Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. vs. Luzon Marine Department Union

Overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law cannot be waived or barred by estoppel or laches; the employer must compensate work beyond eight hours, and such compensation retroacts to the date the services were actually rendered. The same definition of “hours of work” applies to seamen as to dryland laborers; rest periods are excluded only if the laborer ceases work, can rest completely, and can leave the spot of his working place at will.

Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. operated tugboats and employed officers, engineers, and crew members represented by the Luzon Marine Department Union. The union’s demands were litigated before the Court of Industrial Relations, a tribunal created by Commonwealth Act No. 103, and the Eight-Hour Labor Law, Commonwealth Act No. 444, governed the legal working day and prohibited agreements contrary to its provisions. The case required the Supreme Court to determine how the Eight-Hour Labor Law applied to seamen aboard small tugboats plying bays and rivers, and whether the CIR could modify its earlier decision on motions for reconsideration.

Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc. employed officers, engineers, and crew members of motor tugboats who were represented by the Luzon Marine Department Union. On June 21, 1948, the Union filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations against the Company, containing several demands, among them full recognition of the right of collective bargaining, close shop, and check off. On July 18, 1948, while the case was pending, the Union declared a strike, which the Supreme Court ruled illegal in G.R. No. L-2660 on May 30, 1950. After that ruling, the Union filed a “Constancia” with the CIR praying that its remaining unresolved demands be granted: (a) overtime pay of 50% of the regular rate for work in excess of eight hours and double the regular rate for work on Sundays and legal holidays; (b) payment of the second half of December 1941 pay for officers, engineers, and crew members of motor tugboats; (c) reinstatement with pay of Ciriaco Sarmiento, Rafael Santos, and Lorenzo de la Cruz, who were allegedly suspended without just cause and for union activities; and (d) reinstatement with pay of officers, engineers, and crew members of motor tugboats “Shark,” “Hearing,” “Pike,” and “Ray,” who were allegedly discharged without just cause and for union activities.

The case was set for hearing, and the parties submitted oral and documentary evidence from June 8, 1951, to January 7, 1954. In one hearing, the original intervenor Union de Obreros Estibadores de Filipinas moved to withdraw, which was granted. On February 10, 1955, the trial Judge rendered a decision finding that the Company gave the employees three free meals every day and about 20 minutes rest after each mealtime; that they worked from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. every day including Sundays and holidays; and that for work in excess of eight hours, officers, patrons, and radio operators were given overtime pay of P4 each and P2 each for the rest of the crew up to March 1947, increased to P5 and P2.50, respectively, until their separation or the strike of July 19, 1948. When the tugboats underwent repairs, their personnel worked only eight hours a day excluding Sundays and holidays. Although claimants tried to show that some had worked beyond 6:00 p.m., the evidence was uncertain and indefinite, so that demand was denied.

The trial Judge also found that the Company, by the nature of its business and as defined by law (Section 18-b of Commonwealth Act as amended), was considered a public service operator by the Public Service Commission in its decision in Case No. 3035-C, Philippine Shipowners Association vs. Luzon Stevedoring Co., Inc., et al. (Exh. 23), and was therefore exempt from paying additional remuneration or compensation for work performed on Sundays and legal holidays under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, citing Manila Electric Co. vs. Public Utilities Employees Association. The trial Judge ruled that the employees were entitled to overtime pay only for work rendered in excess of eight hours on ordinary days including Sundays and legal holidays, but that the Company had proved payment for such overtime work; the remaining question was computation whether the overtime pay covered the actual overtime work equivalent to the 25% minimum rate fixed by law. Demands Nos. 11 and 12 for reinstatement were denied; the Company was ordered to pay separation pay and overtime for Ciriaco Sarmiento, Rafael Santos, and Lorenzo de la Cruz, after the trial Judge pronounced that their separation or dismissal was not due to union activities but for valid and legal grounds.

The Union moved for reconsideration, praying that the decision be modified to declare that members who rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. were entitled to four hours’ overtime pay; that mealtime should not be deducted from the four overtime hours; that the P3 and P2 set aside for daily meals be considered part of actual compensation; and that employees separated without just cause be paid unearned wages and salaries from separation until the decision in G.R. No. L-2660 became final. The Company also sought reconsideration, but only as to the interpretation that the period during which a seaman is aboard a tugboat is “working time” for purposes of the Eight-Hour Labor Law. Pursuant to Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 254 and further amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559, the motions were passed upon by the CIR en banc, which on June 6, 1955, issued a resolution modifying the February 10, 1955 decision: the four hours of overtime work included in the regular daily schedule from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. should be paid independently of the so-called “coffee-money,” after finding that said extra amounts were given to crew members of some tugboats for work performed beyond 6:00 p.m. over a period of some 16 weeks. The Company’s motion for reconsideration was denied.

From this resolution, the Company filed the present petition for certiorari. When the CIR, acting on the Company’s motion for clarification, ruled that the 20 minutes’ rest given the claimants after mealtime should not be deducted from the four hours of overtime work, the Company filed a supplemental petition for certiorari dated September 5, 1955; both petitions were given due course on September 15, 1955. The Union filed a motion to dismiss, which the Supreme Court considered as an answer, alleging that the CIR decision, resolution, and order presented no question of law because the issues in CIR Case No. 147-V were purely factual. The respondent Judges, represented by counsel, filed an answer likewise asserting that no question of law was involved or error of law committed, as the resolutions appealed from were based on purely findings of fact. The trial Judge’s decision showed that 34 out of 58 claimants received salaries less than the minimum wage authorized by Republic Act No. 602, approved April 6, 1951, at rates such as P82.50 or P67.50 per month. The CIR en banc resolution held that the claimants rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, implying either that they were not given any recess at all, or that they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely.

• Hours of Work for Seamen: Petitioner argued that the definition of “hours of work” applied to dryland laborers should not be equally applicable to seamen, because seamen’s employment and conditions of work are completely different; their work was not continuous but interrupted or broken, and physical impossibility peculiar to their duty prevented them from leaving the tugboats.
• Literal Interpretation Absurdity: Petitioner maintained that a literal interpretation of what constitutes non-working hours would result in absurdity if applied to seamen aboard vessels in bays and rivers, and that the Court should interpret “non-working hours” to cover not only land laborers but also seamen on vessels plying rivers and bays.
• Reliance on Secretary of Justice Opinion: Petitioner cited Opinion No. 247, Series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and argued that a person should not be penalized for following an opinion issued by the Secretary of Justice in the absence of any judicial pronouncement.
• Voluntary Agreement as Full Payment: Petitioner argued that when employees with full knowledge of the law voluntarily agreed to work for a certain definite wage and continued working without protest for almost two years, the agreed compensation should be deemed and retroactively presumed to constitute full payment for all services rendered, including overtime wages, especially where the wages were already set mostly above the minimum wage.
• Estoppel and Laches: Petitioner maintained that the union members’ express acquiescence over almost two years, without protest as to the sufficiency of their wages, operated as estoppel to bar them from claiming or recovering back overtime compensation.
• Retroactivity of Overtime Arrears: Petitioner advanced the theory that the computation of overtime payment in arrears should be based from the filing of the petition, citing Gotamco Lumber Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations.
• Public Policy and Economic Recovery: Petitioner questioned whether the grant of a sizeable amount as back overtime wages by the CIR was in consonance with public policy and the avowed national and government policy on economic recovery and financial stability.
• Validity of CIR En Banc Resolution: Petitioner argued that a CIR resolution en banc that is clearly unsupported in fact and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious, and absolutely devoid of sustaining reason should be declared illegal, especially where it reversed a detailed, exhaustive, and comprehensive trial court decision.

• Purely Factual Issues: Respondent Luzon Marine Labor Union argued, in its motion to dismiss treated as an answer, that the CIR decision, resolution, and order sought to be reviewed presented no question of law, because the issues in CIR Case No. 147-V were purely factual.
• No Error of Law: The respondent Judges of the Court of Industrial Relations asserted that no question of law was involved or error of law committed by them in the resolutions appealed from, since the resolutions were based on purely findings of fact.

• Applicability of Eight-Hour Labor Law to Seamen: Whether the definition of “hours of work” as presently applied to dryland laborers is equally applicable to seamen, or whether a different criterion should be applied because seamen’s employment and conditions of work are completely different.
• Reliance on Secretary of Justice Opinion: Whether a person should be penalized for following an opinion issued by the Secretary of Justice in the absence of any judicial pronouncement.
• Voluntary Agreement as Full Payment: Whether compensation agreed upon by employees with full knowledge of the law, who worked without protest for almost two years, is legally deemed and retroactively presumed to constitute full payment for all services rendered, including overtime wages, especially if the wages were already set mostly above the minimum wage.
• Estoppel and Laches: Whether the union members’ acquiescence over almost two years, without protest as to the sufficiency of their wages, operates as estoppel to bar them from claiming or recovering back overtime compensation.
• Retroactivity of Overtime Arrears: Granting that overtime pay in arrears is due, what is the extent and rule of retroactivity with reference to overtime pay in arrears as set forth and established by the precedents and policies of the Court of Industrial Relations in past decisions duly affirmed by the Supreme Court.
• Public Policy and Economic Recovery: Whether the grant of a sizeable amount as back overtime wages by the Court of Industrial Relations is in consonance with the dictates of public policy and the avowed national and government policy on economic recovery and financial stability.
• Validity of CIR En Banc Resolution: Whether a CIR resolution en banc that is clearly unsupported in fact and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious, and absolutely devoid of sustaining reason should be declared illegal, especially where the trial court’s decision reversed by the resolution was detailed, exhaustive, comprehensive, reasonable, and legal in its conclusions.

• Applicability of Eight-Hour Labor Law to Seamen: No. The same definition of “hours of work” applies to seamen; under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, rest time is excluded only if the laborer is not working, can leave his working place, and can rest completely. The en banc finding that claimants rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. is factual and not reviewable.
• Reliance on Secretary of Justice Opinion: No. The cited Opinion No. 247, Series of 1941, concerned officers and crew on interisland boats, not mariners on small tugboats plying bays and rivers; the issue was also theoretical and unsupported by the record.
• Voluntary Agreement as Full Payment: No. Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 declares any agreement contrary to the Act null and void ab initio; overtime pay cannot be waived.
• Estoppel and Laches: No. Estoppel and laches cannot be invoked against employees or laborers in an action for recovery of past overtime compensation.
• Retroactivity of Overtime Arrears: The overtime compensation should retroact to the date the services were actually performed, not merely from the filing of the petition.
• Public Policy and Economic Recovery: No. Courts cannot inquire into the motives of Congress in enacting legislation; the question is outside judicial province, and petitioner did not claim actual injury or bankruptcy.
• Validity of CIR En Banc Resolution: No. The CIR, for procedural purposes, is a court with power to alter or modify its judgment before finality to conform to law and evidence; the en banc resolution was issued on motions for reconsideration and was within its power.

• Applicability of Eight-Hour Labor Law to Seamen: Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 provides that the legal working day for any person employed by another shall be not more than eight hours daily, and that when work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working, can leave his working place, and can rest completely shall not be counted. The Court found no need to set a different criterion for seamen; the only task was to determine the meaning and scope of “working place.” A laborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop, or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted; it is enough that he cease to work, may rest completely, and may leave at will the spot where he actually stays while working, whether within or outside the premises. Although the trial Judge found that the Company gave three free meals a day with a 20-minute recess after each meal, the CIR en banc amended this by holding that the claimants rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays, implying either that they were not given any recess at all, or that they were not allowed to leave the spot of their working place, or that they could not rest completely. That resolution involved a question essentially of fact, and under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 559, and Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, the Supreme Court was precluded from reviewing it, as held in Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Filipinas vs. Gotamco Sawmill and Operators, Inc. vs. Pelagio.
• Reliance on Secretary of Justice Opinion: Opinion No. 247, Series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice was cited by petitioner, but it had no bearing on the case because it referred to officers and crew on board interisland boats, whose situation is different from that of mariners or sailors working in small tugboats that ply along bays and rivers and have no cabins or places for persons manning them. Moreover, the Court could not pass upon the issue because there was nothing on record to support petitioner’s assertion that it was guided by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice in dealing with its employees, and the issue involved a mere theoretical question.
• Voluntary Agreement as Full Payment: Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 provides that any agreement or contract between the employer and the laborer or employee contrary to the provisions of the Act shall be null and void ab initio. In Manila Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., the Supreme Court held that laborers cannot waive their right to extra compensation. While the silence of an employee who lets time go by without claiming overtime compensation may favor the inference that he has not worked overtime or that his extra work has been duly compensated, that inference could not be drawn in this case. The complaining laborers declared that long before the filing of the case, they had informed Mr. Martinez, a sort of overseer of petitioner, that they had been working overtime and claiming corresponding compensation. There was also nothing on record to show that the claimants, at least the majority of them, had received wages in excess of the minimum wage later provided by Republic Act No. 602, approved April 6, 1951; on the contrary, 34 out of 58 claimants received salaries less than the minimum wage authorized by that law.
• Estoppel and Laches: In Manila Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., the Court held that the principles of estoppel and laches cannot be invoked against employees or laborers in an action for the recovery of compensation for past overtime work. This is because it would be contrary to the spirit of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, under which laborers cannot waive their right to extra compensation; the law principally obligates the employer to observe it and punishes the employer for violation while leaving the employee free and blameless; and the employee or laborer is in such a disadvantageous position as to be naturally reluctant or apprehensive in asserting a claim that may cause the employer to terminate the employment. If estoppel and laches were applied, an employee who cannot expressly renounce the right to extra compensation could be compelled to accomplish the same thing by mere silence or lapse of time, thereby frustrating the purpose of the law by indirection. The Court adhered to this rule in the present case.
• Retroactivity of Overtime Arrears: Petitioner cited Gotamco Lumber Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, but the Court held that case was not in point; it merely declares that Commonwealth Act No. 444 imposes upon the employer the duty to secure the permit for overtime work, and the employer may not plead its own negligence as an exemption or defense. The other CIR decisions cited by petitioner did not appear to have reached or been affirmed by the Supreme Court. A workingman may have already rendered services in excess of the statutory period for some time before he can muster enough courage to confront his employer with a demand for payment; fear of possible unemployment may gag him from asserting his right, and it may take months or years before he presents a claim. To allow the workingman to be compensated only from the date of the filing of the petition would penalize him for his acquiescence or silence, which the Court had already declared beyond the intent of the law. The true intent of Commonwealth Act No. 444 is to compensate the worker for services rendered beyond the statutory period, and this should retroact to the date when such services were actually performed.
• Public Policy and Economic Recovery: Petitioner questioned the reasonableness of the law providing for the grant of overtime wages. The Court stated that courts cannot go outside the field of interpretation so as to inquire into the motive or motives of Congress in enacting a particular piece of legislation; this question is not within the Court’s province to entertain. The alleged possibility that accumulated back overtime wages might cause unreasonable or irreparable injury to the employer, or even bankruptcy or closure, was not considered because petitioner did not claim that the payment it was ordered to make would cause such injury or force it to close its business; petitioner spoke of the situation theoretically and in general.
• Validity of CIR En Banc Resolution: The Court of Industrial Relations has been considered “a court of justice” in Metropolitan Transportation Service vs. Paredes, although in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations it was said to be “more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation.” For procedural purposes, the CIR is a court with well-defined powers vested by the law creating it and with such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. As such, the general rule that before a judgment becomes final, the court that rendered the same may alter or modify it so as to conform with the law and the evidence is applicable to the CIR, as held in Connel Bros. Co. (Phil.) vs. National Labor Union. The law also provides that after a judge of the CIR duly designated to hear a particular case has rendered a decision, any aggrieved party may request reconsideration, and the judges shall sit together, with the concurrence of three necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, order, or award under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103. The en banc resolution was issued on motions for reconsideration presented by both parties, and the CIR en banc found it necessary to modify a part of the February 10, 1955 decision, which was clearly within its power to do. The issue was predicated on a situation not obtaining in the case, because it presupposed that the en banc resolutions were clearly unsupported in fact and in law, patently arbitrary and capricious, and absolutely devoid of sustaining reason, which did not appear to be the case.

• Eight-Hour Labor Law — Working Time and Rest Periods — Under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444, the legal working day is not more than eight hours daily. When work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working, can leave his working place, and can rest completely is not counted. The “working place” is the spot where the laborer actually stays while working; he need not leave the employer’s premises, provided he may cease work, rest completely, and leave that spot at will. The Court applied this to seamen on tugboats and held that no different criterion was needed; the en banc finding that they rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays was a factual finding not subject to review.
• Non-Waiver of Overtime Compensation — Section 6 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 voids ab initio any agreement or contract contrary to the Act. The right to overtime pay cannot be waived, and an employee’s voluntary agreement to work for a fixed wage or silence for almost two years does not constitute full payment or waiver. The Court applied this to reject petitioner’s claim that the employees’ acquiescence barred recovery.
• Estoppel and Laches Not Available Against Laborers for Past Overtime — Following Manila Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, estoppel and laches cannot be invoked against employees or laborers in an action for recovery of past overtime compensation. The employer is principally obligated to observe the law and is punished for violation, while the employee is in a disadvantageous position and may be reluctant to assert claims. The Court applied this to bar petitioner’s estoppel defense.
• Retroactivity of Overtime Pay — The true intent of Commonwealth Act No. 444 is to compensate the worker for services rendered beyond the statutory period, and such compensation should retroact to the date when the services were actually performed, not merely from the filing of the petition. The Court applied this to reject petitioner’s proposed computation from the filing of the petition.
• CIR’s Power to Modify Its Decision Before Finality — For procedural purposes, the Court of Industrial Relations is a court with well-defined powers, and before a judgment becomes final, it may alter or modify the same to conform to law and evidence. Under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, motions for reconsideration are passed upon by the CIR en banc. The Court applied this to uphold the June 6, 1955 en banc resolution.
• Judicial Non-Inquiry into Legislative Motives — Courts cannot go outside the field of interpretation to inquire into the motives of Congress in enacting legislation. The Court applied this to reject the public policy and economic recovery challenge to the grant of back overtime wages.
• Finality of Factual Findings of the CIR — Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended, and Rule 44, the Supreme Court is precluded from reviewing factual findings of the CIR. The Court applied this to the en banc resolution’s finding that claimants rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays.

• "SEC. 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall be of not more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working AND CAN LEAVE HIS WORKING PLACE and can rest completely, shall not be counted." — This is the statutory basis for the Court’s ruling that seamen are covered by the same hours-of-work definition as dryland laborers and that rest periods are excluded only when the laborer can leave his working place and rest completely.
• "As We understand this term, a laborer need not leave the premises of the factory, shop or boat in order that his period of rest shall not be counted, it being enough that he "cease to work", may rest completely and leave or may leave at his will the spot where he actually stays while working, to go somewhere else, whether within or outside the premises of said factory, shop or boat." — This passage defines “working place” for purposes of the Eight-Hour Labor Law and explains why the 20-minute meal rests could not be deducted from the overtime hours.
• "The principles of estoppel and laches cannot be, invoked against employees or laborers in an action for the recovery of compensation for past overtime work." — This is the Court’s canonical formulation of the rule barring estoppel and laches as defenses against laborers claiming past overtime compensation.
• "It is not just and humane that he should be deprived of what is lawfully his under the law, for the true intendent of Commonwealth Act No. 444 is to compensate the worker for services rendered beyond the statutory period and this should be made to retroact to the date when such services were actually performed." — This passage states the ratio for the retroactivity of overtime pay, rejecting computation only from the filing of the petition.

• Manila Terminal Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., 91 Phil. 625, 48 Off. Gaz. 2725 — Controlling precedent followed by the Court for the rule that estoppel and laches cannot be invoked against employees or laborers in an action for recovery of past overtime compensation.
• Kaisahan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Kahoy sa Filipinas vs. Gotamco Sawmill, 80 Phil. 521 — Cited with Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 and Rule 44 to support the non-reviewability of the CIR’s factual findings.
• Operators, Inc. vs. Pelagio, 99 Phil. 893 — Cited similarly for the rule that factual findings of the CIR are not reviewable by the Supreme Court.
• Gotamco Lumber Co. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 85 Phil. 242, 47 Off. Gaz. 3421 — Cited by petitioner for computing overtime arrears from the filing of the petition; the Court held it was not in point because it merely declares the employer’s duty to secure a permit for overtime work and that the employer cannot plead its own negligence.
• Metropolitan Transportation Service vs. Paredes, G.R. No. L-1232, prom. January 12, 1948, 79 Phil. 819, 45 Off. Gaz. 2435 — Cited to support that the Court of Industrial Relations has been considered a court of justice.
• Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 — Cited to note that the CIR is more an administrative board than part of the integrated judicial system, although for procedural purposes it acts as a court.
• Connel Bros. Co. (Phil.) vs. National Labor Union, G.R. No. L-3631, prom. January 30, 1956 — Cited for the rule that before finality, the court that rendered judgment may alter or modify it to conform to law and evidence, and that this applies to the CIR.
• Manila Electric Co. vs. Public Utilities Employees Association, 79 Phil. 408, 44 Off. Gaz. 1760 — Cited in the trial judge’s decision in connection with the public service operator’s exemption from additional remuneration for work on Sundays and legal holidays under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 444.

• Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Eight-Hour Labor Law) — Defines the legal working day as not more than eight hours daily and excludes from working time the period when work is not continuous, the laborer is not working, can leave his working place, and can rest completely. Applied to seamen on tugboats and to the 20-minute meal rests.
• Section 6, Commonwealth Act No. 444 — Declares any agreement or contract between employer and laborer contrary to the Act null and void ab initio. Applied to reject waiver, voluntary agreement, and estoppel defenses.
• Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 444 — Cited by the trial judge in holding that the Company, as a public service operator, was exempt from paying additional remuneration for work on Sundays and legal holidays.
• Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 254 and further amended by Commonwealth Act No. 559 — Provides that motions for reconsideration are passed upon by the CIR en banc and that concurrence of three judges is necessary for a decision, order, or award. Applied to uphold the June 6, 1955 en banc resolution.
• Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended by Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 559 — Limits Supreme Court review of CIR factual findings. Applied to decline review of the en banc finding that claimants rendered services from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. including Sundays and holidays.
• Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103 — Vests the CIR with powers generally pertaining to a court of justice. Applied to support its power to modify its decision before finality.
• Rule 44, Rules of Court — Cited with Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 for the non-reviewability of factual findings.
• Republic Act No. 602, approved April 6, 1951 — The Minimum Wage Law. Referenced to show that 34 of 58 claimants received salaries below the minimum wage, negating an inference from silence that overtime had been compensated.
• Sections 4 and 5 of Chapter III, Article 1, Code of Rules and Regulations to Implement the Minimum Wage Law — Cited as implementing the requisites in Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 444 regarding non-continuous work and rest periods.
• Section 18-b of Commonwealth Act as amended — Cited by the trial judge in finding the Company a public service operator.

Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.