Magoncia vs. Palacio

The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures does not protect contraband articles whose possession is prohibited by law. An individual in possession of such goods is entitled to no protection whatsoever, for such goods are not subject to ownership and may be forfeited or destroyed; they are therefore subject to search and seizure. The legality or illegality of the search is immaterial where the items seized are contraband, because ordering their return would exonerate the possessor from criminal responsibility and render the State powerless to enforce the law.

Zacarias Magoncia was arrested for the crime of robbery in band (robo en cuadrilla) allegedly committed at the house of Hilario Enovejas in the barrio of Ariston, municipality of Asingan, Pangasinan, on October 17, 1946. Acting on reliable information, the chief of police ordered four police officers to search Magoncia's house. The search was conducted without a search warrant. During the search, the police found a paltik (a clandestinely manufactured firearm), a hand grenade, a box containing 42 bullets, and pieces of cotton cloth belonging to Hilario Enovejas, the owner of the house that had been robbed. Republic Act No. 4 prohibits the possession of firearms and accessories, and mere possession thereof constitutes a crime.

Zacarias Magoncia was arrested for the crime of robbery in band committed at the house of Hilario Enovejas in the barrio of Ariston, municipality of Asingan, Pangasinan, on October 17, 1946. Acting on reliable information he had received, the chief of police ordered four police officers to search the accused's house. The officers conducted the search without a search warrant. While the officers were conducting the search, the accused's wife confronted them, asking: "Why do you search the house when my husband is absent?" The police found in the house a paltik (a clandestinely manufactured firearm), a hand grenade, a box containing 42 bullets, and pieces of cotton cloth belonging to Hilario Enovejas, the owner of the house that had been robbed.

A complaint for robbery in band (Causa Criminal No. 53) and another for illegal possession of firearms were filed against the accused before the Justice of the Peace Court of Asingan, Pangasinan. The records were elevated to the Court of First Instance, where the robbery case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 17290 and the illegal possession case as Criminal Case No. 17289. In the illegal possession case, the accused filed a motion on January 8, 1947, praying that the effects illegally seized by the four police officers be returned and that the Provincial Fiscal be ordered to desist from using said effects as evidence. Judge Palacio denied the motion on April 1, 1947. On April 21, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on May 10, 1947.

The accused then filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, praying that the order of May 10, 1947 be reversed and that the Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police of Asingan be ordered to desist from presenting the seized effects as evidence, on the ground that they had been illegally seized by the four police officers. The accused based his petition on three grounds: (1) that he had not waived, according to the evidence on record, his protection under the constitutional precept against unreasonable searches; (2) that the municipal police officers had no justification, under the constitutional prohibition, to make the search as an incident of a lawful arrest; and (3) that said municipal police officers, not being provided with a search warrant, could not validly conduct the search simply because they were looking for contraband.

In support of his first contention, the accused presented his wife as witness, who testified that she did not give the police permission to search the house. Santiago Mauricio, one of the municipal police officers who searched the accused's house, was presented as a witness for the Government. Asked by the judge: "During the time that you were searching the room, did Raymunda Ballasca, the wife of Zacarias Magoncia, ever prohibit you to search the room or the house?", he answered: "Yes, sir." There was thus no consent to the search, neither from the accused, who was absent from his house because he was under arrest for the robbery under investigation, nor from his wife Raymunda Ballasca. It is true that she did not oppose the entry of the police into her house, because it is proverbial that the Filipino custom is to keep doors open to everyone; however, this demonstration of good breeding or excessive hospitality should not be considered as permission to the police to search her house.

The accused was detained for a grave offense and immediate action was necessary to locate the stolen effects. The search was indispensable if the police wanted to recover them. There was no time to lose. Confident in the reports received, the chief of police, instead of asking a judge for a search warrant, ordered four police officers to search the accused's house, and they found pieces of stolen cloth together with a paltik, ammunition, and a hand grenade. The accused now claims the return of these effects but is silent as to the pieces of cloth, which are part of the corpus delicti of the robbery.

• Waiver of Constitutional Protection: Petitioner argued that he had not waived, according to the evidence on record, his protection under the constitutional precept against unreasonable searches and seizures.
• Search as Incident of Arrest: Petitioner argued that the municipal police officers had no justification, under the constitutional prohibition, to make the search as an incident of a lawful arrest.
• Absence of Search Warrant: Petitioner argued that the municipal police officers, not being provided with a search warrant, could not validly conduct the search simply because they were looking for contraband.

• Legality of Seizure of Contraband: The respondent judge and the Provincial Fiscal maintained that the seized items were contraband whose possession is prohibited by law, and that the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches does not protect contraband articles.
• No Abuse of Discretion: The respondent judge was said to have acted within his discretion in denying the return of the paltik, 42 ammunition rounds, and hand grenade, and in denying the petition to prohibit the Fiscal and Chief of Police from presenting such effects as evidence.

• Return of Contraband: Whether the petitioner is entitled to the return of the contraband firearms, ammunition, and hand grenade seized during a warrantless search of his house.
• Prohibition Against Use as Evidence: Whether the Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police should be prohibited from presenting the seized contraband as evidence in the criminal case for illegal possession of firearms.
• Abuse of Discretion: Whether the respondent judge abused his discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for the return of the seized effects and the prohibition against their use as evidence.

• Return of Contraband: No. The petitioner is not entitled to the return of the contraband. The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures does not protect contraband articles whose possession is prohibited by law. When an individual possesses contraband, he is committing a crime, and the contraband may be confiscated without need of a search warrant.
• Prohibition Against Use as Evidence: No. The Provincial Fiscal and Chief of Police should not be prohibited from presenting the seized contraband as evidence. To order the return of the contraband and to prevent the Fiscal from presenting it as evidence would be to exonerate the accused from the criminal responsibility prescribed by Republic Act No. 4 and to render the State powerless.
• Abuse of Discretion: No. The respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the return of the paltik, 42 ammunition rounds, and hand grenade, nor in denying the petition to prohibit the Fiscal and Chief of Police from presenting such effects as evidence.

• Return of Contraband: The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the warrantless search in this case was reasonable or unreasonable, or whether it was justified. The legality or illegality of the seizure by the police was declared immaterial. The controlling question was whether the accused had a right to what he prayed for: the return of the contraband effects found in his possession. Republic Act No. 4 prohibits the possession of firearms and accessories; mere possession constitutes a crime. The possession of contraband is punished by law. When an individual possesses contraband, he is committing a crime, and he may be arrested without a warrant of arrest not only by an agent of authority but also by a private individual, and his contraband may be confiscated without need of a search warrant. The Constitution does not guarantee immunity to the contraband dealer. To return the contraband to the accused and to prevent the Provincial Fiscal from presenting it as evidence would be to exonerate him from the criminal responsibility prescribed by Republic Act No. 4 and to render the State powerless.

• Distinction Between Lawful Property and Contraband: The Court emphasized that a distinction must be drawn between the possession of a thing that is susceptible of legal appropriation and is the object of free commerce, such as a watch, and a box of firearms whose possession is prohibited. In the first case, the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked because possessing a watch is not a crime; but the possession of a firearm without license is a flagrant violation of law, and the possessor is subject to arrest without a duly issued warrant, and the contraband may be confiscated. The Court quoted Corpus Juris: "There is a wide distinction between the seizure of property lawfully within the possession of a person and the seizure of property held and used in violation of law. Thus contraband articles, and those things which under the law one has no right to possess, for the purpose of issue or disposition, are not embraced in the protection of the constitutional guaranty. Indeed, an individual in the possession of such goods is entitled to no protection whatsoever, for such goods are not subject to ownership, and may be forfeited or destroyed. They are, therefore, subject to search and seizure." (56 C.J., 116.)

• Prohibition Against Use as Evidence: The Court cited the case of Uy Kheyten vs. Villareal (42 Phil. 935), where the petitioners sought the return of opium seized by constabulary officers who searched their house armed with a search warrant issued without complying with Articles 96 and 98 of General Order No. 58. The petitioners argued that the search warrant was illegal and the search was made without a duly issued warrant. The Court denied the petition, declaring that the irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant was not sufficient cause to order the return of the opium. Applying the same principle, the Court held that the respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the return of the paltik, 42 ammunition rounds, and hand grenade, nor in denying the petition to prohibit the Fiscal and Chief of Police from presenting such effects as evidence.

• Contraband Exception to the Constitutional Guarantee Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures — The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures does not protect contraband articles whose possession is prohibited by law. There is a wide distinction between the seizure of property lawfully within the possession of a person and the seizure of property held and used in violation of law. Contraband articles, and those things which under the law one has no right to possess, are not embraced in the protection of the constitutional guaranty. An individual in possession of such goods is entitled to no protection whatsoever, for such goods are not subject to ownership and may be forfeited or destroyed; they are therefore subject to search and seizure. The Court applied this doctrine to deny the return of the paltik, hand grenade, and ammunition seized from the petitioner, holding that the legality of the search was immaterial because the possession of the seized items was itself a crime under Republic Act No. 4.

• Warrantless Arrest and Seizure of Contraband — When an individual possesses contraband, he is committing a crime, and he may be arrested without a warrant of arrest not only by an agent of authority but also by a private individual, and his contraband may be confiscated without need of a search warrant. The Constitution does not guarantee immunity to the contraband dealer. The Court applied this principle to hold that the petitioner, who was in possession of firearms and ammunition without license, was subject to arrest and the confiscation of the contraband without a search warrant.

• "There is a wide distinction between the seizure of property lawfully within the possession of a person and the seizure of property held and used in violation of law. Thus contraband articles, and those things which under the law one has no right to possess, for the purpose of issue or disposition, are not embraced in the protection of the constitutional guaranty. Indeed, an individual in the possession of such goods is entitled to no protection whatsoever, for such goods are not subject to ownership, and may be forfeited or destroyed. They are, therefore, subject to search and seizure." — This passage, quoted from Corpus Juris (56 C.J., 116), articulates the controlling doctrine that contraband is not protected by the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, and forms the ratio decidendi of the decision.

• "No debe confundirse la posesion de una cosa que es susceptible de apropiacion legal y que es objeto del comercio libre, como un reloj, con un caja de armas de fuego cuya posesion se prohibe. En el primer caso, cabe invocar la garantia consitucional contra registros y se cuestros irrazonables porque el poseer un reloj no es delito; pero la posesion de un arma de fuego, sin licencia es violacion flagrante de la ley y esta sujeto el poseedor a un arresto sin mandaminto debidamente expedido y el contrabando puede ser decomisado." — This passage draws the critical distinction between property lawfully possessed (such as a watch) and contraband (such as unlicensed firearms), holding that the constitutional guarantee applies only to the former, while the latter subjects the possessor to warrantless arrest and confiscation.

• "Es innecesario decidir si el registro sin mandammiento correspondiente en el caso presente era irrazonable o no, si estaba justificado o no. La legalidad o no de su incautacion por los policias no tiene importancia. La cuestion es si el acusado tiene derecho a lo que pide: la devolucion de los efectos de contrabando, encontrados en su poosesion." — This passage establishes that the legality of the search is immaterial where the items seized are contraband; the only question is whether the accused has a right to the return of prohibited items, which he does not.

• Uy Kheyten vs. Villareal, 42 Phil. 935 — Cited as controlling precedent. In that case, the petitioners sought the return of opium seized by constabulary officers who searched their house with a search warrant issued without complying with Articles 96 and 98 of General Order No. 58. The Court denied the petition, declaring that the irregularity in the issuance of the search warrant was not sufficient cause to order the return of the opium. The Court applied the same principle to deny the return of the contraband firearms and ammunition in the present case.

• Article III, Section 1(3), 1935 Constitution — The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court held that this guarantee does not protect contraband articles whose possession is prohibited by law, and that the petitioner could not invoke it to obtain the return of the seized firearms and ammunition.
• Republic Act No. 4 — The law prohibiting the possession of firearms and accessories. The Court held that mere possession of firearms constitutes a crime under this law, and that the petitioner's possession of the paltik, hand grenade, and ammunition was a flagrant violation of law, subjecting him to warrantless arrest and the confiscation of the contraband.
• Articles 96 and 98, General Order No. 58 — The provisions governing the issuance of search warrants, cited in the context of the Uy Kheyten case, where the Court held that irregularity in the issuance of a search warrant was not sufficient cause to order the return of contraband opium.

• Justice Feria
• Justice Bengzon

• Justice Perfecto (concurring) — Justice Perfecto wrote a separate concurring opinion. He emphasized that the search of Magoncia's house by the four police officers, conducted on orders of the chief of police over the objections of Magoncia's wife, was absolutely illegal. The officers were not provided with any search warrant and had not acted under any judicial authority; they violated one of the fundamental guarantees of the Bill of Rights and trampled upon the sanctity and immunities of the home of a citizen. He stated that the officers were accountable for the illegality they committed, and the proper prosecuting officers were duty bound to take immediate steps for the investigation of the grave constitutional contravention. However, he concurred in denying the petition because to order the return of the prohibited weapons to Magoncia would be to justify an illegality or criminal offense. The illegality of the search is independent from the illegal possession of prohibited arms; the illegality of the search did not make legal an illegal possession of firearms. When police officers, in pursuing an illegal action, discover a criminal offense being committed, they are not precluded from performing their duties for the apprehension of the guilty persons and the taking of the corpus delicti.