Macias vs. del Rosario

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of a deceased person's estate exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, and a subsequently filed separate proceeding for the probate of the same decedent's will in another court must be dismissed even if the first proceeding was originally intestate and a conversion to testate had not yet been ordered, because the conversion from intestate to testate is entirely a matter of form within the sound discretion of the probate court.

Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, a non-resident alien, died on September 14, 1965 in San Francisco, California, leaving a will executed under the laws of the State of New York and codicils executed under the laws of the State of California. The will named Wells Fargo Bank as sole executor and the University of Michigan as residuary beneficiary. The will and codicils were duly probated by the Superior Court of the State of California on October 11, 1965. Wells Fargo Bank, as designated executor, appointed several Manila lawyers as its attorneys-in-fact with authority to file ancillary administration proceedings in the Philippines and to act as administrators of the estate. Atty. Manuel Y. Macias, an experienced lawyer and former assistant in the law firm of Rosina's brother Julian Wolfson, initially represented Ricardo Vito Cruz, Rosina's former accountant, in seeking administration of the Philippine estate.

Rosina Marguerite Wolfson died on September 14, 1965 in San Francisco, California. She left a will executed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York and codicils executed in accordance with the laws of the State of California, naming Wells Fargo Bank as sole executor and the University of Michigan as residuary beneficiary. On October 11, 1965, the Superior Court of the State of California duly probated the will and codicils. Wells Fargo Bank, as the designated executor, executed a notarized and authenticated document on November 10, 1965 appointing several Manila lawyers — James M. Ross, Ewald Selph, Rafael D. Salcedo, Arturo del Rosario, Jesus Bito, Joaquin L. Misa, and Mariano Lozada — as its attorneys-in-fact, with authority to file ancillary administration proceedings for Rosina's estate in the Philippines and to act as administrators thereof.

On January 10, 1966, Atty. Manuel Y. Macias, unaware that Rosina had died testate, filed on behalf of Ricardo Vito Cruz a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Rosina's Philippine estate, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 63866 and assigned to Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by Judge Manuel P. Barcelona. Cruz was appointed special administrator, qualified, and assumed his duties. Upon discovery of the will and codicils, Atty. Arturo del Rosario, acting pursuant to his appointment as attorney-in-fact of Wells Fargo Bank, filed on August 13, 1966 a petition in Sp. Proc. No. 63866 praying that the intestate proceedings be converted into a testate proceeding for the probate of Rosina's will and codicils.

On October 25, 1966, Macias, acting in his own behalf and without informing his former client Cruz, filed a separate and independent petition for the probate of the same will and codicils, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 67302 and assigned to Branch VI, presided over by Judge Gaudencio Cloribel. Macias alleged a legal interest in Rosina's estate and prayed for his own appointment as special administrator. Judge Cloribel set the petition for hearing and appointed Macias special administrator, issuing letters of special administration on November 12, 1966. Both del Rosario and Cruz opposed the petition, invoking Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court on the ground that the estate was already the subject of Sp. Proc. No. 63866 before Branch VIII, where a petition for conversion from intestate to testate was pending. Macias countered that his interest in the estate justified his intervention, that the Wells Fargo Bank's appointment as executor did not extend ex proprio vigore to the Philippines, and that an intestate proceeding was not a probate proceeding.

After Judge Cloribel ordered the transfer of Sp. Proc. No. 67302 to Branch VIII, Judge Barcelona allowed the consolidation on February 11, 1967. On February 20, 1967, Judge Barcelona dismissed Sp. Proc. No. 67302, reasoning that the filing violated the rule against multiplicity of suits, that both proceedings involved the same estate, and that the conversion of Sp. Proc. No. 63866 from intestate to testate was merely a matter of form. Macias's motion for reconsideration was denied on April 22, 1967, the trial court noting that Macias had already participated in Sp. Proc. No. 63866 by presenting evidence supporting the probate of the will and by opposing Cruz's appointment as regular administrator while proposing his own. Macias appealed.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction Inapplicable: Macias maintained that Sp. Proc. No. 63866, being an intestate proceeding, was not a probate proceeding, and therefore Section 1, Rule 73 did not bar his separate probate petition in Sp. Proc. No. 67302.
• Legal Interest: Macias argued that it was sufficient for a person to have an interest in the will or in the property, either as executor or otherwise, to justify intervention in probate proceedings, citing Section 1 of Rule 76 and Santos vs. Castillo.
• Foreign Executor's Authority: Macias contended that the appointment of Wells Fargo Bank as executor by the California Superior Court did not extend ex proprio vigore to the Philippines, and thus the Bank had nothing to do with the local proceedings; he sought his own appointment as regular, not ancillary, administrator based on his interest in the estate.
• Impossibility of Dismissal After Consolidation: Macias insisted that after the trial court ordered the consolidation of the two proceedings, it had no authority to dismiss Sp. Proc. No. 67302 and should instead hear both cases jointly.
• Implementation of the Will: Macias argued that dismissal or consolidation would frustrate the implementation of Rosina's will, particularly her desire to provide a memorial in Manila for her parents and to assist her former Filipino dependents.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction: Cruz argued that under Section 1, Rule 73, the estate was already the subject of Sp. Proc. No. 63866 before Branch VIII, which had first taken cognizance, and that all questions concerning the settlement should be filed there.
• Pending Conversion Petition: Cruz pointed out that del Rosario had already filed on August 13, 1966 a petition to convert Sp. Proc. No. 63866 from intestate to testate, which was pending resolution before Macias filed his separate petition.
• Multiplicity of Suits: Cruz contended that two proceedings over the same estate would complicate matters, delay closure, and violate the prohibition against multiplicity of suits.
• Concealment: Cruz alleged that Macias concealed from the presiding judge of Branch VI the existence of Sp. Proc. No. 63866 and the pending petition for conversion filed by del Rosario.
• Del Rosario's Opposition: Del Rosario opposed Macias's petition on the ground that the estate was already subject of Sp. Proc. No. 63866, where the petition for conversion had been filed and was pending.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction: Whether the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of a decedent's estate, originally as an intestate proceeding, exercises exclusive jurisdiction over all questions concerning the estate, including the probate of a subsequently discovered will.
• Dismissal After Consolidation: Whether a trial court that ordered the consolidation of two estate proceedings may thereafter dismiss one of them, or whether consolidation precludes dismissal and mandates joint hearing.
• Conversion from Intestate to Testate: Whether the conversion of an intestate proceeding into a testate one requires the filing of a separate probate petition or may be accomplished within the original proceeding.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction: Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, and this rule applies equally to testate and intestate proceedings.
• Dismissal After Consolidation: Yes. A trial court is not precluded from dismissing one case after ordering consolidation, as motions for consolidation are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and under Section 1, Rule 31, the court may make such orders as tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.
• Conversion from Intestate to Testate: No separate petition is required. The conversion of an intestate proceeding into a testate one is entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court, requiring only a change in the title of the proceedings.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction: Section 1, Rule 73 provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts." The salutary purpose of this rule is to prevent confusion and delay, and it is inserted not for the benefit of the parties but in the public interest for the better administration of justice. Consequently, every challenge to the validity of the will, any objection to its authentication, and every demand or claim by any heir, legatee, or party in interest must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings. Sp. Proc. No. 63866 was first instituted on January 10, 1966 in Branch VIII, and the petition for conversion to testate was filed by del Rosario on August 13, 1966 — over two months before Macias filed his separate petition on October 25, 1966. The rule applies equally to testate and intestate proceedings because Section 1, Rule 73 speaks of "settlement of the estates of the deceased" without distinction. Macias's argument that an intestate proceeding is not a probate proceeding was thus unavailing.
• Dismissal After Consolidation: While consolidation and joint hearing of two cases would generally be proper, estate settlement is governed by the special provision of Section 1, Rule 73, whose specific command must be obeyed. Motions for consolidation are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and no grave abuse of discretion was found in the trial judge's reconsideration of the prior consolidation order and dismissal of Sp. Proc. No. 67302. Under Section 1, Rule 31, after ordering consolidation, the court "may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." The trial court correctly held that dismissal was necessary to prevent multiplicity of suits, as both proceedings involved the same estate, the same special administrator had been appointed, and the hearing on the allowance of the will had already been terminated in Sp. Proc. No. 63866 with Macias's participation.
• Conversion from Intestate to Testate: The conversion of an intestate proceeding into a testate one is "entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court," citing Reynoso vs. Santiago. If the will and codicils are allowed to probate, all that is needed is to change the title of the proceedings from intestate to testate. Macias had already participated in Sp. Proc. No. 63866 by presenting evidence supporting the probate of the will and by opposing Cruz's appointment as regular administrator while proposing his own. There was thus no reason to proceed with a separate proceeding; if Macias sought appointment as regular administrator, he could do so — and in fact had already done so — within Sp. Proc. No. 63866.

• Exclusive Jurisdiction in Estate Settlement — Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The rule applies equally to testate and intestate proceedings. Its purpose is to prevent confusion and delay, and it is inserted in the law not for the benefit of the parties but in the public interest for the better administration of justice. The parties have no control over it. Consequently, every challenge to the validity of the will, any objection to its authentication, every demand or claim by any heir, legatee, or party in interest must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate should take cognizance of all such questions.
• Conversion of Intestate to Testate Proceedings — The conversion of an intestate proceeding into a testate one is entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court. If the will is allowed to probate, all that is required is to change the title of the proceedings from intestate to testate; no separate probate petition need be filed.
• Multiplicity of Suits in Estate Proceedings — The filing of a separate proceeding for the probate of a will when estate settlement proceedings are already pending in another court violates the basic rule against multiplicity of suits. A court is never deprived of its power to dismiss a case pending before it if the subject matter is the same as that of another case also pending before it.
• Court's Discretion After Consolidation — Under Section 1, Rule 31, after ordering consolidation, the court may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay. A trial court is not precluded from dismissing one case after ordering consolidation, particularly where a special provision of the Rules (Section 1, Rule 73) governs the subject matter and its specific command must be obeyed.

• "Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, 'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.'" — This is the Court's restatement of the controlling rule on exclusive jurisdiction in estate settlement, reiterated from its contemporaneous ruling in Macias vs. Uy Kim, and applied to affirm the dismissal of the duplicate proceeding.
• "the salutary purpose of the rule is to prevent confusion and delay. It is not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties litigant but in the public interest for the better administration of justice, for which reason the parties have no control over it." — This passage articulates the doctrinal rationale for the exclusivity rule, emphasizing its public-interest character and the parties' inability to waive or control it.
• "Section 1 of Rule 73, speaking as it does of 'settlement of the estates of the deceased,' applies equally to both testate and intestate proceedings. And the conversion of an intestate proceedings into a testate one is 'entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court.'" — This resolves the petitioner's argument that an intestate proceeding is not a probate proceeding, establishing that the exclusivity rule makes no distinction between the two.
• "It needs no elaboration that a court can never be deprived of its power to dismiss a case pending before it if the subject-matter of such case is the same as the subject-matter of another case also pending before it." — Quoted from the trial court's order, this passage states the principle that a court retains the power to dismiss a duplicate proceeding even after ordering consolidation.

• Macias vs. Uy Kim, et al., G.R. No. L-31174 (May 30, 1972) — Controlling precedent reiterated in the decision, restating the rule on exclusive jurisdiction under Section 1, Rule 73 in the context of the same estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson.
• Serrano, et al. vs. Chanvo, et al., 5 Phil. 431 — Cited for the proposition that the exclusivity rule serves the public interest and is not for the benefit of the parties, who have no control over it.
• Benedicto, etc. vs. Javellana, 10 Phil. 197 — Cited for the principle that all questions concerning estate settlement — challenges to the will, objections to authentication, demands by heirs or legatees — must be decided within the same special proceedings.
• Maningat vs. Castillo, 75 Phil. 532 — Cited for the definition of the main function of a probate court: to settle and liquidate estates, determine heirs, and adjudicate their respective shares.
• Reynoso vs. Santiago, 85 Phil. 268 — Cited for the doctrine that the conversion of an intestate proceeding into a testate one is entirely a matter of form within the sound discretion of the court.
• Palanca vs. Querubin, 30 SCRA 738 (Nov. 29, 1969) — Cited for the principle that motions for consolidation are addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and that grave abuse of discretion must be shown to warrant supervisory intervention.
• Santos vs. Castillo, G.R. No. L-4563 (March 18, 1937) — Cited by the petitioner for the proposition that a person with interest in the will or property may intervene in probate proceedings; the Court did not dispute this principle but found it inapplicable to justify a separate proceeding.

• Section 1, Rule 73, Rules of Court — Provides that the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Applied as the controlling rule to require that all questions concerning Rosina's estate be filed and resolved in Sp. Proc. No. 63866 before Branch VIII, which first took cognizance.
• Section 1, Rule 76, Rules of Court — Cited by Macias for the proposition that a person with interest in the will or property may justify intervention in probate proceedings. The Court did not dispute the provision's applicability but held that intervention should be sought in the original proceeding, not through a separate petition.
• Section 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court — Cited by Macias in opposing del Rosario's appointment as ancillary administrator on the ground of lack of legal interest. The Court's disposition did not directly rule on this provision, focusing instead on the jurisdictional issue.
• Section 1, Rule 31, Rules of Court — Provides that after ordering consolidation, the court "may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." Applied to sustain the trial court's authority to dismiss Sp. Proc. No. 67302 even after ordering its consolidation with Sp. Proc. No. 63866.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, and Antonio, JJ., concurred.