Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority

The constitutionality of a statute will not be determined unless the question is properly raised in an actual case or controversy by a proper party and its resolution is necessary to the decision of the case; absent these requisites, and absent an indubitable ground for constitutional challenge, the petition must be dismissed.

Police General Levy Macasiano (Ret.) retired from the Philippine National Police on 2 January 1992 and thereafter entered into a Contract of Consultancy with the Department of Public Works and Highways for the Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain. Republic Act No. 7279, the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992, was approved on 24 March 1992 and published in the 4 May 1992 issue of the Official Gazette. Sections 28 and 44 of the Act govern eviction and demolition and impose a three-year moratorium on the eviction of program beneficiaries and demolition of their houses or dwelling units. Macasiano challenged those provisions as unconstitutional in his capacity as DPWH consultant and as a taxpayer.

Police General Levy Macasiano (Ret.) retired from the Philippine National Police on 2 January 1992. Immediately after his retirement, he executed a Contract of Consultancy with the Department of Public Works and Highways for the Operation for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties of Public Domain. In that capacity, he alleged that Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 contained “the seeds of a ripening controversy that serve as drawback” to his tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures, and that because of those sections he was unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures which he had assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past. As a taxpayer, he alleged that he had a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds were properly and lawfully disbursed.

Republic Act No. 7279 was approved on 24 March 1992 and published in the 4 May 1992 issue of the Official Gazette. Section 28 provides that eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged, but allows eviction or demolition in specified situations, including when persons or entities occupy danger areas, when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented, or when there is a court order for eviction and demolition. It also prescribes mandatory requirements for eviction or demolition involving underprivileged and homeless citizens, including notice, consultations, presence of local officials, proper identification, execution during regular office hours and good weather, restrictions on heavy equipment, proper uniforms for Philippine National Police members, and adequate relocation, with relocation to be undertaken within forty-five days from service of notice of final judgment and financial assistance equivalent to the prevailing minimum daily wage multiplied by sixty days if relocation is not possible within that period. Section 44 imposes a moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for three years from the effectivity of the Act, except for persons who constructed their structures after the effectivity of the Act and for cases enumerated in Section 28.

Macasiano filed a petition seeking to have Sections 28 and 44 declared unconstitutional. He maintained that the provisions (a) deprive the government, and more so private property owners, of property without due process of law and without compensation; (b) reward, instead of punish, acts categorically declared unlawful; (c) violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one’s property to be given to plain interlopers; (d) sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State; and (e) encroach upon the judicial power to its valid judgments and orders. He anchored his locus standi on his being a consultant of the DPWH and on his being a taxpayer.

Respondent National Mapping and Resource Information Authority, in its Comment, alleged that implementation of the assailed sections did not belong to or fall within its jurisdiction, disagreed with Macasiano’s constitutional challenge, and averred that Section 28 merely provided a humanitarian approach toward less privileged citizens and did not prohibit but merely discouraged eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covered program beneficiaries. The Office of the Government Corporate (OGCC), for respondent National Housing Authority, informed the Court that the NHA’s official stand was that Sections 28 and 44 were indeed unconstitutional and prayed that the petition be given due course. The Solicitor General, in his Comment, maintained that the petition was devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for judicial review, that there was no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests, that Macasiano merely asked for an advisory opinion, that he was not the proper party because he did not state that he had property being squatted upon, and that there was no showing that the constitutional question was the very lis mota presented.

• Locus Standi as Consultant: Petitioner alleged that Sections 28 and 44 contained the seeds of a ripening controversy that served as a drawback to his tasks and duties regarding demolition of illegal structures, and that because of those sections he was unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures he had assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past.
• Locus Standi as Taxpayer: Petitioner alleged that he had a direct interest in seeing to it that public funds were properly and lawfully disbursed.
• Due Process and Compensation: Petitioner maintained that the provisions deprive the government, and more so private property owners, of their property without due process of law and without compensation.
• Rewarding Unlawful Acts: Petitioner maintained that the provisions reward, instead of punish, acts categorically declared unlawful.
• Taking Property for Interlopers: Petitioner maintained that the provisions violate the prohibition against legislation that takes away one’s property to be given to plain interlopers.
• Overbreadth and Police Power: Petitioner maintained that the provisions sweep overbroadly over legitimate concerns of the police power of the State.
• Encroachment on Judicial Power: Petitioner maintained that the provisions encroach upon the judicial power to its valid judgments and orders.

• NAMRIA — Jurisdiction and Humanitarian Approach: Respondent National Mapping and Resource Information Authority alleged that implementation of the assailed sections did not belong to or fall within its jurisdiction; it disagreed with petitioner’s constitutional challenge and averred that Section 28 merely provided a humanitarian approach toward less privileged citizens and did not prohibit but merely discouraged eviction or demolition, while Section 44 only covered program beneficiaries.
• NHA — Unconstitutionality: Respondent National Housing Authority, through the Office of the Government Corporate (OGCC), informed the Court that its official stand was that Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 were indeed unconstitutional, and after a circumspect evaluation it found no cogent reason not to support the position, praying that the petition be given due course.
• Solicitor General — Lack of Requisites: The Solicitor General maintained that the petition was devoid of merit for non-compliance with the essential requisites for the exercise of judicial review in cases involving the constitutionality of a law; there was no actual case or controversy with litigants asserting adverse legal rights or interests; petitioner merely asked for an advisory opinion; petitioner was not the proper party because he did not state that he had property being squatted upon; and there was no showing that the question of constitutionality was the very lis mota presented.
• Solicitor General — Constitutionality: The Solicitor General argued that Sections 28 and 44 of the Act were not constitutionally infirm.

• Actual Case or Controversy: Whether there exists an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination.
• Proper Party / Locus Standi: Whether petitioner is a proper party to challenge the constitutionality of Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 as a DPWH consultant and as a taxpayer.
• Lis Mota / Necessity of Constitutional Question: Whether the resolution of the constitutional question is necessary to the decision of the case and is the very lis mota presented.
• Constitutionality of Sections 28 and 44: Whether Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279 are unconstitutional for depriving property owners of due process and compensation, rewarding unlawful acts, taking property for interlopers, overbreadth, and encroaching on judicial power.
• Declaratory Relief / Original Jurisdiction: Whether the petition is in reality one for declaratory relief and whether it may be entertained by the Supreme Court.
• Motion to Intervene: Whether the Realty Owners Association of the Philippines, Inc. should be allowed to intervene.

• Actual Case or Controversy: No. There was no actual case or controversy; petitioner did not claim that he had been actually prevented from performing his duties or exercising his rights because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.
• Proper Party / Locus Standi: No. As a consultant, petitioner had no authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on public domain, much less on private lands, and his consultancy contract had expired; as a taxpayer, he did not claim ownership of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected.
• Lis Mota / Necessity of Constitutional Question: No. The constitutional question was not the very lis mota, and no indubitable ground for the challenge was shown; courts avoid ruling on constitutional questions and presume the validity of legislative acts.
• Constitutionality of Sections 28 and 44: No. The constitutional challenge was rejected for failure to show an indubitable ground, and the challenged provisions were not shown to be constitutionally infirm.
• Declaratory Relief / Original Jurisdiction: No. The petition was in reality one for declaratory relief, which does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved; it could be treated as prohibition or mandamus only if otherwise viable or meritorious.
• Motion to Intervene: No. The motion to intervene was denied; the Court found the issues clear and simple enough and dispensed with the need for a comment thereon.

• Actual Case or Controversy: The Court applied the firmly entrenched rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. The essential requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into constitutionality are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. The first two requisites were absent. There was no actual controversy, and petitioner did not claim that in either or both capacities he had been actually prevented from performing his duties as a consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under the challenged sections. Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo; judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants. In reality, the petition was one for declaratory relief, which requires a justiciable controversy, adverse interests, and a legal interest in the controversy, and which does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. Although such a petition may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus if it has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, the exercise of that discretion presupposes that the petition is otherwise viable or meritorious.
• Proper Party / Locus Standi: A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. Petitioner was not a proper party. As a consultant of the DPWH under the Contract for Consultancy, he was not vested with any authority to demolish obstructions and encroachments on properties of the public domain, much less on private lands; the consultancy contract limited his duties to organizing and training selected DPWH personnel, providing advice to the Secretary and other DPWH officials regarding prioritization of areas to be cleared, conducting field inspection from time to time, providing advice in developing appropriate standards and techniques, and developing operational procedures that would institutionalize demolition processes. Moreover, the consultancy contract expired on 31 December 1992, and petitioner did not manifest that he obtained a renewal or extension. Nor did petitioner claim that he was an owner of an urban property whose enjoyment and use would be affected by the challenged provisions. Although he also anchored locus standi on being a taxpayer, a taxpayer’s suit does not mean that in each and every instance where such a ground is invoked the Court is left with no alternative except to hear the parties; as clarified in Tan vs. Macapagal, the Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer’s suit should be entertained.
• Lis Mota / Necessity of Constitutional Question: The Court found no indubitable ground for the constitutional challenge. Quoting Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, it reiterated that the policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers, which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments; the theory is that, as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted. Because the constitutional question was not necessary to the decision and no indubitable ground was shown, the challenge could not be sustained.
• Constitutionality of Sections 28 and 44: The Court rejected the constitutional challenge for failure to show an indubitable ground, not to say even a necessity to resolve it. It did not accept petitioner’s claims that the provisions deprived property owners of due process and compensation, rewarded unlawful acts, took property for interlopers, swept overbroadly over legitimate police power concerns, or encroached upon judicial power. The presumption of validity remained unrebutted, and the petition was dismissed.
• Declaratory Relief / Original Jurisdiction: The petition, in reality, sought a declaration of petitioner’s rights and duties and those of private landowners with respect to demolition of illegal structures on public and private lands. A petition for declaratory relief requires a justiciable controversy, the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse, and the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy. These requisites were not met. Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. Although the Court has said that such a petition may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus if it has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, that discretion presupposes that the petition is otherwise viable or meritorious.
• Motion to Intervene: The Court dispensed with the need for a comment on the motion to intervene because the issues were clear and simple enough, and denied the motion. No further reasoning was provided in the text.

• Judicial Review — Requisites for Constitutional Inquiry — The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. The essential requisites are: (a) the existence of an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination; (b) the constitutional question must be raised by a proper party; (c) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the decision of the case. In this case, the first two requisites were absent, so the Court refused to pass upon the constitutionality of Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279.
• Proper Party / Locus Standi — A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. Petitioner was not a proper party because his consultancy contract did not authorize him to demolish obstructions and encroachments on public domain, much less private lands, and had expired; as a taxpayer, he did not claim ownership of affected urban property, and taxpayer suits are entertained only in the Court’s discretion.
• Judicial Review Cannot Be Exercised In Vacuo — Judicial power is the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants. The Court found no actual controversy because petitioner did not claim that he had been actually prevented from performing his duties or exercising his rights due to the assertion by other parties of benefits under the challenged sections.
• Declaratory Relief — Requisites and Jurisdiction — A petition for declaratory relief requires a justiciable controversy, the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse, and the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy. Such an action does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved. It may be treated as a petition for prohibition or mandamus if it has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved, but only if the petition is otherwise viable or meritorious.
• Presumption of Constitutionality / To Doubt Is to Sustain — Courts avoid ruling on constitutional questions and presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court applied it in rejecting the constitutional challenge for failure to show an indubitable ground.
• Taxpayer’s Suit — Discretionary Review — As far as a taxpayer’s suit is concerned, the Court is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it should be entertained. Petitioner’s invocation of taxpayer standing did not compel the Court to hear the petition.
• Lis Mota — The constitutional question must be the very lis mota presented and its resolution must be necessary to the decision of the case. The Court found that the constitutional issue was not necessary to resolve and that no indubitable ground existed.

• "It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the courts unless that, question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality must be very lis mota presented." — States the threshold rule for judicial review and the lis mota requirement applied to dismiss the petition.
• "A proper party is one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of." — Defines proper party, the second requisite for constitutional inquiry that the Court found absent.
• "Judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."" — Explains why the absence of an actual case or controversy barred review.
• "The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain." — Articulates the presumption of constitutionality and the standard for rejecting the challenge.

• People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1937] — Cited for the rule that the constitutionality of a legislative act will not be determined unless the question is properly raised and necessary to the determination of the case; the issue must be the very lis mota.
• Dumlao vs. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; National Economic Protectionism Association vs. Ongpin, 171 SCRA 657 [1989]; Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989] — Cited for the essential requisites of a successful judicial inquiry into the constitutionality of a law.
• Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516 [1991] — Quoted for the policy of courts to avoid ruling on constitutional questions, to presume the validity of acts of the political departments, and that to doubt is to sustain.
• Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 [1972] — Cited for the rule that the Court has discretion whether or not to entertain a taxpayer’s suit.
• Delumen vs. Republic, 94 Phil. 287 [1954] — Cited for the essential requisites of a petition for declaratory relief.
• Remotigue vs. Osmeña, 21 SCRA 837 [1967]; Rural Bank of Olongapo vs. Commissioner of Land Registration, 102 SCRA 794 [1981]; Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. vs. Republic, 190 SCRA 782 [1990] — Cited for the rule that an action for declaratory relief does not fall within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court even if only questions of law are involved.
• De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 [1982]; Alliance of Government Workers vs. Minister of Labor and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983] — Cited for the proposition that a petition may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus if it has far-reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved.
• Muskrat vs. United States, 219 U.S. 346 [1911] — Cited in Allied Broadcasting Center, Inc. vs. Republic for the definition of judicial power as the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants.
• Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343 [1989] — Cited for the definition of a proper party as one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.

• Sections 28 and 44, Republic Act No. 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) — Section 28 provides that eviction or demolition as a practice shall be discouraged but allows it in specified situations, including danger areas, government infrastructure projects with available funding, and court-ordered eviction or demolition, and prescribes mandatory requirements for eviction or demolition involving underprivileged and homeless citizens. Section 44 imposes a three-year moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units from the effectivity of the Act, except for persons who constructed their structures after effectivity and for cases enumerated in Section 28. The Court did not declare these provisions unconstitutional; the petition was dismissed for lack of the requisites for judicial review and for failure to show an indubitable ground.

Narvasa, C.J.; Cruz; Feliciano; Bidin; Griño-Aquino; Regalado; Romero; Nocon; Bellosillo; Melo; and Quiason, JJ., concurred. Padilla, J., was on leave.