Maguddatu vs. Court of Appeals

After conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, bail is a matter of discretion and not of right; and since the purpose of bail is to secure release, one who is not in the custody of the law, or who has violated the conditions of his bail, is not entitled to bail. The bail bond previously posted remains effective only until the promulgation of the Regional Trial Court's judgment, and may be used to continue provisional liberty during the period to appeal only with the consent of the bondsman.

Petitioners Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu were among the accused in Criminal Case No. 12010 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, for the killing of Jose S. Pascual, and had been admitted to bail during the pendency of the trial. The controversy turns on the constitutional and procedural framework governing bail — Article III, Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution and Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94 — which distinguishes between bail as a matter of right and bail as a matter of discretion, and which fixes the point at which the previously posted bail bond ceases to be effective.

Petitioners Aniceto Sabbun Maguddatu and Laureana Sabbun Maguddatu, together with Atty. Teodoro Rubino, Antonio Sabbun Maguddatu, and several other "John Does," were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, for the killing of Jose S. Pascual. On October 23, 1985, the petitioners filed a motion to be admitted to bail on the ground that the prosecution's evidence was not strong. After a partial trial on the merits, the trial court issued an order dated December 20, 1985 granting the motion for bail and fixing the amount at P30,000.00 each. On the same day, the petitioners posted bail through AFISCO Insurance Corporation.

On January 6, 1987, AFISCO Insurance Corporation filed a motion before the trial court praying for the cancellation of the petitioners' bail bond because of their failure to renew the same upon its expiration on December 20, 1986. The records disclosed no action by the court on that motion.

On January 2, 1998, the trial court convicted petitioners Aniceto and Laureana Maguddatu, together with Atty. Teodoro Rubino, of the crime of homicide and sentenced them to suffer an indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. The judgment of conviction was promulgated in absentia. Accordingly, on February 19, 1998, the trial court issued an order for the immediate arrest of the petitioners and their commitment to the custody of the proper authorities.

While remaining at large, the petitioners, on February 27, 1998, filed a Notice of Appeal from the order of conviction for homicide, together with a motion to be granted provisional liberty under the same bail bond pending appeal. The trial court did not appear to have resolved the motion for bail pending appeal and instead forwarded the records to the Court of Appeals.

On January 8, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution directing the accused-appellants to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why their appeal should not be deemed abandoned and accordingly dismissed for their failure to submit themselves to the proper authorities and to the jurisdiction of the court, considering further that the approval of bail was discretionary and not to be presumed; it likewise directed the Station Commanders of the Manila Police Station and the Makati Police Station to file a return of the Order of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court on February 19, 1998. In a Compliance and Motion dated February 8, 1999, the petitioners explained that their failure to submit to the proper authorities and to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was due only to the fact that they had believed all along that the motion accompanying their Notice of Appeal had already been approved and granted by the court of origin. Despite the compliance and motion, the petitioners remained at large.

On June 23, 1999, the Court of Appeals issued the resolution under question denying the petitioners' application for bail and ordering their arrest. Aggrieved, the petitioners brought the instant petition for certiorari on August 30, 1999. Pending resolution of the petition, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution dated September 8, 1999 deeming the appeal abandoned and dismissed for failure to submit to the court's jurisdiction pending appeal, and ordering the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, to issue warrants of arrest for the immediate apprehension and service of sentence of the two accused. The trial court's factual findings that mattered to the Supreme Court's analysis were that the petitioners had failed to appear at the promulgation of judgment despite due notice and without justifiable reason, had failed to renew their expired bail bond, and had remained at large notwithstanding the order of arrest and two warnings from the Court of Appeals.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying their application for bail and their prayer to recall the order of arrest issued by the trial court.
• Denial of Notice and Abandonment by Counsel: Petitioners complained that they were not informed of the date of promulgation of the decision of conviction in the trial court and that their counsel of record abandoned them.
• Belief That the Motion Had Been Granted: Petitioners maintained that their failure to submit themselves to the proper authorities and to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was due only to the fact that they had believed all the while that the motion accompanying their Notice of Appeal had already been approved and granted by the court of origin.

• Right to Bail: Whether, under the facts of the case, petitioners are entitled to bail as a matter of right or on the discretion of the trial court.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the trial court, in denying bail, committed grave abuse of discretion.

• Right to Bail: No. Bail after conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is discretionary under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, and not a matter of right.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The denial of bail was proper because petitioners were at large, had violated the conditions of their bail, had failed to renew the expired bond, and could not obtain the bondsman's consent to continued provisional liberty on the same bond.

• Right to Bail: Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all accused except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 4, Rule 114 treats bail as a matter of right only (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Section 5, Rule 114 provides that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail, and that the court in its discretion may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal, subject to the consent of the bondsman. Because the petitioners were convicted of homicide — an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment — their entitlement to bail after conviction was addressed to the sound discretion of the court and was not demandable as a matter of right.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The denial of bail was sustained on several grounds. First, the petitioners had remained at large despite an order of arrest from the trial court and two warnings from the Court of Appeals; it is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of liberty, since the purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Their Compliance and Motion dated February 8, 1999 fell short of an unconditional submission to the appellate court's lawful order and to its jurisdiction. Second, the petitioners violated the conditions of their bail: bail is a security for the release of a person conditioned upon his appearance before any court, and the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required; their non-appearance during the promulgation of the trial court's decision despite due notice and without justifiable reason, and their continued non-submission to the proper authorities as ordered by the Court of Appeals, constituted violations of those conditions. They likewise failed to renew their expired bail bond, as shown by the January 6, 1987 motion of AFISCO Insurance Corporation praying for cancellation of the bond upon its expiration. Third, under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, where the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, bail shall be denied or previously granted bail cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution of the enumerated circumstances or other similar circumstances — among them that the accused has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification and that the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail. The penalty imposed on the petitioners, an indeterminate term of eight (8) years of prision mayor medium as minimum to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum, fell squarely within that range, and the circumstances of their flight and violation of bail conditions were present. Fourth, the bail bond previously posted could be used only during the fifteen-day period to appeal under Rule 122 and not during the entire period of appeal, consistent with Section 2(a), Rule 114, which makes the bail effective upon approval and in force at all stages of the case unless sooner cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it; this amendment introduced by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94 departed from the old rules under which bail remained in force until full determination of the case, including the period of appeal. Under the present rule, continuation of provisional liberty on the same bail bond during the period to appeal requires the consent of the bondsman, and that consent was foreclosed because AFISCO Insurance Corporation had already moved for cancellation of the bond. Fifth, the filing of a notice of appeal effectively deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain the motion for bail pending appeal, since appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such notice; trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion. Finally, even conceding the truth of the petitioners' allegations that they were not informed of the date of promulgation and that their counsel of record abandoned them, they still failed to surrender to the authorities despite two orders to that effect by the Court of Appeals, and they had no cause to expect that their application for bail would be granted as a matter of course precisely because it was a matter of discretion. In any event, the petition had become moot, because during its pendency the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated September 8, 1999, dismissed the accused-appellants' appeal for failure to submit to the court's jurisdiction pending appeal.

• Bail as a matter of right versus bail as a matter of discretion — Bail is a matter of right only (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail; the grant is addressed to the court's discretion. The Court applied this distinction to hold that the petitioners, convicted of homicide, could not demand bail as a matter of right.

• Custody of the law as a requisite for bail — For one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise deprived of liberty, because the purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. The petitioners' continued liberty despite an order of arrest and two warnings from the Court of Appeals disqualified them from bail.

• Effectivity of the bail bond; consent of the bondsman — Under Section 2(a), Rule 114, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94, bail shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it. The previously posted bail bond may therefore be used to continue provisional liberty only during the fifteen-day period to appeal under Rule 122, and not during the entire period of appeal, and its continued use during the period to appeal requires the consent of the bondsman. Because AFISCO Insurance Corporation had moved to cancel the bond for non-renewal, that consent was foreclosed.

• Grounds for denial or cancellation of bail after conviction — Where the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances: (a) that the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) that the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c) that the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional pardon; (d) that the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) that there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another crime. The petitioners' flight and violation of bail conditions brought them within this provision.

• Jurisdiction over bail pending appeal — The filing of a notice of appeal effectively deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to entertain a motion for bail pending appeal, because appeal is perfected by the mere filing of such notice. Trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.

• Mootness of the petition — The dismissal of the accused-appellants' appeal by the Court of Appeals for failure to submit to its jurisdiction pending appeal rendered the petition for certiorari moot.

• "It is axiomatic that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law, or otherwise, deprived of liberty. The purpose of bail is to secure one's release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the threshold requirement for bail and is the formulation commonly cited for the rule that custody of the law is a condition sine qua non to any application for bail.
• "The bail bond that the accused previously posted can only be used during the 15-day period to appeal (Rule 122) and not during the entire period of appeal." — This passage defines the temporal reach of a previously posted bail bond under Rule 114, as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94, and is central to the Court's rejection of the petitioners' motion to continue on the same bond.
• "The Constitution guarantees the right to bail of all the accused except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong." — This passage states the constitutional baseline from which the Court derived the rule that bail after conviction for a non-capital offense is discretionary rather than demandable as of right.
• "It has been held that trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion." — This passage articulates the jurisdictional consequence of the perfection of an appeal by notice of appeal and explains why the trial court could no longer act on the petitioners' motion for bail pending appeal.

• Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 (1961) — Cited as authority for the rule that for one to be entitled to bail, he should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty.
• Mendoza vs. Court of First Instance of Quezon, 51 SCRA 369 (1973) — Cited in connection with Feliciano vs. Pasicolan on the custody-of-the-law requirement for bail.
• Meris vs. Ofilada, 293 SCRA 606 (1998) — Cited as further authority on the requisites for entitlement to bail.
• Guillen vs. Nicolas, 299 SCRA 623 (1998) — Cited as further authority on the requisites for entitlement to bail.
• Obosa vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 281 (1997) — Cited in support of the denial or cancellation of bail where the penalty imposed exceeds six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years and the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are present.
• Padilla vs. Court of Appeals, 260 SCRA 155 (1996) — Cited alongside Obosa for the same proposition on the denial or cancellation of bail after conviction.
• People vs. Patajo, G.R. No. 57718, November 20, 1998, En Banc, Minute Resolution — Cited in the Court of Appeals' January 8, 1999 Resolution for the proposition that the approval of bail pending appeal is discretionary and not to be presumed.

• Article III, Section 13, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to bail of all persons except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong, before conviction, by sufficient sureties or on recognizance as may be provided by law; the right shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, and excessive bail shall not be required. The Court used this provision as the constitutional baseline for its holding that bail after conviction for a non-capital offense is discretionary.
• Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Defines bail as a security for the release of a person conditioned upon his appearance before any court. The Court relied on this definition in finding that the petitioners had violated the conditions of their bail.
• Section 2, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Provides that the accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so required by the court or the Rules, and, under paragraph (a) as amended by Supreme Court Administrative Circular 12-94, that bail shall be effective upon approval and remain in force at all stages of the case, unless sooner cancelled, until the promulgation of the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was originally filed in or appealed to it. The Court invoked this provision to hold that the petitioners' bond had ceased to be available for the entire period of appeal.
• Section 4, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Provides that all persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. The Court cited this provision to delimit the instances in which bail is demandable as of right.
• Section 5, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Provides that upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit the accused to bail; that the court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bond during the period to appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman; and that where the penalty imposed is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20) years, bail shall be denied or cancelled upon a showing of the enumerated or similar circumstances. This was the principal provision applied to deny the petitioners' application.
• Section 7, Rule 114, Rules of Court — Provides that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. The Court cited this provision to contrast the non-bailable character of capital offenses with the discretionary character of bail after conviction for a lesser offense.
• Rule 122, Rules of Court — Fixes the fifteen-day period to appeal, during which the previously posted bail bond may still be used; the Court held that the bond could not be used beyond that period.
• Section 8, Rule 124, Rules of Court — Cited in the Court of Appeals' September 8, 1999 Resolution (erroneously designated therein as Rule 128) as the basis for deeming the appeal abandoned and dismissed for failure to prosecute, which rendered the petition moot.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.