Malkinson vs. Agrava

Alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a Filipino child, and the Civil Code does not require that adopter and adopted be of the same nationality; only non-resident aliens and resident aliens whose governments have broken diplomatic relations with the Philippines are disqualified as adopters.

Frederick William Malkinson is an American citizen gainfully employed as a seaman, while his wife Ana Marie de Santos Malkinson is a Filipino citizen and property owner in the Philippines. Ana Marie is the natural mother of Luis Alberto Martin de Santos, and the adoption petition concerns the child's status in relation to the spouses. The Civil Code provisions on adoption, particularly Articles 334, 335, 338, 339, 341, 358, and 363, supply the statutory backdrop, together with the SC’s prior adoption rulings in Therkelsen and Cathey.

On October 13, 1972, petitioners-spouses Frederick William Malkinson and Ana Marie de Santos Malkinson filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila a verified petition to adopt the minor Luis Alberto Martin de Santos. The child was born a Filipino citizen in Madrid, Spain on August 4, 1969, and was the acknowledged natural child of petitioner Ana Marie de Santos Malkinson, who alone extended recognition to him. The petition alleged that since the spouses' marriage on March 6, 1972, the child, who owned no property, had been living with them under their care and custody at No. 1443 Jose P. Laurel Street, Manila; that petitioner Frederick William Malkinson was an American citizen gainfully employed as a seaman with an average yearly income of US $7,000-$8,000, while his co-petitioner spouse was a Filipino citizen and a property owner in the Philippines; and that it was to the best interest of the child that he be adopted by petitioners-spouses, who possessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for legal adoption.

Judge Vicente M. Santiago, Jr., then on detail with the respondent court, issued an order on October 18, 1972 giving due course to the petition, setting it for hearing on January 8, 1973, and directing that appropriate notices be sent to the Solicitor General and the Director of the Bureau of Child and Youth Welfare, Department of Social Welfare, and that the order be published.

Upon respondent Judge Corazon Juliano Agrava's return to her court after her leave of absence, she issued an order on November 22, 1972 stating that, upon a review of the petition alleging that the petitioner husband was an alien while the child sought to be adopted was a citizen of the Philippines, the petition was not sufficient in substance and could not be given course. She ordered that the petition be dismissed after the lapse of 30 days from the petitioners' receipt of notice unless, within that period, proper proceedings were instituted before the Supreme Court to question the correctness of the order.

Petitioners moved for reconsideration, arguing that no law prohibits a resident alien, who is not a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with the Philippines and is not otherwise legally disqualified, from adopting a Filipino. Respondent court denied the motion under its order of December 18, 1972. Hence, petitioners filed the present appeal by certiorari from the dismissal orders.

• Alienage and the Civil Code: Petitioners argued that no law prohibits a resident alien, who is not a citizen of a country without diplomatic relations with the Philippines and is not otherwise legally disqualified, from adopting a Filipino.
• Controlling Jurisprudence: Petitioners maintained that under the clear and plain language of the Civil Code and the SC's express rulings in Therkelsen and Cathey, the petitioner husband, as an American resident not suffering from any legal disqualification, may jointly with his co-petitioner Filipino wife legally adopt the latter's acknowledged natural child.
• Construction of the Civil Code: Petitioners cited Manresa's view, as against Scaevola, that aliens may legally adopt under the laws of Spain which grant them the same civil rights as Spanish citizens.

• Alienage as Disqualification: Respondent maintained that a Filipino could not adopt an alien and vice versa; because the petitioner husband was an alien while the child sought to be adopted was a Filipino, the petition could not be given due course.
• Article 334: Respondent argued that Article 334 of the Civil Code, providing that every person of age in full possession of his civil rights may adopt, cannot be accepted literally and, if Scaevola is correct, should be construed as not permitting a citizen to adopt an alien, or vice versa.
• Article 335(4) and (5): Respondent argued that the prohibitions in Article 335(4) and (5) should be construed as aimed at the adoption of aliens by other aliens, and not at the adoption by an alien of a Filipino.
• Article 358 and Family Solidarity: Respondent argued that an alien who has adopted a Filipino child cannot be expected, by precept and example, to imbue the adopted with love of the Philippines and veneration for Filipino national heroes under Article 358, and that solidarity of a family cannot be achieved if a Filipino child can be adopted by an alien.
• Reexamination of Therkelsen: Respondent maintained that Justice J.B.L. Reyes' statement in Therkelsen as to its non-exposition of its reasons for dismissal of the petition therein left the way open for a review and restudy of the controlling precedents.

• Alienage as Disqualification: Whether alienage by itself disqualifies a resident alien from adopting a Filipino child under the Civil Code.
• Same Nationality Requirement: Whether the Civil Code requires that both adopter and adopted be of the same nationality.
• Construction of Articles 334 and 335: Whether Articles 334 and 335(4) and (5) of the Civil Code should be construed to prohibit adoption by an alien of a Filipino child.
• Policy and Family Solidarity: Whether concerns that an alien adopter may not imbue the child with love of the Philippines and veneration for Filipino national heroes, or that family solidarity may not be achieved, justify denying the adoption.
• Joint Adoption by Spouses: Whether the American petitioner husband, as a resident alien not otherwise disqualified, may jointly with his Filipino wife adopt her acknowledged natural child under Articles 338 and 341 of the Civil Code.

• Alienage as Disqualification: No. Alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a Filipino child; only non-resident aliens and resident aliens whose governments have broken diplomatic relations with the Philippines are disqualified as adopters.
• Same Nationality Requirement: No. The Civil Code does not require that both adopter and adopted be of the same nationality.
• Construction of Articles 334 and 335: No. Articles 334 and 335(4) and (5) do not bar adoption by an alien of a Filipino child; the Civil Code expressly disqualifies only the two classes of aliens, and inclusio unius exclusio alterius applies.
• Policy and Family Solidarity: No. The policy views on whether an alien can instill love of country or achieve family solidarity go into the wisdom or policy of the statute, beyond the SC's domain; the plain language of the law controls.
• Joint Adoption by Spouses: Yes. The Filipino wife as natural mother and the American husband as stepfather are expressly authorized under Article 338 to adopt, and the adoption would raise the child's status to legitimate child of both under Article 341.

• Alienage as Disqualification: The SC reaffirmed the controlling doctrine in Therkelsen and Cathey that the Civil Code's Article 335 only disqualifies from being adopters aliens who are either (a) non-residents or (b) residents but whose governments have broken diplomatic relations with the Philippines; outside these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting under Philippine law. Petitioner Frederick William Malkinson was an American citizen and resident alien, and he did not fall in either disqualified class. The SC therefore held that his alienage alone could not be the basis for dismissing the adoption petition.
• Same Nationality Requirement: In Therkelsen, the SC had rejected the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court's imposition of an additional requisite not found in the Civil Code that both adopter and adopted be of the same nationality. The SC explained that the criterion requiring the adoption to result in the child's acquisition of the alien adopter's citizenship had no support in law; the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, not civil, in nature, and the ways it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code. The SC thus refused to require that the Filipino child acquire the American petitioner's citizenship for the adoption to be allowed.
• Construction of Articles 334 and 335: The SC held that the Civil Code provisions on adoption are plain and clear and free from ambiguity, so there is no room for construction; the law is controlling and the judiciary's clear task is to apply it as it is. If alienage alone of the adopter or adopted were a disqualification, the lawmakers would have explicitly provided it, especially since Article 335 expressly disqualifies only non-resident aliens and resident aliens whose governments have broken diplomatic relations with the Philippines, while Article 339 expressly disqualifies only an alien with whose state the Philippine government has broken diplomatic relations. The SC applied inclusio unius exclusio alterius and rejected the respondent's Scaevola-based construction of Articles 334 and 335(4) and (5).
• Policy and Family Solidarity: The SC held that whatever merit the respondent court's views on the wisdom or policy of allowing an alien to adopt a Filipino child might have, they go into the wisdom or policy of the statute, which are beyond the SC's domain. Adoption statutes are humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration, and are designed to provide homes, parental care, and education for unfortunate, needy, or orphaned children and to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood. Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote these objectives, so the policy concerns about love of country and family solidarity did not justify denying the adoption.
• Joint Adoption by Spouses: The SC noted the Solicitor General's enumeration of other factors showing the merit of the petition: petitioner wife, as the natural mother, is expressly authorized under Article 338(1) of the Civil Code to adopt her natural child and raise its status to that of a legitimate child; petitioner husband, as the stepfather, is expressly authorized under Article 338(3) to adopt his stepchild; and the adoption would strengthen the family solidarity of the spouses and the child because the child's status as natural child of petitioner wife and stepchild of petitioner husband would be raised to that of legitimate child of both petitioners under Article 341, with all the rights and duties appertaining thereto. The SC therefore sustained the joint adoption.

• Alienage as not a disqualification to adoption — Under the Civil Code, alienage by itself does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a Filipino child; only (a) non-resident aliens and (b) resident aliens whose governments have broken diplomatic relations with the Philippines are disqualified as adopters. The SC applied this to petitioner Frederick William Malkinson, an American resident alien who did not fall in either class.
• No same-nationality requirement in adoption — The Civil Code does not require that adopter and adopted be of the same nationality. The SC rejected the respondent court's added prerequisite that adoption by an alien must result in the child acquiring the alien's citizenship.
• Citizenship of the adopter is political, not civil — The citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code; civil law cannot determine how or when citizenship in a foreign state is acquired. The SC used this to reject the condition that the adopted child acquire the alien adopter's citizenship.
• Inclusio unius exclusio alterius in adoption statutes — The express enumeration of disqualified aliens in Articles 335 and 339 excludes other alienage-based disqualifications. Since the law expressly disqualifies only non-resident aliens and resident aliens whose governments have broken diplomatic relations with the Philippines, alienage alone cannot be a ground for disqualification.
• Plain meaning rule / no room for construction — Where the Civil Code provisions on adoption are plain and clear and free from ambiguity, there is no room for construction; the law is controlling and the judiciary's clear task is to apply the law as it is. The SC applied this to reject the respondent's Scaevola-based construction.
• Paramount consideration: welfare of the child — Adoption statutes are humane and salutary, and the interest and welfare of the child are of paramount consideration; every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote their objectives. The SC noted the child's welfare as paramount under Article 363 and that the adoption would strengthen family solidarity.
• Adoption by natural parent and stepfather — Under Article 338(1), the natural mother may adopt her natural child and raise its status to legitimate; under Article 338(3), the stepfather may adopt his stepchild. The SC applied these to allow the joint adoption and raise the child's status to legitimate child of both under Article 341.

• "the present Civil Code in force (Article 335) only disqualifies from being adopters those aliens that are either (a) non-residents or (b) who are residents but the Republic of the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations with their government. Outside of these two cases, alienage by itself alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting a person under our law." — The SC reaffirmed Therkelsen's controlling doctrine that only two classes of aliens are disqualified as adopters and that alienage alone does not disqualify.
• "The criterion adopted by the Court a quo would demand as a condition for the approval of the adoption that the process should result in the acquisition, by the person adopted, of the alien citizenship of the adopting parent. This finds no support in the law, for, as observed by this Court in Ching Leng vs. Galang, G.R. No. L-11931, promulgated on 27 October 1958, the citizenship of the adopter is a matter political, and not civil, in nature, and the ways in which it should be conferred lay outside the ambit of the Civil Code." — The SC rejected the added condition that adoption must confer the alien adopter's citizenship on the child.
• "The Civil Code provisions on adoption are quite plain and clear and are free from any ambiguity. Under such circumstances, there is no room for construction, the law is controlling and the clear task of the judiciary is to apply the law as it is." — The SC refused to depart from the plain text of the adoption provisions based on policy views.
• "If alienage alone of the adopter or of the adopted were to be a disqualification, it is inconceivable that the lawmakers would not have so explicitly provided, considering that in Article 335 of the Code non-resident aliens and resident aliens with whose government the Philippines has broken diplomatic relations are the only two classes of aliens expressly disqualified and prohibited to adopt while in Article 339 only an alien with whose state our government has broken diplomatic relations is expressly disqualified and prohibited to be adopted. Inclusio unius exclusio alterius." — The SC applied inclusio unius exclusio alterius to hold that the enumerated disqualifications exclude other alienage-based disqualifications.

• Therkelsen vs. Republic, 12 SCRA 400 (Nov. 27, 1964) — Controlling precedent; followed and reaffirmed. Held that alienage alone does not disqualify a foreigner from adopting and that only non-resident aliens and resident aliens with broken diplomatic relations are disqualified.
• Cathey vs. Republic, 18 SCRA 86 (Sept. 23, 1966) — Controlling precedent; followed. Held that an American resident alien was entitled to adopt a Filipino child, with the welfare of the child as paramount consideration.
• Ching Leng vs. Galang, G.R. No. L-11931 (Oct. 27, 1958) — Relied on for the rule that the citizenship of the adopter is political, not civil, and outside the ambit of the Civil Code.
• Veneracion vs. Congson Ice Plant & Cold Storage, Inc., L-31213-14 (July 23, 1973) — Cited for the principle that the wisdom or policy of a statute is beyond the SC's domain.
• Maritime Co. of the Phil. vs. Repacom, 40 SCRA 70 (1971) — Cited for the plain meaning rule and the absence of room for construction when the law is clear.
• People vs. Santos, 104 Phil. 551 (1958) — Cited for the same plain meaning rule.
• Ysasi vs. Fernandez, 26 SCRA 393 (1968) — Cited for the same plain meaning rule.
• Santos vs. Aranzanso, 16 SCRA 344 (1966) — Cited for the liberal concept that adoption statutes are humane and salutary and that the child's welfare is paramount.

• Article 334, Civil Code — Provides that every person of age, who is in full possession of his civil rights, may adopt. The SC rejected the respondent's Scaevola-based construction that it does not permit a citizen to adopt an alien, or vice versa; the provision's plain language controls.
• Article 335, Civil Code — Disqualifies from being adopters non-resident aliens and resident aliens whose governments have broken diplomatic relations with the Philippines. The SC held these are the only two classes of aliens disqualified; alienage alone is not a disqualification.
• Article 335(4) and (5), Civil Code — Respondent argued these should be construed as aimed at adoption of aliens by other aliens, not adoption by an alien of a Filipino. The SC rejected this construction because the law expressly enumerates only the two classes.
• Article 338(1) and (3), Civil Code — The natural mother is expressly authorized to adopt her natural child and raise its status to legitimate; the stepfather is expressly authorized to adopt his stepchild. The SC used these to support the joint adoption by petitioner wife and husband.
• Article 339, Civil Code — Only an alien with whose state the Philippine government has broken diplomatic relations is expressly disqualified and prohibited to be adopted. The SC used this in applying inclusio unius exclusio alterius.
• Article 341, Civil Code — The adoption would raise the child's status as natural child of petitioner wife and stepchild of petitioner husband to that of legitimate child of both petitioners with all rights and duties. The SC cited this to show the adoption would strengthen family solidarity.
• Article 358, Civil Code — Respondent invoked it to argue that an alien adopter cannot be expected to imbue the adopted with love of the Philippines and veneration for Filipino national heroes. The SC held such policy views go into the wisdom or policy of the statute, beyond the SC's domain.
• Article 363, Civil Code — The welfare of the child is the paramount consideration under the law. The SC cited this in Cathey and in the liberal concept that adoption statutes are humane and salutary.