Macias vs. Commission on Elections

The Court held that Republic Act No. 3040 is unconstitutional and void where it violated the constitutional requirement that the 120 Members of the House of Representatives "be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants," because the apportionment resulted in grossly disproportionate representation (e.g., Cebu with fewer inhabitants than Rizal was allotted seven representatives while Rizal received only four; Manila with fewer inhabitants than Cotabato received four while Cotabato received three), rendering the law arbitrary, capricious, and contrary to the vital principle of equality of representation that lies at the foundation of republican institutions.

In 1960, the Director of the Census submitted a preliminary population report to the President based on the census enumeration. Relying on this report, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 3040 on May 10, 1961, reapportioning the 120 seats in the House of Representatives among the several provinces. The law allegedly created severe disparities by allotting more representative districts to provinces with smaller populations while assigning fewer districts to provinces with larger populations, effectively diluting the voting power of citizens in the latter provinces.

• Petitioners are four members of the House of Representatives (from Negros Oriental, Misamis Oriental, and Bulacan) and the provincial governor of Negros Oriental, suing on behalf of themselves and other residents of their provinces.
• Republic Act No. 3040 was enacted on May 10, 1961, purportedly based on a preliminary census report submitted by the Director of the Census on November 23, 1960, which stated that the figures "should be considered as official for all purposes" despite being preliminary and subject to revision.
• The law apportioned 120 House seats, creating specific disparities where provinces with larger populations received fewer representatives than provinces with smaller populations:
  • Cebu was allotted seven members while Rizal, with a bigger population, received only four.
  • Manila received four members while Cotabato, with a bigger population, received only three.
  • Pangasinan, with fewer inhabitants than both Manila and Cotabato, received five members.
  • Samar (871,857 inhabitants) was allotted four members while Davao (903,224 inhabitants) received three.
  • Bulacan (557,691 inhabitants) and Negros Oriental (598,783 inhabitants) received two districts each, while Albay (515,961 inhabitants) received three.
  • Misamis Oriental (387,839 inhabitants) received one district while Cavite (379,902 inhabitants) received two.
  • Mountain Province received three districts while Isabela, Laguna, and Cagayan, with more inhabitants, received two each.
  • Capiz, La Union, and Ilocos Norte received two districts each while Sulu, with more inhabitants, received one.
  • Leyte (967,323 inhabitants) received four districts while Iloilo (966,145 inhabitants) received five.

• Petitioners maintained that Republic Act No. 3040 is unconstitutional and void because: (a) it was passed by the House of Representatives without printed final copies of the bill having been furnished to Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, in violation of the Constitution; (b) it was approved more than three years after the return of the last census of population; and (c) it apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants, violating the constitutional mandate for proportional representation.
• Petitioners argued that they possess legal personality to sue because, as voters and as representatives of provinces deprived of adequate representation, they are deprived of the full and effective elective franchise guaranteed by the Constitution.
• Petitioners contended that the preliminary census report could not legally serve as the basis for apportionment because it was expressly subject to revision and had not been finalized.

• Respondent National Treasurer contended that petitioners lack legal personality to bring the action.
• Respondents argued that the enrolled bill rule creates a conclusive presumption that Republic Act No. 3040 was passed in accordance with all constitutional requirements, including the distribution of printed copies, and that certificates from the House Secretary are inadmissible to prove procedural irregularities.
• Respondents maintained that the preliminary census report of November 23, 1960 constituted the "return of every enumeration" required by the Constitution, citing the Director of Census's statement that the figures were "official for all purposes."
• Respondents argued that the ascertainment of what constitutes a return of an enumeration is a matter for legislative determination.
• Respondents asserted that apportionment is a political question non-justiciable by the courts, and that even if justiciable, the Court should exercise judicial statesmanship to sustain the statute because it improves existing conditions.

• Procedural:
  • Whether petitioners possess legal standing to challenge the constitutionality of an apportionment statute.
  • Whether the enrolled bill rule bars judicial inquiry into compliance with the constitutional requirement that bills be printed and distributed three days prior to passage.
• Substantive:
  • Whether Republic Act No. 3040 violates the constitutional provision requiring that representation be apportioned among provinces according to the number of their respective inhabitants.
  • Whether the use of a preliminary census report as the basis for apportionment violates the constitutional requirement that apportionment be made within three years after the return of every enumeration.
  • Whether the constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act presents a political question beyond judicial review.

• Procedural:
  • The Court held that petitioners, as voters and as congressmen and governor of provinces allegedly discriminated against by receiving fewer representative districts than their populations warranted, possess sufficient interest and legal personality to maintain the action. Citizens deprived of the full and effective elective franchise guaranteed by the Constitution by an unconstitutional apportionment act have standing to test the statute in court.
  • The Court reserved decision on the enrolled bill theory and the three-day printed bill requirement, finding that the controversy could be resolved upon the issue of proportional apportionment without definitively ruling on whether the enrolled bill rule creates a conclusive presumption barring inquiry into legislative procedure.
• Substantive:
  • The Court held that Republic Act No. 3040 is unconstitutional and void for violating the constitutional mandate that representation be apportioned among provinces according to the number of their respective inhabitants. The specific disparities demonstrated (wherein provinces with larger populations received fewer representatives than provinces with smaller populations) constituted gross inequality that could not be deemed an approximation to equality, rendering the law arbitrary and capricious.
  • The Court rejected the political question doctrine, holding that the constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question subject to review by the courts, notwithstanding that the statute is an exercise of political power. The mere impact of the suit upon the political situation does not render the question political instead of judicial.
  • The Court noted that the issue regarding the preliminary census report did not clearly favor petitioners, citing authorities sustaining the view that governmental action may be based upon preliminary census figures even in matters of apportionment, but found it unnecessary to definitively resolve this issue given the clear violation of the proportional representation requirement.
  • The Court held that the alleged circumstance that the statute improves existing conditions constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means.

• Standing of Voters to Challenge Apportionment — Citizens who are deprived of as full and effective an elective franchise as they are entitled to under the Constitution by an apportionment act have sufficient interest to proceed in court to test the statute. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioners, as voters and representatives of under-represented provinces, had standing to challenge the law.
• Equality of Representation/Proportional Representation — Representation in the legislature must be apportioned according to population to ensure republican government. The Court held that gross deviations from population-based apportionment (where provinces with larger populations receive fewer representatives than those with smaller populations) violate the constitutional standard "as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants" and render the apportionment law void.
• Political Question Doctrine (Judicial Review of Apportionment) — While apportionment involves the exercise of political power, its constitutionality is a judicial question subject to review by courts. The Court held that the mere fact that an action affects the political situation or has political effects does not make the questions involved political instead of judicial; courts may inquire into the constitutionality of apportionment acts when properly brought before them.
• Enrolled Bill Rule — While the Court acknowledged the enrolled bill theory (that the certification of a bill by presiding officers creates a conclusive presumption of proper enactment), it reserved decision on whether this rule bars inquiry into the constitutional requirement for printed bills, noting that such requirement serves the fundamental purpose of preventing fraud, trickery, deceit, and subterfuge in the enactment of bills.

• "Equality of representation lies at the foundation of representative government."
• "It is not an approximation to equality to allot three representatives to 7,946 voters, and only two representatives to 8,618 voters, and to allot two representatives to 4,854 voters, and one representative to 5,596 voters." — Cited with approval from Massachusetts authority to illustrate gross inequality.
• "The constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question, and not one which the court cannot consider on the ground that it is a political question."
• "The alleged circumstance that this statute improves the present set-up constitutes no excuse for approving a transgression of constitutional limitations, because the end does not justify the means."
• "Whenever this kind of inequality of apportionment has been before the courts, it has been held to be contrary to the Constitution. It has been said to be 'arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of equality.'"

• Stiglitz v. Schardien — Cited as authority upholding the right of a citizen to question the validity of a redistricting statute where twelve districts entitled to six representatives were given twelve, and twelve districts entitled to twenty-two were given twelve.
• Jones v. Freeman — Cited for the recognition that each citizen has the right to have the State apportioned in accordance with the Constitution and to be governed by a Legislature fairly representing the whole body of the electorate.
• Colegrove v. Green — Distinguished as inconclusive (three justices against three, with the seventh concurring in the result) and not controlling on the issue of justiciability of apportionment.
• Parker v. State ex rel. Powell — Cited for the principle that the constitutionality of a legislative apportionment act is a judicial question.
• Denney v. State — Cited for the principle that an unconstitutional apportionment law may be declared void by the courts notwithstanding that such statute is an exercise of political power.
• Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Commissioners — Cited for the principle that gross inequality in apportionment violates constitutional requirements of equality.

• 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 5 — Mandates that the 120 Members of the House of Representatives "shall be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants."
• 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 6 — Requires Congress to make an apportionment "within three years after the return of every enumeration."
• 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Section 19(3) — Provides that "no bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its immediate enactment."
• Act No. 190, Section 313(2) — Cited by respondents regarding the conclusive presumption of due enactment created by the certification of acts by presiding officers.