Macasaet vs. Co, Jr.

Substituted service of summons is valid only after a bona fide attempt at personal service has proven futile or impossible within a reasonable time, with the serving officer required to state in the return the efforts made to locate the defendant and the reasons for their failure; where the defendant's work necessarily requires absence from the office, two attempts on the same day may satisfy this requirement, and subsequent voluntary appearance by filing pleadings waives any defect in service.

Retired police officer Francisco R. Co, Jr. filed a civil suit for damages against Abante Tonite, a daily tabloid, and its officers and editorial staff, alleging that an article published in the June 6, 2000 issue was libelous. The defendants included Allen A. Macasaet (Publisher), Nicolas V. Quijano, Jr. (Managing Director), Isaias Albano (Circulation Manager), and editors Janet Bay, Jesus R. Galang, Randy Hagos, and columnist Lily Reyes. The complaint was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila and raffled to Branch 51.

• Nature of Action: Respondent Francisco R. Co, Jr., a retired police officer formerly assigned at the Western Police District in Manila, instituted a civil action for damages against petitioners—officers and staff of Abante Tonite—for an allegedly libelous article published in the June 6, 2000 issue of the tabloid.
• Attempted Service: On September 18, 2000, RTC Sheriff Raul Medina proceeded to the business address of the defendants at Monica Publishing Corporation, BF Condominium Building, Intramuros, Manila. In the morning, he attempted to serve the summons personally on each defendant but found them out of the office. He returned in the afternoon of the same day and was informed that petitioners were still unavailable.
• Substituted Service: Medina resorted to substituted service, leaving copies of the summons with: (1) Lu-Ann Quijano, secretary of Macasaet and wife of Quijano, for those two defendants; and (2) Rene Esleta, Editorial Assistant of Abante Tonite, for defendants Albano, Bay, Galang, Hagos, and Reyes. The sheriff's return dated September 22, 2000 stated that efforts to serve personally were "ineffectual and unavailing" because Macasaet and Quijano were "always out and not available," while the other defendants were "always roving outside and gathering news."
• Defendants' Response: Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on October 3, 2000, through counsel's special appearance, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons because the sheriff made no prior attempt at personal service as required by Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. They also sought to drop Abante Tonite as a defendant, arguing it was neither a natural nor juridical person.
• Trial Court Proceedings: At the hearing, Sheriff Medina testified that he attempted personal service twice on September 18, 2000, and was informed by office personnel that petitioners were always out due to the nature of their work. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on March 12, 2001, ruling that substantial compliance existed and that Abante Tonite could be sued as a corporation by estoppel. The motion for reconsideration was denied on June 29, 2001.
• Appellate Proceedings: The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari on March 8, 2002, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the RTC's appreciation of the sheriff's return and upholding the corporation by estoppel theory regarding Abante Tonite.

• Invalid Substituted Service: Petitioners maintained that the sheriff immediately resorted to substituted service upon being informed they were not around, without complying with the statutory requirement of first attempting personal service within a reasonable time as mandated by Sections 6 and 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioners argued that because the substituted service was invalid, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over their persons, rendering all subsequent proceedings void.
• Improper Party: Petitioners contended that Abante Tonite could not be sued as a defendant because it was neither a natural person nor a duly registered juridical entity with the Securities and Exchange Commission.

• Substantial Compliance: Respondent countered that the sheriff's return demonstrated bona fide efforts at personal service on two occasions on the same day, and that the impossibility of service was justified by the nature of petitioners' work as journalists who were "always roving outside and gathering news."
• Voluntary Appearance: Respondent argued that petitioners had voluntarily submitted to the court's jurisdiction by filing pleadings, including an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam and a pre-trial brief, thereby waiving any defect in the service of summons.
• Corporation by Estoppel: Respondent maintained that Abante Tonite, though unincorporated, held itself out as a corporation engaged in nationwide circulation and profit-making activity, and was thus estopped from denying its corporate capacity in a suit by a third person who relied on such representation.

• Validity of Substituted Service: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioners through the substituted service of summons.
• Capacity to be Sued: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error by sustaining the inclusion of Abante Tonite as a party defendant despite its not being a natural or registered juridical person.

• Validity of Substituted Service: The substituted service was valid. The sheriff's return showed two attempts at personal service on September 18, 2000—one in the morning and another in the afternoon—which satisfied the requirement of attempting personal service before resorting to substituted service. The conclusion that further attempts would be futile was warranted by the information that petitioners were "always out" due to the nature of their work as journalists; what constitutes a "reasonable time" depends on the circumstances, and strict adherence to personal service is not required when circumstances justify substituted service.
• Voluntary Appearance: Any defect in the service of summons was deemed waived by petitioners' voluntary appearance, evidenced by their filing of an answer with compulsory counterclaim ad cautelam, a pre-trial brief, and their utilization of modes of discovery.
• Capacity to be Sued: Abante Tonite was properly sued as a corporation by estoppel. An unincorporated association that represents itself to be a corporation is estopped from denying its corporate capacity in a suit against it by a third person who relies in good faith on such representation. The tabloid's nationwide circulation and profit-making attributes, disclosed in its editorial box without indication of ownership by Monica Publishing Corporation, supported the application of the doctrine to prevent a wronged party from being left without recourse.

• Substituted Service Requirements: Substituted service of summons, being in derogation of the usual method of personal service, is extraordinary in character and must be followed strictly, faithfully, and fully; it is permissible only when the defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable time, and the serving officer must state in the return the efforts made to find the defendant and the fact that such efforts failed.
• Corporation by Estoppel: An unincorporated association which represents itself to be a corporation will be estopped from denying its corporate capacity in a suit against it by a third person who relies in good faith on such representation; this doctrine applies to prevent injustice to persons who have dealt with the entity as a corporation.
• Jurisdiction in Personam: In actions in personam, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either by proper service of summons or by voluntary appearance; without such jurisdiction, the ensuing trial and judgment are void.
• Reasonable Time for Service: The determination of what constitutes a "reasonable time" for attempting personal service depends on the circumstances obtaining in each case; where the defendant's occupation necessarily requires absence from the office, the serving officer is not required to attempt personal service by all means and at all times.

• "To warrant the substituted service of the summons and copy of the complaint, the serving officer must first attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person. Only after the attempt at personal service has become futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the officer resort to substituted service."
• "It is no longer debatable that the statutory requirements of substituted service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any substituted service other than that authorized by statute is considered ineffective. This is because substituted service, being in derogation of the usual method of service, is extraordinary in character and may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances authorized by statute."
• "While we are strict in insisting on personal service on the defendant, we do not cling to such strictness should the circumstances already justify substituted service instead. It is the spirit of the procedural rules, not their letter, that governs."
• "An unincorporated association, which represents itself to be a corporation, will be estopped from denying its corporate capacity in a suit against it by a third person who relies in good faith on such representation."

• Domagas v. Jensen, G.R. No. 158407, January 17, 2005 — Distinguished actions in personam from actions in rem and quasi in rem; cited for the principle that jurisdiction over the person is essential in actions in personam.
• Keister v. Navarro, No. L-29067, May 31, 1977 — Cited for the rule that substituted service must follow statutory requirements strictly as it is in derogation of the usual method.
• Ang Ping v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126947, July 15, 1999 — Referenced for the principle that substituted service is extraordinary and must be used only as prescribed by statute.
• Orosa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118696, September 3, 1996 — Applied for the doctrine that defects in substituted service may be waived by subsequent voluntary appearance.
• Robinson v. Miralles, G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006 — Cited for the principle that the spirit, not the letter, of procedural rules governs.

• Section 6, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Governs personal service of summons by handing a copy to the defendant in person or tendering it if refused.
• Section 7, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Authorizes substituted service by leaving copies at the defendant's residence with a person of suitable age and discretion, or at the office with a competent person in charge, when personal service is impossible within a reasonable time.
• Section 20, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Provides that a defendant's voluntary appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons.
• Article 44(2) or (3), New Civil Code — Cited regarding corporations and entities with juridical personality; the Court applied the doctrine of corporation by estoppel to an unincorporated association representing itself as a corporation.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., and Bienvenido L. Reyes.