Magkalas vs. National Housing Authority

The National Housing Authority may summarily relocate and demolish the structure of an occupant of expropriated Bagong Barrio property without a judicial order under P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472; R.A. No. 7279 did not impliedly repeal those decrees, and a census tag number creates only a mere expectancy, not a vested right.

Caridad Magkalas occupied a lot in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, identified as TAG-77-0063, while the National Housing Authority administered the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project. P.D. No. 1315 expropriated certain Bagong Barrio lots and designated the NHA as administrator with authority to take possession, control, and disposition of the expropriated properties, including the power of demolition. P.D. No. 1472 authorized the NHA to summarily eject squatters and illegal occupants from government resettlement projects and NHA-administered homelots without judicial order, while R.A. No. 7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, later governed eviction and demolition. These statutes frame the dispute over the NHA’s relocation and demolition order against petitioner.

Caridad Magkalas and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied a lot designated as TAG-77-0063, Block 1, Barangay 132, located at the corner of 109 Gen. Concepcion and Adelfa Streets, Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, for the past 39 years, as found by the RTC. On March 26, 1978, P.D. No. 1315 expropriated certain lots in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, and named the National Housing Authority as Administrator of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project, with authority to take possession, control, and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition. During the census survey of the area, the structure built by petitioner was assigned TAG No. 0063. After conducting studies, the NHA determined that the area where petitioner’s structure was located should be classified as an Area Center (open space), in compliance with the requirement to reserve 30% open space in all types of residential development.

Petitioner, together with Mr. & Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr. & Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, through counsel, appealed the decision to designate the area where their structures were erected as an Area Center. On January 25, 1985, the NHA, through its General Manager, sent a letter to their counsel explaining why the area was designated as the Area Center; the appeal was denied. On August 6, 1985, the NHA sent a Notice of Lot Assignment to petitioner recognizing her as a Censused Owner of a structure with TAG No. 0063-04 which was identified for relocation, and informing her that she was being assigned to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132. Earlier in August 1985, the NHA, through Henry Camayo, sent a letter directing petitioner to vacate the premises and dismantle her structure. On August 23, 1985, petitioner filed a Complaint for Damages with prayer for a restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction against the NHA, docketed as Civil Case No. C-12102; the RTC findings state that this case was dismissed by an Order dated July 23, 1981 with the instruction that the parties exhaust administrative remedies.

Sometime in March 1994, petitioner received a letter dated March 8, 1994 from Ines Gonzales, the Officer-in-charge of District II-NCR. The letter advised her that her previous request to stay put in her house located within the area designated as Area Center had been denied per NHA resolution signed as early as February 21, 1990 by former NHA manager Monico Jacob. She was told to remove the structure she erected on the area within 30 days and to transfer her residence to Lot 77, Block 2. The letter stressed that no judicial order was required to remove her structure pursuant to P.D. No. 1472. The two other homeowners, Mr. & Mrs. Josefino Valenton and Mr. & Mrs. Rey Pangilinan, had already transferred to their allocated lots at Lot 2, Block 1, and Lot 78, Block 2, respectively.

When the NHA maintained its directive, petitioner sought judicial relief. The RTC found that petitioner’s structure was one of those found existing during the census/survey of the area and was assigned TAG No. 77-0063; that while the NHA recognized her as the censused owner of the structure, the issuance of the tag number was not a guarantee for lot allocation; that her census, tagging, and petition did not vest upon her a legal title to the lot she was occupying, but a mere expectancy that the lot would be awarded to her; and that this expectancy did not ripen into a legal title when the NHA, through Ines Gonzales, sent the March 8, 1994 letter informing her that her petition for the award of the lot was denied. The RTC also found that the NHA, after studies and consultation with residents, had designated Area 1, where the lot petitioned by petitioner was located, as an Area Center; that only petitioner had refused to comply with the NHA directive, as the other occupants in Area 1 had already vacated the premises; and that a stage and recreation center was expected to be constructed at the Area Center.

• Vested Rights and Social Justice: Petitioner maintained that she had acquired a vested right over the property subject of the case on the ground that she had been in possession of it for forty (40) years, and that ordering her relocation and the demolition of her house would infringe the social justice clause guaranteed under the Constitution.
• Implied Repeal: Petitioner averred that P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472 were impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 7279, otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, because R.A. No. 7279 discouraged eviction and demolition without a court order and, being the later law, impliedly repealed the former laws under the legal axiom that a later law with contrary provisions effects an implied repeal of the former law.

• Vested Rights and Social Justice: Whether the demolition or relocation of petitioner’s structure will violate the vested rights of petitioner over the acquired property under the Social Justice Clause of the Constitution.
• Implied Repeal: Whether R.A. No. 7279 impliedly repealed P.D. No. 1472 and P.D. No. 1315.

• Vested Rights and Social Justice: No. No vested right arose from petitioner’s long possession or from the census tag number; the NHA’s relocation and demolition order is authorized by P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472, and the Social Justice Clause does not shield an occupancy that hinders the lawful implementation of those decrees.
• Implied Repeal: No. R.A. No. 7279 did not expressly or impliedly repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472; the statutes can be harmonized, and summary demolition without judicial order remains allowed in the instances enumerated by the Court.

• Vested Rights and Social Justice: The NHA’s authority to order petitioner’s relocation and the demolition of her property is mandated by P.D. No. 1315. Under that decree, the entire Bagong Barrio in Caloocan City was identified as a blighted area and declared expropriated, and the NHA, as designated administrator for the national government, was empowered to take possession, control, and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition of their improvements. Section 2 of P.D. No. 1315 required the comprehensive development plan to consider upgrading existing dwelling units, relocating qualified squatter families, and re-blocking, re-arranging, and re-aligning existing dwelling and other structures to allow basic facilities and services. Pursuant to that provision, the NHA identified Area 1, where petitioner’s property was located, as part of the Area Center reserved for open space, after studies showed that development of the area would affect only three structures compared to six or more structures in other areas; a stage and recreation center was expected to be constructed there. Petitioner was informed that she would be relocated to Lot 77, Block 2, Barangay 132, but she refused to vacate, claiming a vested right. Her refusal hampered the development of the entire area, and only she had refused to comply, as the other occupants in Area 1 had already vacated. P.D. No. 1315 explicitly vests the NHA with the power to immediately take possession, control, and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition; thus, by force of law, the NHA has authority to order relocation and demolition upon refusal. P.D. No. 1472 further reinforced the NHA’s authority to summarily eject, without the necessity of judicial order, any and all squatters’ colonies on government resettlement projects, as well as illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment, or dwelling unit owned or administered by it. Because petitioner’s property was located in the area identified as open space, her continued refusal to vacate rendered her occupancy illegal, and she could lawfully be ejected even without a judicial order. Petitioner’s claim of a vested right based on the NHA’s recognition of her as a censused owner by assigning a tag number fails. The issuance of a tag number is not a guarantee for lot allocation; the census, tagging, and her petition did not vest upon her a legal title to the lot she was occupying, but a mere expectancy that the lot would be awarded to her, which did not ripen into legal title when the NHA denied her petition. A vested right is one that is absolute, complete, and unconditional, with no obstacle to its exercise; it is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any contingency, and to be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property. The tagging of structures was conducted merely to determine the qualified beneficiaries and bona fide residents within the area; it did not necessarily signify an assurance that the tagged structure would be awarded to its occupant, as locational and physical considerations had to be taken into account, and the area where petitioner’s property was located had been classified as Area Center (open space). The assignment of a tag number was a mere expectant or contingent right and could not have ripened into a vested right in favor of petitioner, and her possession and occupancy could not be characterized as fixed and absolute. Petitioner cannot find solace in the Social Justice Clause. Social justice should be used only to correct an injustice and must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among diverse units of society and of the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups, consistent with the State’s objective of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons and bringing about the greatest good to the greatest number. Jurisprudence stresses that social justice is for the deserving, whether rich or poor, and that in case of reasonable doubt the balance may be tilted in favor of the poor, but it is never justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for poor and rich alike according to the mandate of the law. There is a need to weigh and balance the rights and welfare of both contending parties in every case in accordance with the applicable law, regardless of their situation in life. The relocation of petitioner and the demolition of her structure were in accordance with P.D. No. 1315, enacted primarily to address the housing problems of the country and to adopt an effective strategy for dealing with slums, squatter areas, and other blighted communities in urban areas. The NHA’s order was consistent with the law’s fundamental objective of promoting social justice in a manner that would inure to the common good, and petitioner cannot disregard the lawful action of the NHA merely implementing P.D. No. 1315. Petitioner’s continued refusal to leave the subject property hindered the development of the entire area, and she cannot invoke the social justice clause at the expense of the common welfare.
• Implied Repeal: R.A. No. 7279 does not necessarily repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472, as it does not contain any provision which categorically and expressly repeals those decrees. Neither could there be an implied repeal. It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed; repeals by implication are not favored because laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. Such repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it, and the failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Courts must generally assume congruent application; the two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The maxim interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi requires that every statute be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws so as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence, and all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal. No irreconcilable conflict or repugnancy exists between Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 and P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472; rather, they can be read together and harmonized to give effect to their provisions. Section 28 of R.A. No. 7279 does not totally and absolutely prohibit eviction and demolition without a judicial order, as it provides for exceptions. The three statutes should be construed in light of the objective to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended. The three laws have a common objective—to address the housing problems of the country by establishing a comprehensive urban development and housing program for the homeless—so the need to harmonize them is imperative. Construing the three laws together, demolition and eviction may be validly carried out even without a judicial order in certain instances: (1) when the property involved is an expropriated property in Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City pursuant to Section 1 of P.D. No. 1315; (2) when there are squatters on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment, or dwelling unit owned or administered by the NHA pursuant to Section 2 of P.D. No. 1472; (3) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds, pursuant to Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 7279; and (4) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented pursuant to Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279. R.A. No. 7279 does not foreclose the NHA’s authority to dismantle petitioner’s house. Under Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279, demolition may be carried out when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented. Under P.D. No. 1315, the government had set aside the amount of P40 million for the establishment and upgrading of housing facilities and services in Bagong Barrio. Thus, on the ground of a much-delayed government infrastructure project about to be implemented, the NHA has the authority to carry out the summary eviction and demolition of petitioner’s structure on the subject lot.

• Vested Right — A vested right is one that is absolute, complete, and unconditional and no obstacle exists to its exercise; it is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property. The Court applied this definition to hold that petitioner’s census tag number and long possession did not create a vested right because the tag number was a mere expectancy contingent on NHA lot allocation.
• Census Tagging Does Not Confer Vested Right — The tagging of structures in the Bagong Barrio area was conducted merely to determine the qualified beneficiaries and bona fide residents within the area. It did not necessarily signify an assurance that the tagged structure would be awarded to its occupant, because locational and physical considerations had to be taken into account. The Court held that the assignment of a tag number was a mere expectant or contingent right that could not ripen into a vested right.
• Social Justice Clause Is Not an Absolute Shield — Social justice should be used only to correct an injustice and must be founded on the recognition of interdependence among diverse units of society and the protection that should be equally and evenly extended to all groups. Justice must be served for poor and rich alike according to the mandate of the law, and the rights and welfare of both contending parties must be weighed and balanced. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner could not invoke social justice at the expense of the common welfare or to disregard the NHA’s lawful implementation of P.D. No. 1315.
• Repeals by Implication Are Not Favored — Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed; repeals by implication are not favored because laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. A law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it, and the failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that R.A. No. 7279 did not impliedly repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472.
• Harmonization of Statutes — Every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence, and all doubts must be resolved against implied repeal. The Court harmonized P.D. No. 1315, P.D. No. 1472, and R.A. No. 7279 because they share the common objective of addressing the country’s housing problems, and it concluded that demolition and eviction may be validly carried out without a judicial order in the enumerated instances.
• NHA Summary Demolition Authority — Under P.D. No. 1315, the NHA is authorized to immediately take possession, control, and disposition of expropriated properties with the power of demolition. Under P.D. No. 1472, the NHA has the power to summarily eject, without the necessity of judicial order, squatters’ colonies on government resettlement projects and illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment, or dwelling unit owned or administered by it. The Court applied these provisions to uphold the NHA’s relocation and demolition order against petitioner.

• "A vested right is one that is absolute, complete and unconditional and no obstacle exists to its exercise. It is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon any contingency. To be vested, a right must have become a title -- legal or equitable -- to the present or future enjoyment of property." — This passage states the Court’s canonical definition of a vested right, which it used to reject petitioner’s claim that long possession and census tagging gave her an absolute right to the lot.
• "The assignment of a tag number was a mere expectant or contingent right and could not have ripened into a vested right in favor of petitioner." — This is the ratio decidendi on the first issue, directly resolving that the NHA’s census tag did not confer a vested right upon petitioner.
• "Repeal of laws should be made clear and expressed. Repeals by implication are not favored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject. Such repeals are not favored for a law cannot be deemed repealed unless it is clearly manifest that the legislature so intended it. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws." — This passage articulates the controlling rule on implied repeal, which the Court applied to hold that R.A. No. 7279 did not impliedly repeal P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472.
• "It readily appears that R.A. No. 7279 does not foreclose the NHA’s authority to dismantle the house of petitioner." — This passage summarizes the Court’s conclusion on the second issue, after harmonizing the three housing statutes and finding that summary demolition remained authorized.

• Boncodin vs. National Power Corporation Employees Consolidated Union (NECU), G.R. No. 162716, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 611, 626-627 — Cited for the definition of a vested right as absolute, complete, unconditional, immediate, perfect, and not dependent upon contingency.
• Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726, 735 (1940) — Cited for Justice Jose P. Laurel’s observation on social justice as founded on interdependence among diverse units of society and the equal and even protection extended to all groups.
• Gelos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86186, May 8, 1992, 208 SCRA 608, 616 — Cited for the principle that social justice is for the deserving, whether rich or poor, and that preference is not given to the poor simply because they are poor.
• Secretary of Finance vs. Ilarde, G.R. No. 121782, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 218, 233 — Cited for the rule that repeals by implication are not favored and that a law cannot be deemed repealed unless the legislature’s intent is clearly manifest.
• Hagad vs. Gozo-Dadole, G.R. No. 108072, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 242, 252 — Cited for the doctrine that implied repeals are not favored, that laws must be harmonized, and that all doubts must be resolved against implied repeal.
• Intia, Jr. vs. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 131529, April 30, 1999, 306 SCRA 593, 609 — Cited for the rule that statutes should be construed in light of the objective to be achieved and the mischief to be suppressed, so as to advance the object and secure the benefits intended.

• Section 1, P.D. No. 1315 — Designated the National Housing Authority as administrator for the national government and authorized it to immediately take possession, control, and disposition of the expropriated properties with the power of demolition of their improvements. Applied to uphold the NHA’s authority over petitioner’s property in Bagong Barrio.
• Section 2, P.D. No. 1315 — Required the comprehensive development plan to consider upgrading existing dwelling units, relocating qualified squatter families, and re-blocking, re-arranging, and re-aligning existing dwelling and other structures to allow basic facilities and services. Applied to support the NHA’s designation of the area as an Area Center/open space.
• Section 2, P.D. No. 1472 — Empowered the National Housing Authority to summarily eject, without the necessity of judicial order, any and all squatters’ colonies on government resettlement projects, as well as illegal occupants in any homelot, apartment, or dwelling unit owned or administered by it. Applied to hold that petitioner could be ejected without a judicial order because her continued occupancy in the open-space area was illegal.
• Section 28, R.A. No. 7279 — Provides that eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged but may be allowed when persons occupy danger areas, when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented, or when there is a court order for eviction and demolition. Applied to hold that R.A. No. 7279 does not absolutely prohibit demolition without judicial order and can be harmonized with P.D. No. 1315 and P.D. No. 1472.
• Section 6, P.D. No. 1315 — The government set aside the amount of P40 million for the establishment and upgrading of housing facilities and services in Bagong Barrio. Applied to support the conclusion that a government infrastructure project with available funding was about to be implemented under Section 28(b) of R.A. No. 7279.
• Article XIII, Sections 9 and 10, Constitution — Section 9 mandates a continuing program of urban land reform and housing for underprivileged and homeless citizens, while Section 10 provides that urban or rural poor dwellers shall not be evicted nor their dwellings demolished except in accordance with law and in a just and humane manner, and that no resettlement shall be undertaken without adequate consultation. Applied to hold that the NHA’s relocation and demolition were in accordance with law and did not violate the Social Justice Clause.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The mode by which petitioner sought review of the RTC Decision and Order before the Supreme Court. Applied as the procedural basis for the petition for review on certiorari.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chairperson), Justice Renato C. Corona, Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, and Justice Adolfo S. Azcuña.