Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot

The Court held that an oral partition is valid and binding when partly performed through possession in severalty and acts of ownership, and parties who acquiesce to and ratify a partition by taking possession of their allotted shares are estopped from later questioning its validity or claiming co-ownership over another's allotted portion, notwithstanding the lack of formal court confirmation or registration.

Lot No. 1639 was covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6775, issued in 1927 to six co-owners, including Roberto Maglucot and Tomas Maglucot. In 1946, the co-owners orally agreed to tentatively partition the lot and took possession of their respective portions. In 1952, Tomas Maglucot filed a petition to subdivide the lot because two co-owners refused the issuance of separate titles. The Court of First Instance consequently issued an order directing the subdivision of the lot into six portions and appointed commissioners to approve the existing sketch plan. Although the sketch plan was never formally confirmed by the court or registered, the parties continued to possess their designated portions. Respondents, successors-in-interest of Tomas Maglucot, later rented portions of Lot 1639-D from petitioners, the heirs of Roberto Maglucot. In December 1992, respondents ceased paying rent and claimed co-ownership over the entirety of Lot 1639, prompting petitioners to file a complaint for recovery of possession and damages.

• The Original Co-ownership: Lot No. 1639 was originally covered by OCT No. 6775, issued on August 16, 1927, in the names of six co-owners: Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot, Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara, and Tomas Maglucot.
• The 1946 Oral Partition: Sometime in 1946, the co-owners orally agreed to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. By virtue of this agreement, the co-owners occupied specific portions of the lot.
• The 1952 CFI Order: On April 19, 1952, Tomas Maglucot filed a petition to subdivide the lot because two co-owners, Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have the lot subdivided and to secure separate certificates of title. On May 13, 1952, the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental issued an order directing the subdivision of the lot into six portions (Lot 1639-A to 1639-F) and appointed two commissioners to approve the sketch/subdivision plan.
• Lack of Formal Confirmation: The sketch/subdivision plan was never submitted to the CFI for formal approval, and no decree or order of partition was registered in the Register of Deeds. OCT No. 6775 remained uncanceled and without any annotation of partition.
• Respondents' Possession and Acquiescence: From 1963 to 1969, respondents Leopoldo Maglucot, Severo Maglucot, and Guillermo Maglucot rented portions of Lot 1639-D (the portion allotted to Roberto Maglucot) from petitioners, paying P100.00 per annum to Ruperta Salma, who represented Roberto Maglucot's heirs. Respondents built houses on the leased portions. The tax declarations for these houses expressly stated that they were constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot.
• The Dispute: In December 1992, respondents stopped paying rentals and claimed ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of possession and damages in the RTC.

• Petitioners maintained that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-owners, with the majority participating in the actual execution of the subdivision.
• Petitioners argued that the 1952 CFI order constituted a judicial confirmation of the partition, initiated by respondents' own predecessor-in-interest, Tomas Maglucot.
• Petitioners contended that respondents are estopped from claiming co-ownership because they paid rent for the use of the property, offered to buy the lot from petitioners, and declared in their tax declarations that their houses were built on the land of Roberto Maglucot.
• Petitioners asserted that the law on acquisitive prescription and estoppel bars respondents from denying the partition, especially given the long-standing possession in severalty since 1946.

• Respondents countered that no valid partition occurred because petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were notified of the tentative subdivision or that the CFI confirmed the sketch plan.
• Respondents argued that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed, as there was no court approval of the partition.
• Respondents emphasized that OCT No. 6775 remains an existing and valid title, containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition, proving that Lot No. 1639 remains undivided.
• Respondents claimed that the payments made to Ruperta Salma were merely for the payment of real property taxes, not rent.

• Procedural Issues: Whether the Supreme Court may review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals in a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
• Substantive Issues: Whether a valid partition was effected in 1952 despite the lack of formal court confirmation of the commissioners' sketch plan and registration thereof; whether respondents are estopped from claiming co-ownership over Lot 1639-D.

• Procedural: The Court ruled that it may review the factual findings of the Court of Appeals under recognized exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari. The Court found that the present case falls under the exceptions where the CA's findings conflict with those of the trial court, are mere conclusions without citation of specific evidence, and are premised on the absence of evidence but contradicted by the evidence on record.
• Substantive: The Court held that a valid partition was effected. Although the 1952 sketch plan was not formally confirmed by the court, the parties actualized the plan by occupying their designated lots for over forty years. An oral partition is valid and enforceable in equity when partly performed through possession in severalty and acts of ownership. The lack of registration does not affect the rights of the parties to the transaction, as registration is merely a species of notice to strangers. Furthermore, respondents are estopped from claiming co-ownership because they ratified the partition through their conduct: they occupied their designated lot, paid rent to petitioners, offered to buy the lot from petitioners, and declared in their tax documents that the land belonged to petitioners' predecessor. A party cannot accept the benefits of a partition and subsequently repudiate it.

• Validity of Oral Partition — Equity enforces an oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed. Courts will recognize and enforce such partition when parties have taken possession in severalty and exercised acts of ownership over their respective portions. The Court applied this to uphold the 1946 oral partition, which the parties actualized through their long-standing possession.
• Estoppel in Partition — Parties to a partition proceeding who elect to take under the partition and take possession of the portion allotted to them are estopped from questioning the title to the portion allotted to another party. A co-owner who accepts a partition and holds it in severalty cannot subsequently avoid it. The Court applied this to bar respondents from questioning petitioners' ownership of Lot 1639-D.
• Ratification by Acquiescence — A party who, knowing they are not bound by a defective proceeding, voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to it through their conduct, ratifies the proceeding. The Court found respondents ratified the unconfirmed sketch plan by occupying their lots pursuant to it for over forty years without objection.
• Effect of Non-Registration — The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a transaction; non-registration does not relieve the parties to the transaction of their obligations thereunder. The Court held the lack of annotation on the OCT did not negate the partition between the co-owners.

• "On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed."
• "Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party."
• "A person cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. In other words, they accepted the lands awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none."
• "The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder."

• Espina v. Abaya, 196 SCRA 313 (1991) — Followed. Held that an oral partition is valid.
• Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil. 196 (1974) and Tan v. Lim, 296 SCRA 455 (1998) — Followed. Reiterated the doctrine that equity enforces oral partitions when partly performed by possession in severalty and acts of ownership.
• Arcenas v. Cinco, 74 SCRA 118 (1976) — Distinguished. The order in Arcenas was interlocutory because it required the submission of a deed of partition for court approval, whereas the order in the present case merely approved an existing sketch plan already followed by the parties.
• Fuentebella v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. 48102, May 27, 1942 — Discussed. Held that an order of partition is interlocutory. The Court noted this was the prevailing rule in 1952, but held that respondents were estopped from questioning the interlocutory decree due to their long acquiescence.

• Article 1431, Civil Code — States that through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. The Court applied this principle to hold that respondents are estopped from denying the partition and the ownership of petitioners' predecessor.
• Rule 69, Rules of Court — Governs the procedure for partition. The Court clarified that while Rule 69 requires court confirmation of the commissioners' report, the parties' actualization of the subdivision plan rendered the purpose of confirmation moot as between them, and they are estopped from raising the lack of confirmation.
• Rule 131, Section 3, Rules of Court — Provides for disputable presumptions, including the presumption of regularity and truth of facts stated in public documents. The Court applied this to the tax declarations which stated that respondents' houses were built on the land of Roberto Maglucot.
• Rule 11.03, Code of Professional Responsibility — Mandates that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts. The Court admonished petitioners' counsel for making improper references to the Court of Appeals researcher.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.