Magayanes vs. Vasquez-Abad (Consolidated Administrative Cases)

A judge who knowingly certifies false information in official payroll registers to facilitate continued salary deposits to a former employee's cash card, and who retains possession of that card to withdraw and misappropriate the funds, is guilty of Falsification of Official Documents, Serious Dishonesty, Gross Misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and Commission of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, warranting dismissal from the service and disbarment.

The Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Calamba City, Laguna, comprises three branches: Branch 1, presided by Executive Judge Leah Angeli B. Vasquez-Abad; Branch 2, presided by Judge Eric Ismael P. Sakkam; and Branch 3, presided by Vice-Executive Judge Sharon M. Alamada. The Calamba City Local Government Unit (LGU) maintains a Job Order (JO)/Casual Employee program through which it assigns personnel to the courts, including drivers and other support staff, with salaries credited to Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) cash cards. The events giving rise to the consolidated administrative cases occurred during the COVID-19 pandemic, a period during which the Supreme Court issued several circulars modifying court operations, including the raffle of cases and the designation of judges-on-duty.

The four consolidated administrative cases arose from a web of mutual complaints among the three judges of the MTCC, Calamba City, Laguna, stemming from disputes over the raffle of cases, the exercise of executive-judge powers, and the handling of a former court employee's salaries.

In A.M. No. MTJ-23-014, Judge Alamada charged Judge Abad with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Rules of Procedure. On April 20, 2021, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed four Informations against Jeffrey Ostil Tamayo. Two days later, Tamayo applied for bail. Before the cases were raffled, Judge Abad assessed probable cause and issued Orders dismissing three of the four cases — Criminal Case Nos. 65207-21 (Resistance and Disobedience), 65209-21 (Violation of Section 56(e) of Republic Act No. 4136), and 65210-21 (Simple Disobedience) — all governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Judge Alamada contended that Judge Abad, as Executive Judge, had no authority to adjudicate cases prior to raffle. Judge Abad defended her actions as being made in good faith, citing pandemic-era circulars (OCA Circular No. 89-2020 and OCA Circular No. 94-2020) that she construed as authorizing the Executive Judge to act on urgent matters including the determination of probable cause. After receiving guidance from Court Administrator Villanueva, Judge Abad recalled her dismissal Orders on April 30, 2021.

In A.M. No. MTJ-23-015, Judge Abad charged Judge Alamada with Dishonesty, Misconduct, and Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct based on the circumstances surrounding the employment of Sandy Labarite Eraga. Eraga was hired by Judge Alamada as her driver in October 2018 and was subsequently included in the Calamba City LGU's JO/Casual Employee program, assigned to Judge Alamada's court. Eraga's LGU salary was credited to an LBP cash card, which he claimed was taken from him by Alona Agoncillo at Judge Alamada's office and never returned. Eraga resigned from Judge Alamada's employment on September 24, 2020, and began working as a security guard with Hunter Security Agency in November 2020. Despite Eraga's resignation, his name continued to appear on the JO Workers Payroll Register of the Calamba City LGU for MTCC Branch 3. Judge Alamada signed certifications on the payroll register for eight periods from September 16, 2020 to March 31, 2021, certifying that Eraga had rendered services during those periods. For seven other periods, Worwor-Miguel signed on Judge Alamada's behalf, and De Jesus signed for one period. Salaries continued to be credited to Eraga's cash card, and withdrawals were made therefrom. Agoncillo testified that Judge Alamada would give her Eraga's cash card for withdrawals and that she would return the card and the withdrawn money to Judge Alamada.

In JIB FPI No. 21-033-MTJ (re-docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-24-026), Judge Abad and Judge Sakkam charged Judge Alamada with Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, citing her "demeaning attitude" and "lack of cordiality" during raffles and an alleged phone call during which she berated the Clerk of Court. In JIB FPI No. 21-042-MTJ (re-docketed as A.M. No. MTJ-24-027), Judge Alamada charged Judge Sakkam and Judge Abad with Gross Ignorance of the Law for Judge Sakkam's notarization of Judge Abad's Letter-Complaint and Eraga's Sinumpaang Salaysay, which she contended violated Circular No. 1-90 on unauthorized notarization.

• Gross Ignorance (A.M. No. MTJ-23-014): Judge Alamada argued that Judge Abad's determination of probable cause and dismissal of three cases prior to raffle constituted an unauthorized exercise of adjudicatory power by an Executive Judge, contrary to A.M. No. 05-08-26-SC (removing preliminary investigation power from first-level court judges), A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC (defining executive judges' prerogatives), Section 12(b) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, and the ruling in Crespo vs. Mogul.
• Preventive Suspension (A.M. No. MTJ-23-014): Judge Alamada prayed for the preventive suspension of Judge Abad, asserting a strong likelihood of guilt on the serious charge of Gross Ignorance of the Law.
• Defective Complaint (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Judge Alamada contended that Judge Abad's Letter-Complaint was unverified and thus failed to comply with Rule 140, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which requires attestation that allegations are true and correct, that the complaint was not filed to harass, and that factual allegations have evidentiary support.
• Unauthorized Notarization (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015 and MTJ-24-027): Judge Alamada argued that Judge Sakkam's administration of oaths on Judge Abad's Letter-Complaint and Eraga's Sinumpaang Salaysay violated Circular No. 1-90, as these acts were unrelated to his judicial or administrative duties, and he failed to attach a certification attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in Calamba City.
• Revenge and Ill Will (A.M. No. MTJ-24-027): Judge Alamada asserted that Judge Abad and Judge Sakkam were motivated by revenge, hatred, and ill will in filing their administrative complaints, which she characterized as leverage against her own complaint against Judge Abad.
• Conduct Unbecoming (A.M. No. MTJ-24-026, defense): Judge Alamada denied the allegations of improper conduct, characterizing them as self-serving, malicious, and unsupported by evidence, and faulted Judge Abad and Judge Sakkam for disregarding the requirement of verification.

• Good Faith in Dismissal (A.M. No. MTJ-23-014): Judge Abad asserted that she dismissed the three criminal cases in good faith, finding that elements of the charged offenses were absent from the Informations, and that her practice of studying records upon filing of Informations was ingrained. She cited OCA Circular No. 89-2020 (suspending raffles and requiring the Judge-on-Duty to resolve urgent matters including probable cause determination) and OCA Circular No. 94-2020, construing the phrase "as far as practicable" as consistent with the general and specific powers of the Executive Judge under A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC.
• Prompt Rectification (A.M. No. MTJ-23-014): Judge Abad maintained that she promptly sought clarification from the OCA and recalled her April 22, 2021 Orders via separate Orders dated April 30, 2021, upon receiving Court Administrator Villanueva's guidance.
• Prior Release Without Bail (A.M. No. MTJ-23-014): Judge Abad contended that her January 2018 order releasing an accused without bail was based on Rule 114, Section 3, Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 10592, and Rule 114, Section 16, as the offense was punishable only by public censure, not imprisonment.
• Falsification and Misappropriation (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Judge Abad argued that Judge Alamada's repeated certifications on the payroll registers constituted falsification of official documents, as Eraga had already resigned and was employed elsewhere. She prayed for preventive suspension, noting Judge Alamada's control over court records and personnel.
• Conduct Unbecoming (A.M. No. MTJ-24-026): Judge Abad and Judge Sakkam alleged that Judge Alamada exhibited a demeaning attitude, lack of cordiality, and insolence, including berating the Clerk of Court via phone call and making unwarranted comments about vaccination status that sowed intrigue.
• Notarization Within Authority (A.M. No. MTJ-24-027, defense): Judge Abad and Judge Sakkam contended that Judge Sakkam's notarization was within his authority as a judge, as it was connected to the exercise of his duty to take disciplinary measures against court personnel, and that Judge Abad's filing of the complaint was within her power as Executive Judge to investigate administrative complaints.

• Gross Ignorance (A.M. No. MTJ-23-014): Whether Judge Abad committed Gross Ignorance of the Law and Rules of Procedure by dismissing three criminal cases motu proprio prior to raffle.
• Falsification, Dishonesty, and Misconduct (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Whether Judge Alamada is administratively liable for falsifying payroll registers, misappropriating Eraga's salaries, and committing gross misconduct, serious dishonesty, and crimes involving moral turpitude.
• Liability of Court Staff (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Whether Worwor-Miguel and De Jesus are administratively liable for signing the payroll registers on Judge Alamada's behalf, and whether Agoncillo is liable for her role in withdrawing money from Eraga's cash card.
• Disbarment (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Whether Judge Alamada, as a member of the Bar, should be disbarred for the same acts constituting administrative liability as a judge.
• Conduct Unbecoming (A.M. No. MTJ-24-026): Whether Judge Alamada committed Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge based on the allegations of demeaning attitude and discourteousness.
• Notarization and Gross Ignorance (A.M. No. MTJ-24-027): Whether Judge Sakkam and Judge Abad committed Gross Ignorance of the Law for the notarization of the Letter-Complaint and Sinumpaang Salaysay.

• Gross Ignorance (A.M. No. MTJ-23-014): No. Judge Abad was admonished, not found guilty of gross ignorance. Her acts resulted from a simple error in interpreting Supreme Court and OCA directives in relation to her functions as Executive Judge, which she promptly remedied by recalling the dismissal Orders.
• Falsification, Dishonesty, and Misconduct (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Yes. Judge Alamada was found guilty of Falsification of Official Documents, Serious Dishonesty, Gross Misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, and Commission of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude. She was dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits and disqualified from reinstatement.
• Liability of Court Staff (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Yes, in part. Worwor-Miguel and De Jesus were found guilty of Falsification of Official Documents and Serious Dishonesty, but not of Commission of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, as they acted upon their superior's instruction without material benefit. Agoncillo was absolved.
• Disbarment (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Yes. Judge Alamada was found guilty of Gross Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty under the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability and was disbarred, her name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.
• Conduct Unbecoming (A.M. No. MTJ-24-026): No. The complaint was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, as Judge Abad and Judge Sakkam had no personal knowledge of the only specific instance cited.
• Notarization and Gross Ignorance (A.M. No. MTJ-24-027): No. The complaints against Judge Sakkam and Judge Abad were dismissed for lack of merit, as Judge Sakkam's notarization was within his authority under Circular No. 1-90 and Canon 2, Section 3 of the NCJC, and Judge Abad's filing was within her power as Executive Judge.

• Gross Ignorance (A.M. No. MTJ-23-014): The JIB correctly held that Judge Abad's acts were borne out of a simple error in interpreting Supreme Court directives and circulars in relation to her power as Executive Judge. The pandemic-era circulars (OCA Circular Nos. 89-2020 and 94-2020) created ambiguity regarding the Executive Judge's authority to act on urgent matters before raffle. Judge Abad promptly recalled her dismissal Orders upon receiving guidance from Court Administrator Villanueva. As this was the first administrative case against her, the Court deemed admonition sufficient, modifying the JIB's recommendation of reprimand to a lesser penalty.

• Falsification, Dishonesty, and Misconduct (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Judge Alamada admitted signing the payroll registers for eight periods, certifying that Eraga had rendered services when she knew he had not. The payroll registers expressly stated "Certified Correct: Each person whose name appears on this roll had rendered services for the time stated," under which her signature appeared. Her claim of ignorance was belied by her own instruction to staff to remind the LGU to remove Eraga's name. Falsification of an official document as an administrative offense consists of knowingly making false statements in official or public documents; intent to injure a third person is irrelevant because the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith. The eight acts of falsification were treated as a single collective act pursuant to Section 21, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, since they could not be reasonably separated from each other. As to misappropriation, Agoncillo's positive testimony that Judge Alamada gave her Eraga's cash card for withdrawals and that she returned the money to Judge Alamada prevailed over Judge Alamada's bare denials. The Cash Card Account History showed withdrawals made every time salaries were credited, from September 2020 to July 2021, when Eraga was no longer working for the LGU. The totality of these acts — false certifications, retention of the cash card, and misappropriation — constituted Serious Dishonesty (qualified by grave abuse of authority, material gain, and moral depravity), Gross Misconduct (violating Canons 2 and 4 of the NCJC), and Commission of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude (acts of baseness and depravity contrary to accepted rules of right and duty). All are serious offenses under A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, punishable by dismissal.

• Liability of Court Staff (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Worwor-Miguel and De Jesus admitted signing the payroll registers on Judge Alamada's behalf for seven and one periods, respectively. By signing, they certified that Eraga had rendered services despite having no knowledge of the same, constituting Falsification of Official Documents and Serious Dishonesty (the integrity of their office was tarnished). However, the Court found they were not liable for Commission of Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude, as they acted upon their superior's instruction and did not materially benefit. Agoncillo was absolved because she merely withdrew money as instructed by Judge Alamada, returned the card and money to Judge Alamada, and had no knowledge of the illegality of the actions.

• Disbarment (A.M. No. MTJ-23-015): Judge Alamada's acts also constituted Gross Misconduct and Serious Dishonesty under Canon VI, Section 33 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability, both serious offenses warranting disbarment. Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, moral fitness as a judge reflects moral fitness as a lawyer. Her multiple infractions, aggravated by lack of remorse and repetitive allegations that the complaints were filed as leverage, rendered her unfit to continue in the practice of law.

• Conduct Unbecoming (A.M. No. MTJ-24-026): Judge Abad and Judge Sakkam failed to substantiate their allegations with credible evidence. They had no personal knowledge of the only specific instance of misconduct imputed — Judge Alamada's phone call with the Clerk of Court. The letters were not buttressed by the affidavit of the Clerk of Court who was reportedly on the receiving end of the demeaning attitude.

• Notarization and Gross Ignorance (A.M. No. MTJ-24-027): Circular No. 1-90 grants MTC and MCTC judges the authority to act as notaries public ex officio in notarizing documents connected with the performance of their official functions and duties. Canon 2, Section 3 of the NCJC provides that judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against court personnel for unprofessional conduct. Judge Sakkam's notarization of Judge Abad's Letter-Complaint and Eraga's Sinumpaang Salaysay was thus within his authority, as it was related to the exercise of his judicial duty to take disciplinary measures. Judge Abad's filing of the complaint was within her power and duty as Executive Judge to investigate administrative complaints against judges and personnel within her administrative area.

• Falsification of Official Documents (Administrative Offense) — Knowingly making false statements in official or public documents. The intent to injure a third person is irrelevant because the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of truth as claimed in the document. The act undermines the integrity of government records. Applied: Judge Alamada's repeated certifications on payroll registers that Eraga had rendered services, despite knowing he had resigned, constituted falsification.

• Serious Dishonesty — Dishonesty is the concealment or distortion of truth showing lack of integrity or a disposition to defraud, cheat, deceive, or betray and an intent to violate the truth. It becomes serious when qualified by circumstances such as: (a) serious damage and grave prejudice to the government; (b) grave abuse of authority; (c) the respondent is an accountable officer and the act involves money with intent for material gain; (d) moral depravity; (e) civil service examination irregularity; (f) misrepresentation on qualifications; or (g) analogous circumstances. Applied: Judge Alamada's falsification and misappropriation qualified under circumstances (a), (b), (c), and (d).

• Single Collective Act Doctrine (Section 21, Rule 140) — When a respondent's administrative liability stems from a series of acts relating to their duties that cannot be reasonably separated from one another, the various acts or omissions should be viewed as a single collective act, and only a singular penalty shall be imposed. The second paragraph of Section 21 recognizes that one act or omission must only give rise to one penalty, even if it constitutes multiple offenses. Applied: Judge Alamada's eight acts of falsification were treated as a single collective act.

• Moral Turpitude — An act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a person owes to fellow men or society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty. The determination is ultimately a question of fact depending on all the circumstances. Applied: Judge Alamada's acts demonstrated moral depravity; Worwor-Miguel and De Jesus' acts did not, as they acted on instruction without material benefit.

• Executive Judge's Supervisory and Investigatory Powers — Under the Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges (A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC) and SC Administrative Order No. 6 (1975), the Executive Judge has the power and duty to exercise supervision over judges and personnel within the administrative area and to investigate administrative complaints against them, submitting findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court. Applied: Judge Abad's filing of the complaint against Judge Alamada and use of staff to gather evidence were within her powers as Executive Judge.

• Ex Officio Notarization by MTC/MCTC Judges — Circular No. 1-90 grants MTC and MCTC judges the authority to act as notaries public ex officio in notarizing documents connected with the performance of their official functions and duties. Applied: Judge Sakkam's notarization of the Letter-Complaint and Sinumpaang Salaysay was connected to his duty to initiate disciplinary measures under Canon 2, Section 3 of the NCJC.

• "When official documents are falsified, respondent's intent to injure a third person is irrelevant because the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as claimed in that document. The act of respondent undermines the integrity of government records and therein lies the prejudice to public service." — This passage, quoting Villordon vs. Avila, articulates the rationale for punishing falsification of official documents as an administrative offense: the violation of public faith, not injury to a specific person, is the gravamen.

• "The second paragraph recognizes that certain acts or omissions may constitute multiple offenses. In this regard, the respondent must be pronounced liable for all such offenses, but only a singular penalty shall be imposed on him or her. This is in keeping with the notion that one act/omission must only give rise to one penalty." — This passage, quoting the Court's annotation on Section 21, Rule 140, as amended, defines the single collective act doctrine and its practical application when multiple offenses arise from interconnected acts.

• "No position demands greater moral righteousness and uprightness from its holder than a judicial office. Those connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest official to the lowliest clerk, carry a heavy burden of responsibility." — This passage states the standard of conduct expected of all judiciary personnel and underscores the Court's willingness to impose the extreme penalty for conduct violating norms of public accountability.

• "Since membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the bench, his or her moral fitness as a judge also reflects his or her moral fitness as a lawyer." — This passage establishes the nexus between judicial discipline and bar discipline, justifying the imposition of disbarment as a consequence of administrative misconduct committed in a judicial capacity.

• Crespo vs. Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) — Cited by Judge Alamada for the proposition that once a complaint or Information is filed in court, any disposition of the case rests in the sound discretion of the court. Referenced in the context of the charge against Judge Abad but ultimately not dispositive, as the Court found Judge Abad's error was borne of good faith.
• Nate vs. Judge Contreras, 754 Phil. 73 (2015) — Cited by Judge Alamada for the rule that judges and clerks of courts are sanctioned for notarizing documents not connected with their official functions. Distinguished: the Court found that Judge Sakkam's notarization was connected to his duty to initiate disciplinary measures.
• Villordon vs. Avila, 692 Phil. 388 (2012) — Cited for the principle that in falsification of official documents, intent to injure a third person is irrelevant; the principal thing punished is the violation of public faith. Followed and applied to Judge Alamada's falsification of payroll registers.
• Banzuela-Didulo vs. Santizo, A.M. No. P-22-063, February 7, 2023 — Cited for the single collective act doctrine under Section 21, Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC. Followed: Judge Alamada's eight acts of falsification were treated as a single collective act.
• So vs. Lee, 851 Phil. 395 (2019) — Cited for the definition of moral turpitude and the principle that not all crimes involve moral turpitude. Applied to distinguish the liability of Worwor-Miguel and De Jesus (no moral turpitude) from that of Judge Alamada (moral turpitude present).
• Samson vs. Caballero, 612 Phil. 737 (2009) — Cited for the principle that the standard of integrity imposed on judges is higher than that of the average person, as the Court is extraordinarily strict with judges. Applied in imposing the penalty of disbarment.

• Section 21, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC — Provides that when multiple offenses arise from acts or omissions that cannot be reasonably separated, the respondent is pronounced liable for all offenses but only a singular penalty is imposed. Applied to treat Judge Alamada's eight falsifications as a single collective act.
• Section 17(1)(a), Rule 140 (A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC) — Prescribes dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and disqualification from reinstatement as the penalty for serious charges. Applied to Judge Alamada's dismissal.
• Canon VI, Section 33, Code of Professional Responsibility and Accountability — Defines serious offenses for lawyers, including gross misconduct and serious dishonesty. Applied to find Judge Alamada guilty as a member of the Bar.
• Canon VI, Section 37(a), CPRA — Provides sanctions for serious offenses by lawyers, including disbarment. Applied to impose disbarment on Judge Alamada.
• Canons 2 and 4, New Code of Judicial Conduct — Require judges to ensure their conduct is above reproach (Canon 2) and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety (Canon 4). Applied to find Judge Alamada guilty of Gross Misconduct constituting violations of the NCJC.
• Circular No. 1-90 — Grants MTC and MCTC judges authority to act as notaries public ex officio for documents connected with their official functions. Applied to uphold Judge Sakkam's notarization as within his authority.
• Canon 2, Section 3, NCJC — Provides that judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct. Applied to justify Judge Sakkam's notarization and Judge Abad's filing of the complaint.
• CSC Memorandum Circular No. 13 (2021) — Defines dishonesty and enumerates circumstances that qualify it as serious. Applied to classify Judge Alamada's, Worwor-Miguel's, and De Jesus's dishonesty as serious.
• A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC (Guidelines on Executive Judges) — Defines the powers, prerogatives, and duties of Executive Judges, including supervision over judges and personnel and investigation of administrative complaints. Applied to uphold Judge Abad's actions in filing the complaint.

Gesmundo, C.J., Leonen, SAJ., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Kho, Jr., and Singh, JJ., concurred. Marquez, J., took no part.