Macasiray vs. People

Objection to documentary evidence must be raised at the time of formal offer; failure to object when a document is merely marked and identified does not constitute a waiver. An accused who testifies to deny the contents of a previously excluded uncounselled confession does not thereby adopt it as evidence or waive the constitutional objection.

On February 9, 1986, Johnny Villanueva was killed. Petitioners Melecio Macasiray, Virgilio Gonzales, and Benedicto Gonzales were charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City. During the prosecution’s evidence‑in‑chief, the extrajudicial confession of Benedicto Gonzales, executed on March 27, 1986 without the assistance of counsel and after only perfunctory warnings, was introduced and marked as Exhibit B. A transcript of the preliminary investigation conducted on April 8, 1986, in which Benedicto allegedly affirmed the confession, was marked as Exhibit D. Both documents were offered in evidence at the close of the prosecution’s case.

• The Extrajudicial Confession and Preliminary Investigation Transcript: Benedicto Gonzales executed an extrajudicial confession on March 27, 1986, admitting participation in the murder and implicating his co-accused. The confession was given without the assistance of counsel; he was informed of his rights only superficially and waived counsel without advice. A transcript of the preliminary investigation on April 8, 1986 recorded his affirmation of the confession. It was undisputed that both documents were obtained in violation of the right to counsel under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution.

• Proceedings at Trial: The prosecution introduced and marked the confession as Exhibit B and the transcript as Exhibit D during the presentation of its witnesses. At the conclusion of the prosecution’s evidence, when the documents were formally offered, petitioners objected on the ground that they were taken without counsel. The trial court sustained the objection and excluded both exhibits in its Order of April 14, 1988.

• Defense Evidence and Rebuttal Offer: When the defense presented its case, Benedicto Gonzales took the stand and, on direct examination, was asked about his extrajudicial confession; he denied its contents. On cross-examination, he was confronted with the transcript and denied making the recorded statements. The prosecution then again offered Exhibits B and D as rebuttal evidence, ostensibly to impeach his credibility. The trial court once more denied admission in its Order of October 17, 1988.

• Court of Appeals Intervention: Private respondent Rosalina Rivera Vda. de Villanueva challenged the exclusion orders before the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court. The CA ruled that petitioners waived objection by failing to object when the documents were first introduced and marked; that the defense itself introduced Exhibit B when it questioned Gonzales about it; and that Exhibit D was admissible for impeachment.

• Timeliness of Objection: Petitioners argued that under the Rules of Court, objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time of formal offer. They timely objected when the prosecution formally offered Exhibits B and D; the failure to object during marking and identification was not a waiver.

• No Waiver by Defense’s Questioning: Petitioners maintained that they did not adopt the extrajudicial confession as their own evidence. Benedicto Gonzales was asked about the confession solely to deny its truth. The defense did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits, thus it never became part of the defense evidence.

• Constitutional Inadmissibility: Petitioners contended that both documents were obtained without the assistance of counsel and after only perfunctory warnings, rendering them inadmissible under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. No subsequent act could cure the constitutional violation.

• Waiver by Failure to Object Timely: Private respondent contended that the defense waived objection because they did not oppose the introduction and marking of the documents during the prosecution’s evidence-in-chief and did not move for their exclusion before trial.

• Adoption by Defense: Respondent argued that when the defense called Benedicto Gonzales and had him testify on his extrajudicial confession (Exh. B), they effectively offered it as part of their evidence-in-chief, thus waiving any objection to its admissibility.

• Impeachment Purpose: Respondent asserted that the transcript (Exh. D) could be admitted independently for the limited purpose of impeaching Gonzales’s credibility, as he was confronted with it on cross-examination and denied its contents. The trial court’s refusal to admit it even for that purpose constituted grave abuse of discretion.

• Timeliness and Waiver: Whether petitioners waived objection to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession and the transcript by (a) failing to object when the documents were marked and identified, and (b) later questioning the accused about the confession during the defense evidence.

• Impeachment Use: Whether the transcript of the preliminary investigation, though constitutionally inadmissible as evidence-in-chief, may be admitted for the limited purpose of impeaching the credibility of the accused.

• Timeliness and Waiver: Objection to documentary evidence must be made at the time of formal offer. The marking and identification of a document prior to formal offer does not constitute the offer itself; failure to object at that stage is not a waiver. Petitioners’ objection at the formal offer was timely. Further, the defense did not waive the objection by questioning Benedicto Gonzales about his confession. The questioning was for the purpose of denying the confession’s contents, not to adopt it as evidence. The defense never marked the confession as its exhibit, confirming it was not offered as defense evidence. Consequently, no waiver occurred.

• Impeachment Use: Because the trial court had already excluded the confession and transcript as constitutionally inadmissible, the defense was not required to deny their contents. Thus, there was no legitimate basis for impeaching Gonzales’s credibility with those documents. Admitting the excluded statements for impeachment would effectively circumvent the constitutional exclusionary rule.

• Timeliness of Objection to Documentary Evidence — Under Rule 132, §§34‑36 of the Rules of Court, a party must object to documentary evidence at the time it is formally offered, specifying the purpose of the objection. The identification and marking of a document as an exhibit prior to formal offer does not constitute the offer itself; an objection made at that preliminary stage is not equivalent to an objection at the formal offer, and failure to object then does not result in waiver. (Reiterating Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990))

• Waiver of Objection to Inadmissible Confession — The defense does not waive its objection to a constitutionally inadmissible extrajudicial confession merely by asking the accused about it during trial for the purpose of denying its contents. To constitute a waiver by adoption, the defense must affirmatively offer the confession as its own evidence, typically by marking it as a defense exhibit. The Court applied this to hold that the defense’s act of questioning Gonzales to deny the confession did not amount to an adoption or waiver.

• Impeachment with Excluded Evidence — Evidence declared inadmissible on constitutional grounds may not be introduced for impeachment purposes where its exclusion means the accused had no need to address its contents. Allowing such use would render the exclusionary rule ineffectual.

• “Objection to the documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered, not earlier.”

• “It has been held that the identification of the document before it is marked as an exhibit does not constitute the formal offer of the document as evidence for the party presenting it. Objection to the identification and marking of the document is not equivalent to objection to the document when it is formally offered in evidence. What really matters is the objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.”

• “In fact, the defense did not mark the confession as one of its exhibits, which is proof of the fact that it did not adopt it as evidence. There is, therefore, no basis for the appellate court’s ruling that because the defense adopted the confession by introducing it in evidence, the defense waived any objection to the admission of the same in evidence.”

• Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) — Followed; reiterated the rule that objection to documentary evidence must be made at formal offer, not at the time of identification.

• Quebral v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 353 (1996) — Cited as further reiteration of the same rule.

• People v. Caguioa, 95 SCRA 2 (1980) — Discussed; the Court clarified that while in that case an early objection was sustained, it did not depart from the principle that objections should be raised at the formal offer, and the ruling did not detract from that prevailing rule.

• Rule 132, §§34, 35, 36, Rules of Court — Section 34 requires that an offer of evidence specify the purpose; Section 35 provides that documentary evidence is offered after the presentation of testimonial evidence; Section 36 mandates that objection to evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered. The Court applied these provisions to hold that the objection was timely when made upon formal offer, not earlier.

• Section 20, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — Guarantees the right to counsel during custodial investigation. The extrajudicial confession and transcript were obtained in violation of this provision because the accused was not effectively informed of his rights and waived counsel without assistance, rendering them inadmissible.

Regalado, Melo, Puno, and Martinez, JJ., concur.