Madarang vs. Spouses Morales

A petition for relief from judgment must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six months from entry of judgment, both periods being jurisdictional and inextendible; the mere allegation that counsel's negligence is excusable because of advanced age is an unwarranted stereotype that does not constitute excusable negligence, and a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief is a prerequisite to a petition for certiorari.

Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales lent ₱500,000.00 to Spouses Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome on March 23, 1993, payable within two months at 5% monthly interest, secured by a real estate mortgage over a property in Bago Bantay, Quezon City. After the Spouses Bartolome died without fully paying the loan, the Spouses Morales filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure against the heirs—Juliet Vitug Madarang (who allegedly represented herself as Lita Bartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to extend the loan), Romeo Bartolome, and Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome. The defendants contested the authenticity of the Spouses Bartolome's signatures on the deed of real estate mortgage and asserted that the complaint had previously been dismissed in another branch of the RTC of Quezon City.

On March 23, 1993, Spouses Nicanor and Luciana Bartolome borrowed ₱500,000.00 from Spouses Jesus D. Morales and Carolina N. Morales, agreeing to pay within two months at 5% monthly interest. To secure the loan, the Spouses Bartolome mortgaged their house and lot in Bago Bantay, Quezon City. The payment period lapsed without full payment, and after demand, the Spouses Bartolome only partially satisfied the obligation. The Spouses Bartolome subsequently died.

On January 9, 2001, the Spouses Morales filed a complaint for judicial foreclosure with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Juliet Vitug Madarang, Romeo Bartolome, and Spouses Rodolfo and Ruby Anne Bartolome. Madarang was sued because she allegedly represented herself as Lita Bartolome and convinced the Spouses Morales to lend money to the Spouses Bartolome. Romeo and Rodolfo Bartolome were sued as legitimate heirs of the Spouses Bartolome, and Ruby Anne Bartolome is Rodolfo's wife. In their answer, the defendants assailed the authenticity of the deed of real estate mortgage, specifically the Spouses Bartolome's signatures, and claimed the complaint was already barred because it had been dismissed in another branch of the RTC of Quezon City for failure to comply with a court order.

The RTC rendered a decision on December 22, 2009, ordering the defendants to pay the Spouses Morales ₱500,000.00 plus 7% monthly interest and costs of suit within 90 to 120 days from entry of judgment, failing which the Bago Bantay property would be sold at public auction. Defendants received the decision on January 29, 2010, through their counsel, Atty. Arturo F. Tugonon. On February 8, 2010, they filed a motion for reconsideration, later amended, together with a request for a PNP handwriting expert to examine the authenticity of the signatures. The motion and its amendment merely alleged that the decision was "contrary to law & to the defendants' evidence presented in court" without specifying which findings or conclusions were unsupported. The RTC found both motions pro forma and denied them by order dated May 25, 2010, also denying the request for a handwriting expert.

Counsel for the defendants received the May 25, 2010 order on June 24, 2010, giving defendants until July 9, 2010 to file a notice of appeal. The notice of appeal was filed only on August 11, 2010, and was denied by the RTC on August 13, 2010 for having been filed out of time. On September 24, 2010, the defendants filed a petition for relief from judgment, attributing the failure to file a timely appeal to the excusable negligence of their 80-year-old counsel. The RTC denied the petition for relief on April 27, 2011, finding it filed beyond 60 days from finality of the decision. Petitioners then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, which dismissed the petition outright on July 27, 2011 for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief. The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration on November 10, 2011, prompting the present petition.

• Excusable Negligence: Petitioners argued that their former counsel's failure to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period was a mistake and excusable negligence attributable to his being 80 years of age, and that such negligence should not be imputed to the defendants.
• Timeliness of Appeal: Petitioners contended that the trial court erred in denying their notice of appeal because they personally received a copy of the decision only on August 11, 2011, and the period to appeal should be counted from that date rather than from the date their "ailing counsel" received it.
• Exemption from Motion for Reconsideration: Petitioners maintained that they need not file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment because the questions raised were pure questions of law, citing Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals as authority.

• Pro Forma Motion: Respondents argued that the trial court did not err in declaring petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision pro forma.
• Failure to File Motion for Reconsideration: Respondents contended that the Court of Appeals did not err in denying the petition for certiorari since petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.

• Excusable Negligence: Whether the failure of petitioners' former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period constitutes excusable negligence.
• Dismissal of Certiorari: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing outright petitioners' petition for certiorari for failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment.

• Excusable Negligence: No. The failure was not excusable negligence, and the petition for relief from judgment was filed beyond the jurisdictional six-month period from entry of judgment. The mere allegation that counsel's negligence was excusable because of advanced age is an unwarranted stereotype of senior citizens.
• Dismissal of Certiorari: No. The Court of Appeals did not err. A motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law required before filing a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 65.

• Excusable Negligence: Under Section 3, Rule 38, a petition for relief from judgment must comply with two jurisdictional periods: 60 days from knowledge of the judgment and six months from entry of judgment. Both periods are inextendible and uninterruptible. The trial court erred in counting the 60-day period from finality of judgment rather than from knowledge thereof, but the petition was nevertheless time-barred under the six-month period. Petitioners' counsel received the decision on January 29, 2010; the motion for reconsideration was pro forma and did not toll the 15-day appeal period; the decision became final on February 13, 2010; and the six-month period expired on August 12, 2010. The petition for relief was filed on September 24, 2010, beyond the six-month deadline. Even assuming timeliness, the negligence was not excusable. Section 1, Rule 38 requires that the negligence be so gross that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it. The argument that counsel's 80-year-old age constituted excusable negligence stereotypes and demeans senior citizens by assuming that advanced age equates with incompetence. There was no showing that the negligence could have been prevented through ordinary diligence. Notice to counsel of record is notice to the client, so the period to appeal was correctly counted from counsel's January 29, 2010 receipt, not from the petitioners' personal receipt.

• Dismissal of Certiorari: Under Section 1, Rule 65, a petition for certiorari lies only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. A motion for reconsideration is such a remedy, as it affords the court that rendered the assailed order an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error. Petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their petition for relief from judgment before filing certiorari. Petitioners' reliance on Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals was misplaced because the questions they raised—authenticity of signatures and excusable negligence—were questions of fact, not pure questions of law. The exception to the motion-for-reconsideration requirement applies only when the issues are purely legal.

• Petition for Relief from Judgment — An equitable remedy granted only in exceptional cases, not available when other remedies such as motion for new trial or appeal exist. The petitioner must strictly comply with two jurisdictional periods: (a) 60 days from knowledge of the judgment, order, or proceeding to be set aside, and (b) six months from entry of such judgment, order, or proceeding. Both periods are inextendible, uninterruptible, and cannot be subjected to any condition or contingency. The remedy is an act of liberality by the State and an exception to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments; failure to comply with the periods is fatal.

• Excusable Negligence — To warrant relief from judgment, the negligence must be so gross that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it. The mere allegation that counsel's negligence is excusable because of advanced age is an unwarranted stereotype and does not satisfy the standard. Parties are bound by their counsel's negligence absent a showing that ordinary diligence could have prevented it.

• Notice to Counsel is Notice to Client — Notice of judgment on the counsel of record is notice to the client. The reglementary period to appeal is counted from counsel's receipt of the judgment, not from the client's personal receipt.

• Motion for Reconsideration as Prerequisite to Certiorari — A motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law contemplated by Section 1, Rule 65. It must be filed before a petition for certiorari to afford the lower court an opportunity to correct its own errors. The exception for pure questions of law does not apply when the issues involve questions of fact, such as authenticity of signatures or the existence of excusable negligence.

• "The mere allegation that there is excusable negligence simply because counsel was 80 years old is a prejudicial slur to senior citizens. It is based on an unwarranted stereotype of people in their advanced years. It is as empty as the bigotry that supports it." — This passage articulates the Court's rejection of age-based stereotyping as a ground for excusable negligence, a distinctive feature of this decision.

• "A party filing a petition for relief from judgment must strictly comply with two (2) reglementary periods: (a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside; and (b) within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding." — This passage, quoted from Gesulgon vs. NLRC, restates the canonical formulation of the double jurisdictional periods for petitions for relief from judgment.

• "Strict compliance with these periods is required because provision for a petition for relief from judgment is a final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality in order at last to put an end to litigation." — This passage explains the policy rationale for the strict jurisdictional nature of the periods under Rule 38.

• Gesulgon vs. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 90349, March 5, 1993, 219 SCRA 561 — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the canonical statement of the double jurisdictional periods under Section 3, Rule 38 and the rationale that strict compliance is required because the petition for relief is a final act of liberality by the State.

• Spouses Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 557 Phil. 241 (2007) — Followed. Cited for the proposition that the 60-day and 6-month periods are both inextendible and uninterruptible, and that strict compliance is jurisdictional.

• Progressive Development Corporation, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 566 (1999) — Distinguished. Petitioners cited this case for the proposition that a motion for reconsideration is not required before certiorari when the issues are purely questions of law. The Court distinguished it on the ground that the issues petitioners raised—authenticity of signatures and excusable negligence—were questions of fact, not pure questions of law.

• Metro Transit Organization, Inc. vs. PIGLAS NFWU-KMU, 574 Phil. 481 (2008) — Followed. Cited for the rule that a motion for reconsideration is the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law under Section 1, Rule 65, and that it is required to afford the lower court an opportunity to correct its own errors.

• Torres vs. China Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010, 610 SCRA 134 — Followed. Cited for the doctrine that notice of judgment on counsel of record is notice to the client.

• Guevarra vs. Spouses Bautista, 593 Phil. 20 (2008) — Followed. Cited for the standard that excusable negligence requires negligence so gross that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it, and that parties are bound by their counsel's negligence absent such showing.

• Section 3, Rule 38, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs the time for filing a petition for relief from judgment: within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six months after such judgment or final order was entered. The Court held that both periods are jurisdictional and inextendible, and that the petition filed on September 24, 2010 was beyond the six-month period from the February 13, 2010 entry of judgment.

• Section 1, Rule 38, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Provides the grounds for a petition for relief from judgment: fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The Court held that the negligence alleged—counsel's advanced age—did not constitute excusable negligence because it was an unwarranted stereotype and there was no showing that ordinary diligence could not have prevented the lapse.

• Section 1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Requires that no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available before a petition for certiorari may be filed. The Court held that a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the petition for relief from judgment was such a remedy, and petitioners' failure to file it justified the outright dismissal of their certiorari petition.

• Section 2, Rule 37, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs motions for reconsideration and the requirement that they specify the findings or conclusions in the judgment that are not supported by the evidence or contrary to law. The Court held that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was pro forma for failing to meet this requirement, and thus did not toll the 15-day period to appeal.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Martin S. Villarama, Jr. (designated as Acting Member per Special Order No. 1691 dated May 22, 2014), and Jose Catral Mendoza concurred.