Madreo v. Bayron

The condonation doctrine applies to a public official re-elected through a recall election before 12 April 2016; such re-election condones prior administrative misconduct and vests a right not to be removed that cannot be impaired by the later abandonment of the doctrine in Carpio-Morales. Re-elections on or after 12 April 2016 no longer have that effect.

Lucilo R. Bayron was the City Mayor of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, and Karl Bayron is his son. The controversy implicated the condonation doctrine—first enunciated in Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija and reiterated in Aguinaldo vs. Santos—under which re-election condones an elective official’s prior administrative misconduct. The doctrine was abandoned in Ombudsman Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals, but the SC declared the abandonment prospective and later fixed its finality at 12 April 2016 in Crebello vs. Office of the Ombudsman; the OMB then issued Office Circular No. 17 dated 11 May 2016 refusing to honor condonation for administrative cases open and pending as of 12 April 2016.

During the 2013 elections, Lucilo R. Bayron won as Mayor of Puerto Princesa City, Palawan, and assumed office on 30 June 2013. On 1 July 2013, the City Government of Puerto Princesa, represented by Lucilo as city mayor, entered into a Contract of Services with Lucilo’s son, Karl Bayron, engaging Karl as Project Manager for Bantay Puerto-VIP Security Task Force, with a monthly compensation of P16,000.00, from 1 July 2013 to 31 December 2013. The Contract of Services contained a declaration that Karl “is not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity with the Hiring Authority.”

On 22 November 2013, Aldrin Madreo filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the OMB against Lucilo and Karl, charging them with administrative offenses of Grave Misconduct, Serious Dishonesty, Conduct Unbecoming of a Public Officer, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, docketed as OMB-L-A-13-0564, and with criminal offenses of Nepotism, Perjury, Falsification of Public Documents, and violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, docketed as OMB-L-C-13-0500. Madreo alleged that the Contract of Services contained the declaration that Karl was not related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity to the hiring authority, but that Karl is the biological son of Lucilo as evidenced by an official copy of his Birth Certificate. Madreo argued that the concealment indicated a clear intention to violate the law, lack of integrity, and a disposition to betray and defraud the public; he added that Lucilo and Karl violated Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 17-02, which prohibits a person covered by the rule against nepotism from being hired under a contract of service, and that Karl acted without authority when he issued Office Order No. 001, Series of 2013, detailing Rigor Cobarrubias, a regular employee, to the City Traffic Management Office.

In his Consolidated Counter-Affidavit, Lucilo alleged that the position for which Karl was engaged was a non-career position; he pointed out that the position is confidential in nature and that Karl’s engagement is allowed under the Civil Service Rules. Lucilo also sought outright dismissal on the grounds of failure to comply with Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, which requires that a criminal and/or administrative complaint be under oath; lack of OMB jurisdiction because administrative complaints against local elective officials should be filed before the Office of the President; and Madreo’s lack of personal interest in the subject matter because he was not a resident nor a taxpayer of Puerto Princesa City. Both Lucilo and Karl explained that Karl was not considered a public officer, so there was no legal obligation to disclose their relationship; that the confidential nature of the position exempted it from the rule against nepotism; and that there was no deliberate or willful intent to commit a falsehood because it was the city government, not Lucilo, which entered into the contract with Karl.

On 8 May 2015, during the pendency of the OMB proceedings, a recall election was held for the position of city mayor of Puerto Princesa; after the casting and counting of votes, Lucilo was proclaimed as the winner and duly elected mayor. On 22 June 2015, Lucilo filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to Dismiss, praying for dismissal of the administrative complaint in light of his proclamation and asserting that re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer’s misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him. During the May 2016 local elections, while the OMB proceedings were ongoing, Lucilo was re-elected as mayor of Puerto Princesa City. The administrative complaint remained pending before the OMB while these elections took place.

• Condonation Doctrine: Madreo and the OMB contended that the doctrine of condonation should not be applied to obliterate Lucilo’s administrative liability because the doctrine had already been abandoned in Carpio-Morales.
• Recall Election: They argued that, assuming the doctrine still prevailed, it could not apply to Lucilo because what was involved was a recall election, not a re-election for a fresh term of office.
• Administrative Liability: They postulated that the CA gravely erred in absolving Lucilo from administrative liability considering that he falsely attested to his non-relationship with his son Karl in the subject notarized Contract of Services.

• Condonation Doctrine: Lucilo asserted that his re-election in the 8 May 2015 recall election and in the May 2016 local elections operated as a condonation of his past misconduct, cutting off the right to remove him, under the doctrine also known as the Aguinaldo doctrine.
• Nature of the Position: Lucilo alleged that the position for which Karl was engaged was a non-career and confidential position, allowed under the Civil Service Rules, and exempt from the rule against nepotism; he added that Karl was not a public officer, so there was no legal obligation to disclose their relationship.
• Intent and Contracting Party: Lucilo and Karl claimed that there was no deliberate or willful intent to commit a falsehood because it was the city government, and not Lucilo, which entered into the contract with Karl.
• Procedural Defenses: Lucilo argued that the complaint should be dismissed for failure to comply with Administrative Order No. 07, as amended, requiring that a criminal and/or administrative complaint be under oath; that the OMB lacked jurisdiction because administrative complaints against local elective officials should be filed before the Office of the President; and that Madreo lacked personal interest because he was not a resident nor a taxpayer of Puerto Princesa City.

• Prospective Application of Carpio-Morales: Whether the OMB may refuse to honor the condonation doctrine in all administrative cases open and pending as of 12 April 2016, the date Carpio-Morales became final.
• Recall Election: Whether the condonation doctrine applies to a public official who is re-elected through a recall election, rather than a regular election for a fresh term.
• Effect of Lucilo’s Re-elections: Whether Lucilo’s 8 May 2015 recall-election victory condoned his prior administrative misconduct and rendered the administrative complaint moot, and whether his May 2016 re-election had the same effect.
• Administrative Liability: Whether the CA gravely erred in absolving Lucilo from administrative liability despite his alleged false attestation in the notarized Contract of Services.

• Prospective Application of Carpio-Morales: No. The abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales is prospective from 12 April 2016; the doctrine still applies to officials re-elected before that date, and OMB Office Circular No. 17 cannot retroactively bar the defense for pending cases.
• Recall Election: Yes. The condonation doctrine covers re-election through recall elections because the controlling consideration is the electorate’s act of electing the official again, not the type of election.
• Effect of Lucilo’s Re-elections: The 8 May 2015 recall election condoned Lucilo’s prior administrative misconduct and mooted the complaint; the May 2016 re-election did not, because it occurred after the doctrine’s abandonment.
• Administrative Liability: Not reached. The dismissal of the administrative complaint on condonation made it unnecessary to pass upon whether the OMB correctly found Lucilo liable for Serious Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.

• Prospective Application of Carpio-Morales: The SC held that the OMB’s position “completely obliterated the doctrine as a defense for all cases, even those already pending resolution or appeal at the time of the finality of Carpio-Morales,” and was “patently violative of the binding rule that laws shall only have a prospective effect and must not be applied retroactively in such a way as to apply to pending disputes and cases.” Carpio-Morales abandoned the doctrine but declared the abandonment prospective; Crebello fixed finality on 12 April 2016. Re-election is the most important element because it triggers the doctrine and vests the right not to be removed. The SC clarified that the defense is no longer available if the public official’s re-election happens on or after 12 April 2016; it still applies to those re-elected before that date. OMB Office Circular No. 17, which refused to honor condonation for cases open and pending as of 12 April 2016, was rejected.
• Recall Election: The SC held that the condonation doctrine covers re-election through regular and recall elections. The doctrine speaks of “re-election to public office” without specifying the type of election, so the pivotal consideration is the electorate’s act of electing again an erring official. The SC applied ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Although recall is a mode of removal, it also operates as a re-election because it resorts to the democratic process of election; the incumbent is automatically considered a duly registered candidate and is entitled to be voted upon under Section 71 of RA No. 7160. If the incumbent receives the highest number of votes, confidence in him is affirmed and he continues in office under Section 72. The same considerations behind condonation exist in recall elections: the electorate can cut short the term by not voting for him, and if they re-elect him, they are presumed to have full awareness of the allegations and to have forgiven him. No persuasive reason exists to distinguish regular from recall elections.
• Effect of Lucilo’s Re-elections: The SC ruled that the doctrine applied to Lucilo by reason of his re-election during the 8 May 2015 recall election. It was undisputed that his re-election took place before the finality of Carpio-Morales on 12 April 2016; the doctrine was still good law at that time. Lucilo could rely on it as a defense, and his re-election effectively obliterated all prior administrative misconduct, if any. With his re-election on 8 May 2015, he already had a vested right not to be removed from office by reason of condonation, which could not be deprived or impaired by the subsequent abandonment in Carpio-Morales or by any new law, doctrine, or SC ruling. His 8 May 2015 re-election rendered moot and academic the administrative complaint filed on 22 November 2013 for misconduct allegedly committed on 1 July 2013, so it had to be dismissed. The doctrine could not be extended to his May 2016 re-election because by then the doctrine had already been abandoned, and that re-election no longer had the effect of condoning his previous misconduct.
• Administrative Liability: The SC deemed it unnecessary to pass upon the issue of whether the OMB correctly found Lucilo liable for Serious Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct because the administrative complaint against him was dismissed on condonation.

• Condonation doctrine (Aguinaldo doctrine) — An elected public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term because re-election operates as condonation of the previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him. The doctrine applies to elective officials, not appointive officials, and does not apply to criminal acts. It applies to re-election through regular or recall elections. It was abandoned in Carpio-Morales, but only prospectively: it no longer applies to public officials re-elected on or after 12 April 2016; it still applies to those re-elected before that date.
• Prospective application of judicial decisions / vested rights — The abandonment of a judicial doctrine is prospective; parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on its faith should not be deprived. Once a public official is re-elected before the abandonment, he acquires a vested right not to be removed by reason of condonation, which cannot be impaired by a later ruling. The SC applied this to hold that Lucilo’s 8 May 2015 recall re-election was governed by the old doctrine despite Carpio-Morales.
• Recall election as re-election for condonation — A recall election, though a mode of removal, also operates as a re-election when the incumbent wins, because the electorate casts votes to elect among candidates and may affirm confidence in the incumbent. The doctrine covers recall elections since the controlling element is the sovereign will of the electorate to forgive prior misconduct.
• Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus — Where the law or case law does not distinguish, neither should the SC. The SC used this to reject the distinction between regular and recall elections for the condonation doctrine.

• “The defense of condonation doctrine is no longer available if the public official’s re-election happens on or after 12 April 2016. With the abandonment of the condonation doctrine in Carpio-Morales, which became final on 12 April 2016, any re-elections of public officials on said date and onwards no longer have the effect of condoning their previous misconduct.” — This is the SC’s clarification of the prospective abandonment of the condonation doctrine.
• “Accordingly, that the manner of re-election was through a regular or recall elections is beside the point for the doctrine of condonation to apply. There should be no distinction as to the manner of re-election in the application of the said doctrine where none is indicated.” — This rejects the OMB’s argument that recall elections are outside the condonation doctrine.
• “In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that the doctrine of condonation is applicable to the case of Lucilo by reason of his re-election, as the term is understood in the application of the doctrine, during the recall election on 8 May 2015.” — This applies the doctrine to Lucilo’s specific recall-election victory.
• “The doctrine of condonation, however, cannot be extended to Lucilo’s re-election during the May 2016 elections. By then, the doctrine had already been abandoned, and his re-election no longer had the effect of condoning his previous misconduct.” — This limits the doctrine’s application to the 2015 recall election and excludes the 2016 re-election.

• Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 106 Phil. 466 (1959) — First enunciated the condonation doctrine; controlling precedent.
• Aguinaldo vs. Santos, 287 Phil. 851 (1992) — Reiterated the doctrine, also known as the Aguinaldo doctrine; controlling precedent.
• Salalima vs. Guingona, Jr., 326 Phil. 847 (1996) — Explained that the doctrine is founded on the sovereign will of the electorate and sound public policy; followed.
• Ombudsman Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals, 772 Phil. 672 (2015) — Abandoned the condonation doctrine but declared the abandonment prospective; controlling on the abandonment.
• Crebello vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 232325, April 10, 2019 — Clarified that Carpio-Morales became final on 12 April 2016; followed.
• Salumbides, Jr. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 633 Phil. 325 (2010) — Emphasized that it is the will of the populace that could extinguish administrative liability; followed.
• Garcia vs. Mojica, 372 Phil. 892 (1999) — Held that re-election is presumed to be with full knowledge of the official’s life and character, including past misconduct; followed.
• Garcia vs. Commission on Elections, 297 Phil. 1034 (1993) — Defined recall as a mode of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term; used to support the treatment of recall as re-election.

• Section 1, Article II, 1935 Constitution — The SC cited the principle that the Philippines is a democratic and republican State and sovereignty resides in the people, to ground the condonation doctrine in the sovereign will of the electorate expressed through elections.
• Section 71, Republic Act No. 7160 — The SC used the provision that in a recall election the official sought to be recalled is automatically considered a duly registered candidate and is entitled to be voted upon, to hold that a recall election can operate as a re-election.
• Section 72, Republic Act No. 7160 — The SC used the provision that if the incumbent receives the highest number of votes, confidence in him is affirmed and he shall continue in office, to show that a recall election can affirm the electorate’s trust and condone prior misconduct.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — The consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari were filed under Rule 45, which was the procedural basis for the SC’s review.
• Article 8, Civil Code — Cited in the Carpio-Morales excerpt for the rule that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of the legal system, supporting prospective application.
• Article 4, Civil Code — Cited in the same excerpt for the rule that laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided, supporting the SC’s rejection of OMB Circular No. 17’s retroactive application.

• Justice Caguioa (Concurring) — Separate opinion; its text is not included.

• Justice Leonen (Dissenting) — Separate opinion; its text is not included.
• Justice Perlas-Bernabe (Concurring and Dissenting) — Separate opinion; its text is not included.