Magtoto vs. Manguera

The right to counsel and to be informed of such right during custodial investigation, codified for the first time in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, is prospective in effect; confessions obtained before the Constitution's effectivity on January 17, 1973 are admissible in evidence even if the accused was not informed of such right, because no such right existed when those confessions were taken.

The three consolidated cases arose from separate criminal prosecutions in which extrajudicial confessions had been obtained from accused persons without informing them of their right to remain silent and to counsel. In all three cases, the confessions were taken before January 17, 1973 — the date the 1973 Constitution took effect. Section 20, Article IV of that Constitution introduced, for the first time in Philippine law, the right of a person under investigation for the commission of an offense to remain silent, to have counsel, and to be informed of such right, with the further mandate that any confession obtained in violation thereof shall be inadmissible in evidence. Prior to the 1973 Constitution, no such right existed; the Miranda-Escobedo rule from United States jurisprudence had been expressly rejected by the Philippine Supreme Court in People vs. Jose and People vs. Paras. The Constitutional Convention delegates were aware of this rejection and deliberately incorporated the Miranda-Escobedo doctrine into the new Constitution.

The three consolidated cases each involve accused persons who gave extrajudicial confessions while under investigation for criminal offenses, without having been informed of any right to remain silent or to counsel. In all three cases, the confessions were obtained before January 17, 1973, the date the 1973 Constitution took effect.

In G.R. No. L-37201-02, Clemente Magtoto was accused of murder for the deaths of Ignacio Calara and Eduardo Calara in two informations both dated February 23, 1973, filed before the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro. His extrajudicial confession was executed on November 25, 1972, while he was in the preventive custody of the Philippine Constabulary. During the joint trial, the defense objected to the confession's admission on the ground that Magtoto had not been informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel. The trial court admitted the confession in its order of June 18, 1973. Magtoto filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify that order.

In G.R. No. L-37424, Maximo Simeon, Louis Mednatt, Inocentes de Luna, Ruben Miranda, Alfonso Ballesteros, Rudolfo Suarez, Manuel Manalo, Alberto Gabion, and Rafael Brill were accused of murder for the death of Pedro Langaoen in Criminal Case No. CCC-VII 87 before the Criminal Circuit Court of Pasig, Rizal. They were arraigned on November 25, 1972 and pleaded not guilty. Their extrajudicial confessions, taken on October 17, 1970 without the benefit of counsel, were presented during the trial on June 2, 1973 and admitted by the court in its order of August 16, 1973. The accused filed a petition for certiorari challenging the admission.

In G.R. No. L-38929, Vicente Longakit and Jaime Dalion were accused of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 4113 before the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, Branch II, under an information dated February 6, 1970. Longakit's extrajudicial confession was executed on November 7, 1968, with an additional confession on September 1, 1970, both without his having been informed of his right to counsel. When the confessions were offered in evidence during the trial, the court rejected them on June 18, 1974. The People of the Philippines filed a petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the exclusion. No extrajudicial confession of co-accused Jaime Dalion was mentioned in the record.

The common legal question across all three cases was whether the right to counsel and to be informed of such right — first constitutionalized in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution — should be applied retroactively to confessions taken before the Constitution's effectivity, or prospectively only.

• Retroactivity of Constitutional Right (Magtoto; Simeon, et al.): Petitioners argued that their extrajudicial confessions should be declared inadmissible because they were taken without informing them of their right to remain silent and to counsel, as now required under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.
• Implied Right to Counsel under R.A. No. 1083: It was argued that the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as added by Republic Act No. 1083, impliedly granted a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right, such that confessions taken without observance of this right were already inadmissible even before the 1973 Constitution.
• Retroactive Effect of Penal Laws (People, petitioner in L-38929): The People, as petitioner in G.R. No. L-38929, challenged the trial court's exclusion of Longakit's confessions, contending that the confessions were properly admissible under the rules in force at the time they were taken.

• Prospectivity of Constitutional Guarantee (Magtoto; Simeon, et al., as respondents): Respondents maintained that Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution created a new right that did not exist before its effectivity, and therefore confessions taken before January 17, 1973 in accordance with the rules then in force should remain admissible.
• No Pre-Existing Right to Counsel (Solicitor General): The Solicitor General argued that Republic Act No. 1083 only granted a detained person the right to be informed of the cause of detention and, upon his request, to communicate and confer with counsel — it did not require police investigators to inform the detained person of any right to counsel. The right to counsel and to be informed of such right was first granted by the 1973 Constitution and should be applied prospectively.
• Unsettling Effect of Retroactivity: Respondents contended that retroactive application would have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice, potentially leading to the acquittal of guilty individuals in cases where confessions were obtained before the Constitution's effectivity and in accordance with the rules then in force.

• Prospectivity vs. Retroactivity: Whether the right to counsel and to be informed of such right during custodial investigation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution should be applied retroactively or prospectively.
• Pre-Existing Right under R.A. No. 1083: Whether the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as added by Republic Act No. 1083, impliedly granted a detained person the right to counsel and to be informed of such right before the 1973 Constitution.
• Applicability of Article 22, Revised Penal Code: Whether Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for retroactive effect of penal laws insofar as they favor the accused, applies to the constitutional provision in question.

• Prospectivity vs. Retroactivity: Prospective only. The right to counsel and to be informed of such right during custodial investigation was first granted by the 1973 Constitution and applies only to confessions obtained after its effectivity on January 17, 1973; confessions taken before that date remain admissible.
• Pre-Existing Right under R.A. No. 1083: No. Republic Act No. 1083 only granted a detained person the right to be informed of the cause of detention and, upon his request, to communicate and confer with counsel; it did not require investigators to inform the detained person of any right to counsel.
• Applicability of Article 22, Revised Penal Code: No. Article 22 applies to substantive penal laws, while the constitutional provision in question is basically a procedural rule of evidence involving the admissibility of confessions; moreover, constitutional provisions as a rule should be given prospective effect.

• Prospectivity vs. Retroactivity: Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution granted, for the first time, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense. The inadmissibility clause — which renders confessions obtained in violation of this right inadmissible — can only take effect when the right already existed and had been violated. Because the confessions in all three cases were taken before January 17, 1973, in accordance with the rules then in force, no right had been violated. The Constitutional Convention delegates were aware of the Miranda-Escobedo doctrine, which had been rejected by the Court in People vs. Jose and People vs. Paras, and deliberately incorporated it as a new right in the 1973 Constitution. This historical background demonstrates the intent to give the guarantee prospective, not retroactive, effect. Retroactive application would also have a great unsettling effect on the administration of justice, potentially leading to the acquittal of guilty persons in cases where confessions were obtained before the Constitution's effectivity in accordance with the rules then prevailing. Even in the United States, the trend had moved toward "pure prospectivity," as evidenced by Johnson vs. New Jersey and Jenkins vs. Delaware, which departed from the earlier limited retroactivity of Linkletter vs. Walker.

• Pre-Existing Right under R.A. No. 1083: The second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, as added by Republic Act No. 1083, provides that "the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel." The only right granted by this provision was to be informed of the cause of detention; the right to communicate and confer with counsel was contingent upon the detained person's own request. Senator Cuenco's remark during Senate deliberations — that the bill should require informing the detained person of his right to counsel — reflected only his personal opinion and was not incorporated into the statute. The original wording of Senate Bill No. 50 was amended from "have the services of" to "communicate and confer anytime with," apparently to harmonize with Republic Act No. 857, which penalized public officers who obstructed attorneys from visiting arrested persons upon request. None of these statutes required investigators to inform detained persons of a right to counsel. It was not for the Court to add a requirement that Congress and the President had not included.

• Applicability of Article 22, Revised Penal Code: Article 22 was inapplicable for three reasons: first, the constitutional provision was determined to have prospective effect based on the reasons already given; second, the "penal laws" in Article 22 refer to substantive penal laws — those declaring what acts are crimes and prescribing punishment — while the constitutional provision is basically a procedural rule of evidence governing the admissibility of confessions and therefore cannot be classified as a "penal law"; and third, constitutional provisions as a rule should be given prospective effect. The accused's fundamental right to prove that his confession was involuntary remained unaffected by the ruling.

• Prospectivity of Constitutional Guarantees — Constitutional provisions, as a rule, should be given prospective effect. A new right created by the Constitution — such as the right to counsel during custodial investigation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution — operates only from the date of effectivity and cannot be applied retroactively to acts occurring before that date. The inadmissibility sanction for confessions obtained in violation of this right can only attach when the right already existed and was violated at the time the confession was taken.

• Admissibility of Voluntary Confessions (Pre-1973 Constitution) — Before the 1973 Constitution, extrajudicial confessions were admissible in evidence without previous proof of voluntariness, being presumed voluntary until the contrary was proved. A confession constitutes evidence of a high order, supported by the presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless prompted by truth and conscience. Involuntary or coerced confessions obtained by force or intimidation are null and void, discredited as a thing that never existed, and the defense need not prove their contents are false.

• Distinction Between Substantive Penal Laws and Procedural Rules of Evidence — Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides for retroactive effect of penal laws favoring the accused, applies only to substantive penal laws — those declaring what acts are crimes and prescribing punishment — not to procedural rules of evidence governing the admissibility of confessions. Constitutional provisions on the admissibility of evidence are procedural in character and therefore fall outside the scope of Article 22.

• No Pre-Constitutional Right to Counsel During Investigation — Prior to the 1973 Constitution, no law granted a person under investigation for the commission of an offense the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. Republic Act No. 1083 only allowed a detained person, upon his request, to communicate and confer with counsel; it did not require investigators to inform him of any such right. The Miranda-Escobedo doctrine was expressly rejected in People vs. Jose and People vs. Paras before its incorporation into the 1973 Constitution.

• "We hold that this specific portion of this constitutional mandate has and should be given a prospective and not a retrospective effect. Consequently, a confession obtained from a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, who has not been informed of his right (to silence and) to counsel, is inadmissible in evidence if the same had been obtained after the effectivity of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: the constitutional right to counsel during investigation is prospective, and the date of the confession's taking — not the date of its presentation in court — determines admissibility.

• "Section 20, Article IV of the New Constitution granted, for the first time, to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, the right to counsel and to be informed of such right. And the last sentence thereof which, in effect, means that any confession obtained in violation of this right shall be inadmissible in evidence, can and should be given effect only when the right already existed and had been violated." — This passage articulates the logical foundation for prospectivity: the inadmissibility sanction presupposes the existence of the right at the time of violation.

• "It is not for this Court to add a requirement and carry on where both Congress and the President stopped." — This passage defines the judicial role in statutory construction: the Court may not import into a statute a requirement that the legislature deliberately omitted, reinforcing the conclusion that R.A. No. 1083 did not create a right to be informed of counsel.

• "For if the cause of justice suffers when an innocent person is convicted, it equally suffers when a guilty one is acquitted." — This passage captures the policy rationale for prospectivity: retroactive application would unsettle the administration of justice and risk acquitting guilty persons whose confessions were validly taken under the rules prevailing before the 1973 Constitution.

• People vs. Jose, 37 SCRA 450 (1971) — The Court rejected the Miranda-Escobedo rule in this jurisdiction, holding that the right to counsel under the old Constitution applied only to criminal prosecutions from arraignment to judgment, not to custodial interrogation. This case was central to the prospectivity analysis because the Constitutional Convention was aware of it when drafting Section 20, Article IV, and deliberately incorporated the rejected Miranda-Escobedo doctrine as a new right.

• People vs. Paras, 56 SCRA 248 (1974) — Followed People vs. Jose in rejecting the inadmissibility of extrajudicial confessions given without counsel. Together with Jose, established that no right to counsel during investigation existed before the 1973 Constitution.

• People vs. Urro, 44 SCRA 473 (1972) — Reaffirmed the rule that involuntary or coerced confessions are null and void, discredited as a thing that never existed, and that the defense need not prove their contents are false. Marked the Court's return to the original rule after the interlude of Moncado vs. People's Court.

• Moncado vs. People's Court, 80 Phil. 1 — Held that a confession could be repudiated only if proved to have been obtained by force or violence and also shown to be false. This ruling was subsequently overruled by Stonehill vs. Diokno, and the Court reverted to the original rule that coerced confessions are inadmissible regardless of truth.

• Stonehill vs. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1963) — Held that evidence illegally obtained is not admissible, overruling Moncado vs. People's Court and restoring the rule that involuntary confessions are inadmissible without need to prove falsity.

• U.S. vs. Delos Santos, 24 Phil. 329 — Established the original rule that a confession is evidence of a high order, supported by the presumption that no person of normal mind would confess unless prompted by truth and conscience, and that involuntary confessions are incompetent and must be rejected.

• People vs. Nishishima, 57 Phil. 26 (1932) — Held that involuntary confessions are inadmissible, whether on the ground of unreliability or humanitarian principles abhorring torture or unfairness toward the accused.

• Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) — U.S. Supreme Court decision requiring that individuals taken into custody be warned of their right to remain silent, right to an attorney, and right to appointed counsel if indigent. Rejected in Philippine jurisdiction in People vs. Jose but subsequently incorporated into the 1973 Constitution by the Constitutional Convention.

• Johnson vs. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966) — U.S. Supreme Court decision moving toward "pure prospectivity" by refusing to permit cases pending on direct review to benefit from the new Miranda requirements, cited by the Court as support for the trend toward prospectivity.

• Section 20, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — The constitutional provision at the center of the case, granting for the first time the right to remain silent, to counsel, and to be informed of such right to a person under investigation for the commission of an offense, and declaring inadmissible any confession obtained in violation thereof. The Court held this provision to be prospective in effect, applying only to confessions obtained after January 17, 1973.

• Article 125, Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 1083) — Provides that a detained person shall be informed of the cause of detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer with counsel. The Court held that this provision did not grant a right to counsel and to be informed of such right; it merely allowed the detained person to request counsel, and did not require investigators to inform him of any such right.

• Article 22, Revised Penal Code — Provides that penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony. The Court held this inapplicable because the constitutional provision is a procedural rule of evidence, not a substantive penal law, and because constitutional provisions should as a rule be given prospective effect.

• Section 29, Rule 130, Rules of Court — Provides that the declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt may be given in evidence against him. Cited as the general rule on the admissibility of confessions.

• Section 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court — Provides that an extrajudicial confession shall not be sufficient ground for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti. Cited in support of the evidentiary framework governing confessions.

• Republic Act No. 857 — Penalizes public officers who obstruct attorneys from visiting and conferring with arrested persons upon request. Cited to show that existing statutes only allowed counsel upon request and did not require investigators to inform detained persons of a right to counsel.

Makalintal, C.J., Barredo, Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concurred. Antonio, J., filed a concurring opinion, the text of which is not reproduced in the provided decision.

• Castro, J. — The dissenting opinion of Justice Castro (joined by Teehankee and Fernando, JJ.) insinuated that the Constitutional Convention delegates were unaware of the existence of the second paragraph of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code when drafting Section 20, Article IV. The majority rejected this insinuation, noting that the delegates were fully aware of the Miranda-Escobedo doctrine and had expressly adopted it. The specific points of the dissent's legal reasoning are not fully reproduced in the provided text, but the majority's response indicates that the dissent favored retroactive application of the constitutional right to counsel.

• Teehankee, J. — Joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Castro.

• Fernando, J. — Joined the dissenting opinion of Justice Castro.