Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc. vs. Ramos

A seafarer who suffers a permanent partial loss of vision in one eye, even if the injury is curable or correctable, is entitled to disability compensation where the impairment diminishes earning capacity, and the schedule of disabilities under the POEA Standard Employment Contract is not exclusive but must be construed liberally in favor of seafarers.

Petitioner Maersk Co. IOM Ltd., through its local manning agent petitioner Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc., employed respondent Joselito R. Ramos as an able-seaman aboard M/V NKOSSA II under a POEA-approved employment contract for a period of four months. The employment relationship was governed not only by the POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels but also by a Collective Bargaining Agreement between AMOSUP and Maersk Company (IOM), which prescribed specific disability compensation rates and grades for injured seafarers. The dispute arose from a work-related eye injury sustained by respondent during the contract period, which led to protracted medical treatment, conflicting medical assessments, and ultimately a claim for disability benefits that petitioners rejected.

On October 3, 2001, petitioner Maersk Co. IOM Ltd., through its local manning agent petitioner Maersk Filipinas Crewing Inc., employed respondent Joselito R. Ramos as an able-seaman aboard M/V NKOSSA II for a contract period of four months. On November 14, 2001, within the contract period and while on board the vessel, respondent's left eye was struck by a screw. He was repatriated to Manila on November 21, 2001 and referred to Dr. Salvador Salceda, the company-designated physician, for examination.

On November 26, 2001, respondent was examined by Dr. Anthony Martin S. Dolor at the Medical Center Manila and was diagnosed with "corneal scar and cystic macula, left, post-traumatic." Three days later, he underwent repair of corneal perforation and removal of a foreign body from the anterior chamber of his left eye. He was discharged on December 2, 2001 with prescribed home medications and regular check-ups. He was referred to another ophthalmologist who opined that no further improvement could be attained on the left eye but that the patient could return to duty with the left eye disabled by 30%.

Respondent continued seeking further evaluation. On May 22, 2002, he was examined by Dr. Angel C. Aliwalas, Jr. at the Ospital ng Muntinlupa and diagnosed with "corneal scar with post-traumatic cataract formation, left eye." On May 28, 2002, he underwent an eye examination and glaucoma test at the Philippine General Hospital. Because respondent's demand for disability benefits was rejected by petitioners, he filed a complaint with the NLRC for total permanent disability, illness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.

Meanwhile, in his medical report dated July 31, 2002, Dr. Dolor stated that although respondent's left eye could not be improved by medical treatment, he could return to duty and was still fit to work, his normal right eye compensating for the discrepancy with the use of correctional glasses. On August 30, 2002, petitioners paid respondent's illness allowance equivalent to 120 days' salary. On October 5, 2002, respondent was examined by Dr. Roseny Mae Catipon-Singson of Casa Medica, Inc., who diagnosed him with traumatic cataract with corneal scarring and opined that he "cannot be employed for any work requiring good vision unless condition improves." On November 19, 2002, the ophthalmologist at Medical Center Manila recommended cataract surgery with intra-ocular lens implantation.

On May 15, 2003, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint as prematurely filed, noting that the POEA-approved contract and CBA provided for a third-doctor referral mechanism in case of disagreement between the seafarer's physician and the company-designated physician, which the parties had failed to avail themselves of. On July 21, 2003, respondent's counsel attempted to file a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC, but counsel's messenger arrived at approximately 4:00 p.m. and found the NLRC office already closed at 3:30 p.m. due to a jeepney strike. The messenger filed and served copies by registered mail, completing the filing and payment of fees on July 22, 2003.

On July 30 and September 12, 2003, respondent underwent cataract extraction on both eyes. On January 7, 2004, he was fitted with correctional glasses and evaluated by Dr. Dolor, who found his right eye at 20/20, left eye at 20/70, and best corrected vision for both eyes at 20/20, on the basis of which respondent was pronounced fit to work. On January 31, 2006, the NLRC granted respondent's appeal, vacated the Labor Arbiter's decision, and awarded disability compensation of USD 6,270.00, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. The NLRC found that respondent's failure to perfect his appeal on July 21, 2003 was not his fault because the NLRC NCR office had closed early, and that no third-doctor referral was necessary because there was no disagreement between the company-designated physician and respondent's physicians as to the 30% visual impairment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the NLRC's findings on both procedural and substantive issues but deleted the moral and exemplary damages for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis.

• Authority of Counsel: Petitioners argued that the presumption of the SVBB law firm's authority to continue representing respondent was destroyed upon respondent's filing of a Manifestation denying such authority, and that consequently the appeal filed by the law firm was unauthorized and did not prevent the Labor Arbiter's decision from attaining finality.
• Perfection of Appeal: Petitioners maintained that respondent did not perfect his appeal before the NLRC because he failed to file copies of the Notice of Appeal with Memorandum of Appeal and to pay the necessary fees within the reglementary period.
• Nature of Disability: Petitioners submitted that the award of disability compensation was unwarranted because the injury was curable or correctable, as evidenced by the company-designated physician's certification of continued fitness to work in two medical reports, including a finding that respondent's best corrected vision for both eyes was 20/20 with correctional glasses.
• Scope of Disability Schedule: Petitioners stressed that Section 32 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract only provides disability compensation benefits for at least 50% loss of vision in one eye, and since the schedule does not include the injury suffered by respondent, the award of disability benefits was unwarranted.

• Extent of Impairment: Respondent asserted that no less than the company-designated physician had established the extent of his visual impairment at 30%, and that because of the injury to his left eye and loss of vision, he had suffered impairment of his earning capacity and could no longer practice his profession as a seaman.

• Authority of Counsel: Whether counsel of respondent was authorized to represent the latter after the Labor Arbiter had rendered its decision on May 15, 2003.
• Perfection of Appeal: Whether respondent perfected his appeal to the NLRC.
• Entitlement to Disability Compensation: Whether respondent is partially disabled and therefore entitled to disability compensation.

• Authority of Counsel: Yes. The SVBB law firm is presumed to have authority to represent respondent, the mere denial of authority in a Manifestation — absent a compelling reason and unsupported by evidence — being insufficient to overcome the presumption under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
• Perfection of Appeal: Yes. Respondent perfected his appeal before the NLRC, the office having closed early at 3:30 p.m. on the last filing day due to a jeepney strike, making it just and fair to give him until the next working day to perfect his appeal.
• Entitlement to Disability Compensation: Yes. Respondent suffers from permanent partial disability and is entitled to disability compensation of USD 6,270.00, computed as 10.45% of the maximum rate of USD 60,000.00 under Grade 12 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract, plus attorney's fees.

• Authority of Counsel: Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required. This presumption is strong, as the mere denial by a party that he authorized an attorney to appear for him, absent a compelling reason, is insufficient to overcome it — especially when the denial comes after the rendition of an adverse judgment. Here, respondent's Manifestation disclaiming SVBB's authority was submitted almost four years after the Labor Arbiter dismissed his complaint, by which time the NLRC had already rendered a favorable decision through SVBB's efforts. Respondent gave no cogent reason for the disavowal and presented no evidence other than the bare denial. The Court found it telling that respondent renounced his counsel's authority only at a late stage, and that petitioners sought to exploit this circumstance to avoid payment of liability.

• Perfection of Appeal: The NLRC NCR office closed at 3:30 p.m. on July 21, 2003 — earlier than the normal closing time of 5:00 p.m. — because of a jeepney strike. Respondent's counsel's messenger arrived at 4:00 p.m. for the sole purpose of perfecting the appeal. Since it was not respondent's fault that he was unable to perfect his appeal on that day, the NLRC having itself declared the latter part of the day non-working, it was just and fair to give him until the next working day. The Court reinforced this by noting its consistent holding that courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to speedily end litigation with the parties' right to due process.

• Entitlement to Disability Compensation: The Court is not a trier of facts; findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, especially when affirmed by the CA, are accorded finality and respect when supported by substantial evidence. Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain it occasions, but to the loss or impairment of earning capacity; the basis of compensation is reduction of earning power. Under Section 2 of Rule VII of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation, permanent partial disability occurs when an employee loses the use of any particular anatomical part of his body which disables him to continue with his former work. While the company-designated physician certified respondent as fit to work, the same physician admitted that respondent's left eye could no longer be improved by medical treatment and had diagnosed it as permanently disabled at 30% as early as April 13, 2002. The curability of the injury does not preclude an award for disability, because in labor laws disability need not render the seafarer absolutely helpless; it is enough that it incapacitates him to perform his customary work. The cataract extraction took place in 2003, roughly two years after the injury in 2001, during which respondent was unable to reassume work as a seaman, resulting in loss and impairment of earning capacity. No reemployment offer was ever extended despite petitioners' contention that respondent was fit to return to work. As to the amount, petitioners' argument that Section 32 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract only covers at least 50% loss of vision was rejected because the schedule of disabilities is not exclusive — Section 20.B.4 provides that illnesses not listed are disputably presumed as work-related — and the contract must be construed liberally in favor of seafarers. Applying Section 30 (now Section 32) of the standard contract, respondent's impediment grade is Grade 12, entitling him to 10.45% of the maximum rate of USD 60,000.00 under the CBA, yielding USD 6,270.00. Attorney's fees were sustained under Article 2208(2) of the Civil Code, which justifies such awards in actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer liability laws.

• Presumption of Counsel's Authority — Under Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required. The presumption is strong: the mere denial by a party that he authorized an attorney to appear for him, absent a compelling reason, is insufficient to overcome it, especially when the denial comes after the rendition of an adverse judgment. In this case, respondent's bare denial in a Manifestation filed almost four years after the Labor Arbiter's dismissal — and only after the NLRC had rendered a favorable decision — did not overcome the presumption.

• Relaxation of Procedural Rules — Courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character, mindful of the duty to reconcile the need to speedily end litigation with the parties' right to due process. Applied here, where the NLRC office closed early due to a jeepney strike on the last day for filing an appeal, the respondent was given until the next working day to perfect his appeal.

• Disability as Loss of Earning Capacity — Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain it occasions, but to the loss or impairment of earning capacity. There is disability when there is diminution of earning power because of actual absence from work due to injury or illness arising from and in the course of employment. The curability of the injury does not preclude an award for disability, because disability need not render the seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be compensable; it is enough that it incapacitates him to perform his customary work.

• Liberal Construction of POEA Standard Employment Contract — The POEA Standard Employment Contract was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen, and its provisions must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in the seamen's favor. The schedule of disabilities under Section 32 is not exclusive; Section 20.B.4 provides that illnesses not listed are disputably presumed as work-related, meaning the schedule contemplates injuries not explicitly listed.

• "Disability does not refer to the injury or the pain that it has occasioned, but to the loss or impairment of earning capacity. There is disability when there is a diminution of earning power because of actual absence from work." — This passage articulates the controlling definition of disability in labor law, distinguishing compensable disability from mere physical injury and anchoring the right to compensation on impairment of earning capacity.

• "The curability of the injury 'does not preclude an award for disability because, in labor laws, disability need not render the seafarer absolutely helpless or feeble to be compensable; it is enough that it incapacitates him to perform his customary work.'" — This formulation resolves the tension between medical curability and compensability, establishing that the legal standard for disability compensation is functional incapacity, not medical incurability.

• "The POEA Standard Employment Contract was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. In resolving disputes regarding disability benefits, its provisions must be 'construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in the seamen's favor, because only then can the provisions be given full effect.'" — This passage states the canon of liberal construction governing the POEA Standard Employment Contract, frequently cited in subsequent seafarer disability jurisprudence.

• "The mere denial by a party that he has authorized an attorney to appear for him, in the absence of a compelling reason, is insufficient to overcome the presumption, especially when denial comes after the rendition of an adverse judgment." — This articulates the strength of the presumption of counsel's authority and the standard for rebutting it, tying the doctrine to the timing and motivation behind the disavowal.

• Maersk Filipinas vs. Mesina, 710 Phil. 531 (2013) — Followed for the principle that the POEA Standard Employment Contract must be construed and applied fairly, reasonably, and liberally in favor of seamen.

• Seagull Maritime Corp. vs. Dee, 548 Phil. 660 (2007) — Cited as underlying authority for the liberal construction doctrine and for the proposition that disability need not render the seafarer absolutely helpless to be compensable.

• Esguerra vs. United Philippines Lines, Inc., 713 Phil. 487 (2013) — Followed for the principle that the curability of an injury does not preclude an award for disability benefits.

• Career Philippines vs. Serna, G.R. No. 172086, December 3, 2012 — Cited for the doctrine that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, when affirmed by the CA and supported by substantial evidence, are accorded finality and respect.

• Stolt-Nielsen Transportation Group, Inc. vs. Medequillo, Jr., G.R. No. 177498, January 18, 2012 — Cited for the proposition that findings of fact supported by substantial evidence must be upheld.

• GSIS vs. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 585 (1999) — Cited for the definition of permanent partial disability under the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation.

• Negros Slashers, Inc. vs. Teng, 682 Phil. 593 (2012) — Cited for the principle that courts have the prerogative to relax procedural rules of even the most mandatory character.

• Section 21, Rule 138, Rules of Court — Provides the presumption that an attorney is properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, with no written power of attorney required. Applied to sustain the SVBB law firm's authority to represent respondent despite his subsequent disavowal.

• Section 2, Rule VII, Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation — Defines permanent partial disability as the permanent partial loss of the use of any part of the body that disables the employee to continue with his former work. Applied to classify respondent's 30% permanent visual impairment as a permanent partial disability.

• Section 32 (formerly Section 30), POEA Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels — Sets the schedule of disability or impediment grades for injuries suffered, including eye injuries. Applied to classify respondent's condition as Grade 12, entitling him to 10.45% of the maximum disability compensation rate.

• Section 20.B.4, POEA Standard Employment Contract — Provides that illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. Applied to reject petitioners' argument that the disability schedule is exclusive.

• Section 20.1.4.4 and Section 20.1.5, CBA between AMOSUP and Maersk Company (IOM) — Prescribes the rate of compensation for 100% disability for Ratings at USD 60,000.00, with pro-rata computation for lesser disabilities, and provides that a seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability but certified as permanently unfit for further sea service by the company doctor is entitled to 100% compensation. Applied to compute respondent's disability benefit at USD 6,270.00 (10.45% of USD 60,000.00), since the company physician did not certify him as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity.

• Article 2208(2), Civil Code — Authorizes the award of attorney's fees in actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws. Applied to sustain the award of attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.

Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo, Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, and Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa concurred in the decision. No separate concurring opinions were written.