Magay vs. Estiandan

A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked, and its validity may be questioned only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose. Even on the assumption that the land remained public domain, reversion had to be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, not by a private occupant.

Venancia B. Magay, assisted by her husband Victoriano R. Magay, claimed ownership of the disputed land in Palawan by purchase from her mother-in-law, Soledad de los Reyes. The land had formerly been titled in the name of Soledad de los Reyes under Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020, which was cancelled and replaced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004 in Magay's name upon registration of the deed of sale dated June 26, 1963. The area purchased was resurveyed, with Lot No. 1 thereof identified as the land in question, on which Eugenio L. Estiandan had constructed two houses, an old house and a new house.

Before the sale, Soledad de los Reyes had sent two letters to Estiandan telling him to vacate the premises. After acquiring the property, Magay sent other letters likewise advising him to vacate. Magay declared the property for taxation purposes and paid the real estate taxes thereon. Because Estiandan refused to vacate, Magay hired counsel and spent P600.00 for attorney's fees.

According to Estiandan, he had filed a miscellaneous sales application over the land in question, then pending and neither rejected nor approved in the Bureau of Lands. He anchored the application on the decision of Judge Bartolome Revilla in El Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas contra Antonio Aborot y otros adjudicating the land to the Government of the Philippines. He further questioned the validity of the title issued to Soledad de los Reyes, alleging that its issuance and reconstitution in 1948 were done under anomalous circumstances and fraudulently.

The trial court found from plaintiff's evidence the chain of title from Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020 to Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004, the resurvey identifying the disputed lot, the construction of the two houses thereon by defendant, the prior and subsequent demands to vacate, and the tax declaration and payments.

• Validity of Torrens Title: Appellant argued that Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020 issued to Soledad de los Reyes in 1948 was fraudulently issued and its reconstitution done under anomalous circumstances, so its validity and that of the derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004 could be questioned in the possession suit.
• Public Domain and Sales Application: Appellant maintained that the land in question had been adjudicated to the Government of the Philippines in El Gobierno de las Islas Filipinas contra Antonio Aborot y otros, and that his pending miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands entitled him to remain, the application having been neither rejected nor approved.
• Jurisdiction: Appellant contended that the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the case, disputing its characterization of the complaint as an accion publiciana rather than unlawful detainer within Section 1, Rule 70.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: Whether appellant can question in this proceeding the validity of Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020 and the derivative Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004 on the ground of alleged fraudulent issuance.
• Reversion of Public Land: Whether appellant, as a sales applicant, is the proper party to seek reversion assuming the land is still part of the public domain.
• Jurisdiction and Nature of Action: Whether the lower court erred in assuming jurisdiction and in treating the complaint as an accion publiciana rather than unlawful detainer under Section 1, Rule 70.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: No. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked; its validity may be raised only in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
• Reversion of Public Land: No. Even assuming the land remained public domain, reversion must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, not by a private applicant.
• Jurisdiction and Nature of Action: No. Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint, and the lower court correctly treated the suit as an accion publiciana within its jurisdiction.

• Collateral Attack on Torrens Title: The rule applied was the indefeasibility of Torrens title against indirect challenge. Applied to the facts, appellant's defense that Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020 was fraudulently issued in 1948 and anomalously reconstituted, and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004 issued upon the June 26, 1963 sale was consequently infirm, was an attempt to invalidate registered title within a recovery-of-possession suit. Because no direct action to annul the titles had been instituted, the defense was barred.
• Reversion of Public Land: The rule applied was that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may seek reversion of land allegedly part of the public domain. Applied to the facts, appellant's reliance on a pending miscellaneous sales application and on the adjudication to the Government in the Aborot case conferred no standing to defeat registered ownership or to obtain reversion in his own name. The pending, unacted application neither proved public character nor authorized private reversion.
• Jurisdiction and Nature of Action: The rule applied was that jurisdiction over subject matter is fixed by the allegations of the complaint, not by entitlement to relief after trial nor by defenses or a motion to dismiss. Applied to the facts, the complaint as pleaded stated an accion publiciana for recovery of possession by the registered owner after demands to vacate, with rentals from October 1965, attorney's fees, and costs. The lower court's characterization under Section 1, Rule 70 was therefore sustained.

• Indefeasibility of Torrens title against collateral attack — A certificate of title issued under the Torrens system cannot be questioned indirectly in a suit where title is merely incidental, such as an action for possession; the issue of validity can only be raised in an action expressly instituted to annul or set aside the title. The defense of alleged fraudulent issuance in 1948 and anomalous reconstitution was thus rejected as a collateral attack on Original Certificate of Title No. E-2020 and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2004.
• State as sole proper party in reversion — Where land is claimed to be part of the public domain notwithstanding a Torrens title, reversion to the State must be sought by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines; a private sales applicant has no standing to institute or obtain reversion. Appellant's pending miscellaneous sales application in the Bureau of Lands therefore afforded no defense to the registered owner's suit.
• Jurisdiction determined by allegations of the complaint — Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether plaintiff is ultimately entitled to recover upon all or some claims, a matter resolvable only after trial; nor may jurisdiction be made to depend on defenses in the answer or motion to dismiss, otherwise jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant. The complaint was accordingly correctly treated as an accion publiciana, not unlawful detainer, under Section 1, Rule 70.

• "It is well-settled that a torrens title cannot be co attacked. The issue on the validity of the title can only in action expressly instituted for that purpose." — States the controlling bar against indirect challenges to registered title, which disposed of the principal defense in this accion publiciana.
• "Even assuming that the land in question is still part of the public domain, then the appellant is not the proper party to institute the reversion of the land but it must be the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the Philippines." — Defines standing for reversion and rejects reliance on a pending sales application as a defense to registered ownership.
• "jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein-a matter that can be resolved only after and as a result of the trial." — Articulates the test sustaining the lower court's jurisdiction and its characterization of the action as accion publiciana.
• "Nor may the jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for, were we to be governed by such rule, the question of jurisdiction could depend almost entirely upon the defendant." — Explains why appellant's jurisdictional objection based on defenses could not defeat jurisdiction fixed by the complaint.

• Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 — Cited as authority for the rule that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked and validity must be litigated in a direct action.
• Director of Lands vs. Gan Tan, 89 Phil. 184 — Cited as supporting authority for the non-collateral-attack rule on Torrens titles.
• Hederson vs. Garrido, 90 Phil. 624 — Cited as supporting authority for the non-collateral-attack rule on Torrens titles.
• Samonte, et al. vs. Sambilon, et al., 107 Phil. 198 — Cited as supporting authority for the non-collateral-attack rule on Torrens titles.
• Director of Lands vs. Lelita Jugado, et al., 111 Phil. 1057 — Cited as authority that reversion of land to the public domain must be instituted by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic.
• Serrano vs. Munoz Hi Motors, Inc., 27 SCRA 1085 — Cited, through Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, as controlling on determination of jurisdiction by the allegations of the complaint and rejection of defense-dependent jurisdiction.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Governs the distinction between unlawful detainer and accion publiciana for recovery of possession; applied to sustain the lower court's treatment of plaintiff-appellee's complaint as an accion publiciana within its jurisdiction rather than unlawful detainer.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.