Macailing vs. Andrada

A decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in a public land case becomes final and executory thirty days after receipt by the interested parties under Lands Administrative Order No. 6, and the Office of the President may no longer review it absent the exceptions of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default, or excusable neglect. A Court of First Instance may take cognizance of a certiorari petition challenging the legal correctness of a national administrative official’s decision even if the official holds office outside its territorial jurisdiction, provided no injunction or prohibitory writ is sought against the non-resident official.

Plaintiffs were settlers occupying four hectares each of four parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato. Salvador Andrada, later substituted by his heirs, was a sales applicant over a larger parcel that included the lands occupied by plaintiffs. The governing administrative regulation, Lands Administrative Order No. 6, fixed the finality of decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and limited reconsideration.

Plaintiffs Rafael Macailing, Silvestre Macailing, Dominico Necesito, and Rafael Necesito were settlers occupying four hectares each of four parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato. Salvador Andrada, later substituted by his heirs, was a sales applicant over a larger parcel that included the lands occupied by plaintiffs. The dispute over these parcels was first taken up by the District Land Officer of Cotabato, who decided in plaintiffs’ favor and excluded the four parcels claimed by them.

The Director of Lands reversed, declaring that the portions adjudged to the four plaintiffs “shall be restored to the heirs (of Salvador Andrada) who should include them proportionately in the new application to be filed by them respectively.” On appeal, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, on October 27, 1956, reversed the Director of Lands and awarded to plaintiffs the lands they claimed. Defendants sought reconsideration; the Secretary denied it on May 30, 1957. Defendants moved once more to reconsider. On September 12, 1957, the Secretary rejected the second motion, ruled that his judgment had long become final and executory, and stated that his office had no more jurisdiction to entertain the motion; he considered the case a closed matter insofar as his office was concerned. Defendants received copy of this denial on October 14, 1957.

On October 23, 1957, defendants appealed to the Office of the President. On August 20, 1959, in a letter-decision, Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, by authority of the President, reversed the decision of the Secretary and declared that the lands involved should be restored to the heirs of Andrada to be included in their individual applications.

Plaintiffs, on December 23, 1959, started the present suit in the Cotabato court, raising the issue of finality of the decision of the Secretary. The parties entered into a stipulation of facts, and the case was submitted to the Court of First Instance of Cotabato. The stipulation established the dates of the Secretary’s October 27, 1956 decision, the motions for reconsideration, the September 12, 1957 denial, and the October 23, 1957 appeal to the President.

• Proper Remedy: Defendants-appellants argued that plaintiffs’ remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action before the Court of First Instance, and that because plaintiffs did not avail of the proper remedy, the action should be dismissed.
• Territorial Jurisdiction: Defendants-appellants averred that the Court of First Instance of Cotabato had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari because the Assistant Executive Secretary holds office in Manila, outside the court’s territorial boundaries.
• Presidential Review: Defendants-appellants contended that the power of review on appeal is inherent in the President; that the Constitution fixes no period for such appeal; and that the appeal could therefore be entertained by the President even outside the 30-day period provided in Section 12 of Lands Administrative Order No. 6. They also maintained that their appeal was only nine days after October 14, 1957, the date they received the Secretary’s September 12, 1957 ruling denying their second motion for reconsideration.

• Finality and Time-Bar: Plaintiffs-appellees maintained that defendants’ appeal to the President was time-barred because the Secretary’s October 27, 1956 decision had become final and executory after thirty days from receipt, and no exception applied.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Plaintiffs-appellees charged the Assistant Executive Secretary with grave abuse of discretion in upholding defendants’ appeal in desecration of a solemn decision of the Secretary that had already become final and executory.

• Proper Remedy: Whether plaintiffs’ proper remedy to review the administrative decision is certiorari rather than an ordinary civil action.
• Verification: Whether the absence of verification in the petition is a fatal defect.
• Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato has jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari against the Assistant Executive Secretary, who holds office in Manila outside its territorial boundaries.
• Finality: Whether defendants’ appeal to the Office of the President was time-barred under Lands Administrative Order No. 6, rendering the Assistant Executive Secretary’s decision null and void.

• Proper Remedy: Yes. Certiorari is the appropriate remedy where the statute is silent and the administrative agency has original jurisdiction; plaintiffs’ allegations showed grave abuse of discretion, and the absence of a formal averment of no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy was not fatal.
• Verification: No. The absence of verification is not fatally defective where the material facts are of record and the questions raised are mainly of law.
• Jurisdiction: Yes. The Cotabato court had jurisdiction because the sole issue was the legal correctness of the administrative decision, not the control of acts of non-resident officials through injunction or prohibition.
• Finality: Yes. The Secretary’s decision became final after thirty days from receipt under Lands Administrative Order No. 6; the Executive Secretary had no power to review it, and the August 20, 1959 decision was null and void.

• Proper Remedy: Where statutes are silent on judicial review of administrative decisions, the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court remain available. Where administrative agencies have original jurisdiction, the court’s interference with administrative action is necessarily limited, and review cannot be done through an ordinary civil action if constitutional or legislative authority is wanting. The remedies that may be availed of where the statute is silent are certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus. Plaintiffs’ complaint, though not formally conforming to the requirements, alleged that the Assistant Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion in upholding defendants’ appeal against a decision that had already become final and executory. There was no necessity to aver that there was no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law because this could be clearly read from the factual narration; the case had already reached the administrative peak in the Office of the President. Thus, plaintiffs’ case was the special civil action of certiorari.
• Verification: The petition was not verified. The Court held that the absence of verification is not fatally defective. Verification may be excused where the material facts alleged are a matter of record in the court below, consisting in pleadings filed or proceedings taken therein, and the questions raised are mainly of law. Here, the case shaped out a question of law; there were no facts that really needed confirmation under oath, and no trial was conducted by the court below. The absence of verification did not justify dismissal.
• Jurisdiction: Section 44(h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 limits the power of Courts of First Instance to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus to their respective provinces and districts. Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court, provides that the petition may be filed in a Court of First Instance having jurisdiction over the acts or omissions of an inferior court, corporation, board, officer, or person. Prior cases such as Castaño vs. Lobingier, Acosta vs. Alvendia, Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado, Hacbang vs. The Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Mfg. Co., Inc. vs. National Administrator of Regional Office No. 2, People vs. Mencias, Santos vs. Moreno, Cudiamat vs. Torres, and NAWASA vs. Reyes held that Courts of First Instance cannot issue writs against officers outside their territorial boundaries. However, those cases involved injunctive or prohibitory writs seeking to control the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court. Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary distinguished those cases: where the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, the power of judicial review is not confined to the Court of First Instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the Courts of First Instance in the localities where the plaintiffs reside and where the questioned decisions are being enforced. Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. vs. Arranz clarified that if the petition also seeks to enjoin enforcement of the administrative decision against non-resident officials, the Court of First Instance cannot validly issue the injunction. Here, plaintiffs’ case was a certiorari petition challenging the legal correctness of the Assistant Executive Secretary’s decision; no injunction was sought against non-resident officials. The Cotabato court therefore had jurisdiction. Desiata vs. Executive Secretary affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nullifying the decision of the Executive Secretary acting for the President, and Alejo vs. Garchitorena impliedly upheld the power of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to review land decisions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
• Finality: Lands Administrative Order No. 6, Section 12, provides that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources or the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall become final, unless otherwise specifically stated, after the lapse of thirty days from receipt by the interested parties. Section 13 prohibits reconsideration of a final decision or order, except as provided in Section 14. Section 14 allows relief from a decision, order, or proceeding taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default, or excusable neglect, upon application within a reasonable time but in no case exceeding one year. Defendants did not dispute that they did not move to reconsider or appeal from the Secretary’s decision of October 27, 1956 within thirty days from receipt. They attempted to appeal only on October 23, 1957. They contended that their appeal was but nine days after October 14, 1957, the date they received the September 12, 1957 ruling denying their second motion for reconsideration. That ruling, however, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary’s decision had long become final and executory and declared that the Secretary’s office had no more jurisdiction to entertain the motion. Desiata vs. Executive Secretary controlled: the Executive Secretary had no more power to review a decision that had become final, and the decision of the Executive Secretary was null and void. The Court found no reason to retreat from Desiata. Lands Administrative Order No. 6 has the force and effect of law; an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law is law. A Department Secretary is the alter ego of the President, and an administrative rule laid down by a Department Secretary is, to all intents and purposes, that of the President unless countermanded by the latter. It is illogical, unreasonable, and unfair for the executive branch to set aside administrative rules in a specific case for the convenience of one party. Closed proceedings should remain closed; vested rights should not be unsettled. Defendants did not come within the exceptions of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default, or excusable neglect. The August 20, 1959 letter-decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary by authority of the President reversing the Secretary’s decision was therefore null and void and of no force and effect.

• Finality of Administrative Decisions — Under Lands Administrative Order No. 6, a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on an appealed public land case becomes final after thirty days from receipt by the interested parties, unless otherwise stated. After finality, no motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation may be entertained except for relief under Section 14 for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default, or excusable neglect, applied for within a reasonable time not exceeding one year. The Court applied this to bar the appeal to the President and void the Assistant Executive Secretary’s reversal.
• Judicial Review of Administrative Decisions Where Statute Is Silent — Where the law providing for judicial review is silent, the extraordinary remedies of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under the Rules of Court remain available. A review cannot be had through an ordinary civil action if constitutional or legislative authority is wanting. The Court treated plaintiffs’ action as a special civil action for certiorari.
• Territorial Jurisdiction and Certiorari Against Non-Resident Officials — Courts of First Instance may issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, injunction, and mandamus only within their respective provinces or districts. However, where the sole issue is the legal correctness of an administrative decision, and no injunction or prohibitory writ is sought to control acts of non-resident officials, the Court of First Instance in the locality where the plaintiffs reside and where the decision is enforced may take cognizance of the certiorari petition.
• Administrative Regulations as Law — An administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. A Department Secretary is the alter ego of the President, and an administrative rule laid down by a Department Secretary is, to all intents and purposes, that of the President unless countermanded. The executive branch cannot set aside its own administrative rules in a specific case for the convenience of one party.
• Non Quieta Movere / Finality of Quasi-Judicial Acts — Public policy and sound practice require that judgments and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative officers acting within their jurisdiction become final at a definite date. The rule forbidding reopening of a matter once judicially determined applies to administrative decisions. The Court invoked this to uphold the finality of the Secretary’s decision.
• Verification as Non-Jurisdictional — The absence of verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, defect and may be excused where the material facts are of record and the questions raised are mainly of law. The Court excused the lack of verification in the certiorari petition.

• "The decision having become final, the Executive Secretary had no more power to review it ... ." — This statement, quoted from Desiata vs. Executive Secretary, is the ratio on finality: once the Secretary’s decision became final, the Office of the President lost authority to review it.
• "Here the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into the merits of the case, we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of first instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned decisions are being enforced." — This passage from Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary supplies the controlling distinction allowing the Cotabato court to take cognizance of the certiorari petition despite the Manila office of the Assistant Executive Secretary.
• "In administrative law, an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law, is law." — The Court used this principle to give Lands Administrative Order No. 6 binding effect and to hold that the executive branch could not disregard its own finality rule.
• "Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law." — Quoted from Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O’Brien, this passage anchors the Court’s policy justification for refusing to reopen the final administrative decision.

• Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary, L-21066, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 753 — Controlling precedent on jurisdiction; distinguished prior non-jurisdiction cases involving injunctive writs and allowed provincial Court of First Instance review of administrative decisions where the sole issue is legal correctness.
• Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. vs. Arranz, L-27106, March 20, 1968, 22 SCRA 1186 — Clarified Gayacao; where the petition also sought to enjoin enforcement of the administrative decision against non-resident officials, the Court of First Instance could not validly issue the injunction.
• Desiata vs. Executive Secretary, L-21894, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 487 — Controlling precedent on finality; held that the Executive Secretary had no power to review a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources that had become final, and nullified the Executive Secretary’s decision.
• Castaño vs. Lobingier, 7 Phil. 91 — Cited for the rule that Court of First Instance writs cannot be issued against officers outside the court’s territorial boundaries; distinguished because it involved injunctive relief.
• Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 782 — Held that the Judiciary Act denies Courts of First Instance power to issue writs over persons outside their territorial boundaries; distinguished as involving prohibitory writs.
• Acosta vs. Alvendia, L-14598, October 31, 1960 — Nullified an injunction issued by the Manila Court of First Instance against a Nueva Ecija sheriff; cited for territorial limitation and distinguished.
• Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L-20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316 — Held that the period fixed in an administrative order binds the Office of the President and that administrative decisions must end sometime.
• Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O’Brien, 38 Phil. 527 — Cited for the public policy that judgments should become final at a definite date fixed by law.
• Ortua vs. Singson, 59 Phil. 440 — Cited in Gayacao for the recognized power of provincial Courts of First Instance to review administrative decisions of national officials.
• Alejo vs. Garchitorena, 83 Phil. 924 — Impliedly upheld the power of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to review land decisions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
• Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. Macadaeg, L-14174, October 31, 1960 — Cited for the rule that verification is not an absolute necessity where material facts are of record and the questions raised are mainly of law; absence of verification is a formal, not jurisdictional, defect.

• Section 12, Lands Administrative Order No. 6 — Provides that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources or the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall become final, unless otherwise specifically stated, after thirty days from receipt by the interested parties. The Court applied it to hold the October 27, 1956 decision final.
• Section 13, Lands Administrative Order No. 6 — Prohibits reconsideration of a final decision or order after it has become final, except as provided in Section 14. The Court used it to reject defendants’ motions and appeal.
• Section 14, Lands Administrative Order No. 6 — Allows relief from a decision, order, or proceeding taken through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default, or excusable neglect, on application within a reasonable time not exceeding one year. The Court found defendants did not fall within this exception.
• Section 44(h), Judiciary Act of 1948 — Grants Courts of First Instance original jurisdiction and power to issue writs of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto, and habeas corpus in their respective provinces and districts. The Court construed it as a territorial limitation, subject to the Gayacao exception.
• Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for certiorari may be filed in a Court of First Instance having jurisdiction over the acts or omissions of an inferior court, corporation, board, officer, or person. The Court treated it as a venue provision co-terminous with jurisdiction over the respondent officer.
• Section 2, Rule 58 (then Rule 60), Rules of Court — Governs who may grant preliminary injunction and limits its issuance to the court’s territorial jurisdiction. The Court cited it in the line of cases distinguishing injunctive writs from certiorari review of legal correctness.
• Section 2, Article VIII, Constitution — Vests in Congress the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, while the Supreme Court’s rule-making power is limited to pleading, practice, and procedure. The Court cited it in Samar Mining to explain that Rule 65 does not expand Court of First Instance jurisdiction.

Justices Concepcion (C.J.), Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, and Barredo concurred. Justices Castro and Teehankee concurred in the result. Justice Fernando reserved his vote, and Justice Villamor took no part.