Macalintal vs. Teh

A judge whose order is challenged in a certiorari proceeding is merely a nominal party and must not actively participate in the appellate proceedings; acting both as party-litigant and as judge in one's own court, including adjudicating a motion for one's own inhibition through private counsel and awarding oneself attorney's fees, constitutes gross ignorance of the law warranting dismissal.

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal served as counsel for a party in Election Case No. R-95-001 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, where respondent Judge Angelito C. Teh sat as Presiding Judge and Executive Judge. The administrative complaint originated from a letter dated 01 April 1996 that Macalintal sent to the Supreme Court narrating Judge Teh's actuations relative to that election case. Although Macalintal did not intend the letter as a formal administrative complaint and it was not sworn to as required by Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, the Court treated it as such upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, dispensing with the verification requirement because respondent Judge had practically admitted all pertinent allegations in his comment.

Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal represented a party in Election Case No. R-95-001 pending before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 87, Rosario, Batangas, presided over by Judge Angelito C. Teh. Judge Teh issued a resolution in that election case adverse to the client of Macalintal, prompting the latter to elevate the matter to the Commission on Elections via a petition for certiorari. While the case was pending before the COMELEC, Judge Teh took active part in the proceedings by filing his own comment on the petition and, subsequently, an urgent manifestation to rectify an assertion by complainant that he had erroneously cited Section 8, Rule 35, of the Omnibus Election Code.

Macalintal forthwith filed a motion to prevent Judge Teh from further acting on Election Case No. R-95-001, effectively a motion for inhibition. Rather than acting on the motion in accordance with the procedure prescribed in Section 2, Rule 137, of the Rules of Court, Judge Teh hired his own lawyer and filed an answer to the motion before his own court, praying for its dismissal for lack of factual and legal basis and for an order directing Macalintal to pay him P100,000 as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. On 31 July 1996, Judge Teh issued a resolution denying the motion for inhibition for lack of sufficient legal and factual basis and ordering Macalintal to pay the P100,000 in attorney's fees "for compelling the respondent Judge to engage the services of counsel who prepared the Answer to the Motion for Inhibition."

Macalintal's letter of 01 April 1996 to the Supreme Court narrating these actuations was treated as an administrative complaint. In his comment dated 20 September 1996, Judge Teh admitted filing his own pleadings with the COMELEC, claiming he did so out of deference to the COMELEC En Banc order of 16 November 1995 requiring respondents to comment on the petition. When the Supreme Court, in its resolution of 12 March 1997, directed Judge Teh to act on the motion for inhibition in accordance with Section 2, Rule 137, Judge Teh issued an order dated 17 April 1997 granting the motion for inhibition "in compliance with the resolution" of the Court, evidently misunderstanding or deliberately misreading the directive, which had merely required him to follow the proper procedure in resolving the motion — not to grant it. The COMELEC, meanwhile, had found Judge Teh's 31 July 1996 resolution to be "irrational."

• Improper Participation in Appellate Proceedings: Complainant maintained that Judge Teh's active participation in the certiorari proceedings before the COMELEC — by filing his own comment and an urgent manifestation — was improper, a judge whose order is challenged being merely a nominal party with no personal interest in the proceedings.
• Improper Adjudication of Own Inhibition: Complainant contended that Judge Teh acted improperly in adjudicating the motion for his own inhibition by hiring private counsel, filing an answer in his own court, and then awarding himself P100,000 in attorney's fees against complainant, thereby acting both as party-litigant and as judge in the same proceeding.

• Deference to COMELEC Order: Respondent Judge argued that he filed his own pleadings with the COMELEC out of respect and in deference to the COMELEC En Banc order of 16 November 1995 requiring respondents to comment on the petition.
• Purpose of Urgent Manifestation: Respondent Judge maintained that the urgent manifestation he filed before the COMELEC was meant merely to rectify complainant's assertion that he had erroneously cited Section 8, Rule 35, of the Omnibus Election Code.
• Defective Complaint: Respondent Judge observed that complainant's letter had not been sworn to, implying it did not comply with the verification requirement of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court.

• Propriety of Judge's Participation in Certiorari: Whether a judge whose order is challenged in a certiorari proceeding may actively participate in the appellate proceedings by filing pleadings on his own behalf.
• Propriety of Adjudicating Own Inhibition: Whether a judge may adjudicate a motion for his own inhibition by filing an answer through private counsel in his own court and awarding himself attorney's fees against the movant's counsel.
• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Whether respondent Judge's actuations constitute gross ignorance of the law warranting administrative sanction.

• Propriety of Judge's Participation in Certiorari: No. Under Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, a judge whose order is challenged in an appellate court is merely a nominal party and need not file any answer or take active part unless expressly directed by the Court.

• Propriety of Adjudicating Own Inhibition: No. A judge must act on a motion for inhibition in accordance with Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which requires the judge to either proceed with the trial or withdraw therefrom based on his own determination of the question of disqualification — not to litigate the motion as a party through private counsel and award himself attorney's fees.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: Yes. Respondent Judge's gross deviation from acceptable judicial norms, including his failure to consider basic and elemental rules, constituted gross ignorance of the law warranting dismissal from the service.

• Propriety of Judge's Participation in Certiorari: Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that when a petition relates to the acts or omissions of a court or judge, the judge is impleaded only as a nominal party; it is the duty of the private respondent to appear and defend both in their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge. The judge should maintain a detached attitude and should not waste time taking an active part in a proceeding relating to his official actuations, but should instead apply himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating cases. In Turqueza vs. Hernando, the Court explained that a judge has no personal interest or personality in a certiorari proceeding challenging his order. Judge Teh's active participation before the COMELEC — filing his own comment and an urgent manifestation — was therefore uncalled for and contrary to the procedural rules.

• Propriety of Adjudicating Own Inhibition: Section 2, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court prescribes the procedure for objections to a judge's competency: the objecting party files a written objection stating the grounds, and the judge either proceeds with the trial or withdraws therefrom according to his own determination, with his decision forthwith made in writing. Judge Teh, instead of following this procedure, hired private counsel, filed an answer to the motion in his own court, denied the motion, and ordered Macalintal to pay P100,000 in attorney's fees for compelling him to engage counsel. He thus acted both as party-litigant and as judge before his own court. When the Supreme Court directed him to act on the motion in accordance with the Rules, he misunderstood the directive and simply granted the motion "in compliance with" the Court's resolution, when the Court had merely required him to follow proper procedure — not to grant or deny the motion in any particular way.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law: The Court applied the doctrine from Castaños vs. Escaño, which holds that when inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of judicial duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of his position or too vicious that the omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, dismissal is in order. Judge Teh's conduct — actively litigating as a party in proceedings challenging his own order, adjudicating a motion for his own inhibition through private counsel, awarding himself attorney's fees, and misapprehending a direct order from the Supreme Court — manifested gross deviation from acceptable norms. The Court also invoked the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law, or misconduct.

• Nominal Party Doctrine for Judges in Certiorari Proceedings — A judge whose order or decision is challenged in an appellate or certiorari proceeding is merely a nominal or formal party with no personal interest or personality therein. Under Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the judge need not appear, file an answer, or take active part unless expressly directed by the court. It is the duty of the private respondent to appear and defend both in their own behalf and in behalf of the judge. The judge should maintain a detached attitude and devote himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating cases. The Court applied this doctrine in finding Judge Teh's active participation before the COMELEC improper.

• Gross Ignorance of the Law as Ground for Dismissal — When a judge's inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law, or a principle in the discharge of his duties, the judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position or too vicious that the oversight was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, dismissal is in order. The Court applied this doctrine from Castaños vs. Escaño to Judge Teh's failure to follow elementary procedural rules on inhibition and the role of judges in certiorari proceedings.

• Res Ipsa Loquitur in Judicial Discipline — The Court may impose its authority upon erring judges whose actuations, on their face, show gross incompetence, ignorance of the law, or misconduct. The doctrine was invoked to justify imposing administrative sanctions based on the admitted facts of the complaint, even without a sworn verification.

• Duty of Continuing Legal Education for Judges — A member of the bench must continuously keep himself abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments and show acquaintance with statutes, procedural rules, and authoritative doctrines. The learning process in law does not cease.

• "Respondent Judge, in fine, acted both as a party litigant and as a judge before his own court." — This passage encapsulates the core misconduct: the judge's dual and contradictory role in adjudicating a motion for his own inhibition, which formed a principal basis for the finding of gross ignorance of the law.

• "When the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider so basic and elemental a rule, a law or a principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and title he holds or he is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority. In both instances, the judge's dismissal is in order." — Quoted from Castaños vs. Escaño, this passage states the controlling standard for gross ignorance of the law as a ground for dismissal and is the canonical formulation frequently cited in subsequent judicial discipline cases.

• "(T)he judge should maintain a detached attitude from the case and should not waste his time by taking an active part in a proceeding which relates to official actuations in a case but should apply himself to his principal task of hearing and adjudicating the cases in his court." — Drawn from Turqueza vs. Hernando, this passage defines the proper posture of a judge whose order is challenged on certiorari and articulates the norm Judge Teh violated by actively participating before the COMELEC.

• Turqueza vs. Hernando, 97 SCRA 483 — Followed. The Court relied on this case to explain that a judge whose order is challenged in an appellate court is merely a nominal party who should maintain a detached attitude and should not actively participate in the proceedings.

• Castaños vs. Escaño, 251 SCRA 174 — Followed. The Court quoted this case for the proposition that failure to consider basic and elemental rules warrants dismissal, applying it directly to Judge Teh's gross deviation from procedural norms.

• Consolidated Bank and Trust Corporation vs. Capistrano, 159 SCRA 47 — Cited for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the context of judicial discipline, allowing the Court to impose sanctions on erring judges whose actuations on their face show gross incompetence, ignorance, or misconduct.

• Republic vs. CFI of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, 53 SCRA 317 and Taroma vs. Sayo, 67 SCRA 508 — Cited in support of the proposition that a judge impleaded in certiorari proceedings is merely a nominal or formal party.

• Section 5, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that when a petition relates to the acts or omissions of a judge, the judge is impleaded only as a public respondent and, unless specifically directed by the court, shall not appear in or file an answer or comment to the petition. Applied to hold that Judge Teh's active participation before the COMELEC was improper.

• Section 2, Rule 137, Rules of Court — Prescribes the procedure for objecting to a judge's disqualification: the objecting party files a written objection stating the grounds, and the judge either proceeds with the trial or withdraws therefrom according to his own determination, with his decision forthwith made in writing. Applied to hold that Judge Teh should have followed this procedure in acting on the motion for inhibition rather than litigating it as a party through private counsel.

• Rule 140, Rules of Court — Requires that complaints against judges be sworn to. The Court dispensed with the verification requirement because the letter had already been treated as an administrative complaint upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator and because respondent Judge had practically admitted all pertinent allegations.

Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concurred. Regalado, J., was on leave.