Magbanua vs. Junsay

To recover damages for malicious prosecution, the plaintiff must prove (1) the prosecution occurred and the defendant was the prosecutor or instigated it; (2) the criminal action ended in acquittal; (3) the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice—an improper or sinister motive; the mere act of submitting a case to authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. Here, probable cause and legal malice were absent.

Petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua was a housemaid in the residence of respondent Pilar S. Junsay, a physician, while petitioner Conrado Magbanua is Rosemarie's father and Artemio Taborada is her husband. Respondents Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela were members of the Bacolod City police force assigned at the Taculing Police Station. The action for damages for malicious prosecution is governed by the Civil Code provisions on human relations and damages, particularly Articles 19, 20, 21, 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217, and 2219(8).

Petitioner Rosemarie Magbanua worked as a housemaid in the residence of respondent Pilar S. Junsay in Bacolod City. On or about July 18, 1982, an Information was filed before the RTC, Branch XLI, Bacolod City, in Criminal Case No. 28, charging Rosemarie, Ernesto Fernandez, and a certain Gudo with Robbery. The Information alleged that the accused conspired, confederated, and mutually helped one another, with intent to gain and with use of force upon things, by making a hole on the lower portion of the kitchen door of Pilar's house at Bata Subdivision, Bacolod City, through which they entered and took assorted jewelries and cash valued at P29,624.00. Only Rosemarie was tried; her co-accused remained at large.

The prosecution's case relied on an alleged confession made by Rosemarie admitting her participation in the robbery. The defense contested its admissibility and claimed it was made under duress. According to the investigation report, Rosemarie admitted receiving instructions from Ernesto Fernandez and Gudo to leave the barrel belt of the kitchen door unlocked so they could enter Pilar's house; she also admitted that after her co-accused took Pilar's jewelry, they gave her a necklace which she kept in a shoulder bag and which she identified when shown during the investigation. Petitioners alleged that Rosemarie, then a minor, an uneducated farm girl, and a stranger in Bacolod City, was maltreated by the investigating officers to extract the confession. The records included a medical certificate issued by Dr. Teodoro S. Lavasa dated July 27, 1982, a note to the jail warden recommending hospitalization due to hemoptysis, fever, and body pains, and a NAPOLCOM decision finding PFC Ibarra Lopez and Patrolman Juanito Jacela guilty of grave misconduct and suspending them for two months without pay.

On December 20, 1985, the RTC, Branch XLI, Bacolod City, acquitted Rosemarie. It found that the medical certificate, the attending physician's testimony, and the NAPOLCOM decision clearly established that she was physically maltreated by the investigating officers to force her to confess; her declaration against interest was therefore inadmissible. Apart from the alleged admission, the only evidence of her participation was Pilar's testimony that after Rosemarie told her part of the stolen jewelry was in her bag, Pilar searched the room and found a gold necklace. The trial court discredited this testimony because the police had extensively investigated the scene, including dusting for fingerprints, making it improbable that they would have failed to search Rosemarie's bag or room. The RTC found the prosecution evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and even insufficient to establish a prima facie case.

On March 9, 1987, Rosemarie, assisted by Artemio Taborada, and her father Conrado Magbanua filed a Complaint for Damages in the RTC, Branch 51, Bacolod City, against Pilar, assisted by her husband Vicente Junsay, and police officers Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela. They alleged that by reason of respondents' false, malicious, and illegal actuations in filing Criminal Case No. 28, Rosemarie suffered untold pain, shame, humiliation, worry, and mental anguish, assessed at not less than P200,000.00; that Conrado lost his job and his family suffered; and that Rosemarie suffered physical pain and mental torture. They sought moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, loss of earnings, and expenses incurred in defending Criminal Case No. 28 and in prosecuting the civil case. The RTC granted their petition to litigate as paupers.

Pilar moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, four years and eight months having lapsed from the cause of action to the filing of the Complaint. Petitioners opposed, contending that the action was for malicious prosecution, not for physical injuries or violations of Rosemarie's rights, and that the prescriptive period should be counted from her acquittal on December 20, 1985, not from July 18, 1982. The RTC denied the motion on March 24, 1988, finding the cause of action to be malicious prosecution. In her Answer dated May 18, 1988, Pilar disclaimed maltreating Rosemarie, stated that she was not present during the investigation and was merely informed of Rosemarie's participation by the investigators as reflected in their Joint Affidavit, that she never laid a hand on Rosemarie, that she had no hand in the filing of the case except to execute an affidavit regarding her ownership of the lost jewelry, and that she had no liability to Rosemarie or Conrado. She counterclaimed for damages, attorney's fees, and costs. The police respondents adopted her Answer and counterclaim. At the September 9, 1988 pre-trial, petitioners stipulated that they were claiming damages for malicious prosecution, not for physical injuries, and respondents concurred that the main issue was whether Rosemarie was maliciously prosecuted.

The RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the filing of the criminal complaint was not prompted by a sinister design to vex or humiliate Rosemarie. Pilar, as the victim of a robbery, merely reported the matter to the police; she did not tell the police that Rosemarie robbed her. The police investigators conducted the investigation and filed the complaint as part of their duties; they did not know Pilar or Rosemarie before July 18, 1982, and the complaint was filed not only against Rosemarie but also against Ernesto Fernandez and Gudo. The courts noted that Rosemarie admitted participation during the investigation and that the necklace was recovered in her shoulder bag. No evidence showed bad blood between Pilar and Rosemarie before the robbery.

• Baseless Prosecution: Petitioners submitted that the prosecution of Rosemarie was founded upon baseless accusations; the charges were based on false affidavits and false police reports, without which the criminal case would not have been filed.
• Maltreatment and Coerced Confession: Petitioners decried the maltreatment Rosemarie allegedly suffered at the hands of respondents; she was maltreated to extract a confession and make her admit a crime she did not commit, and as a minor, uneducated farm girl, and stranger in Bacolod City, she was subjected to torture and inhumane treatment.
• Abuse of Status and Position: Petitioners contended that respondent Pilar employed her privileged status as a medical doctor, while police respondents Ibarra and Juanito used their positions as members of the Bacolod City Police to secure an admission from Rosemarie.
• Prescription: In opposing Pilar's Motion to Dismiss, petitioners argued that the cause of action was not for damages based on physical injuries or violations of Rosemarie's rights from July 18, 1982, but for malicious prosecution; the prescriptive period should therefore be counted from her acquittal on December 20, 1985, and only about one year and three months had passed when the Complaint was filed.
• Damages Claimed: Petitioners maintained that Rosemarie suffered physical pain and mental torture due to the false criminal charge; they sought moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, loss of earnings, and expenses incurred in defending Criminal Case No. 28 and in prosecuting the civil action.

• Prescription: Respondent Pilar moved to dismiss on the ground that the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations under Article 1146 of the Civil Code, since four years and eight months had lapsed from the time the cause of action arose to the filing of the Complaint.
• Denial of Maltreatment: Pilar disclaimed petitioners' allegation that she maltreated Rosemarie during the police investigation; she stated that she was not present during the investigation, was subsequently informed of Rosemarie's participation by the investigators as reflected in their Joint Affidavit, and never laid a hand on Rosemarie before, during, or after the investigation.
• No Participation in Filing: Pilar asserted that she had no hand in the filing of the criminal case except to execute an affidavit regarding her ownership of the lost jewelry, and that she had no liability to Rosemarie or to Conrado, who did not appear to have any involvement in the matter.
• Counterclaim: Pilar sought damages, including attorney's fees and costs of suit, by way of counterclaim.
• Adoption by Police Respondents: Respondents Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela filed an Answer and Manifestation adopting Pilar's Answer and counterclaim insofar as applicable to them.

• Malicious Prosecution: Whether the filing of Criminal Case No. 28 for Robbery against Rosemarie Magbanua constituted malicious prosecution.
• Probable Cause: Whether respondents acted without probable cause in bringing the criminal action against Rosemarie.
• Legal Malice: Whether the prosecution was impelled by legal malice—an improper or sinister motive—so as to render respondents liable.
• Damages: Whether petitioners are entitled to damages for malicious prosecution.
• Police Liability: Whether police respondents Ibarra Lopez and Juanito Jacela may be held liable for malicious prosecution when they acted pursuant to their duties and without malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.

• Malicious Prosecution: No. The filing of Criminal Case No. 28 did not constitute malicious prosecution because the elements of absence of probable cause and legal malice were not established.
• Probable Cause: No, respondents did not act without probable cause. Probable cause existed based on Rosemarie's admission during investigation that she participated in the robbery, which prompted the prosecutor to file the Information; the later inadmissibility of the admission due to duress was an evidentiary matter that did not negate probable cause.
• Legal Malice: No. There was no proof of a sinister design to vex or humiliate Rosemarie; Pilar, as robbery victim, merely reported the crime to authorities, and the police acted in the performance of their duties, with no showing of malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
• Damages: No. Because malicious prosecution was not established, petitioners are not entitled to damages for malicious prosecution.
• Police Liability: No. Mistakes committed by public officers are not actionable absent a clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith, which was not established.

• Malicious Prosecution: The Court defined malicious prosecution and enumerated four elements: (1) the prosecution occurred and the defendant was the prosecutor or instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice—an improper or sinister motive. The first two elements were undisputed: Rosemarie was prosecuted for Robbery and was acquitted on December 20, 1985. The determinative elements were absence of probable cause and legal malice. The Court examined both and found neither, so the filing of Criminal Case No. 28 did not constitute malicious prosecution.
• Probable Cause: For purposes of malicious prosecution, probable cause means such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is based on opinion and reasonable belief and does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. During the investigation, Rosemarie admitted her participation: she received instructions from her co-accused to leave the kitchen door unlocked, and after her co-accused took Pilar's jewelry, they gave her a necklace which she kept in a shoulder bag and identified when shown. On that basis, the Office of the Prosecutor found probable cause and filed the Information. The inadmissibility of the admission on the ground that it was extracted under duress was an evidentiary matter that did not detract from the fact that respondents had reason to believe the suit was not unfounded and that the crime was committed.
• Legal Malice: In an action for damages based on malicious prosecution, it must be established that the prosecution was impelled by legal malice. There is necessity of proof that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant the award of damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code, or that the suit was grounded on malice or bad faith. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law would not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate. No proof of a sinister design to vex or humiliate Rosemarie was shown. Pilar, who was robbed of her valuables, could only be expected to bring the matter to the authorities; no evil motive should be attributed to a victim of a crime who institutes the necessary legal proceedings. No evidence showed bad blood between Pilar and Rosemarie before the robbery. The police respondents Ibarra and Juanito acted pursuant to their duties after Pilar's report and the investigation; mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent a clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith, which was not established.
• Damages: Since malicious prosecution was not established, petitioners were not entitled to damages for malicious prosecution. The case was a suit for malicious prosecution, not for the violations and maltreatment allegedly committed against Rosemarie in extracting the admission. The RTC had ruled that the action was not one on the injuries allegedly suffered by Rosemarie; otherwise, an action seeking damages for her injuries would have been deemed prescribed.
• Police Liability: The actuations of respondents Ibarra and Juanito were not impelled by legal malice. Their commencement of the action against Rosemarie and her co-accused was pursuant to their duties as police officers, made after Pilar's report of the crime and the investigation. Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent a clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith, which was not established.

• Malicious Prosecution — An action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein. To prosper, the plaintiff must prove four elements: (1) the prosecution occurred and the defendant was the prosecutor or instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice—an improper or sinister motive. The Court applied this test and found the first two elements present but the third and fourth absent.
• Probable Cause in Malicious Prosecution — Probable cause means such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. It is based on opinion and reasonable belief and does not require sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. The Court applied this definition to Rosemarie's admission during investigation, holding that it supplied probable cause even though the admission was later ruled inadmissible because extracted under duress.
• Legal Malice — The prosecution must be impelled by legal malice, an improper or sinister motive. There must be proof that the suit was so patently malicious as to warrant damages under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code, or that it was grounded on malice or bad faith. The mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution. The Court found no legal malice because Pilar merely reported the robbery as a victim and the police acted in the performance of their duties.
• Right to Litigate — The law does not impose a penalty on the right to litigate. The mere filing of a suit does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution should he be unsuccessful. The Court relied on this doctrine to reject liability against Pilar and the police respondents.
• Public Officer Liability for Mistakes — Mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent a clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. The Court applied this rule to police respondents Ibarra and Juanito, finding no malice or gross negligence in their investigation and filing of the complaint.

• "In this jurisdiction, the term "malicious prosecution" has been defined as "an action for damages brought by one against whom a criminal prosecution, civil suit, or other legal proceeding has been instituted maliciously and without probable cause, after the termination of such prosecution, suit, or other proceeding in favor of the defendant therein."" — This defines the cause of action and supplies the foundation for the Court's analysis.
• "This Court has drawn the four elements that must be shown to concur to recover damages for malicious prosecution. Therefore, for a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister motive." — This is the canonical four-element test applied to deny the claim.
• "On the question of probable cause, this Court has ruled that for purposes of malicious prosecution, "probable cause" means "such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted."" — This defines probable cause and explains why Rosemarie's admission, though later inadmissible, supported the filing.
• "Moreover, it is a doctrine well-entrenched in jurisprudence that the mere act of submitting a case to the authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution, for the law would not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to litigate." — This states the ratio for rejecting legal malice and protecting the right to litigate.

• Drilon vs. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 949, 956-957 (1997) — Cited for the definition of malicious prosecution and the rule that the mere act of submitting a case to authorities for prosecution does not make one liable.
• Villanueva vs. United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), 384 Phil. 130, 140 (2000) — Cited for the four elements of malicious prosecution and the gravamen that it is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.
• Cometa vs. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 1187, 1194 (1999), citing Buchanan vs. Vda. de Esteban, 32 Phil. 363, 365 (1915) — Cited for the definition of probable cause in malicious prosecution.
• Villanueva vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 162187, 18 November 2005, 475 SCRA 495, 511 — Cited for the rule that probable cause is based on opinion and reasonable belief and does not require sufficient evidence to procure a conviction.
• Martires vs. Cokieng, G.R. No. 150192, 17 February 2005, 451 SCRA 696, 709, citing Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 338 Phil. 191, 203 (1997) — Cited for the doctrine that the mere act of submitting a case to authorities for prosecution does not make one liable for malicious prosecution.
• Farolan vs. Solmac Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 83589, 13 March 1991, 195 SCRA 168, 178 — Cited for the rule that mistakes committed by a public officer are not actionable absent a clear showing that they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith.
• Solidbank Corporation vs. Mindanao Ferroalloy Corporation, G.R. No. 153535, 28 July 2005, 464 SCRA 409, 429, citing ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 499, 531 (1999) — Cited for the necessity of proof that the suit was patently malicious under Articles 19 to 21 of the Civil Code or grounded on malice or bad faith.
• Yasoña vs. De Ramos, G.R. No. 156339, 6 October 2004, 440 SCRA 154, 157 — Cited for the definition of malicious prosecution.

• Article 1146, Civil Code — Actions upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff and upon quasi-delict must be instituted within four years. Respondent Pilar invoked this provision in moving to dismiss; the RTC ruled that the action was for malicious prosecution, not for injuries, and otherwise an action for injuries would have been deemed prescribed.
• Articles 19, 20, and 21, Civil Code — Human relations provisions. Article 19 requires every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith; Article 20 requires indemnification for damage caused contrary to law; Article 21 requires compensation for willful loss or injury caused contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. The Court cited these as the statutory basis for malicious prosecution and required proof that the suit was patently malicious under them or grounded on malice or bad faith.
• Articles 26, 29, 32, 33, 35, 2217, and 2219(8), Civil Code — Cited as part of the statutory basis for a civil action for damages for malicious prosecution. The Court did not separately apply each provision but treated them as the legal framework for the claim.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concurred. Nachura, J., was on leave.