Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Where an appeal from an RTC decision in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raises only questions of law, the appeal must be brought directly to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not by ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals; the Court of Appeals commits grave abuse of discretion in denying a motion to dismiss such an appeal.

Petitioners Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation hold possessory rights over mining claims in Tuba and Itogon, Benguet, which rights were confirmed by the Supreme Court in Poe Mining Association vs. Garcia (202 SCRA 222, 1991). Respondent Philex Mining Corporation, as operator of the Nevada mining claims, had constructed improvements — roads, a motorpool facility, a tailings dam, and bunkhouses — on the surface of the 21.9 hectares subject of petitioners' mining claims. Section 59 of Presidential Decree No. 463 grants mining claim owners or lessees the auxiliary right to institute eminent domain proceedings when another claim owner refuses to grant the right to build, construct, or install facilities necessary for mining operations.

On October 16, 1992, respondent Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili Gold Mining and Development Co., Inc. and Omico Mining and Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet, docketed as Civil Case No. 92-CV-0727. Philex sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of petitioners' mining areas — where their "Macawiwili claims" are located — pursuant to §59 of Presidential Decree No. 463, which grants a claim owner or lessee the right to prosecute an action for eminent domain when another claim owner refuses to grant the right to build, construct, or install facilities necessary for mining operations. Philex likewise moved for a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioners from ejecting it from the mining areas sought to be expropriated.

The dispute had its roots in a prior Supreme Court decision, Poe Mining Association vs. Garcia (202 SCRA 222, October 2, 1991), which upheld the possessory rights of Macawiwili and Omico over their mining claims in Tuba and Itogon, Benguet, as against Poe Mining Association and Philex Mining as operator. On the surface of the 21.9 hectares awarded to petitioners, Philex had constructed improvements consisting of a network of roads (built circa 1958), a motorpool facility (built 1963), a tailings dam, and three two-storey concrete bunkhouses. The DENR-Cordillera Administrative Region was poised to order the removal of these improvements and to hand possession to petitioners. Philex, while admitting petitioners' possessory rights, asserted that the improvements were vital to its mining operations, particularly its Nevada claims, and sought expropriation to retain them.

On November 11, 1992, the RTC issued a temporary restraining order but denied the application for a preliminary injunction. On February 18, 1993, acting on petitioners' motion, the trial court dismissed the complaint. The RTC held that the Supreme Court had already adjudged the land in favor of petitioners, that allowing expropriation would be a patent defiance of that decision and constitute forum-shopping, that the right to expropriate under §59 of P.D. No. 463 was merely an auxiliary right to be construed strictly, that one mining company could not expropriate land belonging to another mining company, and that surface rights could not be segregated from subsurface mineral rights. Philex moved for reconsideration, which was denied, and then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On February 16, 1994, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal before the Court of Appeals, arguing that only questions of law were involved and the appeal should therefore be brought directly to the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals denied this motion on April 12, 1994. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court.

• Mode of Appeal: Petitioners contended that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in denying their motion to dismiss Philex's appeal, because the appeal raised only questions of law — specifically, whether Philex had the right to expropriate petitioners' mining areas under §59 of P.D. No. 463 — and should therefore have been brought directly to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, not by ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals.
• Exhaustion of Remedies Not Required: Petitioners argued that filing a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals was not a prerequisite to the certiorari petition, as the same questions had already been raised, argued, and submitted for resolution in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal before that tribunal, rendering a motion for reconsideration a futile exercise.

• Dismissal for Failure to File Motion for Reconsideration: Respondent Philex Mining sought dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioners should have filed a motion for reconsideration to give the Court of Appeals an opportunity to correct itself.
• Factual Issues Involved: Philex maintained that the issues raised in its appeal were factual in nature and therefore the Court of Appeals was the proper forum.
• Right to Expropriate: Philex argued that §59, in relation to §53 of P.D. No. 463, expressly granted it the right to expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by other persons, and that this power was not inferior to the possessory rights of other claim owners.
• Expropriation Between Mining Companies: Philex contended there was nothing absurd in allowing a mining company to expropriate land belonging to another mining company, citing Benguet Consolidated, Inc. vs. Republic, and that a general grant of eminent domain power merely allowed the court to inquire into the necessity of expropriation.
• No Forum-Shopping: Philex asserted it was not guilty of forum-shopping because it sought to expropriate as operator of the Nevada mining claims, not the Poe mining claims involved in the prior Supreme Court decision.
• Surface and Subsurface Rights: Philex argued that expropriation would not divide the surface from the subsurface because it sought to expropriate all rights that petitioners and the Pigoro heirs had over the 21.9-hectare area.
• Alternative Cause of Action: Philex contended that the trial court erred in disregarding its alternative cause of action, arguing that an alternative statement in a pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by the insufficiency of other alternative statements.

• Exhaustion of Remedies: Whether petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals before filing the petition for certiorari is fatal to the petition.
• Nature of the Appeal: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss Philex's appeal, i.e., whether the issues raised by Philex in its appeal were questions of law, questions of fact, or mixed questions of fact and law.

• Exhaustion of Remedies: No. Petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration was not fatal because the same questions had already been squarely raised, argued, and passed upon by the Court of Appeals in the motion to dismiss appeal, rendering a motion for reconsideration a mere repetition of arguments.
• Nature of the Appeal: Yes. The Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion. The issues raised by Philex in its appeal were purely questions of law, as their resolution did not require examination of the probative value of evidence but only a determination of what the law provided on a given state of facts; such questions should have been raised directly before the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

• Exhaustion of Remedies: The general rule requires that a motion for reconsideration be filed before the tribunal whose act is challenged in certiorari, to afford it an opportunity to correct its errors. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as recognized in Pajo vs. Ago and Ortiz (108 Phil. 905, 1960), Locsin vs. Climaco (26 SCRA 816, 1969), and Central Bank vs. Cloribel (44 SCRA 307, 1972): where the issue raised is purely of law, where public interest is involved, where there is urgency, and where the same questions have already been raised and passed upon by the lower court. The issues petitioners raised in their certiorari petition were substantially the same as those asserted in their Motion to Dismiss Appeal before the Court of Appeals. Filing a motion for reconsideration would simply repeat arguments already submitted; the rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does not call for an exercise in futility.

• Nature of the Appeal: Under Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 and Rule 41, §2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from RTC judgments in the exercise of original jurisdiction must be brought to the Court of Appeals where questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law are raised, by notice of appeal; but where only questions of law are raised, the appeal must be brought directly to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. A question of law is one where the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, without examination of the probative value of evidence; a question of fact arises when the doubt concerns the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. Philex's assignment of errors before the Court of Appeals — whether it had the right to expropriate under §59 of P.D. No. 463, whether one mining company may expropriate another's land, whether the suit constituted forum-shopping, whether expropriation would divide surface from subsurface rights, and whether the trial court erred in disregarding an alternative cause of action — all required only a determination of what the law provided on the given state of facts, not an examination of the probative weight of evidence. These were purely questions of law properly cognizable by the Supreme Court via Rule 45. The Court of Appeals therefore committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the appeal.

• Distinction Between Questions of Law and Questions of Fact — A question of law arises when the doubt or difference concerns what the law is on a certain state of facts; a question of fact arises when the doubt concerns the truth or falsehood of alleged facts. A question of law does not involve examination of the probative value of evidence presented by the parties. The Court applied this distinction to Philex's assignment of errors, concluding that all five issues raised were questions of law because they required only a determination of the legal provisions applicable to an undisputed state of facts.

• Modes of Appeal from RTC Judgments — From RTC judgments in the exercise of original jurisdiction: (a) where questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law are raised, appeal is to the Court of Appeals by notice of appeal; (b) where only questions of law are raised, appeal is directly to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. From RTC judgments in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, all appeals go to the Court of Appeals by petition for review under Rule 42, regardless of whether the questions are of fact, law, or mixed.

• Exception to the Motion for Reconsideration Requirement in Certiorari — As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration must be filed before the tribunal whose act is challenged in certiorari. Exceptions exist where: (1) the issue raised is purely of law; (2) public interest is involved; (3) there is urgency; or (4) the same questions have already been raised, argued, and passed upon by the lower court, so that a motion for reconsideration would serve no practical purpose. The rule does not call for an exercise in futility.

• "[T]here is a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts." — This passage articulates the canonical distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, which was dispositive in determining the proper mode of appeal and formed the ratio decidendi of the case.

• "These are legal questions whose resolution does not require an examination of the probative weight of the evidence presented by the parties but a determination of what the law is on the given state of facts. These issues raise questions of law which should be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with this Court." — This passage applies the law-fact distinction to Philex's assignment of errors and states the Court's conclusion that the appeal was improperly brought to the Court of Appeals.

• "The rule requiring exhaustion of remedies does not call for an exercise in futility." — This formulation, drawn from Central Bank vs. Cloribel, encapsulates the exception to the motion for reconsideration requirement in certiorari proceedings and was applied to excuse petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration before the Court of Appeals.

• Pajo vs. Ago and Ortiz, 108 Phil. 905 (1960) — Followed for the proposition that when the questions raised in certiorari are the same as those already raised and passed upon by the lower court, a motion for reconsideration is not a prerequisite to filing the petition.
• Locsin vs. Climaco, 26 SCRA 816 (1969) — Followed for the rule that when a definite question has been properly raised, argued, and decided by the lower court, a motion for reconsideration is no longer necessary before filing certiorari.
• Central Bank vs. Cloribel, 44 SCRA 307 (1972) — Followed for the enumerated exceptions to the motion for reconsideration requirement, including purely legal questions, public interest, and urgency, and for the principle that exhaustion of remedies does not require futility.
• Poe Mining Association vs. Garcia, 202 SCRA 222 (1991) — Referenced as the prior Supreme Court decision that adjudged the possessory rights over the disputed mining claims in favor of petitioners, which the RTC held could not be circumvented through expropriation.
• Benguet Consolidated, Inc. vs. Republic, 143 SCRA 466 (1986) — Cited by respondent Philex for the proposition that land covered by mining claims may be the subject of expropriation; the Court did not rule on this citation's applicability but noted it as part of Philex's arguments.
• Medina vs. Asistio, Jr., 191 SCRA 218 (1990) — Cited for the distinction between questions of law and questions of fact, quoting Ramos vs. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the P.I.

• Section 59, Presidential Decree No. 463 (Mineral Resources Decree) — Grants a claim owner or lessee the right to prosecute an action for eminent domain when another claim owner or occupant refuses to grant the right to build, construct, or install facilities necessary for mining operations. The trial court characterized this as an "auxiliary mining right" found under Chapter XI of the decree, not an absolute right. The Supreme Court's analysis treated the scope and proper construction of this provision as a question of law.
• Rule 41, §2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Distinguishes the modes of appeal from RTC judgments: ordinary appeal to the Court of Appeals for questions of fact or mixed questions; petition for review under Rule 42 for RTC appellate jurisdiction cases; and appeal by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 for purely questions of law. Applied to determine that Philex's appeal, raising only questions of law from an RTC decision in its original jurisdiction, should have been filed directly with the Supreme Court.
• Rule 65, §1, 1964 and 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Governs petitions for certiorari when a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Applied to the petition at bar, with the 1997 modifications noted (addition of "quasi-judicial functions" and "amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction").
• Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90, §4(c) — Provides that if an appeal under Rule 41 from the RTC to the Court of Appeals raises only questions of law, the appeal shall be dismissed. Applied as the procedural basis for petitioners' motion to dismiss Philex's appeal.
• Article 437, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that the owner of land has rights not only to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above to a reasonable height. Cited by the trial court in its ruling that surface rights cannot be segregated from subsurface mineral rights.

Regalado, Melo, Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concurred.