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Mabalo vs. Heirs of Roman Babuyo

The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed, with modification, the lower courts' decisions ordering petitioner Perlita Mabalo to vacate a portion of an undivided co-owned property. The Court held that Mabalo, who purchased the pro-indiviso share of a co-owner, became a co-owner herself but committed forcible entry when she used force to exclude the respondents, who were in prior physical possession of the disputed portion. The award of rent and attorney's fees was deleted for lack of evidentiary and legal basis.

Primary Holding

A co-owner who forcibly takes exclusive possession of a specific portion of an undivided co-owned property, thereby ousting another co-owner in prior physical possession, may be evicted through an action for forcible entry. The right of a co-owner to possess the common property is not absolute and must be exercised without prejudice to the similar rights of other co-owners and in accordance with the fiduciary nature of co-ownership.

Background

Roman Babuyo owned a 5,599-square-meter parcel of land in Misamis Oriental. Upon his death, the property was inherited by his children (the respondents) and remained undivided. Segundina Babuyo Fernandez, a granddaughter of Roman through another heir, sold a 364-square-meter portion of this land to petitioner Perlita Mabalo. On June 3, 2014, Mabalo entered the property, ordered workers to stop trimming trees, constructed a "No Trespassing" fence, and demolished two houses erected on the portion she claimed. The respondents, who had been in prior physical possession and had introduced improvements on the land, filed a complaint for forcible entry.

History

  1. Heirs of Roman Babuyo filed a complaint for forcible entry against Perlita Mabalo before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) on July 10, 2014.

  2. The MCTC rendered a Decision on February 24, 2015, in favor of the Heirs of Roman Babuyo, ordering Mabalo to vacate, remove improvements, pay attorney's fees, and pay monthly rent.

  3. Mabalo appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the MCTC decision in a Resolution dated May 6, 2016.

  4. Mabalo filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the RTC in a Decision dated March 15, 2018.

  5. Mabalo elevated the case to the Supreme Court via a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Facts

  • Nature of the Property and Parties: The subject lot was owned by Roman Babuyo. Upon his death, it passed to his heirs (respondents) and remained undivided. Segundina Babuyo Fernandez, a granddaughter through another heir, claimed and later sold a 364 sqm portion to petitioner Mabalo.
  • The Entry and Dispossession: On June 3, 2014, Mabalo went to the property, stopped ongoing maintenance work, constructed a fence with a "No Trespassing" sign, and caused the demolition of two houses on the portion she claimed. The respondents were in prior physical possession and had introduced improvements on the land.
  • Lower Court Findings: The MCTC, RTC, and CA uniformly found that the respondents established prior physical possession and that Mabalo deprived them of possession through force. The courts treated the property as co-owned and undivided.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Prior Possession of Vendor: Petitioner argued that the official receipts of realty taxes paid by her vendor, Segundina, established that Segundina was in actual physical possession of the 364 sqm portion prior to the sale.
  • Acts of Other Co-Heirs: Petitioner contended that some co-heirs had already sold portions of their shares, implying that the property was not strictly co-owned.
  • No Force or Intimidation: Petitioner maintained that her entry was not by means of force, intimidation, threat, or stealth but was in the valid exercise of her right as an owner of the specific portion she purchased.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Admission of No Prior Possession: Respondents countered that petitioner categorically admitted she was not in possession of the subject lot prior to June 3, 2014.
  • Respondents' Prior Possession: Respondents argued that they had been in prior physical possession of the entire subject lot, having inherited it and introduced improvements thereon.
  • Entry Constituted Force: Respondents asserted that when petitioner entered the property, demolished houses, and excluded them from its use, her acts amounted to the use of "force" as contemplated by law.

Issues

  • Co-Ownership and Sale: Whether the sale of a specific portion of an undivided co-owned property is valid and what rights it confers upon the buyer.
  • Right to Possession: Whether a co-owner has the right to possess the common property and the limitations on that right.
  • Forcible Entry Between Co-Owners: Whether an action for forcible entry will lie against a co-owner who forcibly takes exclusive possession of a portion of the co-owned property to the exclusion of another co-owner in prior possession.

Ruling

  • Co-Ownership and Sale: The sale of a specific portion of an unpartitioned co-owned property is valid but effective only to the extent of the co-owner's undivided (pro-indiviso) share. The buyer steps into the shoes of the selling co-owner and becomes a co-owner of the entire property until partition.
  • Right to Possession: A co-owner has the right to possess the entire co-owned property, but this right is not exclusive. It is limited by the obligation to respect the similar rights of other co-owners and not to prejudice the co-ownership. The possession of a co-owner is fiduciary in nature, akin to that of a trustee.
  • Forcible Entry Between Co-Owners: An action for forcible entry will lie against a co-owner who forcibly takes exclusive possession of a specific portion of the common property, thereby ousting another co-owner in prior physical possession. The key consideration is the manner of entry—using force to exclude the prior possessor violates the due process rights of the other co-owner and breaches the fiduciary duty inherent in co-ownership. The remedy is to restore possession to the ousted co-owner, not to terminate the co-ownership.

Doctrines

  • Co-ownership as a Form of Trust — A co-ownership is fiduciary in character. Each co-owner is a trustee for the others and may not perform acts prejudicial to their interest. Possession by one co-owner is presumed to be for the benefit of all.
  • Limited Alienation in Co-ownership — A co-owner may sell their undivided interest in the co-owned property. If a specific portion is sold before partition, the sale is valid but transfers only the seller's pro-indiviso share, subject to the final partition. The buyer becomes a co-owner.
  • Forcible Entry by a Co-owner — While a co-owner has a right to possess the common property, they cannot assert exclusive ownership over a specific portion by forcibly excluding a co-owner in prior possession. Such an act constitutes forcible entry, and the remedy of ejectment is available to restore the status quo and uphold the principle that no one may take the law into their own hands.

Key Excerpts

  • "The exercise of one's rights is not without limitations. Having the right should not be confused with the manner by which such right is to be exercised." — This underscores that the manner of exercising a co-owner's right to possession is subject to legal limitations and the rights of others.
  • "The foundation of a possessory action is really the forcible exclusion of the original possessor... by the owner or one claiming to have a better right, but who employed force, violence or threat to enforce their claims." — This highlights the core principle of forcible entry: protecting prior physical possession from being wrested by force, regardless of ownership claims.
  • "The basis of the eviction of the defendant co-owner is not the mere existence of their right of possession as a co-owner, but whether they exercised such right in a manner that ousted or deprived the rights of the other co-owners who were in prior possession." — This clarifies the test for when a co-owner's entry becomes unlawful.

Precedents Cited

  • De Guia v. Court of Appeals, 459 Phil. 447 (2003) — Cited for the rule that an ejectment suit may be filed against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership, but only for the purpose of obtaining recognition of the co-ownership.
  • Cabrera v. Ysaac, 747 Phil. 187 (2014) — Applied to distinguish between the sale of a definite portion (which requires unanimous consent) and the sale of an undivided interest (which is allowed).
  • Ulay v. Bustamante, G.R. Nos. 231721 & 231722, March 18, 2021 — Relied upon for the principle that a sale of a specific portion of an unpartitioned co-owned property is valid but limited to the seller's undivided share by operation of estoppel.
  • Heirs of Salamat v. Tamayo, 358 Phil. 797 (1998) and Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, 452 Phil. 665 (2003) — Cited to establish the fiduciary and trust-like nature of co-ownership.
  • Bunyi v. Factor, 609 Phil. 134 (2009) — Quoted for the principle that the act of going to the property and excluding the lawful possessor necessarily implies the exertion of force sufficient for forcible entry.

Provisions

  • Article 486, Civil Code — Provides that each co-owner may use the co-owned property provided they do not injure the interest of the co-ownership or prevent other co-owners from using it according to their rights.
  • Article 493, Civil Code — States that each co-owner has full ownership of their pro-indiviso share and may alienate it, but the effect of the alienation with respect to co-owners is limited to the portion that may be allotted upon division.
  • Article 487, Civil Code — Allows any one of the co-owners to bring an action in ejectment. The Court interpreted this to permit ejectment against a co-owner who forcibly takes exclusive possession.
  • Article 536, Civil Code — States that in no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects. A person who believes they have a right to deprive another of possession must invoke the aid of the court.
  • Section 1, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Governs forcible entry and unlawful detainer actions. The Court applied its requirements: prior physical possession, deprivation by force/intimidation/threat/strategy/stealth, and filing within one year.

Notable Concurring Opinions

The decision was unanimous. The members of the Second Division who concurred were: - Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa (Chairperson) - Associate Justice Henri Jean Paul B. Inting - Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao - Associate Justice Justice Maria Filomena D. Singh

Notable Dissenting Opinions

N/A — The decision was unanimous.