Malig vs. Bush

A trial court may not dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss. Furthermore, the rule on the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court over the settlement of the estate (Rule 75, Sec. 1) pertains to venue and does not preclude a separate action for the recovery of inheritance allegedly obtained through fraud.

Plaintiffs Rose Bush Malig, Joe, Thomas, and John Bush allege they are the acknowledged natural children and only direct heirs of the late John T. Bush, born of his common-law relationship with Apolonia Perez. Defendant Maria Santos Bush allegedly falsely claimed to be the legal wife of the deceased to secure her appointment as administratrix of his estate and submitted a project of partition bequeathing the estate to herself and two others, depriving the plaintiffs of their inheritance through fraud.

On September 19, 1962, plaintiffs Rose Bush Malig, Joe, Thomas, and John Bush, all surnamed Bush, filed a complaint alleging that they were the acknowledged natural children and the only heirs in the direct line of the deceased John T. Bush. They claimed to have been born of the common-law relationship of their father with Apolonia Perez from 1923 up to August 1941, during which time their parents were not suffering from any legal disability to marry. They lived with their father during his lifetime and were treated by him as his acknowledged natural children. Upon John T. Bush's death, he left several real and personal properties.

The defendant, Maria Santos Bush, allegedly falsely represented herself as the legal wife of the deceased, enabling her to secure an appointment as administratrix of his estate in Testate Proceedings No. 29932 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. She submitted a project of partition for approval, purportedly based on a will bequeathing the estate to herself, Anita S. Bush, and Anna Berger. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant knew they were the acknowledged natural children of the deceased, and that they only discovered her fraud and misrepresentation in July 1962. They prayed for the annulment of the project of partition, an accounting of the estate, and recovery of their legal participation or the market value of the properties if already disposed of, plus fruits, damages, and attorney's fees.

The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of lack of cause of action, res judicata, and statute of limitations. On January 10, 1963, the lower court denied the motion, finding that the grounds were not indubitable. The defendant then filed her answer, specifically denying the material averments and invoking laches, res judicata, and statute of limitations as affirmative defenses. When the case was set for hearing, the defendant manifested she would file another written motion to dismiss, this time challenging the jurisdiction of the court. She argued that since the action sought to annul a project of partition approved by the probate court, only that court could take cognizance of the case under Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. On October 31, 1963, the lower court granted the motion and dismissed the complaint, but not on the jurisdictional ground raised; instead, it dismissed the case on the ground of prescription. The plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the appeal to the Supreme Court.

• Dismissal on unalleged ground: Petitioner argued that the lower court erred in dismissing the action on the ground of prescription, which was not alleged in the respondent's motion to dismiss that raised only the issue of jurisdiction.
• Action for recovery, not acknowledgment: Petitioner asserted that their action was not for the acknowledgment of natural children under Article 137 of the Civil Code, but for the recovery of their inheritance allegedly deprived through fraud, as they already alleged they were the acknowledged natural children of the deceased.

• Jurisdiction of the probate court: Respondent argued that the Court of First Instance lacked jurisdiction because the action sought to annul a project of partition duly approved by the probate court, citing Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
• Prescription: Respondent insisted on the applicability of Article 137 of the Civil Code, arguing that an action for acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, and the present action was commenced after the death of the putative father.

• Procedural Due Process in Motion to Dismiss: Whether the lower court may dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss.
• Prescription: Whether the action had prescribed based on Article 137 of the Civil Code.
• Jurisdiction/Venue: Whether the probate court has exclusive jurisdiction over the action to annul a project of partition and recover inheritance.

• Procedural Due Process in Motion to Dismiss: No. The lower court cannot dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss, as it effectively did so motu proprio without giving the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point.
• Prescription: No. Prescription was not indubitable on the face of the complaint because the plaintiffs did not seek acknowledgment but alleged they were already acknowledged natural children seeking recovery of inheritance obtained through fraud.
• Jurisdiction/Venue: No. The rule on the exclusive jurisdiction of the probate court pertains to venue and does not preclude a separate action for the recovery of inheritance allegedly obtained through fraud.

• Procedural Due Process in Motion to Dismiss: The first motion to dismiss was denied because the grounds were not indubitable. The second motion raised only jurisdiction. By dismissing on the ground of prescription, the lower court acted motu proprio. Citing Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, the Rules of Court provide specific grounds for dismissal, and a court cannot dismiss on a ground not alleged in the motion, except when the plaintiff fails to appear or prosecute. The lower court also failed to state why the action had prescribed and reversed its previous ruling without new arguments.
• Prescription: The defendant cited Article 137 of the Civil Code, which restricts actions for acknowledgment of natural children to the lifetime of the putative parents. However, this provision is not indubitably applicable because the plaintiffs did not seek acknowledgment; they alleged as a matter of fact that they were already acknowledged natural children. Whether this is true depends on evidence at trial, not on the face of the complaint.
• Jurisdiction/Venue: Rule 75, Section 1 (now Rule 73, Section 1) fixes jurisdiction for the special proceeding of estate settlement, particularly concerning the residence of the decedent or location of the estate, which is a matter of venue. The rule ensures that the court first taking cognizance of the estate settlement exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of others. However, the present action is not necessarily to annul the partition and reopen the estate proceeding, but to recover the plaintiffs' alleged inheritance deprived through fraud. Thus, the action is proper.

• Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius — The expression of one thing is the exclusion of the other. The Court applied this maxim to the Rules of Court's provisions on dismissal, holding that since the Rules specify the cases where an action may be dismissed, no other grounds can be used, especially motu proprio.
• Distinction between action for acknowledgment and action for recovery of inheritance — An action for acknowledgment of natural children under Article 137 of the Civil Code prescribes upon the death of the putative parents. However, an action by parties who already allege they are acknowledged children seeking to recover inheritance obtained through fraud is not barred by Article 137.

• "In dismissing the complaint upon a ground not relied upon, the lower court in effect did so motu proprio, without offering the plaintiffs a chance to argue the point." — This passage highlights the procedural defect in the lower court's dismissal, emphasizing that due process requires parties to be heard on the actual grounds raised.
• "The matter really concerns venue, as the caption of Rule cited indicates, and in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.'" — This clarifies that the exclusivity provision in estate settlement rules is a matter of venue to prevent conflicting jurisdictions, not a bar to separate civil actions for recovery of property.
• "In the final analysis this action is not necessarily one to annul the partition already made and approved by the probate court, and to reopen the estate proceeding so that a new partition may be made, but for recovery by the plaintiffs of the portion of their alleged inheritance of which, through fraud, they have been deprived." — This defines the true nature of the plaintiffs' cause of action, distinguishing it from a probate proceeding and justifying the regular court's jurisdiction.

• Manila Herald Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Ramos, et al., 88 Phil. 94 — Followed. The Court relied on this case to support the rule that a court cannot dismiss an action on a ground not alleged in the motion to dismiss, applying the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius to the Rules of Court.

• Rule 8, Section 1, Rules of Court — Enumerates the grounds for dismissal of an action. The Court noted that the specific enumeration excludes other grounds for dismissal.
• Rule 30, Rules of Court — Provides the cases in which an action may be dismissed, including the court's own motion when the plaintiff fails to appear or prosecute.
• Rule 75, Section 1, Rules of Court (now Rule 73, Section 1) — Governs where the estate of deceased persons is settled. The Court clarified that this rule concerns venue and the exclusion of other courts in estate settlement, not a bar to a separate action for recovery of inheritance.
• Article 137, Civil Code — Provides that an action for acknowledgment of natural children may be commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents. The Court held it inapplicable because the plaintiffs sought recovery of inheritance, not acknowledgment.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, and Capistrano, JJ., concurred. Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part. Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.