Magat vs. People

A conviction for a lesser offense included in the charge cannot stand if that lesser offense has already prescribed; the prosecution cannot evade prescription by charging a graver offense and later securing conviction for the lesser one. On the facts, light slander had prescribed and the RTC could not cure the defect by convicting the accused of serious slander.

Rudolfo S. Magat and Minerva F. Magat were spouses working at Manila Sanitarium and Hospital; Rudolfo was a practising physician and Minerva a secretary-receptionist in the Radiology Department. Ma. Luisa F. Domocmat was married to Dr. Jeremias Domocmat, and Rudolfo was a wedding sponsor at their civil marriage. The parties were former friends and acquaintances connected with the hospital and all belonged to the Seventh-Day Adventists Church, which operates the institution; a parting of ways had occurred between the Magats on one hand and Domocmat and Dr. Clarita Garcia on the other.

On May 12, 1985, between 10:00 and 10:30 in the morning, Dr. Clarita F. Garcia was confined at Room 335 of the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital in Pasay City due to a surgical operation. Ma. Luisa F. Domocmat arrived at the room bringing a basket of fruits. Shortly thereafter, Dr. Rudolfo S. Magat and his wife Minerva F. Magat entered the same room. According to the prosecution, both accused, one after the other, immediately and in loud tones uttered the slanderous words to Domocmat. The alleged defamatory words were: "By Rudolfo S. Magat: 'Ikaw tarantada kang babae. Kung ilang beses kitang kinantot. Yang asawa mo sira. Kayong lahat kayang-kaya ko.' By Minerva F. Magat: 'Putang babae ka. Malandi ka. Palibhasa hindi ka na naka-kantot ng asawa ko. Ikaw Clarie yong asawa mo naman ang lalandian niya palibhasa hindi na siya naka-kantot ng asawa ko.'"

Dr. Garcia heard the offensive words directed at Domocmat. When Dr. Garcia tried to pacify them, she was likewise shouted at by both accused. According to the prosecution, Minerva later directly told Dr. Garcia: "Ikaw Clarie, yong asawa mo naman ang lalandian niya, palibhasa hindi na nakakantot ng asawa ko, kasi nililigawan ng asawa mo," while Dr. Magat told his wife, referring to Dr. Garcia: "Huwag mong pansinin iyan, kilala ko ang pamilya niya, mga sira ang ulo niyan, mukhang mangkukulam." Both accused hurriedly left the room when they noticed Domocmat calling by phone Dr. Nehemias Garcia, husband of Dr. Clarita Garcia.

Petitioners, for their part, testified that in the morning of the same date at the lobby of the hospital, Minerva met Domocmat, who allegedly uttered, "Hi, Quitin. Hi! Quintin. Kumusta ka Quintin" — Quintin being a former boyfriend of Minerva before her marriage. Minerva retorted, "Ay ang kati. Ay ang kati." Immediately thereafter, Dr. Magat met Minerva, and she reported the lobby incident to him. They decided to look for Domocmat at Room 335. Upon reaching the room at about 10:00 a.m., Dr. Magat knocked at the door, found it open, and they entered and saw Domocmat and Dr. Garcia. Addressing Domocmat after closing the door, Dr. Magat said, "Baby, bakit hanggang ngayon ay ginaganoon mo pa si Miner, wala naman siyang ginagawa sa iyo." Domocmat answered, "Bakit ka ba galit na galit, Palibhasa'y hindi ka na nakakakantot." Dr. Magat retorted, "napakasama naman ng bibig mo," and told his wife, "Mommy, halika na, umalis na tayo tutal sira na naman sa atin ang mga iyan." On their way out, Domocmat followed them and said, "hayop, mga aso, mga putik."

The pre-trial order of April 4, 1986 recorded the stipulation that on May 12, 1985, at about 10:00 to 10:30 a.m., only Dr. Rudolfo Magat, Minerva Magat, Domocmat, and Dr. Clarita Garcia were present in Room 335. It was also stipulated that Rudolfo was a wedding sponsor in the civil marriage between Domocmat and Dr. Jeremias Domocmat, that Domocmat was married to Dr. Jeremias Domocmat, and that Dr. Clarita Garcia was confined at Room 335 on that date. The complaint-affidavit of Dr. Clarita Garcia was filed on September 17, 1985, or 132 days after the incident, and the sworn complaint was actually filed in the trial court on October 14, 1985.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissal: Petitioners argued that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing their petition for review of the lower court's decision.
• Prescription: Petitioners argued that the crime of which they were convicted had already prescribed and that the complaint should have been dismissed on that ground.
• Failure to Prove Guilt Beyond Reasonable Doubt: Petitioners argued that they should be acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Validity of the Decision by a Non-Hearing Judge: Petitioners argued that the trial court's decision was invalid because the judge who rendered it had not heard the case and had been reluctant to decide it; they also alleged pressure from "the powers-that-be" and the inhibition of the judge who heard the evidence.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Petitioners argued that conviction could not rest solely on witnesses whose credibility was not sufficiently established; they stressed the implausibility of the alleged sexual taunts, the presence of Dr. Magat's wife, and their good moral character.
• Absence of Publication: Petitioners argued that even granting the statements were made, slander was not committed absent publication of the slanderous statements.

• Procedural Defects: Respondent argued that the CA properly dismissed the petition and that the SC should not have given due course because of procedural defects.
• Prescription: Respondent argued that the prescription claim was destitute of merit because the complaint was for serious slander, not light slander; petitioners were convicted of serious slander based on the evidence; and they did not complain of lack of jurisdiction when convicted of light slander.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Dismissal of Petition: Whether the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the petition for review of the lower court's decision.
• Prescription: Whether the crime of which both petitioners were convicted had already prescribed.
• Validity of Decision by Non-Hearing Judge: Whether the trial court's decision is valid in light of the reluctance of the judge who rendered it, since he was not the one who heard the case.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Whether the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in convicting petitioners solely on the testimony of witnesses whose credibility was not sufficiently established.
• Publication in Slander: Whether, granting the statements imputed to petitioners were made, the crime of slander was actually committed in the absence of publication of the slanderous statements.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Dismissal of Petition: The SC did not sustain the CA's technical dismissal; it waived the procedural lapses and gave due course in the interest of substantive justice, because the accused's life and liberty were at stake.
• Prescription: Yes. The offense proved was light slander, which prescribes in two months under Article 90; the complaint was filed 132 days after the incident, so criminal liability was extinguished by prescription. The RTC could not cure this by convicting them of serious slander.
• Validity of Decision by Non-Hearing Judge: No. The judge's failure to hear the witnesses did not by itself invalidate the decision, but it removed the usual deference to the trial court's factual findings and contributed to reasonable doubt.
• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Yes. The conviction could not rest on testimony whose credibility was not sufficiently established; the SC found the alleged utterances implausible and the evidence insufficient to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
• Publication in Slander: No. Publication was not established; Dr. Garcia was not a disinterested third party, and no one else was present when the words were allegedly uttered.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion — Dismissal of Petition: The CA denied due course because the petition for review was not verified and was not accompanied by certified true copies of the questioned decision. When the petitioners came to the SC, their counsel failed to submit proofs of service to the CA and the adverse party. The SC acknowledged that strict adherence to rules is enforced for orderly procedure and speedy adjudication, but held that in exceptional cases where negligence or ignorance of counsel may unjustly prejudice the properties, lives, and future of accused persons — as when an innocent person may be railroaded to prison or proof beyond reasonable doubt was not adduced — it may waive technical rules under its equity jurisdiction in the interest of substantive justice. The SC did so and gave due course to the petition.

• Prescription: The incident occurred on May 12, 1985. The complaint-affidavit of Dr. Clarita Garcia was filed on September 17, 1985, or 132 days later, and the sworn complaint was filed in the trial court on October 14, 1985. The MTC convicted the petitioners of light slander on January 19, 1989. Under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, light offenses prescribe in two months. Article 89(5) provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the crime. The SC applied Francisco vs. Court of Appeals: where an accused is found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already prescribed; otherwise the law on prescription would be circumvented by charging the graver offense. The SC also held that prescription is not waived by the failure to move to quash because it extinguishes criminal liability, citing Damasco vs. Laqui and Section 8, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Since the offense ascertained from the evidence was light slander and it had prescribed, the MTC committed reversible error in convicting the petitioners; the RTC likewise erred in convicting them of serious slander to correct the error.

• Validity of Decision by Non-Hearing Judge: The trial of the case took almost three years before Judge Enrique A. Lanzanas of the Pasay MTC. The judge who heard the testimony of the witnesses backed out of the case shortly before decision writing time. Judge Oscar R. Reyes, who succeeded him, also tried to inhibit himself; when then Executive Judge Cesar Francisco prevented him from doing so, he formally regretted having to decide the case and said that the other judge was in a better position to dispense justice because he had not observed the witnesses' demeanor and candidness. The SC held that the usual respect accorded to the MTC's factual findings was not available in this case because the judge who heard the witnesses did not decide the case. The decision was not invalidated on that ground alone, but the lack of opportunity to observe the witnesses contributed to the reasonable doubt.

• Credibility of Prosecution Witnesses: Only four persons were present inside Room 335: the two petitioners, Domocmat, and Dr. Garcia. The case turned on the exact words spoken, making the witnesses' credibility, demeanor, and candidness all-important. The SC found reasonable doubt because the alleged slander was implausible. There was no reason for Dr. Magat to taunt Domocmat with recollections of sexual acts in the heat of anger; there was nothing to suggest that they ever had immoral, illicit, or sexual relations, and Domocmat denied any sexual encounter or even a platonic relationship. It was difficult to believe that a husband would mock a woman with sexually explicit words in the presence of his wife, or that the wife would join in the name-calling. There was no evidence that the parties belonged to a group of liberated or "swinging" couples; on the other hand, there was testimony and at least twelve testimonials showing good moral character. The SC reiterated that evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be credible in itself, citing People vs. Aldana, People vs. Patog, and People vs. Lim.

• Publication in Slander: The only "disinterested" person in the case may not even be considered a third party for the element of publication. Dr. Clarita Garcia was not exactly a disinterested person because her husband, Dr. Nehemias Garcia, was suspended for three months as a result of an incident with Dr. Magat in the hospital's parking lot on May 12, 1985; she had cause for anger against the petitioners. The heated exchange of words was between all four persons inside the room with nobody else present, making it doubtful that the sole presence of Dr. Garcia resulted in the imputations having been publicly made. The SC thus found that publication was not established.

• Prescription of a lesser included offense — Where an accused is found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of that lesser offense if it has already prescribed; otherwise the prosecution could circumvent the law on prescription by charging a graver offense. Applied: the MTC convicted the Magats of light slander, which had prescribed, and the RTC could not cure the defect by convicting them of serious slander.
• Prescription as extinction of criminal liability — Under Article 89(5) of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the crime. Prescription is substantive and is not waived by the accused's failure to move to quash. Applied: the complaint was filed after the two-month prescriptive period for light slander.
• Two-month prescriptive period for light offenses — Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that light offenses prescribe in two months. Applied: light slander had prescribed 132 days after the incident.
• Credibility of evidence must be credible in itself — Evidence to be believed must not only come from a credible source but must also be credible in itself. Applied: the alleged sexual taunts were implausible, and the prosecution's evidence did not meet the test.
• Publication in slander — The presence of a person who is not a disinterested third party does not establish publication of slanderous remarks. Applied: Dr. Garcia had cause for anger against the petitioners, and no one else was present when the words were allegedly uttered.
• Appellate deference to trial court factual findings — The usual respect for a trial court's factual findings, especially on witness credibility, is not available where the judge who decided the case did not hear the witnesses and observe their demeanor. Applied: the judge who penned the decision relied only on the records.
• Waiver of technical rules in the interest of substantive justice — The SC may overlook procedural lapses caused by counsel's negligence where the life, liberty, or future of an accused may be unjustly prejudiced, or where proof beyond reasonable doubt was not adduced. Applied: the SC gave due course despite defects in the petition.
• Reasonable doubt from implausible prosecution evidence — A conviction cannot rest on testimony that is contrary to human experience and common sense. Applied: the SC acquitted the petitioners because the alleged utterances were implausible and publication was not established.

• "Where an accused has been found to have committed a lesser offense includible within the offense charged, he cannot be convicted of the lesser offense, if it has already prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction the circumvention of the law on prescription by the simple expedient of accusing the defendant of the graver offense." — The SC adopted this rule in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals and applied it to bar conviction for prescribed light slander.
• "It is, therefore, evident that the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the petitioners of a crime that had already been extinguished through prescription. It was likewise error for the Regional Trial Court to try to correct the error by simply convicting the petitioners of the higher offense." — The SC concluded that both the MTC and the RTC erred on the prescription issue.
• "There is a reasonable doubt because it is implausible that the words constituting the slander were actually uttered as charged." — The SC found the prosecution's version contrary to human experience and common sense.
• "The fact that the heated exchange of words was between all four persons inside the room with nobody else present makes it rather doubtful that the sole presence of Dr. Garcia results ill the imputations having been publicly made." — The SC doubted publication because Dr. Garcia was not a disinterested third party and no one else was present.

• Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, 122 SCRA 538 [1983] — Controlling precedent; laid down the rule that an accused cannot be convicted of a prescribed lesser offense included in the charge.
• Damasco vs. Laqui, 166 SCRA 214, 217-218 [1988] — Followed; held that prescription is not waived by failure to move to quash because it extinguishes criminal liability.
• People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 433 — Cited; prescription is a loss or waiver by the State of its right to prosecute.
• Santos vs. Superintendent, 55 Phil. 345 — Cited with Moran for the same rule on prescription.
• People vs. Aldana, 175 SCRA 635 [1989] — Cited; evidence must be credible in itself.
• People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA 429 [1986] — Cited; same rule on credibility.
• People vs. Lim, 190 SCRA 706 [1990] — Cited; same rule on credibility.

• Article 90, Revised Penal Code — Light offenses prescribe in two months; applied to light slander.
• Article 89(5), Revised Penal Code — Criminal liability is totally extinguished by prescription of the crime; applied to extinguish the petitioners' liability.
• Section 8, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure — Extinction of offense is an exception to the effects of failure to assert a ground in a motion to quash; applied to hold that prescription was not waived.