Maderazo vs. People

A public officer may not take the law into his own hands by padlocking a market stall, inventorying its contents, and hauling goods to the police station without judicial intervention, and such acts constitute unjust vexation even if the offended party was not present when the acts were committed, provided the acts caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom they were directed.

The petitioners were public officials of the Municipality of Caibiran, Biliran: Melchor G. Maderazo was the Municipal Mayor, Victor Maderazo, Jr. was his nephew and a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, and Seniforo Perido was the Chief of Police. Medaria Verutiao was a lessee of a market stall in the public market who had constructed the stall at her own expense under Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, which allowed private construction of market structures with reimbursement through rental offsets. The Local Government Code (Republic Act 7160) provides specific remedies for collecting delinquent fees and rentals, including administrative distraint and levy and judicial action, which the Mayor was required to follow rather than resorting to self-help.

Medaria Verutiao was a lessee of a market stall in the public market of Caibiran, Biliran, paying a monthly rental of ₱200.00. She was allowed to construct the market stall herself with the permission of the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer, spending ₱24,267.00 for its construction. Under Section 38 of Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984, private parties could construct buildings for commercial purposes and be reimbursed by applying 50% of the monthly rentals when the stall was occupied for business. Verutiao submitted an itemized statement of expenses to Municipal Treasurer Jose Lee on February 14, 1992, but the Municipality only partially paid her ₱10,000.00 in 1995. Because she had not been fully reimbursed, she did not pay her rent, and the treasurers did not collect her rents knowing the Municipality still owed her money.

On January 13, 1994, Verutiao and the Municipality entered into a one-year lease contract, renewable every year, with a monthly rental of ₱400.00. The contract provided that any violation of its conditions would be sufficient cause for cancellation even before expiration. As of January 1997, Verutiao had unpaid rentals of ₱2,532.00 after deducting her construction expenses. On December 22, 1996, Verutiao closed her stall and went to Mindanao for the Christmas holidays, returning on January 15, 1997. On January 17, 1997, she and her husband received a letter-order from Mayor Melchor Maderazo directing her to vacate the stall within twenty-four hours for failure to pay rentals, declaring the lease contract cancelled. The spouses, through counsel, responded that they could only be ejected if the Municipality reimbursed their construction expenses, citing Section 38 of the ordinance.

On January 21, 1997, Mayor Maderazo padlocked the leased premises. On January 27, 1997, the locks were opened on the authority of the Mayor, and the contents of the market stall were inventoried by Victor Maderazo, Jr. and taken to the police station for safekeeping. Verutiao was in her farm, about 4 to 5 kilometers away, during these events. She considered the act political harassment because her husband was a candidate for councilor under the opposition ticket and she was a leader of the opposing party. Victor Maderazo, Jr. testified that he conducted the inventory upon the request of Mayor Melchor Maderazo, in the company of Police Chief Seniforo Perido, Barangay Captain Rodolfo Rico, Revenue Collector Orlando Mocorro, and other laborers, and that the inventory was orderly.

The Sandiganbayan ruled that Mayor Maderazo had no authority to padlock, open, and inventory the contents of the stall and take them to the police station. Although he had the power to cancel the lease contract, he could not eject the lessee by padlocking the stall and ordering the hauling and seizure of goods. The court found the accused could not be convicted of grave coercion because they did not use violence, threats, or intimidation, as Verutiao was not at the stall when it was padlocked and its goods inventoried. However, the court convicted them of unjust vexation because their overt acts caused her annoyance, irritation, and vexation.

• Lack of Unjust Vexation: Petitioners maintained that they were not criminally liable for unjust vexation because Verutiao was not prevented from doing something not prohibited by law, could not have been intimidated or forced, and was not transacting business at the time. Since she was not at her stall when it was opened and her goods inventoried, she could not have been vexed.

• Misfeasance of Conviction for a Different Crime: Petitioners argued that they were charged with grave coercion for allegedly evicting Verutiao on January 27, 1997, but were convicted of unjust vexation for acts that occurred on that date, while the padlocking was done by Mayor Maderazo alone on January 21, 1997. Petitioners Perido and Victor Maderazo, Jr. were not involved in the padlocking, and Mayor Maderazo was not at the stall on January 27, 1997.

• Authority of the Mayor: Petitioners posited that Mayor Maderazo had every right to consider the stall vacant under Section 44 of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994, and that as Mayor he had the duty to enforce laws and ordinances, collect revenues, and protect municipal property. They argued that under Section 174 of the Local Government Code, administrative action through distraint of goods was among the civil remedies for collecting delinquent revenues, and that Verutiao was merely stopped from improperly using the stall, not ejected.

• Violation of the Local Government Code: The Special Prosecutor averred that the Local Government Code provides specific remedies for collecting fees or charges—administrative distraint or levy and judicial action—but Mayor Maderazo cancelled the lease contract and ordered the padlocking and hauling of goods without availing of these remedies or following the procedure in Section 175.

• Duty to Consider Exemptions: The Special Prosecutor argued that even if Verutiao was delinquent in rentals, Mayor Maderazo was mandated to consider and resolve the exemptions she claimed, which were properly communicated to him, and he could not take the law into his own hands.

• Liability of Co-Petitioners: The Special Prosecutor maintained that Perido and Maderazo, Jr. could not escape criminal liability by claiming they were following orders, as only lawful orders deserve obedience, and their participation went beyond being witnesses—they became participants to an illegal and unauthorized act.

• Unjust Vexation Established: The Special Prosecutor argued that although Verutiao was not at the stall and could not have been intimidated or forced, she was tormented and distressed by the petitioners' actuations, and unjust vexation is broad enough to include any human conduct that unjustly annoys or irritates an innocent person.

• Conviction for Unjust Vexation: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in convicting petitioners of the crime of unjust vexation.
• Authority of the Mayor to Padlock: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in finding that petitioner Mayor Maderazo had no power to padlock a market stall and haul the goods contained therein.
• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Whether the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime for which the accused was being held to account.

• Conviction for Unjust Vexation: No. The conviction of petitioners Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust vexation was affirmed, but petitioner Seniforo Perido was acquitted. The overt acts of the petitioners on January 27, 1997—unlocking the stall, inventorying its contents, and transporting the goods to the police station—annoyed, irritated, and embarrassed Verutiao, and the crime of unjust vexation does not require the offended party's presence at the time of commission.

• Authority of the Mayor to Padlock: No. Mayor Maderazo had no right, without judicial intervention, to oust Verutiao from the stall and have her merchandise transported to the police station. Although he had the power to cancel the lease contract, he was required to file an action for unlawful detainer to recover possession, and he could not take the law into his own hands.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: Partially. The prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. for unjust vexation, but failed to prove that Seniforo Perido conspired with them, as he was merely present to witness the inventory and ensure peace and order.

• Conviction for Unjust Vexation: Article 287, second paragraph of the Revised Penal Code punishes unjust vexation, which is broad enough to include any human conduct that, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. Compulsion or restraint need not be alleged in the Information, as unjust vexation may exist without compulsion or restraint. However, being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element, and good faith is a good defense because it negates malice. The paramount question is whether the offender's act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it was directed. The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. In this case, the overt acts of Mayor Melchor Maderazo and Victor Maderazo, Jr. on January 27, 1997—ordering the stall reopened, conducting an inventory, and transporting goods to the police station—annoyed, irritated, and caused embarrassment to Verutiao. Although she was not at her stall when these acts occurred, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed; it is enough that she was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated, or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts. By their collective acts, petitioners evicted Verutiao from her stall and prevented her from selling therein, depriving her of possession and income.

• Authority of the Mayor to Padlock: Although the lease contract expired on January 13, 1997 without renewal and Mayor Maderazo ordered Verutiao to vacate for failure to pay rent, he was required to file an action for unlawful detainer against her to recover possession and cause her eviction. Such action is designed to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder, preventing those believing themselves entitled to possession from resorting to force. The Mayor could not be permitted to invade the property and oust the lessee who is entitled to actual possession, placing the burden on her to institute an action to try the property right. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions are summary proceedings established to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession, which is presumed lawful until the contrary is proven. While the Mayor is tasked to enforce laws and ordinances, implement programs, ensure collection of taxes and revenues, and institute proceedings for recovery of funds and property, he must act within the confines of the law and not resort to the commission of a felony. A public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and ordinances and must exercise power in accordance with law, with strict observance of the rights of the people, never whimsically, arbitrarily, and despotically.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The prosecution failed to prove that Seniforo Perido conspired with the other petitioners. He was at the situs of the stall merely to witness the inventory and ensure peace and order. He agreed to have the contents of the stall stored in the police station presumably to protect the property from the elements and asportation by thieves until Verutiao claimed the same or the disposition thereof was determined by the authorities concerned. Accordingly, he was deserving of acquittal.

• Unjust vexation under Article 287, second paragraph, Revised Penal Code — Unjust vexation is a form of light coercion broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person. The crime exists even without compulsion or restraint, and the offended party need not be present when the crime is committed; it is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated, or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts. Being a felony by dolo, malice is an inherent element, and good faith is a good defense because it negates malice.

• No person may take the law into his own hands — The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice. A public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and ordinances and must exercise his power and perform his duties in accordance with law, with strict observance of the rights of the people.

• Forcible entry and unlawful detainer as exclusive remedy for recovering possession — An action for forcible entry and unlawful detainer is a summary proceeding established for the purpose of providing expeditious means of protecting actual possession, which is presumed to be lawful until the contrary is proven. A person who believes himself entitled to possession of property may not resort to force to gain possession but must secure appropriate action in court to assert his claims. The person who has first acquired possession should remain in possession pending the decision, and the parties cannot be permitted meanwhile to engage in petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject of dispute.

• "The second paragraph of the Article is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person." — This passage defines the scope of unjust vexation under Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code and is the canonical formulation of the crime's elements.

• "The main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is precisely to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men. It is unlawful for any person to take into his own hands the administration of justice." — This states the policy rationale underlying the prohibition against self-help, which is central to the Court's reasoning in affirming the conviction.

• "For the crime to exist, it is not necessary that the offended party be present when the crime was committed by said petitioners. It is enough that the private complainant was embarrassed, annoyed, irritated or disturbed when she learned of the overt acts of the petitioners." — This establishes the rule that the offended party's presence is not required for unjust vexation, a key holding in this case.

• "A public officer is proscribed from resorting to criminal acts in the enforcement of laws and ordinances. He must exercise his power and perform his duties in accordance with law, with strict observance of the rights of the people, and never whimsically, arbitrarily and despotically." — This articulates the standard of conduct required of public officers in enforcing laws, which the Court applied to find Mayor Maderazo liable.

• People vs. Reyes, 60 Phil. 369 (1934) — Cited as authority for the proposition that the paramount question in unjust vexation is whether the offender's act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it was directed.

• People vs. Nebreja, 76 Phil. 119 (1946) — Cited for the principle that the main purpose of the law penalizing coercion and unjust vexation is to enforce the principle that no person may take the law into his hands and that our government is one of law, not of men.

• Josefa vs. San Buenaventura, G.R. No. 163429, March 3, 2006, 484 SCRA 49 — Cited for the proposition that an action for unlawful detainer must be filed to recover possession of property and cause the eviction of a lessee.

• Pitargue vs. Sorilla, 92 Phil. 5 (1952) — Cited for the principle that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder and to prevent those believing themselves entitled to possession from resorting to force.

• Mediran vs. Villanueva, 37 Phil. 752, 757 (1918) — Cited for the rule that a person entitled to possession may not invade the property and oust the lessee who is entitled to actual possession, placing the burden on the latter to institute an action to try the property right.

• Dizon vs. Concina, G.R. No. L-23756, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 897 — Cited for the nature of forcible entry actions: the law protects the person who in fact has actual possession, and in case of controverted right, requires the parties to preserve the status quo until a court of competent jurisdiction decides the question of ownership.

• Article 287, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining light coercions and unjust vexation. The second paragraph, under which petitioners were convicted, punishes any other coercions or unjust vexations with arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or both.

• Article 286, Revised Penal Code — The provision defining grave coercion, under which petitioners were originally charged. The Sandiganbayan found that the second element—violence, threats, or intimidation—was lacking because Verutiao was not at the stall when the acts were committed.

• Section 444(b)(1)(2), Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code) — The provision tasking the Mayor to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the Municipality and to implement all approved programs, projects, services, and activities of the Municipality.

• Section 444(b)(I)(3)(III), Republic Act 7160 — The provision obliging the Mayor to ensure that all taxes and other revenues of the Municipality are collected.

• Section 444(b)(I)(3)(17), Republic Act 7160 — The provision obliging the Mayor to institute or cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings for the recovery of funds and property.

• Section 174, Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code) — The provision enumerating the civil remedies for the collection of delinquent local taxes, fees, or charges, including administrative action through distraint of goods, chattels, or effects, and levy upon real property.

• Section 175, Republic Act 7160 (Local Government Code) — The provision prescribing the procedure for administrative distraint and levy, which the Special Prosecutor argued Mayor Maderazo failed to follow.

• Section 38, Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1984 — The ordinance provision allowing private construction of market structures with reimbursement through rental offsets, which Verutiao invoked to justify her refusal to pay rent until fully reimbursed.

• Section 44, Municipal Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1994 — The ordinance provision declaring a stall vacant when a holder discontinues or is required to discontinue business before the expiration of the lease, which petitioners invoked to justify the Mayor's actions.

Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, J.J., concurred.