Macutay vs. Samoy

In case of double registration of land under the Torrens system, the certificate of title earlier in date prevails, and the possessor claiming under the earlier registrant has the better right of possession in an accion publiciana; a provisional determination of ownership in such an action does not constitute a collateral attack on the later certificate of title.

The case is an offshoot of a long-running land dispute between the parties' predecessors-in-interest, Fortunato Manuud and Urbana Casasola, over parcels of land in Tumauini, Isabela. Nicasio Macutay is the registered owner of 12 hectares under OCT No. P-20478, issued in 1972, tracing his claim to his stepfather Fortunato. Respondents cultivate a three-hectare portion (the Disputed Portion) as tenants of Urbana and her son Eugenio Vehemente, who held title under OCT No. P-4319 (issued 1955) and TCT No. T-8058, respectively. The Disputed Portion is covered by both overlapping titles, giving rise to the issue of double registration.

On December 9, 1946, Urbana Casasola filed a homestead application over a 16.75-hectare parcel of land in Tumauini, Isabela. The Director of Lands approved the application on September 11, 1947, and on December 3, 1951, an order issued directing the issuance of a homestead patent in Urbana's favor. Homestead Patent No. V-41498 was issued on January 4, 1955, and transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Isabela on February 7, 1955, the same date OCT No. P-4319 was issued in Urbana's name.

On June 13, 1955, Fortunato Manuud — Nicasio Macutay's stepfather — sent a telegram to President Ramon Magsaysay protesting the issuance of the homestead patent, claiming he had been in possession of a four-hectare portion of the land since 1936, before the outbreak of the Second World War. Fortunato sent another telegram to the Presidential Complaints and Action Committee on October 24, 1955, reiterating his protest. The PCAC referred the matter to the Bureau of Lands for investigation, but on January 23, 1957, prior to the reception of evidence and upon Urbana's motion, the Director of Lands dismissed the protest for lack of a prima facie showing of fraud in the issuance of the patent. Fortunato's appeal and motion for reconsideration with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources were likewise denied on June 23, 1958 and June 20, 1959, respectively.

In the interim, both Fortunato and Urbana passed away. The homestead patent was transferred to Urbana's sole heir, Eugenio Vehemente, through TCT No. T-8058. Fortunato's heirs, represented by his surviving wife Maria Bartolome, filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of First Instance assailing the adverse orders of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The CFI dismissed the petition on June 6, 1960, but the Court of Appeals reversed on appeal and remanded the case for reception of evidence. On June 20, 1977, the CFI granted the petition and directed the reinstatement of Fortunato's protest. Despite this favorable ruling, Fortunato's heirs did not pursue the protest. Meanwhile, Fortunato's stepson, Nicasio, managed to secure OCT No. P-20478 sometime in 1972, covering 12 hectares of land in Barangay Liwanag, Tumauini, Isabela.

Thirty-four years later, on January 16, 2007, Nicasio filed a complaint captioned "Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages" before the RTC of Cabagan, Isabela, against respondents Sosima Samoy, Alfredo Granil, Rene Acorda, Noblito Samoy, and Sibirino Roque, who were in actual possession of a three-hectare northern portion of the land covered by OCT No. P-20478 (the Disputed Portion). Nicasio alleged that respondents occupied the Disputed Portion without legal right and against his will, and that they refused to surrender possession despite repeated demands. Respondents countered that the Disputed Portion was covered by Urbana's OCT No. P-4319 and later Eugenio's TCT No. T-8058, that they had been cultivating the land as tenants of Urbana and Eugenio since 1969, and that they had built significant improvements on their respective areas. They further argued that Nicasio's title was null and void because it covered land already registered under Urbana's title decades earlier, and that Lot 647 — within which the Disputed Portion falls — was shown in Urbana's name in the Tumauini Public Land Subdivision Plan Pls-964.

The RTC dismissed the complaint, recognizing that while the Disputed Portion was embraced in Nicasio's Torrens title, no evidence showed he had ever been in possession of it or acquired it through any mode recognized by the Civil Code. The RTC held that Nicasio's title served as conclusive proof of ownership only over the land in his actual possession, which excluded the Disputed Portion. The CA affirmed on the ground of laches, holding that Nicasio had slept on his rights for more than 34 years.

• Laches: Nicasio argued that the defense of laches is not available to respondents because they are mere intruders who have not shown any color of title to the Disputed Portion, and thus the CA erred in denying his appeal solely on this ground.
• Collateral Attack: Nicasio maintained that the RTC erroneously permitted a collateral attack on his Torrens title when it upheld respondents' right of possession due to his failure to substantiate his claim of ownership over the Disputed Portion.
• Imprescriptibility of Registered Land: Nicasio cited Bishop vs. Court of Appeals, arguing that owners of registered land have the imprescriptible right to eject persons illegally occupying their property, and that such right is never barred by laches.

• Right of Possession: Respondents insisted on their right to possess the Disputed Portion upon the authority of Eugenio Vehemente, relying on a private document dated February 8, 1955 purportedly executed by Eugenio, which was presented by respondent Noblito during cross-examination before the RTC.
• Nullity of Nicasio's Title: Respondents argued that Nicasio's Torrens title is null and void because it covers a portion of private land already registered under Urbana's OCT No. P-4319 decades prior, and because Lot 647, within which the Disputed Portion falls, is shown in Urbana's name in the Tumauini Public Land Subdivision Plan Pls-964.

• Validity of Title / Collateral Attack: Whether the validity of Nicasio's Torrens title may be assailed in the present case.
• Better Right of Possession: Whether Nicasio has the right to recover possession of the Disputed Portion.

• Validity of Title / Collateral Attack: No. The complaint is an accion publiciana, not an accion reivindicatoria; any determination of ownership therein is merely provisional and does not constitute a real or collateral attack on the Torrens title, since the court cannot alter, modify, or cancel a certificate of title in such a proceeding.
• Better Right of Possession: No. Respondents have the better right of possession because the Disputed Portion is covered by two overlapping titles, and under the doctrine of double registration, the earlier title — Urbana's OCT No. P-4319 (1955) — prevails over Nicasio's OCT No. P-20478 (1972).

• Validity of Title / Collateral Attack: The Court first determined the true nature of the action. Although captioned "Accion Reinvindicatoria with Damages," the RTC Complaint only prayed for recovery of possession and costs of suit — it contained no prayer for recovery of ownership or annulment of respondents' title. The allegations in both the complaint and the petition confirmed that the action was essentially an accion publiciana — a plenary action to recover the better right of possession independently of title. Drawing on Heirs of Cullado vs. Gutierrez and Supapo vs. Sps. de Jesus, the Court explained that in an accion publiciana, the issue is the better right of possession; while courts may pass upon the issue of ownership when it is inseparably linked to possession, such adjudication is merely provisional and not a final or binding determination of ownership. Because a provisional determination of ownership does not alter, modify, or cancel a certificate of title, it does not constitute a "real attack" on the Torrens title within the meaning of Section 48 of PD 1529. The issue of whether the attack is direct or collateral is therefore immaterial in an accion publiciana.

• Better Right of Possession: The Court found that the Disputed Portion was covered by two overlapping titles issued in the names of two different persons: respondents' predecessor-in-interest Urbana (OCT No. P-4319, issued February 7, 1955) and petitioner Nicasio (OCT No. P-20478, issued 1972). This situation of double registration was squarely addressed in Legarda vs. Saleeby, which held that in case land has been registered under the Torrens system in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail. Since Urbana's title was issued decades before Nicasio's, respondents' possession — anchored on the ownership of the first registrant Urbana and her transferee Eugenio — must be respected. Nicasio's attempt to evade the double registration issue by challenging respondents' proof of tenancy authority was rejected, as petitioners in actions involving real property must rely on the strength of their own title, not on the weakness of respondents' claim. The RTC had observed that Nicasio was never shown to have possessed the Disputed Portion, had not acquired it through any mode recognized by Article 712 of the Civil Code, and failed to explain how respondents managed to wrest possession from him. The Court stressed that its ruling was limited to the issue of who has the better right to possession and was not a final and binding determination of ownership; the proper action for final determination of ownership is an accion reivindicatoria that may be filed against Eugenio, the registered owner of TCT No. T-8058.

• Double Registration (Legarda Doctrine) — When land has been registered under the Torrens system in the name of two different persons, the certificate of title earlier in date shall prevail. This rule is derived from Article 1473 of the Civil Code on double sale, applied by analogy to double registration under the Land Registration Act. In this case, Urbana's OCT No. P-4319 (issued February 7, 1955) prevailed over Nicasio's OCT No. P-20478 (issued 1972), giving respondents — who claimed possession through Urbana and her transferee Eugenio — the better right of possession.

• No Collateral Attack in Accion Publiciana — A provisional determination of ownership in an accion publiciana does not constitute a collateral attack on a Torrens title because the court hearing such an action lacks the jurisdiction to alter, modify, or cancel a certificate of title, which may only be done in a direct proceeding under Section 48 of PD 1529. The resolution of ownership in an accion publiciana is allowed only to determine the issue of possession and is neither final nor binding on the issue of ownership. The distinction between direct and collateral attack is immaterial in such proceedings.

• Distinction Among Actions to Recover Real Property — (1) Accion interdictal is a summary ejectment proceeding for recovery of physical possession where dispossession has not lasted more than one year; (2) Accion publiciana is a plenary action to recover the better right of possession (possession de jure) independently of title, filed when dispossession has lasted more than one year; and (3) Accion reivindicatoria is an action for recovery of ownership, where the court can definitively rule on the validity of title. Only in an accion reivindicatoria can ownership be finally adjudicated; in an accion publiciana, any ownership ruling is provisional.

• "in case land has been registered under the Land Registration Act in the name of two different persons, the earlier in date shall prevail." — This is the canonical formulation of the double registration rule from Legarda vs. Saleeby (1915), applied here to resolve the conflict between OCT No. P-4319 (1955) and OCT No. P-20478 (1972), and frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on overlapping Torrens titles.

• "the Court thus clarifies here that in an accion publiciana, the defense of ownership (i.e., that the defendant, and not the plaintiff, is the rightful owner) will not trigger a collateral attack on the plaintiff's Torrens or certificate of title because the resolution of the issue of ownership is done only to determine the issue of possession." — This passage from Heirs of Cullado vs. Gutierrez, quoted and applied in the decision, articulates the ratio decidendi on why a provisional ownership determination in an accion publiciana does not violate Section 48 of PD 1529.

• "our ruling in this case is limited only to the issue of determining who between the parties has a better right to possession. This adjudication is not a final and binding determination of the issue of ownership. As such, this is not a bar for the parties or even third persons to file an action for the determination of the issue of ownership." — This closing remark from Supapo vs. Sps. de Jesus, reiterated in Heirs of Cullado and again in this decision, defines the provisional and non-binding nature of ownership rulings in accion publiciana proceedings.

• Heirs of Cullado vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 212938, July 30, 2019 — Controlling precedent followed extensively. The Court relied on this En Banc decision to distinguish accion interdictal, accion publiciana, and accion reivindicatoria, and to establish that a provisional determination of ownership in an accion publiciana does not constitute a collateral attack on a Torrens title.

• Supapo vs. Sps. de Jesus, 758 Phil. 444 (2015) — Followed. The Court adopted its holding that in an accion publiciana, courts may pass upon the issue of ownership to determine who has the right to possess, but such adjudication is merely provisional and not a bar to a subsequent action on ownership.

• Legarda vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil. 590 (1915) — Controlling precedent on double registration. The Court applied its rule that where land is registered under the Torrens system in the name of two different persons, the earlier title prevails.

• Bishop vs. Court of Appeals, 284-A Phil. 125 (1992) — Cited by petitioner for the proposition that the right of registered landowners to eject illegal occupants is imprescriptible and never barred by laches. The Court effectively overcame this argument by finding a situation of double registration, which placed the case outside the scenario of mere squatters occupying registered land.

• Section 48, Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) — Provides that a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack and cannot be altered, modified, or cancelled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law. The Court applied this provision to explain why a provisional ownership determination in an accion publiciana does not constitute a collateral attack: the court in such a proceeding simply lacks the power to alter, modify, or cancel the title.

• Article 712, Civil Code — Defines the modes of acquiring ownership: by law, by donation, by testate and intestate succession, by tradition pursuant to certain contracts, and by prescription. The RTC found, and the Supreme Court agreed, that Nicasio failed to show he acquired the Disputed Portion through any of these modes.

• Article 428(2), Civil Code — Recognizes the jus vindicandi, the owner's right of action against the holder and possessor to recover the thing. This provision was discussed in the context of accion reivindicatoria, distinguishing it from accion publiciana.

• Article 1473, Civil Code — Provides that when one piece of real property has been sold to two different persons, it shall belong to the person acquiring it who first inscribes it in the registry. The Court in Legarda applied this rule by analogy to double registration under the Torrens system, holding that the earlier title prevails.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson), Carandang, Zalameda, and Gaerlan, JJ., concurred.