execution of felonies. The CA convicted the accused of attempted murder under these provisions, but the conviction as to petitioner was reversed and set aside on reasonable doubt.
• Rule 45 in relation to Rule 125, Rules of Court — Governs the Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner to challenge the CA Decision.

• Justice Sandoval-Guttierez
• Justice Carpio-Morales
• Justice Garcia

Justice Corona was on leave.