Malanyaon vs. Lising

Dismissal of a criminal case against a suspended public officer by reason of his death does not amount to acquittal under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, and the officer's heirs are not entitled to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, as the statutory entitlement arises only when the officer is acquitted on the merits after due hearing.

Nilo A. Malanyaon was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur. The late Mayor S.B. Pontanal was the municipal mayor of the same locality and had been charged in Criminal Case No. P-339 for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019 governs the suspension of public officers facing criminal prosecution under the Act and provides that a suspended officer who is acquitted is entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits he failed to receive during suspension, while one who is convicted by final judgment loses all retirement or gratuity benefits.

The late Mayor S.B. Pontanal served as municipal mayor of the Municipality of Bula, Camarines Sur. He was charged in Criminal Case No. P-339 for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019). Upon the filing of the case and after hearing, he was suspended from office pursuant to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019. During his incumbency and while under suspension, Pontanal died. By reason of his death, the criminal charge against him in Criminal Case No. P-339 was dismissed.

Following the dismissal, Municipal Treasurer Cesario Goleta disbursed the sum of P5,000 to Venancia Pontanal, the Mayor's widow, representing a portion of the salary of the late Mayor corresponding to the period of his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. Nilo A. Malanyaon, then a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula, Camarines Sur, filed an action to declare the disbursement illegal and contrary to Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, on the ground that the late Mayor had not been acquitted of the charge against him. He sought to restrain or prevent the Municipal Treasurer from further paying or disbursing the balance of the claim.

The respondent judge dismissed Malanyaon's action, ruling that the criminal case against the late Mayor, having been dismissed due to his death, amounted to acquittal. This dismissal by the court a quo prompted the petition for review before the Supreme Court.

• Illegal Disbursement: Petitioner contended that any disbursement of municipal funds by respondent Municipal Treasurer in favor of the heirs of the late Mayor for salaries corresponding to the period of suspension and other benefits would be illegal and contrary to the provisions of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, because the late Mayor was not acquitted of the charge against him.

• Acquittal by Death: Respondents argued that the dismissal of the criminal case against the late Mayor due to his death amounted to acquittal, thereby entitling his heirs to the salaries and benefits under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019.
• Application of Article 81, Revised Penal Code: Respondents invoked Article 81, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liability.

• Meaning of "Acquitted" under Section 13: Whether the dismissal of a criminal case against a suspended public officer by reason of his death amounts to acquittal under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, thereby entitling his heirs to back salaries and benefits.
• Applicability of Article 81, Revised Penal Code: Whether Article 81, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, on the extinction of criminal and civil liability by death of the accused pending appeal, applies to the claim for back salaries of a suspended officer.

• Meaning of "Acquitted" under Section 13: No. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer does not amount to acquittal. "Acquitted" in Section 13 means acquittal on the merits after due hearing and consideration of the evidence, where the court finds that guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
• Applicability of Article 81, Revised Penal Code: No. Article 81, No. 1 is irrelevant because the case against Mayor Pontanal was not on appeal but on trial, and the claim for back salaries is neither a criminal nor a civil liability but a statutory right conditioned on acquittal.

• Meaning of "Acquitted" under Section 13: The statute speaks of the suspended officer being "acquitted," which means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him, the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer does not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal. As articulated in People vs. Salico, acquittal is always based on the merits — the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Dismissal, by contrast, terminates the proceeding for reasons other than a determination on the merits, such as lack of jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction issues, or insufficiency of the information in form and substance. The only instance where dismissal is commonly but incorrectly used in place of acquittal is when, after the prosecution has presented all its evidence, the defendant moves for dismissal and the court dismisses on the ground that the evidence fails to show guilt beyond reasonable doubt — in which case the dismissal is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. The dismissal of the case against Mayor Pontanal by reason of his death was not a determination on the merits and therefore did not constitute acquittal under Section 13.

• Applicability of Article 81, Revised Penal Code: Article 81, No. 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liability. This provision was found irrelevant for two reasons. First, the case against Mayor Pontanal was not on appeal but on trial; the provision applies only when the accused dies while an appeal is pending. Second, the claim for back salaries is neither a criminal nor a civil liability within the meaning of the provision. It is in fact a right provided the conditions of the law are present — specifically, the condition that the suspended officer be acquitted. Since that condition was not satisfied, Article 81 has no bearing on the entitlement to salaries and benefits under Section 13.

• Acquittal vs. Dismissal — Acquittal is always based on the merits, meaning the court finds after due hearing that the defendant's guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Dismissal does not decide the case on the merits or declare the defendant not guilty; it terminates the proceeding for procedural or jurisdictional reasons. The only case where dismissal is commonly but incorrectly used instead of acquittal is when, after the prosecution has rested its case, the court dismisses on the ground of insufficiency of evidence — which is in reality an acquittal because the case is decided on the merits. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the dismissal of the criminal case against Mayor Pontanal by reason of death was not an acquittal under Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, and therefore his heirs were not entitled to back salaries and benefits.

• "It is obvious that when the statute speaks of the suspended officer being 'acquitted' it means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt." — This passage defines the controlling interpretation of "acquitted" in Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019, establishing that statutory entitlement to back salaries requires a determination on the merits, not merely the termination of proceedings.

• "Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal." — This is the dispositive legal conclusion that resolves the central issue, drawing the definitive line between dismissal and acquittal for purposes of the suspended officer's statutory rights.

• "We do not see the relevance of this provision to the case at bar. For one thing the case against Mayor Pontanal was not on appeal but on trial. For another thing the claim for back salaries is neither a criminal nor a civil liability. It is in fact a right provided the conditions of the law are present." — This passage rejects the respondents' invocation of Article 81 of the Revised Penal Code, clarifying that the extinction of liability by death is conceptually distinct from the statutory right to recover salaries conditioned on acquittal.

• People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722 (1949) — Cited as controlling authority for the distinction between acquittal and dismissal. The Court relied on this case to establish that acquittal is always based on the merits, while dismissal terminates proceedings for reasons other than a determination of guilt or innocence.

• Section 13, Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) — Provides that a public officer against whom criminal prosecution is pending shall be suspended from office; if convicted by final judgment, he loses all retirement or gratuity benefits; if acquitted, he is entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless administrative proceedings have been filed against him in the meantime. The Court interpreted "acquitted" to mean acquittal on the merits after due hearing, not mere dismissal of the case.
• Article 81, No. 1, Revised Penal Code — Provides that the death of the accused pending appeal extinguishes his criminal and civil liability. The Court found this provision inapplicable because the case was on trial, not on appeal, and because the claim for back salaries is a statutory right, not a criminal or civil liability.

Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concurred.