Madayag vs. Madayag

Prior physical possession in forcible entry may be acquired not only by material or actual occupation but also by juridical acts — such as the issuance and registration of a Certificate of Lot Award, the execution of a deed of absolute sale, and registration under the Torrens system — and a complaint that sets up, without using the statutory language, the facts of prior possession and of dispossession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth satisfies the jurisdictional requirements of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.

Patrick G. Madayag, Federico G. Madayag, Dionisio Madayag, Arthuro Madayag, Lourdes Madayag Dennison, and Carlos Madayag are the children of the spouses Anatalio Madayag and Maria Consuelo Madayag. During his lifetime, Anatalio was an employee of John Hay Air Base and was thereby allowed to occupy a parcel of land in the housing facility for the base's employees, identified as Lot 24, Block 7, Scout Barrio Housing Project, Baguio City, with an area of 493 square meters, where he built the residential building that served as the family home. The housing facility was under the jurisdiction of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), the government agency whose lot award and sale processes governed the eventual disposition of the property to the family.

Patrick G. Madayag, Federico G. Madayag, Dionisio Madayag, Arthuro Madayag, Lourdes Madayag Dennison, and Carlos Madayag are the children of the spouses Anatalio Madayag and Maria Consuelo Madayag. During his lifetime, Anatalio was an employee of John Hay Air Base and was consequently allowed to occupy a parcel of land in the housing facility maintained for the base's employees, identified as Lot 24, Block 7, Scout Barrio Housing Project, Baguio City, with an area of 493 square meters. Anatalio built a residential building on the lot, and the property served as the family home; the housing facility itself was under the jurisdiction of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA).

Anatalio and Maria Consuelo died in 1979 and 1994, respectively. On February 7, 1994, the siblings agreed to execute a Deed of Adjudication of Real Property and Quitclaim, by which Federico, together with his brothers Dionisio, Arthuro, and Carlos, waived and relinquished their interests in the property in favor of Patrick and their sister Lourdes, who is an American citizen. Sometime in 2002, the BCDA issued a Certificate of Lot Award in favor of the "Heirs of Anatalio F. Madayag"; this certificate was subsequently cancelled and corrected, as attested to by Bobby Akia, an officer of the Land and Asset Development Division of the John Hay Management Corporation, by virtue of the said Deed. Consequently, on March 20, 2006, the BCDA issued a Certificate of Lot Award solely in favor of Patrick and his named co-owner in the Deed, Lourdes. By virtue of that award, the BCDA sold the parcel of land to Patrick under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 4, 2009, and two days later, on March 6, 2009, the property was registered in Patrick's name under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 98257.

On November 5, 2010, Patrick filed a Complaint for Forcible Entry and Damages against Federico. Patrick alleged that after the property was adjudicated by the siblings to him and Lourdes, he took possession of the same and made improvements thereon, using it as his residence whenever he came to Baguio City from the United States of America. He later learned that Federico had entered and occupied the property without his permission, and when he returned from the United States sometime in March 2010 and tried to settle the matter with his brother, Federico threatened him with bodily harm if he came back to Baguio.

Federico, for his part, averred in his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses that the property is an ancestral and family home put up by their parents; that upon their parents' death, he and his siblings became co-owners thereof; and that the Deed of Adjudication of Real Property and Quitclaim was agreed upon by the siblings to be executed merely for the purpose of facilitating the award and titling of the property, with the clear understanding that it would remain their ancestral and family home, to be enjoyed by any of the siblings including their respective families. Federico further averred that Patrick could not invoke prior physical possession because he never possessed the property exclusively on his own, and that it was their sister Lourdes who primarily provided the improvements on the subject property.

The MTCC found that Patrick failed to sufficiently allege, much less prove, prior physical possession and that the Complaint contained no allegation that he was dispossessed by force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth; the alleged dispossession, as pleaded, was not shown to have been effected by any of those means. The RTC, on appeal, found the Complaint sufficient, holding that Patrick's allegation that he took possession of the house, made improvements, and used it as his residence whenever he came to Baguio sufficiently alleged prior possession, and that Federico's entry into and occupation of the house without Patrick's knowledge and consent while taking advantage of the latter's absence sufficiently alleged stealth or strategy; it further found that prior physical possession may be acquired by juridical acts, which in this case consisted of the adjudication of the property to Patrick and Lourdes and its subsequent registration in Patrick's name. The Court of Appeals, in turn, found that the allegation of prior physical possession did not satisfy the requirement in forcible entry cases, that no allegation showed Patrick physically possessed the property and was ousted by Federico through force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the claim of prior possession by virtue of absolute ownership is not the same as actual or de facto possession; it likewise sustained the alleged agreement among the siblings that the property would remain the ancestral and family home, supported by an affidavit executed by their brother Dionisio and by the Certificate of Lot Award issued to the "Heirs of Anatalio F. Madayag."

• Ancestral and Family Home; Co-Ownership: Federico averred in his Answer with Special and Affirmative Defenses that the subject property is an ancestral and family home put up by their parents, and that upon their parents' death he and his siblings became co-owners thereof.
• Purpose of the Deed of Adjudication and Quitclaim: Federico maintained that the Deed of Adjudication of Real Property and Quitclaim was executed by the siblings merely to facilitate the award and titling of the property, with the clear understanding that it would remain their ancestral and family home to be enjoyed by any of the siblings, including their respective families.
• Absence of Exclusive Prior Possession: Federico argued that Patrick cannot invoke prior physical possession of the property, since Patrick never possessed the property exclusively on his own.
• Source of Improvements: Federico contended that it was not right for Patrick to claim that he introduced the improvements on the subject property, because it was their sister Lourdes who primarily provided therefor.

• Sufficiency of the Allegations of Prior Physical Possession and Dispossession by Stealth: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating the MTCC Judgment dismissing Patrick's complaint for forcible entry on the ground that the Complaint failed to sufficiently allege the essential elements of forcible entry.
• Sufficiency of the Proof of Prior Physical Possession and Dispossession by Stealth: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Patrick failed to prove prior physical possession of the subject property and his dispossession thereof by Federico through stealth.

• Sufficiency of the Allegations of Prior Physical Possession and Dispossession by Stealth: No. The Complaint sufficiently stated the essential elements of forcible entry, it being enough that the facts of prior physical possession and of dispossession through an unlawful act constituting force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth are set up, without the need to employ the language of Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Sufficiency of the Proof of Prior Physical Possession and Dispossession by Stealth: No. Prior possession was proven by juridical acts — the Certificate of Lot Award, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the registration of the property under TCT No. 98257 in Patrick's name — and dispossession by stealth was established by Federico's clandestine entry and occupation of the premises without the knowledge and consent of the registered owner, who was then abroad.

• Sufficiency of the Allegations of Prior Physical Possession and Dispossession by Stealth: The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court's jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint. In ejectment cases, the complaint must state and sufficiently show on its face the essential facts laid down under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court to vest the court with jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. That provision requires, in an action for forcible entry, that it be alleged that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action was filed within one year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the complainant learned of the dispossession. It is not necessary for the complainant to utilize the language of the statute; it suffices that the facts are set up showing that the complainant had prior physical possession of the property in litigation and that he was dispossessed thereof through the defendant's unlawful act or acts constituting force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. Scrutinizing the Complaint, the Court found that Patrick clearly alleged that upon adjudication of the property to him and Lourdes in 1994, he took possession thereof, made improvements therein, and used the same as his residence every time he went to Baguio; that Federico entered and occupied the property without the former's knowledge and consent, taking advantage of his absence; and that upon his return from the United States in March 2010 he came to know of Federico's act. Federico's entry and occupation, as alleged, was therefore effected clandestinely, and consequently his possession was by stealth. There was no question that the Complaint was filed within one year from Patrick's discovery of Federico's unlawful entry.

• Sufficiency of the Proof of Prior Physical Possession and Dispossession by Stealth: The only question courts must resolve in an ejectment case is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute; the main issue is possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership or possession de jure, and the decision must be based on who had prior physical possession of the premises under litigation. As a rule, "possession" in forcible entry cases refers to nothing more than prior physical possession or possession de facto, not possession de jure or that arising from ownership, and title is not an issue. The Court has, however, consistently ruled that possession can be acquired not only by material or actual occupation but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. In Quizon vs. Juan, the Court explained that possession can be acquired by juridical acts, which are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, such as donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and inscription of possessory information titles; the reason for the exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession, it being sufficient that he was able to subject the property to the action of his will. In Mangaser vs. Ugay, the Court held that the plaintiff, the registered owner of the property in dispute, acquired possession thereof by juridical act, specifically through the issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its subsequent registration with the Register of Deeds, and ruled that disregarding such juridical acts to obtain prior possession would create an absurd situation by putting a premium in favor of land intruders against Torrens title holders. Habagat Grill vs. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., also cited in Mangaser, gave weight to the prior possession of the registered owner's predecessor-in-interest as evidenced by the execution and registration of public instruments. Applying these principles, the Court noted that Patrick is the registered owner of the subject property: the property was awarded to him as evidenced by the Certificate of Lot Award dated March 20, 2006; by virtue of that award the property was sold to him under the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 4, 2009; and on March 6, 2009 the property was registered in his name under TCT No. 98257. A right to the possession of the property flows from Patrick's ownership thereof, and a person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to its possession. The Court of Appeals, by contrast, relied heavily on the affidavit executed by Dionisio stating that there was a verbal agreement among the siblings that the property would remain an ancestral home usable by any of them; aside from that affidavit, no other evidence was presented to support Federico's claim that his entry and possession of the property registered in Patrick's name was not unlawful. The Court thus agreed with the RTC that Patrick sufficiently proved prior possession by juridical act, and warned that disregarding such juridical acts and unreasonably constricting the concept of prior possession to physical occupation in its rigid literal sense would open the floodgates of absurdity wherein land intruders would be favored over Torrens title holders in the summary procedure of ejectment, while Torrens title holders would be forced into the protracted litigation of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. The Court likewise agreed that Patrick was dispossessed by stealth, since Federico's entry into the premises without the consent and knowledge of the registered owner, who was abroad at the time, clearly falls under stealth, defined in jurisprudence as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within, the residence of another without permission. Finally, it was undisputed that the action was filed within one year from Patrick's discovery of the forcible entry.

• Nature of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint — The nature of an action and the court's jurisdiction over it are determined by the allegations in the complaint, not by the evidence or the defenses raised. In ejectment cases, the complaint must state and sufficiently show on its face the essential facts under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court to vest jurisdiction without resort to parol evidence. The Court applied this rule to hold that the MTCC and the CA erred in dismissing the complaint at the threshold, since the allegations themselves supplied the jurisdictional facts.
• Essential elements of forcible entry — An action for forcible entry requires that the complainant allege and prove (a) prior physical possession of the land or building, and (b) deprivation of that possession by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. The action must be filed within one year from the time of the unlawful deprivation of possession, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time the complainant learned of the dispossession. The complainant need not use the language of the statute; it suffices that the facts are set up showing prior physical possession and dispossession through the defendant's unlawful act.
• Possession de facto versus possession de jure — The only question in an ejectment case is who between the parties is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute; the main issue is possession de facto, independent of any claim of ownership or possession de jure, and title is not an issue. The Court nevertheless held that this distinction does not preclude proof of prior possession through juridical acts, which the law itself treats as acts of possession.
• Acquisition of possession by juridical acts — Possession can be acquired not only by material or actual occupation but also by juridical acts — acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, such as donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, and inscription of possessory information titles. The rationale is that possession in the eyes of the law does not require physical presence on every square meter of the property; it is sufficient that the possessor was able to subject the property to the action of his will. Applied to the case, the Certificate of Lot Award, the Deed of Absolute Sale, and the registration of the property under TCT No. 98257 constituted juridical acts conferring prior possession on Patrick.
• Right of a Torrens title holder to possession — A person who has a Torrens title over the property is entitled to its possession, and a right to possession flows from ownership. Disregarding juridical acts of acquisition and constricting prior possession to literal physical occupation would favor land intruders over Torrens title holders in the summary procedure of ejectment, compelling the latter to resort to the protracted remedies of accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria while intruders enjoy the use of another's land.
• Stealth as a mode of dispossession — Stealth is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within, the residence of another without permission. The Court held that Federico's entry into the premises without the consent and knowledge of the registered owner, who was abroad at the time, clearly fell under stealth.
• Unsupported self-serving claim of a family agreement — A claim that the registered owner's entry and possession was not unlawful, resting solely on an affidavit attesting to a verbal agreement among the siblings, cannot prevail absent other supporting evidence, particularly against a Torrens title holder's right to possession.

• "The invariable rule is that what determines the nature of the action, as well as the court has jurisdiction over the case, are the allegations in the complaint." — This states the threshold rule governing the jurisdictional analysis in ejectment cases and supplies the framework for the Court's holding that the Complaint's allegations, not the evidence adduced or the defenses pleaded, determined whether the MTCC properly acquired jurisdiction over the forcible entry action.
• "Possession can be acquired by juridical acts. These are acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession. Examples of these are donations, succession, execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the like. The reason for this exceptional rule is that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession. It is sufficient that petitioner was able to subject the property to the action of his will." — Quoted from Quizon vs. Juan, this passage is the canonical formulation of the juridical-acts doctrine and is the ratio decidendi of the Court's ruling that Patrick's Certificate of Lot Award, deed of sale, and Torrens registration sufficed to establish prior physical possession.
• "Well-settled is the rule that a person who has a Torren's title over the property is entitled to the possession thereof." — This encapsulates the Court's holding that possession flows from Torrens ownership, and it anchors the policy argument against favoring land intruders over registered owners in the summary procedure of ejectment.
• "any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into, or to remain within [the] residence of another without permission." — This is the Court's definition of stealth, drawn from Diaz vs. Spouses Punzalan, which the Court applied to characterize Federico's entry and occupation of the house during Patrick's absence abroad as dispossession by stealth.

• Quizon vs. Juan, 577 Phil. 470, 480 (2008) — The controlling precedent on the acquisition of possession by juridical acts; the Court quoted its explanation that possession may be acquired through acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, and that it is sufficient that the possessor subjected the property to the action of his will.
• Mangaser vs. Ugay, 749 Phil. 372, 382, 385-386 (2014) — Followed and relied upon; held that a registered owner acquired prior possession by juridical act through the issuance of a free patent under Commonwealth Act No. 141 and its registration, and warned against creating an absurd situation favoring land intruders over Torrens title holders.
• Habagat Grill vs. DMC-Urban Property Developer, Inc., 494 Phil. 603 (2005) — Cited in Mangaser and relied upon by the Court; gave weight to the prior possession of the registered owner's predecessor-in-interest as evidenced by the execution and registration of public instruments.
• Diaz vs. Spouses Punzalan, 783 Phil. 456, 462 (2016) — The source of the rule that, when entry is through stealth, the one-year period for filing the forcible entry action is counted from the time the complainant learned of the dispossession, and of the definition of stealth applied by the Court.
• Javier vs. Lumontad, 749 Phil. 360, 368 (2014) — Cited for the rule that the nature of the action and the court's jurisdiction are determined by the allegations of the complaint, and that the complaint must show on its face the essential facts under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court.
• Dela Cruz vs. Hermano, 757 Phil. 9, 18 (2015) — Cited for the rule that the complainant need not utilize the language of the statute, it being sufficient that the facts constituting prior possession and unlawful dispossession are set up in the complaint.
• Echanes vs. Spouses Hailar, 792 Phil. 724, 732 (2016) — Cited for the rule that the only question in an ejectment case is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the property, the main issue being possession de facto independent of any claim of ownership.
• Muñoz vs. Atty. Yabut, Jr., 665 Phil. 488, 517 (2011) — Cited for the rule that courts should base their decision in ejectment cases on who had prior physical possession of the premises under litigation.

• Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Governs actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer. It requires that the complaint allege that the complainant was deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, and that the action be filed within one year from the time the unlawful deprivation of possession took place. The Court applied the provision to hold that the Complaint sufficiently showed on its face the essential jurisdictional facts, that the complainant need not employ the statutory language so long as the facts are set up, and that the one-year period was satisfied because the entry was through stealth and the action was filed within one year from Patrick's discovery of the dispossession.

Caguioa (Acting Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, Inting, and Lopez, JJ., concurred. Justice Inting was designated an additional member per Raffle dated January 20, 2020 in lieu of Chief Justice Diosdado M. Peralta.