Mabanag vs. Ramos

A sheriff who receives money from litigants without judicial approval commits simple misconduct, and one who thereafter misappropriates such funds for personal use commits gross misconduct; both liabilities subsist notwithstanding the complainant's desistance and the respondent's supervening resignation, with fines imposed in lieu of dismissal under Section 18 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC.

Marvin A. Ramos was appointed Sheriff IV of Branch 34, Regional Trial Court of Balaoan, La Union, on March 29, 2009. Dr. Stella Marie P. Mabanag was one of the prevailing co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 705, entitled "Heirs of Luz Mabanag, et al. vs. Ignacio Nerona," where the RTC declared her and her co-plaintiffs co-owners of a 13,770-square meter lot in Agdeppa, Bangar, La Union, based on a compromise agreement approved in the Decision dated September 14, 2010. A Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2012 was subsequently issued directing the sheriff to implement the compromise agreement, which required the plaintiffs to relocate, segregate, or subdivide their land from the defendant's property. The agricultural tenants occupying the subject lot had not remitted rental payments to the Mabanags since the case was filed in 1998.

In March 2019, one of the agricultural tenants of the subject lot in Barangay Oaqui I, Luna, La Union, remitted rental payments amounting to PHP 50,000.00 to Dr. Mabanag's brother, Dante Luis Leoncini, who was acting as her representative in the execution proceedings. The payment was made in the presence of Sheriff Ramos. Since there was no one available to accept the money at that time, the tenants entrusted the amount to Ramos for safekeeping at the barangay hall, where he signed an acknowledgment receipt in the presence of barangay officials Domingo Maynes and Victor Narcise. Ramos called Leoncini to inform him of the receipt, and Leoncini purportedly instructed that the money be left with the sheriff.

After Leoncini's death and during the COVID-19 pandemic, Dr. Mabanag sought to retrieve the money to pay property taxes. On the morning of June 24, 2020, she sent Ramos a text message requesting the funds. Ramos initially replied that he was on leave, but by 5:20 p.m. that day, he sent a message confessing that he had used the money during the lockdown, while promising to repay it. He claimed he had an arrangement with Leoncini regarding the payment, though Dr. Mabanag stated her brother had never mentioned any such arrangement. On July 2, 2020, she gave Ramos ten days to return the money, but he insisted she honor the agreement he had with Leoncini.

Ramos presented a markedly different account. He contended that on the afternoon of March 9, 2020, Leoncini visited his residence and demanded the money, which he handed over as evidenced by a second acknowledgment receipt bearing Leoncini's signature and witnessed by his driver, Wilfredo Rillorta. This second receipt, however, appeared to be a mere annotation inserted at the bottom of the first acknowledgment receipt, lacked any indication of its subject matter or the name of the payor, and bore the signature of Leoncini—who was already deceased—and of Rillorta, who never confirmed the signature's authenticity. Ramos denied ever exchanging text messages with Dr. Mabanag and claimed the cellphone number in the screenshots was not his.

On December 23, 2021, Ramos visited Dr. Mabanag's home, brought the full PHP 50,000.00, and asked for forgiveness. Dr. Mabanag executed an Affidavit of Desistance on January 10, 2022, and sought to withdraw the complaint, while acknowledging that desistance would not automatically result in dismissal. By that time, Ramos had already voluntarily resigned from the service effective December 20, 2021. The JIB, in its Report dated September 6, 2023, found substantial evidence that Ramos received the money without judicial authority and misappropriated it for personal use, recommending penalties for both simple and gross misconduct.

• Misappropriation: Complainant Dr. Mabanag alleged that Ramos received PHP 50,000.00 from the agricultural tenants for safekeeping but used the amount for his personal needs during the COVID-19 lockdown, as evidenced by text messages in which he admitted using the money and promised to repay it.
• Lack of Authority to Receive Funds: Complainant implicitly argued that Ramos had no authority to receive money from the tenants on behalf of the parties, as the Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2012 only directed the relocation, segregation, or subdivision of the land and did not authorize the sheriff to collect rental payments.

• Denial of Text Messages: Ramos asserted that he never exchanged text messages with Dr. Mabanag, never met her in relation to Civil Case No. 705, and that the cellphone number shown in the screenshots did not belong to him.
• Delivery to Leoncini: Ramos maintained that he had already turned over the PHP 50,000.00 to Leoncini on March 9, 2020, as evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt signed by Leoncini and witnessed by his driver, Rillorta.
• Arrangement with Leoncini: Ramos claimed he had an arrangement with Leoncini regarding the payment, and insisted that Dr. Mabanag should honor that agreement.
• Lack of Intent: Ramos argued that he never had any intention to misappropriate someone else's funds or defraud anyone.

• Effect of Desistance: Whether the administrative complaint may be dismissed on account of the complainant's affidavit of desistance and motion to withdraw.
• Simple Misconduct: Whether Ramos committed simple misconduct by receiving PHP 50,000.00 from litigants for safekeeping without judicial approval.
• Gross Misconduct: Whether Ramos committed gross misconduct by misappropriating the PHP 50,000.00 for his personal use.
• Effect of Resignation: Whether the administrative case is rendered moot by Ramos's voluntary resignation from the service.
• Imposable Penalties: Whether separate penalties may be imposed for the two distinct offenses and what the appropriate penalties are in light of the supervening resignation.

• Effect of Desistance: No. The withdrawal of the complaint or affidavit of desistance does not warrant dismissal, as the Court's disciplinary authority over judiciary personnel cannot be made to depend on the complainant's whims.
• Simple Misconduct: Yes. Ramos committed simple misconduct by acting as a liaison between the parties and receiving money from litigants without judicial approval, contrary to the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel.
• Gross Misconduct: Yes. Ramos committed gross misconduct by misappropriating the PHP 50,000.00 for personal use, as proven by text message screenshots, his failure to refute the averments in the affidavit of desistance, and the suspect nature of his documentary evidence.
• Effect of Resignation: No. Voluntary resignation does not render the administrative complaint moot; the Court retains jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent guilty and impose penalties in lieu of dismissal under Section 18 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC.
• Imposable Penalties: Yes. Separate penalties were imposed for each offense pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC: a fine of PHP 60,000.00 for simple misconduct and PHP 110,000.00 for gross misconduct in lieu of dismissal, with perpetual disqualification.

• Effect of Desistance: The Court has an inherent interest in the conduct and behavior of its officials and employees to ensure that justice is properly delivered. An affidavit of desistance does not divest the Court of its jurisdiction under Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution to investigate and resolve complaints against erring judiciary personnel. The issue in an administrative case is not whether the complainant has a cause of action, but whether the employee has breached the norms and standards of the courts. The disciplinary power of the Court cannot be made to depend on the whims of the complainant, who is in the real sense only a witness. Allowing unilateral desistance to control the outcome would undermine discipline within the judiciary and erode public confidence in government instrumentalities.

• Simple Misconduct: Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, particularly a public officer's unlawful behavior, recklessness, or gross negligence. Under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, a Sheriff IV's duties are limited to serving and executing writs, keeping custody of attached properties, maintaining record books, and performing duties assigned by the Executive Judge or Presiding Judge. The Writ of Execution dated January 16, 2012 only directed the relocation, segregation, or subdivision of the land; it did not authorize Ramos to collect rental payments from tenants. The Code of Conduct for Court Personnel provides that court personnel shall not be required to perform work outside their assigned job description. By allowing himself to act as a liaison between Leoncini and the tenants and receiving money without judicial approval, Ramos transgressed established rules, constituting simple misconduct.

• Gross Misconduct: Gross misconduct requires the additional elements of corruption, clear willful intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules. "Misappropriate" connotes using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own or devoting it to a purpose different from that agreed upon. Dr. Mabanag's verified complaint attached screenshots of text messages in which Ramos admitted using the money during the COVID-19 lockdown and promised to repay it. Text messages are admissible as ephemeral electronic communications under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and the complainant's testimony as a party to the exchange sufficed to prove their contents. Against this positive assertion under oath, Ramos's general denial failed. His supposed second acknowledgment receipt was equivocal and suspect: it was merely an annotation on the first receipt, lacked a subject matter and payor identification, bore the signature of the deceased Leoncini (invoking the Dead Man's Statute), and was allegedly witnessed by Rillorta, who never confirmed the signature's authenticity. Moreover, Ramos failed to refute the damaging statements in Dr. Mabanag's affidavit of desistance despite having the opportunity to do so, amounting to admission by silence. The return of the money and request for forgiveness corroborated the misappropriation. These acts demonstrated corruption and flagrant disregard of established rules, constituting gross misconduct.

• Effect of Resignation: Cessation from office by resignation neither warrants dismissal of the administrative complaint nor renders it moot and academic. The Court retains jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent innocent or guilty. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice. Under Section 18 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, if the penalty of dismissal can no longer be imposed due to supervening resignation, the respondent may instead be meted with forfeiture of benefits (excluding accrued leave credits), disqualification from public employment, and/or a fine.

• Imposable Penalties: Under Section 21 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, if a respondent is found liable for more than one offense arising from separate acts in a single proceeding, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each offense. Ramos's two infractions—receiving money without authority and misappropriating it—arose from separate acts. Simple misconduct carries a fine of more than PHP 35,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 100,000.00. Gross misconduct carries dismissal, but since dismissal could no longer be imposed due to resignation, a fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00 was appropriate. The Court imposed PHP 60,000.00 for simple misconduct and PHP 110,000.00 for gross misconduct, totaling PHP 170,000.00, with perpetual disqualification. Under Section 22, if the fines remain unpaid after three months, the amount may be deducted from salaries and benefits, including accrued leave credits—a mechanism of payment, not forfeiture.

• Non-Dismissability of Administrative Complaints Upon Desistance — The withdrawal of a complaint or execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant does not warrant the dismissal of an administrative case against a judiciary employee. The Court's disciplinary authority under Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution cannot be made to depend on the whims of the complainant, who is in the real sense only a witness. Applied here to hold that Dr. Mabanag's affidavit of desistance did not divest the Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate Ramos's administrative liability.

• Simple vs. Gross Misconduct — Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, particularly a public officer's unlawful behavior, recklessness, or gross negligence. It is grave or gross if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, clear willful intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules, supported by substantial evidence. Applied here to classify Ramos's unauthorized receipt of money as simple misconduct and his misappropriation thereof as gross misconduct.

• Admissibility of Ephemeral Electronic Communications — Text messages are classified as ephemeral electronic communications under Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence and are admissible when proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the communication or has personal knowledge thereof. Applied here to admit Dr. Mabanag's screenshots of text messages, corroborated by her sworn testimony, as evidence of Ramos's admission of misappropriation.

• Dead Man's Statute — Under Rule 130, Section 23 of the Rules of Court, if one party to an alleged transaction is precluded from testifying by death, insanity, or other mental disability, the other party is not entitled to the undue advantage of giving his own uncontradicted and unexplained account of the transaction. Applied here to discredit the supposed second acknowledgment receipt bearing the signature of the deceased Leoncini.

• Admission by Silence — Failure to comment on a charge despite the opportunity to do so amounts to admission by silence. Applied here where Ramos failed to refute the damaging statements in Dr. Mabanag's affidavit of desistance and motion to dismiss despite receipt thereof.

• Supervening Resignation Does Not Render Administrative Case Moot — Cessation from office by resignation, retirement, or other modes of separation neither warrants dismissal of the administrative complaint nor renders it moot and academic. The Court retains jurisdiction to pronounce the respondent guilty and impose penalties in lieu of dismissal under Section 18 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC.

• Deduction of Unpaid Fines from Accrued Leave Credits — Under Section 22 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, unpaid fines may be deducted from the respondent's salaries and benefits, including accrued leave credits. This deduction is in the nature of compensation—a manner of payment—and is not tantamount to the prohibited forfeiture of accrued leave credits, which remain the employee's earned remuneration.

• "The disciplinary power of the Court cannot be made to depend on the whims of the complainant. To rule otherwise would undermine the discipline of court officials and personnel." — This passage articulates the rationale for the Court's refusal to dismiss administrative complaints upon the complainant's desistance, a foundational principle in judicial discipline.

• "The word 'misappropriate' connotes the act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon." — This defines the controlling concept of misappropriation in the context of administrative liability for gross misconduct by court personnel.

• "Cessation from office of respondent by resignation or retirement neither warrants the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case moot and academic." — This formulation, quoted from OCA vs. Amor, establishes the continuing jurisdiction of the Court over administrative cases notwithstanding the respondent's separation from service.

• "If the respondent is found liable for more than one (1) offense arising from separate acts or omissions in a single administrative proceeding, the Court shall impose separate penalties for each offense." — This provision of Section 21 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC was applied to justify the imposition of separate fines for Ramos's simple misconduct and gross misconduct.

• Domingo vs. CSC, 874 Phil. 587 (2020) — Cited as controlling authority defining the distinction between simple and gross misconduct, establishing that gross misconduct requires the additional elements of corruption, clear willful intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of established rules.

• Ressurreccion vs. Ibuna, Jr., 529 Phil. 659 (2006) — Followed for the proposition that a sheriff's act of going beyond the scope of his authority under the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court constitutes misconduct.

• Asuncion vs. Salvado, A.C. No. 13242 (2022) — Followed for the rule that text messages are admissible as ephemeral electronic communications under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, provable by the testimony of a party to the exchange.

• Judge Platil vs. Mondano, 887 Phil. 1025 (2020) — Followed as analogous precedent where a clerk of court was found guilty of gross misconduct for misappropriating funds collected from litigants.

• OCA vs. Amor, 889 Phil. 605 (2020) — Followed for the doctrine that supervening resignation does not render an administrative case moot and that the Court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate liability.

• Santiago vs. Fernando, A.M. No. P-22-053 (2023) — Followed as recent precedent on the application of Section 18 of A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, where fines were imposed in lieu of dismissal for a respondent already separated from service, with deduction from accrued leave credits authorized under Section 22.

• Usama vs. Tomarong, A.M. No. RTJ-21-017 (2023) — Followed as recent precedent imposing fines in lieu of suspension for a judge who had optionally retired, with authorization to deduct unpaid fines from retirement benefits including accrued leave credits.

• Nelmida vs. Ramos, A.M. No. P-14-3225 (2014) — Cited as an aggravating circumstance; Ramos had previously been fined PHP 10,000.00 for simple misconduct, demonstrating a propensity to repeat similar offenses.

• Article VIII, Section 6, 1987 Constitution — Confers on the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all courts and personnel, the constitutional basis for the Court's continuing disciplinary authority notwithstanding the complainant's desistance.

• Section 1(k), Rule 2, Rules on Electronic Evidence — Defines "ephemeral electronic communication" to include text messages, the basis for admitting Dr. Mabanag's screenshots as electronic evidence.

• Section 2, Rule 11, Rules on Electronic Evidence — Provides that ephemeral electronic communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party to the same or has personal knowledge thereof, satisfied by Dr. Mabanag's sworn testimony.

• Rule 130, Section 23, Rules of Court (Dead Man's Statute) — Precludes a party from giving an uncontradicted account of a transaction when the adverse party is deceased; applied to discredit the second acknowledgment receipt bearing the signature of the deceased Leoncini.

• 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court, Section 2.2.4.1–2.2.4.4 — Enumerates the duties and functions of a Sheriff IV, none of which include receiving money from litigants for safekeeping; the basis for finding simple misconduct.

• Code of Conduct for Court Personnel — Provides that court personnel shall not be required to perform work outside the scope of their assigned job description; violated by Ramos's unauthorized receipt of funds.

• A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC (Revised Rule 140), Section 17 — Prescribes the penalties for simple misconduct (fine of more than PHP 35,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 100,000.00) and gross misconduct (dismissal, or fine of more than PHP 100,000.00 but not exceeding PHP 200,000.00).

• A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, Section 18 — Authorizes the imposition of forfeiture of benefits, disqualification, and/or fine in lieu of dismissal where the respondent has supervening resigned, retired, or been separated from service.

• A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, Section 21 — Mandates separate penalties for multiple offenses arising from separate acts in a single administrative proceeding; applied to impose distinct penalties for simple and gross misconduct.

• A.M. No. 21-08-09-SC, Section 22 — Governs payment of fines, allowing deduction from salaries and benefits including accrued leave credits if unpaid within three months, characterized as a manner of payment rather than forfeiture.

Gesmundo, C.J.; Leonen, SAJ.; Caguioa; Hernando; Inting; Zalameda; M. Lopez; Gaerlan; Rosario; J. Lopez; Dimaampao; Kho, Jr.; and Singh, JJ., concurred.