Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. vs. NLRC

A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal under Rule 45, and cannot be used to review factual findings of labor tribunals; where the Court of Appeals rendered a final judgment on the merits, the proper remedy is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, and the failure to avail of that remedy within the reglementary period is fatal to a subsequent Rule 65 petition.

Petitioner Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. (MMSP-Independent) and Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Stayfast (NLMS-Olalia) were rival unions seeking certification as the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Stayfast Philippines, Inc. A certification election was conducted under the supervision of the Department of Labor and Employment. Petitioner lost that election, and the resulting certification of NLMS-Olalia was upheld through the Secretary of Labor and Employment and ultimately by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 125957. The dispute arose against the backdrop of competing union demands for collective bargaining and the company's insistence on negotiating only with the finally certified bargaining agent.

Petitioner Malayang Manggagawa ng Stayfast Phils., Inc. (MMSP-Independent) and Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa sa Stayfast (NLMS-Olalia) competed to become the exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of Stayfast Philippines, Inc. A certification election was held on December 29, 1995, in which NLMS-Olalia garnered 112 votes against petitioner's 109, with 2 votes for "No Union." The Med-Arbiter certified NLMS-Olalia as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent on January 9, 1996. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor and Employment, who initially ordered a run-off election but later reconsidered and restored the Med-Arbiter's Order. Petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court via certiorari, but the petition was dismissed on January 14, 1998, and became final.

Meanwhile, NLMS-Olalia demanded to collectively bargain with respondent company, which refused, insisting it would negotiate only with whichever union was finally certified. NLMS-Olalia went on strike on April 1, 1997, until it was temporarily restrained eight days later. On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed its own notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB). Respondent company opposed, arguing that petitioner lacked personality to file a notice of strike because it was not the certified bargaining agent. During conciliation-mediation, the parties reached concessions, and petitioner withdrew its notice of strike. The NCMB issued a Certification dated July 31, 1997, confirming that the notice of strike was considered dropped/withdrawn and that no new notice of strike had been filed.

On July 21, 1997, petitioner's members staged a "sit-down strike" to protest alleged discrimination by respondent company. Respondent company issued a memorandum requiring the participants to explain within 24 hours why they should not be terminated or suspended for unauthorized work stoppage, acts inimical to company interest, and disregard of supervisory instructions. No one complied within the deadline, and respondent company terminated the participants on July 22, 1997. The following day, petitioner staged a full-blown strike and filed a complaint for unfair labor practice, union busting, and illegal lockout against respondent company and its General Manager, Maria Almeida, before the NLRC.

Petitioner alleged that respondent company had committed repeated acts of discrimination, including denial of the use of the company canteen for strike vote purposes, denial of leave applications for petitioner's members to attend labor case hearings while approving similar applications from NLMS-Olalia members, and suspension of petitioner's president for absences due to attendance at such hearings. Petitioner claimed the termination of approximately 127 of its officers and members constituted union busting and unlawful lockout. Respondent company countered that petitioner's strike was illegal because it had previously withdrawn its notice of strike, making the subsequent strike a wildcat strike, and that the strike was compounded by prohibited acts such as blocking entry and exit points. Respondent company also maintained that the dismissed employees were afforded due process through the memorandum requiring explanation, which they ignored.

The Labor Arbiter found that petitioner failed to cite any instance of discrimination occurring before the filing of its June 5, 1997 notice of strike, that the incidents mentioned as discriminatory occurred after that filing, and that the strike became illegal due to prohibited acts under Article 264(e) of the Labor Code, including violence, coercion, intimidation, and obstruction of ingress and egress. The Labor Arbiter also noted that petitioner submitted its labor dispute for compulsory arbitration on the afternoon of July 23, 1997, yet continued the strike. The NLRC affirmed, adding that the sit-down strike was staged barely a week after petitioner withdrew its notice of strike with prejudice and that no new notice of strike was filed. Both tribunals found no sufficient proof of discriminatory acts.

• Unfair Labor Practice: Petitioner argued that respondent company's discriminatory acts against its members — including denial of canteen use for strike votes, denial of leave applications to attend labor hearings while approving those of rival union members, and suspension of petitioner's president — constituted unfair labor practice under Article 248(e) of the Labor Code.
• Union Busting and Illegal Dismissal: Petitioner maintained that the termination of approximately 127 of its officers and members constituted union busting and unlawful lockout, entitling them to reinstatement with full backwages.
• Damages and Attorney's Fees: Petitioner claimed that the arbitrary action of respondent company and its General Manager wantonly disregarded the legal rights of petitioner's officers and members, thereby entitling them to damages and attorney's fees.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner asserted that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it upheld the NLRC's rulings and disregarded the constitutional protection of labor as well as Article 248(e) and Article 263 of the Labor Code.

• Timeliness of Petition: Respondent company and its General Manager questioned the timeliness of the petition, noting it was filed 52 days after petitioner's receipt of the Court of Appeals Decision, when a petition for review under Rule 45 should have been filed within 15 days.
• Illegality of Strike: Respondent argued that the sit-down strike, which later became a full-blown strike, was illegal because petitioner had previously withdrawn its notice of strike with prejudice during NCMB proceedings, and no new notice of strike was filed.
• Prohibited Acts During Strike: Respondent contended that the illegality of the strike was compounded by the commission of prohibited acts, including the blocking of entry and exit points of respondent company's premises.
• Due Process Afforded: Respondent maintained that petitioner's officers and employees were afforded due process before dismissal, as they were issued a memorandum requiring them to explain their participation in the illegal sit-down strike, which they simply ignored.

• Propriety of Remedy: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to challenge a decision of the Court of Appeals that dismissed a petition and affirmed the NLRC's ruling.
• Motion for Reconsideration: Whether petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration with the Court of Appeals before filing the Rule 65 petition is fatal.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether petitioner established grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
• Questions of Fact: Whether petitioner improperly raised questions of fact in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
• Merits — Unfair Labor Practice and Illegal Dismissal: Whether the findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the strike was illegal, the dismissals were valid, and no unfair labor practice was committed are supported by substantial evidence.

• Propriety of Remedy: No. The proper remedy was a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, because the Court of Appeals Decision was a final judgment on the merits that disposed of the case and left nothing more to be done.
• Motion for Reconsideration: No. A motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for a Rule 65 petition, and none of the recognized exceptions applied; the Court of Appeals was never given an opportunity to rectify any error.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously, whimsically, arbitrarily, or despotically, offering only sweeping allegations without substantiation.
• Questions of Fact: No. Petitioner's arguments essentially questioned the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, which cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.
• Merits — Unfair Labor Practice and Illegal Dismissal: No. Both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC found no sufficient proof of discriminatory acts, and the established facts showed that the sit-down strike violated company rules and that the dismissed employees ignored the opportunity to explain their misconduct.

• Propriety of Remedy: The Court of Appeals Decision dated July 1, 2002 was a final judgment because it denied due course to and dismissed the petition, disposing of it in a manner that left nothing more to be done. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the proper remedy from a judgment of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari raising only questions of law. Certiorari under Rule 65 is available only in the absence of appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Where the rules prescribe a particular remedy, that remedy must be availed of. The existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits resort to certiorari, which cannot serve as a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal. Petitioner received the Court of Appeals Decision on August 2, 2002, had until August 19, 2002 to file a Rule 45 petition, but let that period lapse and instead filed the Rule 65 petition on October 1, 2002.

• Motion for Reconsideration: As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite before resort to certiorari, intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any error through re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. While well-recognized exceptions exist — such as patent nullity, urgent necessity, deprivation of due process, ex parte proceedings, or purely legal questions — none of these exceptions applied here. The Court of Appeals was never given any opportunity to rectify whatever error it may have made, and petitioner offered no compelling reason to warrant deviation from the rule.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Grave abuse of discretion requires a showing that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary, or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. Petitioner offered only a general statement in the Jurisdictional Facts portion and a sweeping allegation of grave abuse of discretion in the grounds of the petition, without any argument showing how or why the Court of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously or despotically. Petitioner merely reiterated its version of the case, which had already been rejected by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.

• Questions of Fact: Petitioner used the Discussion/Arguments portion of its petition to refute the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter as upheld by the NLRC, reiterating its positions on discriminatory acts, union busting, and entitlement to reinstatement and backwages. To question the identical findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC is to raise a question of fact, which cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari. The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts in certiorari proceedings, where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion.

• Merits — Unfair Labor Practice and Illegal Dismissal: Petitioner's case rested on alleged discriminatory acts, but both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC held there was no sufficient proof of such acts. The established facts showed that the sit-down strike on July 21, 1997 violated respondent company's rules, and petitioner's officers and members ignored the opportunity given to explain their misconduct, resulting in their termination. The Court of Appeals found these findings supported by substantial evidence, and the Supreme Court found no grave abuse of discretion or error in that ruling. Findings of fact made by Labor Arbiters and affirmed by the NLRC are entitled to great respect, even finality, and are binding if supported by substantial evidence.

• Certiorari as Remedy of Last Resort — A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, available only where there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It cannot be allowed when a party fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, and cannot serve as a substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner should have filed a Rule 45 petition within 15 days from receipt of the Court of Appeals Decision, and its failure to do so was fatal to the Rule 65 petition.

• Prior Motion for Reconsideration Required — A motion for reconsideration is generally a prerequisite before filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error through re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Recognized exceptions include patent nullity, prior resolution of the same issues, urgent necessity, uselessness of reconsideration, deprivation of due process, ex parte proceedings, and purely legal questions. The Court found none of these exceptions applicable.

• Finality of Labor Tribunals' Factual Findings — Findings of fact made by Labor Arbiters and affirmed by the NLRC are entitled to great respect, even finality, and are considered binding if supported by substantial evidence. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the Court of Appeals' ruling that the NLRC Resolution was supported by justifiable reason and could not be faulted with grave abuse of discretion.

• Questions of Fact Barred in Certiorari — Questions of fact cannot be raised in an original action for certiorari under Rule 65, as the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts in such proceedings. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion, not errors of law or mistakes in the appreciation or evaluation of evidence.

• "The proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits, final order or resolution is appeal. This holds true even if the error ascribed to the court rendering the judgment is its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or the exercise of power in excess thereof, or grave abuse of discretion in the findings of fact or of law set out in the decision, order or resolution." — This passage articulates the fundamental rule that appeal, not certiorari, is the proper remedy to reverse a judgment on the merits, even where jurisdictional errors or grave abuse of discretion are alleged.

• "Petitioner cannot mask its failure to file an appeal by petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court by the mere expedient of conjuring grave abuse of discretion to avail of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65." — This statement captures the Court's rejection of the common practice of substituting certiorari for a lost appeal by merely alleging grave abuse of discretion.

• "The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion." — This quotation defines the limited scope of certiorari review and the prohibition against factual review in Rule 65 proceedings.

• "Findings of fact made by Labor Arbiters and affirmed by the NLRC are not only entitled to great respect, but even finality, and are considered binding if the same are supported by substantial evidence." — This passage states the doctrine of finality accorded to concurrent factual findings of labor tribunals when supported by substantial evidence.

• Bugarin vs. Palisoc, 513 Phil. 59 (2005) — Cited for the rule that the proper remedy to obtain a reversal of judgment on the merits is appeal, and that the existence and availability of the right of appeal prohibits resort to certiorari.
• Balayan vs. Acorda, 523 Phil. 305 (2006) — Cited for the principle that certiorari is a limited form of review and a remedy of last recourse, and cannot substitute for a lapsed or lost appeal.
• Romy's Freight Service vs. Castro, 523 Phil. 540 (2006) — Cited for the rule that a motion for reconsideration is a prerequisite for certiorari, the enumerated exceptions thereto, and the rationale that the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts in certiorari proceedings.
• Yu vs. Judge Reyes-Carpio, G.R. No. 189207, June 15, 2011 — Cited for the precise definition of "grave abuse of discretion" as requiring a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, patent and gross enough to amount to evasion of positive duty.
• Spouses Santos vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 354 Phil. 918 (1998) — Cited for the doctrine that findings of fact by Labor Arbiters affirmed by the NLRC are entitled to great respect, even finality, when supported by substantial evidence.

• Section 1, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs appeals by certiorari from judgments of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court, providing that a verified petition for review on certiorari may be filed raising only questions of law. Applied to hold that petitioner's proper remedy was a Rule 45 petition, not a Rule 65 petition.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Governs the special civil action of certiorari, available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Applied to hold that the petition was the wrong remedy.
• Section 2, Rule 45, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition under Rule 45 shall be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment. Applied to determine that petitioner had until August 19, 2002 to file the proper appeal.
• Section 1, Rule 22, Rules of Court — Provides that if the last day of a period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the time shall not run until the next working day. Applied to compute the deadline as August 19, 2002 (Monday), since August 17, 2002 was a Saturday.
• Article 248(e), Labor Code — Prohibits employer discrimination against employees in regard to terms and conditions of employment on account of their union affiliation. Petitioner invoked this provision to support its unfair labor practice claim, but the Court found no sufficient evidence of discrimination.
• Article 263, Labor Code — Governs strikes and lockouts, including the requirements for a valid strike. Petitioner invoked this provision, but the Court found the strike illegal.
• Article 264(e), Labor Code — Enumerates prohibited acts during a strike, including violence, coercion, intimidation, and obstruction of free ingress and egress. Applied by the Labor Arbiter to find the strike illegal.

Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chairperson), Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza, and Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred in the decision.