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Maglente vs. Baltazar-Padilla

The petition was dismissed. Petitioners, who had been declared the rightful parties to purchase a leased property in an interpleader case, sought a writ of possession after a deed of sale was executed in their favor. The Supreme Court held that a writ of possession may issue only in four enumerated instances—land registration proceedings, extrajudicial foreclosure, judicial foreclosure, and execution sales—and does not lie as a consequence of an interpleader judgment ordering the execution of a contract of sale. The interpleader decision merely resolved who had the right to purchase, not ownership or possession, and the execution of the deed of sale was only preliminary to the eventual acquisition of the property.

Primary Holding

A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) execution sales. A writ of possession does not lie in an interpleader case where the judgment merely resolved the right to purchase the property and ordered the execution of a contract of sale, as the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to it.

Background

Petitioners were lessees of a 687.80-square meter parcel of land owned by Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC) at 400 Solana St., Intramuros, Manila. The lease contract contained a right of first refusal in favor of petitioner Ursula Maglente, as well as a prohibition against subleasing without the lessor's consent. Despite this prohibition, Maglente subleased portions of the property to respondents. When PRC offered to sell the property, both petitioners and respondents claimed the right to purchase, prompting PRC to file an interpleader action to compel the conflicting claimants to litigate their claims among themselves.

History

  1. February 23, 1989 — PRC filed a complaint for interpleader in the RTC against both petitioners and respondents (Civil Case No. 89-48037) to determine who had the right to purchase the property.

  2. March 11, 1991 — The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners, declaring them the rightful parties to purchase the property and ordering PRC to execute the corresponding contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor within 30 days.

  3. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the RTC judgment.

  4. October 8, 1999 — The Supreme Court (G.R. No. 111743) affirmed the CA decision and denied respondents' petition, holding that the contract of sale was already perfected; entry of judgment was ordered on April 11, 2000.

  5. On petitioners' motion, a writ of execution was issued directing PRC to execute the contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners; PRC executed a "deed of sale" in their favor.

  6. April 20, 2001 — The RTC, Branch 38, denied petitioners' motion for issuance of a writ of possession, sustaining respondents' objection that the interpleader decision did not declare petitioners owners entitled to possession.

  7. Petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 with the Supreme Court.

Facts

On January 15, 1985, Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC), owner of a 687.80-square meter parcel of land at 400 Solana St., Intramuros, Manila, entered into a three-year contract of lease with petitioner Ursula Maglente. The contract granted Maglente the first priority (right of first refusal) to buy the property if PRC were to sell it, and prohibited her from subleasing any portion without the lessor's consent. Notwithstanding this prohibition, Maglente subleased portions of the property to respondents.

On March 9, 1987, when the lease was about to expire, PRC sent a written offer to sell the property to Maglente. Maglente intimated that she would exercise her right of first refusal, with her co-petitioners as co-buyers. In February 1989, PRC received a letter from respondents expressing their desire to purchase the same property. Because of the conflicting claims, PRC filed a complaint for interpleader on February 23, 1989, to compel the claimants to litigate their claims among themselves.

On March 11, 1991, the trial court declared petitioners the rightful parties to purchase the property and ordered PRC to execute the corresponding contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor within 30 days. Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Respondents then appealed to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 111743, which affirmed on October 8, 1999, holding that the contract of sale was already perfected—PRC offered the lot for sale, petitioners accepted, and they had completed payment of their ₱100,000 downpayment. Entry of judgment was ordered on April 11, 2000.

On petitioners' motion, a writ of execution was issued directing PRC to execute the contract of sale/contract to sell in favor of petitioners. PRC executed a "deed of sale" in their favor. Petitioners then filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of possession, but respondents, who were occupying the property, objected on the ground that the interpleader decision merely resolved the right to purchase and did not declare petitioners owners entitled to possession. The trial court sustained respondents' argument and denied the motion. Petitioners later obtained a Transfer Certificate of Title over the subject property.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Entitlement to Writ of Possession: Petitioners argued that they were entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged in the interpleader case as the proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a "deed of sale" had already been executed in their favor.
  • Writ of Execution Carries Corollary Right: Petitioners argued that the trial court's writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a writ of possession.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Limited Scope of Interpleader Judgment: Respondents objected to the motion for writ of possession on the ground that the trial court's decision in the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners' right to purchase the leased property but did not declare them as the owners entitled to possession.

Issues

  • Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was the proper remedy to assail the RTC's denial of the motion for issuance of a writ of possession.
  • Entitlement to Writ of Possession: Whether petitioners were entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged in the interpleader case as the proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a "deed of sale" had already been executed in their favor.

Ruling

  • Propriety of Certiorari: Yes, the petition was given due course. Although petitioners did not allege that the trial court was without jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction, or committed grave abuse of discretion, a question of law was involved—whether a writ of possession should be granted to a party with the right of first refusal in an interpleader case—so the Court gave due course to the petition.
  • Entitlement to Writ of Possession: No. A writ of possession shall issue only in four instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) execution sales. The writ does not lie in an interpleader case where the judgment merely ordered the execution of a contract of sale in favor of the winning parties.

Ruling Rationale

  • Propriety of Certiorari: The remedy of certiorari is limited to acts of any tribunal or board exercising judicial functions without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. It must be based on jurisdictional grounds; otherwise, any error committed amounts to nothing more than an error of judgment which may be questioned only on ordinary appeal. However, because a question of law was involved, the Court gave due course to the petition.

  • Entitlement to Writ of Possession: A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) execution sales. Here, petitioners sought the writ as a consequence of the trial court's decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor—a situation not among the enumerated instances. Furthermore, the trial court's decision in the interpleader case, affirmed by both the CA and the Supreme Court, merely resolved the question of who had the right to purchase PRC's property; the directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of petitioners, nothing else. At that point, petitioners were not yet the owners of the property; the execution of the "deed of sale" in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the property. Although the Court in G.R. No. 111743 stated that the contract of sale had already been perfected, it refrained from declaring petitioners the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either; the interpleader case did not delve into that issue. The rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to it. Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion; they must file the appropriate action in court against respondents to recover possession.

Doctrines

  • Writ of Possession — A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened; and (4) execution sales. The Court applied this doctrine to deny the writ in an interpleader case, holding that the writ does not lie where the judgment merely ordered the execution of a contract of sale in favor of the winning parties.
  • Writ of Possession Complements Writ of Execution — A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either. The Court held that the interpleader case did not determine ownership or possession, so the writ of execution did not carry with it the corollary right to a writ of possession.
  • Enforcement of Judgment Must Conform to Its Tenor — The enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to it, and it should be in harmony with the judgment that gives it life and not exceed it. The Court applied this rule to affirm the trial court's refusal to issue the writ, as its issuance would not have been in conformity with the interpleader judgment.
  • Perfected Contract of Sale vs. Transfer of Ownership — Under Article 1478 of the Civil Code, the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. The Court noted that although the contract of sale had been perfected, ownership had yet to transfer to petitioners pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property.

Key Excerpts

  • "A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales." — This passage states the controlling doctrine enumerating the exclusive instances when a writ of possession may issue, which is the ratio decidendi of the case.
  • "A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either." — This passage defines the relationship between the writ of possession and the writ of execution, clarifying that the former does not automatically follow the latter unless ownership or possession was directly determined.
  • "The rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to it." — This passage articulates the principle that a writ of execution must strictly conform to the judgment it enforces, which the Court applied to affirm the denial of the writ of possession.

Precedents Cited

  • Planters Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 615 (1999) — Cited for the doctrine that certiorari is limited to acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
  • Jalandoni vs. Drilon, 383 Phil. 855 (2000) — Cited for the rule that certiorari must be based on jurisdictional grounds; otherwise, any error committed amounts to an error of judgment reviewable only on ordinary appeal.
  • BF Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 507 (1988) — Cited for the proposition that a question of law may warrant giving due course to a petition.
  • Canlas vs. Court of Appeals, No. L-77691, August 8, 1988, 164 SCRA 160 — Cited as authority for the enumeration of instances when a writ of possession may issue.
  • Idolor vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161028, January 31, 2005, 450 SCRA 396 — Cited in support of the enumeration of instances when a writ of possession may issue.
  • Eternal Garden Park vs. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 369 (1998) — Cited for the rule that a writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either.
  • Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000, 326 SCRA 338 — Cited for the same rule regarding the writ of possession complementing the writ of execution, and for the rule that enforcement of a judgment must conform to its tenor.
  • Isaguirre vs. De Lara, G.R. No. 138053, May 31, 2000, 332 SCRA 803 — Cited in support of the rule regarding the writ of possession complementing the writ of execution.
  • Paylago vs. Nicolas, G.R. No. 38152, September 20, 1990, 189 SCRA 727 — Cited for the rule that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to it.
  • Laingco vs. Camilo, No. L-35883, June 29, 1984, 130 SCRA 144 — Cited for the same rule regarding strict conformity of judgment enforcement.

Provisions

  • Rule 65, Rules of Court — The petition for certiorari was filed under this rule; the Court noted that certiorari is limited to acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
  • Rule 62, Section 1, Rules of Court — The interpleader provision under which PRC filed its complaint; it allows a person against whom conflicting claims are made to compel the claimants to interplead and litigate their several claims among themselves.
  • Article 1318, Civil Code — Cited in the earlier Supreme Court decision in G.R. No. 111743 for the requisites of a perfected contract of sale, which were met in this case.
  • Article 1478, Civil Code — Provides that the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof; the Court cited this to explain that ownership had yet to transfer to petitioners pending execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property.
  • Section 13, Article VIII, Constitution — Cited in the certification that the conclusions in the decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Puno, C.J. (Chairperson), Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., Azcuna, J., and Garcia, J. concurred in the decision. Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. was on official leave.