Madridejo vs. De Leon

A natural child is legitimated by subsequent marriage only when acknowledged by the parents—voluntarily under Article 131 or by compulsion under Articles 135 and 136—before or after the celebration thereof; absent such acknowledgment, the subsequent marriage of the parents does not operate as legitimation.

Flaviana Perez was first married to Eulogio de Leon, with whom she had one son, Domingo de Leon. After Eulogio's death in 1915, Flaviana lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor, and bore a son, Melecio Madridejo, on June 1, 1917. The dispute arose after Domingo de Leon's death on May 2, 1928, when Melecio claimed to be Domingo's next of kin and sought recovery of property held by Gonzalo de Leon and other defendants. The case turned on whether Melecio had been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents, which would determine his standing as Domingo's heir.

Eulogio de Leon and Flaviana Perez, husband and wife, had one child, Domingo de Leon. Eulogio died in 1915, survived by his wife and son. During her widowhood, Flaviana Perez lived with Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor. The registry of births of the municipality of Siniloan, Laguna, shows that on June 1, 1917, a child named Melecio Madridejo was born to Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez, the necessary data having been furnished by Pedro Madridejo (Exhibit B). On June 17, 1917, a 24-day-old child of Siniloan, Laguna, was baptized as a son of Flaviana Perez, with no mention of the father (Exhibit 2).

On July 8, 1920, Flaviana Perez, being at death's door, was married to Pedro Madridejo, a bachelor of thirty years of age, by the parish priest of Siniloan (Exhibit A). She died the following day, July 9, 1920, leaving Domingo de Leon, her son by Eulogio de Leon, and Melecio Madridejo, as well as her alleged second husband, Pedro Madridejo. Domingo de Leon subsequently died on May 2, 1928.

Melecio Madridejo, through his guardian ad litem Pedro Madridejo, filed suit against Gonzalo de Leon and others, claiming to be Domingo de Leon's next of kin and seeking restoration and delivery of property held by the defendants. The defendants' answer contained, in its second paragraph, an admission that Melecio was Flaviana Perez's son, which Melecio alleged relieved him of the burden of proving maternal acknowledgment. The trial court found in Melecio's favor, declaring him Domingo's next of kin and ordering the defendants to restore and deliver the property. The defendants appealed.

• Validity of Marriage: Whether the marriage between Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez is valid notwithstanding the parish priest's failure to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.
• Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage: Whether Melecio Madridejo, a natural child, was legitimated solely by the subsequent marriage of his parents, Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez.
• Judgment for Defendants: Whether the trial court erred in not rendering judgment in favor of the defendants.

• Validity of Marriage: Yes. The marriage in articulo mortis was valid; the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary is not among the essential requisites required by law for validity.
• Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage: No. Melecio was not legitimated because he was not acknowledged by either parent—voluntarily or by compulsion—before or after the marriage, as required by Article 121 of the Civil Code.
• Judgment for Defendants: Yes. The trial court erred in ruling for the plaintiff; the judgment was reversed and the complaint dismissed.

• Validity of Marriage: The parish priest of Siniloan who solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary. This omission did not invalidate the marriage in articulo mortis, as it did not appear that any essential requisite required by law for the ceremony's validity was lacking. The forwarding of the marriage certificate is an administrative requirement, not an essential requisite of marriage.

• Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage: Article 121 of the Civil Code provides that children shall be considered legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof. The Civil Code establishes two kinds of acknowledgment: voluntary (Article 131) and compulsory (Articles 135 and 136). As to voluntary acknowledgment, the birth registry certificate (Exhibit B) was not the record of birth contemplated by law, as it lacked the requisites of Article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry; it was a public instrument but was neither executed nor signed by Pedro Madridejo and contained no statement acknowledging paternity. Although Pedro furnished the data for the registry, this was insufficient to constitute acknowledgment by public document. As to the mother, it did not appear that Flaviana Perez supplied the data in either the civil registry or the baptismal register; the baptismal certificate (Exhibit 2) constitutes proof only of baptism and not of parentage, and church registers of baptism are no longer considered public documents. As to compulsory acknowledgment, Articles 135 and 136 require that the natural child take judicial action against the father or mother, or against persons setting themselves up as heirs of both, to compel acknowledgment through a court judgment. Melecio had not demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child—a condition precedent to establishing legitimation—and had not impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo or the heirs of his mother Flaviana Perez, so that the court would have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement. The admission in the defendants' answer that Melecio was Flaviana's son would have been effective only if the action had been brought to compel Flaviana or her heirs to acknowledge him, which it was not. Accordingly, no acknowledgment—voluntary or compulsory—having been made, the subsequent marriage did not legitimate Melecio.

• Judgment for Defendants: Because Melecio was not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents, he had no standing as Domingo de Leon's next of kin. The trial court's judgment was therefore reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the defendants absolved, without prejudice to any right Melecio may have to establish or compel his acknowledgment as the natural son of Pedro Madridejo and Flaviana Perez.

• Legitimation by Subsequent Marriage — Under Article 121 of the Civil Code, legitimation by subsequent marriage requires that the natural child be acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration of the marriage. Acknowledgment may be voluntary, under Article 131 (in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document), or compulsory, under Articles 135 (father) and 136 (mother), the latter requiring judicial action to compel acknowledgment through a court judgment. The Court applied this doctrine by examining whether either parent had acknowledged Melecio through any of these modes and found none.

• Distinction Between Birth Registry Entry and Record of Birth — A birth registry certificate, though a public instrument, does not constitute the "record of birth" contemplated in Article 131 if it lacks the requisites of Article 48 of the Law of Civil Registry and is neither executed nor signed by the acknowledging parent nor contains an express statement of acknowledgment. Pedro Madridejo's furnishing of data to the municipal secretary was insufficient to constitute voluntary acknowledgment by public document.

• Evidentiary Value of Baptismal Records — Church registers of baptism are no longer considered public documents and a baptismal certificate constitutes proof only of the fact of baptism, not of kinship or parentage. The Court relied on Adriano vs. De Jesus and United States vs. Evangelista for this proposition.

• "Children shall be considered as legitimated by a subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof." — This is the text of Article 121 of the Civil Code as quoted in the decision, establishing the statutory precondition for legitimation by subsequent marriage and forming the analytical core of the Court's ruling.

• "In the instant action brought by Melecio Madridejo not only has he not demanded to be acknowledged as a natural child, which is the condition precedent to establishing his legitimation by the subsequent marriage and his right to the estate of his uterine brother, Domingo de Leon, but he has not even impleaded either his father Pedro Madridejo, or the heirs of his mother, Flaviana Perez, in order that the court might have authority to make a valid and effective pronouncement of his being a natural child, and to compel them to acknowledge him as such." — This passage articulates the procedural requirement for compulsory acknowledgment: the child must affirmatively seek judicial acknowledgment against the parent or the parent's heirs, which Melecio failed to do.

• "Melecio Madridejo, then, was not acknowledged by Pedro Madridejo or Flaviana Perez, either voluntarily or by compulsion, before or after their marriage, and therefore said marriage did not legitimate him." — This is the Court's conclusive finding on the absence of acknowledgment, directly supporting the reversal of the trial court's judgment.

• Adriano vs. De Jesus, 23 Phil. 350 — Cited for the proposition that a baptismal certificate constitutes proof only of baptism and not of kinship or parentage.
• United States vs. Evangelista, 29 Phil. 215 — Cited for the proposition that church registers of baptism are no longer considered public documents.

• Article 121, Civil Code — Provides that children are legitimated by subsequent marriage only when acknowledged by the parents before or after the celebration thereof. This was the controlling provision; the Court found that no acknowledgment had occurred, so legitimation did not take effect.
• Article 131, Civil Code — Provides that voluntary acknowledgment of a natural child must be made in the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public document. The Court found that neither the birth registry entry nor the baptismal record satisfied this requirement.
• Article 135, Civil Code — Provides the grounds for compulsory acknowledgment by the father (indisputable written acknowledgment, uninterrupted possession of status of natural child, or cases of rape, seduction, or abduction). The Court noted that no judicial action for compulsory acknowledgment had been brought.
• Article 136, Civil Code — Provides the grounds for compulsory acknowledgment by the mother (inclusion in cases under Article 135, or when birth and identity of the child are fully proven). Again, no judicial action was initiated.
• Article 48, Law of Civil Registry — Referenced to explain why the birth registry certificate (Exhibit B) did not qualify as the "record of birth" contemplated in Article 131, as it lacked the requisites of this provision.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, and Romualdez, JJ., concurred.

• Johns, J. — Dissented, stating that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. No elaboration of reasoning was provided in the text.